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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This plan is the combined effort of ten Department of Energy national laboratories: Savannah River 
National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, 
and Argonne National Laboratory. The plan describes the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) 
Technology Development Program as envisioned by the laboratories.  This plan does not necessarily 
reflect the views and decisions of the Department of Energy (DOE) with regard to current or future 
activities of the GNEP program.  It has been prepared to guide the development by DOE of integrated 
plans for realizing the domestic portion of the GNEP vision as well as providing a basis for developing 
international cooperation. The cost information in this document is based on estimates from the national 
laboratory participants, and does not represent annual budget estimates from the Department of Energy.   
Beginning with the GNEP overall goals, this plan describes the basic technical objectives for each 
element of the program, summarizes the technology status and identifies the areas of greatest technical 
risk. On this basis a proposed technology development program is described that can deliver the required 
information for a Secretarial decision on the path forward of GNEP in 2008 and support construction of 
new advanced fuel cycle facilities, if the chosen path includes them.  
The proposed technology development program is predicated on the construction of an integrated suite of 
fuel cycle facilities in the following decade. However, at this time the United States (U.S.) Government 
has not decided on a particular process for facility construction or on the scope of international 
cooperation. Furthermore, siting of any of the proposed facilities will be determined by a separate 
process, following applicable laws and appropriate decision-making processes.  Therefore, this document 
focuses entirely on what the technology needs are, why they are needed, and when it could be completed 
and not on where, or by whom, any of the required development work would be done. 
GNEP Objectives 
GNEP seeks to bring about a significant, wide-scale use of nuclear energy and take actions now that 
would allow that vision to be achieved while decreasing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and 
effectively addressing the challenge of nuclear waste disposal.  GNEP would advance the nonproliferation 
and national security interests of the U.S. by reinforcing U.S. nonproliferation policies, reducing the 
spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies abroad, and reducing or eliminating excess civilian 
plutonium stocks that have accumulated. 
To enable the expansion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and make a major contribution to global 
development into the 21st century, the U.S. seeks to pursue and accelerate cooperation to: 
• Expand nuclear power to help meet growing energy demand in an environmentally sustainable 
manner. 
• Develop, demonstrate, and deploy advanced technologies for recycling spent nuclear fuel that 
do not separate plutonium, with the goal over time of ceasing separation of plutonium, reducing 
or eliminating excess stocks of civilian plutonium, and drawing down existing stocks of 
civilian spent fuel.  Such advanced fuel cycle technologies would substantially reduce nuclear 
waste, simplify its disposition, and in the U.S. would help ensure the need for only one 
geologic repository through the end of this century. 
• Develop, demonstrate, and deploy advanced reactors that consume transuranic elements from 
recycled spent fuel. 
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• Establish supply arrangements among nations to provide reliable fuel services worldwide for 
generating nuclear energy by providing nuclear fuel and taking back spent fuel for recycling 
without spreading enrichment and reprocessing technologies. 
• Develop, demonstrate, and deploy advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear power reactors 
appropriate for the power grids of developing countries and regions. 
• In cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency, develop enhanced nuclear 
safeguards to effectively and efficiently monitor nuclear materials and facilities to ensure 
commercial nuclear energy systems are used only for peaceful purposes. 
The need for nuclear energy to play a major role in meeting base-load electrical energy requirements is 
now recognized by most of the world’s industrialized nations.  Similarly, in the U.S. there is growing 
recognition of the need to start building new nuclear power plants as soon as possible and to rebuild our 
national nuclear infrastructure —needs supported by both the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and the DOE’s 
Nuclear Power 2010 program.  DOE has produced a strategic plan that outlines an implementation 
strategy to enable a world-wide increase in the use of nuclear energy safely, without contributing to the 
spread of nuclear weapons capabilities, and in a manner that responsibly disposes of waste products from 
nuclear power generation.  
GNEP Criteria 
GNEP must meet the following criteria: 
1. Proliferation/Safeguards Risk: The risk of non-peaceful use of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle comes 
from two principal sources: (1) a nation wanting to advance toward the capability to build nuclear 
weapons in a short period of time following the withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and (2) 
a terrorist group seeking to obtain nuclear materials to quickly fabricate and explode an improvised 
nuclear device or a dirty bomb.  GNEP aims to address both of these issues by providing incentives to 
limit the number of countries possessing enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and by eliminating 
over time excess stockpiles of civil plutonium and strengthening controls over materials. 
2. Proliferation Prevention: Preventing the spread of commercial nuclear technology does not by itself 
prevent the spread of weapons capability.  The plutonium contained in spent fuel discharged from a 
light water reactor (LWR) is not considered “weapons grade.”  However, plutonium separated from 
spent nuclear fuel could be fashioned into a weapon and achieve a nuclear yield of some magnitude. 
While the safeguarding of bulk-handling facilities will continue to pose significant technical 
challenges, advances have been made in developing processes that: are easier to safeguard, allow 
improved materials accountability, are more resistant to terrorist threats, and offer the possibility of 
placing a much reduced burden on our waste disposal facilities.  However, there is no technology 
“silver bullet” that can be built into an enrichment plant or reprocessing plant that can prevent a 
country from diverting these commercial fuel cycle facilities to nonpeaceful use.  GNEP seeks to 
develop advanced fuel cycle technology for civil purposes, centered in existing fuel-cycle states, that 
would allow them to provide fuel services more cheaply and reliably than the remaining states could 
provide indigenously.  
3. Terrorist Threat Reduction. In the most general terms, GNEP seeks to eliminate (over time) excess 
stocks of separated plutonium and reduce stocks of spent fuel worldwide, thereby strengthening 
nuclear security worldwide. In more specific terms, a key objective with respect to any GNEP 
recycling facility is to deny access to fissile nuclear materials of critical mass that could be readily 
made into a nuclear device. Supportive policies can be implemented in this regard: (1) minimize 
transportation—keep fissile materials inside one integrated facility from the time used fuel enters until 
recycled material leaves; (2) maintain a mixture of fissile material with nonfissile material in a ratio 
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that is not easily useable as a weapon; (3) use advanced safeguards and security techniques; and (4) 
maintain a goal of minimizing the buildup of, and eventually eliminating, stockpiles of separated 
civilian plutonium or its near equivalent. 
4. Reduce Repository Burden. Commercial spent nuclear fuel can either be disposed of directly into a 
repository or reprocessed/recycled with the byproduct high-level waste sent to a repository. 
Reprocessing and recycle using proven and currently available technologies (variants of PUREX and 
light-water reactor recycle with a mixed oxide fuel) would offer some minor benefit to the repository 
but not meet the GNEP objectives. The full benefit envisioned for the separations process in GNEP 
anticipates substantial repository benefits (by separating out all the actinides) and a reduction in liquid 
process waste. The most significant repository benefits can be achieved by removing the very long-
lived minor actinides and recycling them as part of the fuel for fast reactors. Further repository benefit 
can be achieved by removing the fission products cesium and strontium from the high-level waste 
stream and allowing them to decay separately. These elements have a relatively short half-life, and, 
after decay, could be disposed of as low level waste. Additionally, removing the technetium and fixing 
it in a matrix with the cladding hulls could reduce the possibility of this fission product migrating 
away from the repository area.  
5. Assured Fuel Supply. The U.S. seeks to encourage the world’s leading nuclear exporters to create a 
safe, orderly system that spreads nuclear energy without proliferation. States that refrain from 
enrichment and reprocessing would have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civil nuclear 
power reactors. If the U.S. is going to participate in assuring access to nuclear fuel and, in the longer 
term, spent fuel services to these countries as they enter the nuclear arena, it must have the capability 
to provide the needed fuel cycle services—capability that we do not currently possess. Our fuel-cycle 
technology should also build our ability and that of our partners to establish and sustain cradle to grave 
fuel service or leasing arrangements over time and at a scale commensurate with the anticipated 
expansion of nuclear energy by helping in a major way to solve the nuclear waste challenge. 
6. Capability and leverage. The GNEP vision has been well received by the international nuclear 
community, particularly among the leading fuel-cycle states. Sustaining and building on that 
enthusiasm depends on the ability of the U.S. to get back in the commercial nuclear business and 
assume an active role. Participating fully in that business is essential in shaping the rules that apply to 
it. We have a vision of a future world that can universally enjoy the benefits of safe, economical, 
emission-free energy; and we have programs and plans to put the U.S. back in the nuclear energy 
game in a leadership role. Access to our market is itself a form of leverage.  
GNEP implementation model 
The implementation of GNEP is based on the concept of a government/industry partnership. 
There are three facilities (see Figure E-1) required to implement and thus affirm our commitment to 
GNEP: (1) an advanced recycling facility to separate the components of spent fuel and production-scale 
fabrication of transmutation fuel required by GNEP, herein termed a Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center 
(CFTC); (2) a fast reactor to burn the actinide based fuel, herein termed an Advanced Burner Reactor 
(ABR) to transform the actinides in a way that makes them easier to store as waste, not a proliferation 
concern, and produce electricity; and (3) an Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF) to serve as a research 
and development (R&D) center of excellence for developing transmutation fuels and improving fuel cycle 
technology. 
The pursuit of these three facilities constitutes a pathway with two complementary components.  The first 
component, the CFTC and the ABR, could, as an option, be led by industry with technology support from 
laboratories, international partners, and universities.  The second component, research and development, 
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led by the national laboratories, would include the AFCF funded by the DOE and located at a government 
site.  The two components would work closely together to move GNEP forward by integrating the 
capabilities of the national laboratories with the needs of industry. 
 
 
Figure E-1.  Initial GNEP Facilities 
 
Technical challenges remain for the implementation of the closed-fuel cycle as envisioned under GNEP. 
Many of the technologies essential for the successful implementation of GNEP have been demonstrated at 
laboratory and bench scale. But uncertainties, such as scaling-up the chemical separations for the recycle 
process or fabricating and qualifying the transmutation fuel for the advanced burner reactor, exist and 
require careful attention. These technical risks will be addressed by continued R&D and technology 
development for GNEP. This plan discusses how these needs could be met. 
GNEP Technology Development 
The technology development program (TDP) described herein is established using a requirements-driven 
process. It begins with the proposed GNEP deployment system, identifies the technology gaps, and 
develops requirements that the system must meet to satisfy the GNEP goals. This systems integration 
approach will be a constant focus of the GNEP TDP. In so doing, improved understanding of technology 
options can be introduced into both the deployment system and first facilities, thereby ensuring that the 
program direction is constantly being monitored and changed as deemed necessary. This approach will 
also allow comparison with other deployment options being implemented elsewhere or being considered 
as backup options for this program. 
There are four basic functions that the technologies must accomplish to meet the GNEP vision: light 
water reactor (LWR) spent nuclear fuel separation, fabrication of transmutation fuels incorporating the 
separated transuranics (as a group), irradiation of transmutation fuels, and separation of transuranics (as a 
group) from the transmutation fuels after irradiation. The technology development necessary for each of 
these functions is described by first considering the performance objectives and identifying a baseline 
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technology. The status of each technology pathway is briefly discussed with special emphasis on the level 
of technical maturity and technical risk. The summary tables with fast reactor infrastructure and 
programmatic risk and the technology readiness levels (TRLs) for LWR spent fuel processing, waste form 
development, fast reactor spent fuel processing, fuel fabrication, and fuel performance are shown in 
Tables E-1 through E-6. This assessment of maturity and risk is used to develop the TDP. R&D needs for 
alternative technologies in the case of moderate- and high-risk program elements are also identified. 
Fabrication and separation of transmutation fuels are considered together as the technologies are 
intimately coupled. Finally, estimated costs for the next five years (generated by the national laboratory 
participants) with associated milestones are provided for each program element (see Tables E-7 and E-8). 
 
Table E-1. Fast Reactor Infrastructure and Programmatic Risk 
Fast Reactor 
Infrastructure 
Programmatic Risk 
Fast Reactor 
Component Design 
Infrastructure 
Demonstrated at full scale. The U.S. has not built a fast reactor in 
decades and human resources are limited. 
Programmatic risk is high because of the lack of U.S. infrastructure to 
support commercial deployment of fast reactor technology. 
Fast Reactor 
Component Testing 
Infrastructure 
Programmatic risk is high because of the lack of U.S. infrastructure to 
support fast reactor component testing and development. International 
infrastructure is also severely degraded. 
Fast Reactor 
Manufacturing 
Infrastructure 
Programmatic risk is high for the ABR prototype. Infrastructure for 
manufacturing fast reactor components is currently insufficient to 
support technology demonstration. Subsequent advanced recycling 
reactors will benefit from the infrastructure development activities 
during the ABR prototype development 
Fast Reactor Safety 
Analysis Tools 
Programmatic risk is medium because of the personnel infrastructure 
to support safety code development and maintenance. Updating and 
validation of safety analysis and design tools is recommended. In 
addition, test facilities for safety testing and code validation will be 
required. 
Licensing Infrastructure 
Programmatic risk is high. Licensing strategy is unknown. NRC has 
very few staff who understands sodium technology. 
Technical criteria for licensing need to be clarified and the regulatory 
structure re-established. 
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Table E-2. LWR Spent Fuel Processing – Technology Readiness Levels 
TRL Category Description 
 
1 
Concept for separations process developed; process options (e.g., 
contactor type, solvent extraction steps) identified; separations criteria 
established. 
 
2 
Calculated mass-balance flowsheet developed; scoping experiments 
on process options completed successfully with simulated LWR spent 
fuel; preliminary selection of process equipment. 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Concept Development 
Laboratory-scale batch testing with simulated LWR spent fuel 
completed successfully; process chemistry confirmed; reagents 
selected; preliminary testing of equipment design concepts done to 
identify development needs; complete system flowsheet established. 
 
 
 
4 
Unit operations testing at engineering scale for process validation with 
simulated LWR spent fuel consisting of unirradiated materials; 
materials balance flowsheet confirmed; separations chemistry models 
developed. NOTE: engineering scale is defined as a process 
equipment scale and throughput rate that can with confidence be 
scaled to industrial operations levels. 
 
5 
Unit operations testing completed at engineering scale with actual 
LWR spent fuel for process chemistry confirmation; reproducibility of 
process confirmed by repeated batch tests; simulation models 
validated. 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof of Principle 
Unit operations testing in existing hot cells with full-scale equipment 
completed successfully, using actual LWR spent fuel; process 
monitoring and control system proven; process equipment design 
validated. 
7 
 
Integrated system cold shakedown testing completed successfully with 
full-scale equipment (simulated fuel). 
 
8 
Demonstration of integrated system with full-scale equipment and 
actual LWR spent fuel completed successfully; short (~1 month) 
periods of sustained operation. 
 
9 
 
 
 
Proof of Performance 
Full-scale demonstration with actual LWR spent fuel successfully 
completed at ≥100 metric tons per year rate; sustained operations for a 
minimum of three months. 
* The current TRL for this technology is highlighted in blue. 
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Table E-3.  Waste Form Development – Technology Readiness Levels 
TRL Category Description 
 
1 
Identification of waste form options and related processes. 
 
2 
Waste acceptance criteria evaluation, flowsheet development, process 
options scoping experiments, and preliminary systems engineering. 
 
3 
 
 
 
Concept Development 
Laboratory-scale simulated waste streams batch testing, preliminary 
equipment design testing, systems engineering, and waste form 
screening. 
 
 
4 
Waste form production testing of simulated waste streams, actinide 
and non-radioactive fissions products at engineering scale, process 
validation, short-term characterization testing, and initial model 
development. 
 
5 
Waste form production with representative radioactive fission product 
content at engineering scale, long-term characterization testing, and 
waste acceptance criteria confirmation. 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof of Principle 
Waste form production of actual process waste streams using full-
scale equipment, process and equipment final validation, and model 
verification. 
7 
 
Integrated waste form production in industrial facility using full-scale 
equipment; cold shakedown testing of production operations. 
 
8 
Demonstration of integrated waste form production as part of initial 
demonstration of separations systems. 
 
9 
 
 
 
Proof of Performance 
Full-scale demonstration of waste form production with the full fission 
product loading derived from treatment of actual spent nuclear fuel. 
*  The current TRL for this technology is highlighted in blue. 
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Table E-4. Fast Reactor Spent Fuel Processing - Technology Readiness Levels 
TRL Category Description 
 
1 
Concept for separations process developed; process options 
(e.g., electrolyte composition, process equipment) identified; 
separations criteria established. 
 
2 
Calculated mass-balance flowsheet developed; scoping 
experiments on process options completed successfully with 
simulated advanced recycling reactor spent fuel; preliminary 
selection of process equipment. 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Concept Development 
Bench-scale batch testing with simulated advanced recycling 
reactor spent fuel completed successfully; process chemistry 
confirmed; reagents selected; preliminary testing of equipment 
design concepts done to identify development needs; complete 
system flowsheet established. 
 
 
 
4* 
Unit operations testing at engineering scale for process 
validation with simulated advanced recycling reactor spent fuel 
consisting of unirradiated materials; materials balance 
flowsheet confirmed; separations chemistry models developed. 
NOTE: engineering scale is defined as a process equipment 
scale and throughput rate that can with confidence be scaled to 
industrial operations levels. 
 
5 
Unit operations testing completed at engineering scale with 
actual fast reactor spent fuel for process chemistry 
confirmation; reproducibility of process confirmed by repeated 
batch tests; simulation models validated. 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof of Principle 
Unit operations testing in existing hot cells with full-scale 
equipment completed successfully, using actual fast reactor 
spent fuel; process monitoring and control system proven; 
process equipment design validated. 
7 
 
Integrated system cold shakedown testing completed 
successfully with full-scale equipment (simulated fuel). 
 
8 
Demonstration of integrated system with full-scale equipment 
and actual advanced recycling reactor spent fuel completed 
successfully; short (~1 month) periods of sustained operation. 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
Proof of Performance 
Full-scale demonstration with actual advanced recycling reactor 
spent fuel successfully completed at throughput rate consistent 
with annual discharge from a cluster of advanced recycle 
reactors at a collocated site; sustained operations for a 
minimum of three months. 
* The current TRL for this technology is highlighted in blue. 
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Table E-5. Fuel Fabrication – Technology Readiness Levels 
TRL TRL Function Generic Definition Fuel Performance-Specific 
Definition 
1 
 Basic principles 
observed and formulated
Technical review leading to identified 
technical options.  Identification of 
criteria for candidate selection. 
2 
 
Concept 
Development 
Technology concepts 
and/or applications 
formulated 
Fuel candidates selected from options 
based on performance data on similar 
systems, based on selection criteria. 
3 
 Analytical and 
experimental 
demonstration of critical 
function and/or proof of 
concept 
 
Analysis and lab-scale experimentation 
and characterization addressing 
feasibility including small fabrication 
tests with surrogate materials. 
4 
 
Component and/or 
bench-scale validation 
in a laboratory 
environment 
Establish proof of concept.  Fabrication 
of irradiation testing samples in 
accordance with requirements.  At this 
scale, legacy materials are blended 
together and a feedstock spec is not 
available.   
5 
 
Proof-of-principle Component and/or 
breadboard validation in 
a relevant environment 
Fabrication of irradiation testing samples 
in accordance with requirements.  At this 
scale, actual separated materials are used 
and feedstock specs are developed. 
6 
 
 
 System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in 
relevant environment 
Fabrication at multiple pin level using 
actual materials and scalable fabrication 
techniques.  A full set of fabrication 
specifications is developed.  Design 
parameters investigated.  Information is 
sufficient to support a Fuel Specification 
and a Fuel Safety Case. 
7 
 
 
 
 
Proof-of-
performance 
System prototype 
demonstration in 
prototypic environment 
Fabrication of reference fuel at assembly 
levels using actual equipment and with 
actual feedstock materials with statistical 
demonstration of performance.   
8  Prototype fabrication facility completed and qualified through test and demonstration. 
9  Actual fabrication facility proven through successful mission operations. 
* The current TRL for this technology is highlighted in blue. 
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Table E-6. Fuel Performance – Technology Readiness Levels 
TRL TRL Function Generic Definition Fuel Development-Specific 
Definition 
1 
 Basic principles 
observed and formulated
Technical review leading to identified 
technical options.  Identification of 
criteria for candidate selection. 
2 
 
Concept 
Development 
Technology concepts 
and/or applications 
formulated 
Fuel candidates selected from options 
based on performance data on similar 
systems, based on selection criteria. 
3 
 Analytical and 
experimental 
demonstration of critical 
function and/or proof of 
concept 
Analysis and lab-scale experimentation 
and characterization addressing 
feasibility including property 
measurement, and ex-pile tests. 
4 
 Component and/or 
bench-scale validation 
in a laboratory 
environment 
Establish proof of concept. Performance 
phenomena identified with proof-of-
concept irradiation testing of small 
samples completed. 
5 
 
Proof-of-principle Component and/or 
breadboard validation in 
a relevant environment 
Irradiation testing of prototypic 
rods/compacts under nominal 
representative conditions (e.g., fission 
densities, fuel and cladding 
temperatures, cladding damage rates) is 
performed and assessed. 
6 
 
 
 
System/subsystem 
model or prototype 
demonstration in 
relevant environment 
Prototypic rod/compact and 
assembly/element irradiation in 
representative environment, under full 
range of relevant normal and off-normal 
conditions.  
7 
 
 
 
Proof-of-
performance 
System prototype 
demonstration in 
prototypic environment 
Irradiation of Lead Test Assemblies 
8  Irradiation of multiple test assemblies over multiple years of fabrication. 
9  Commercial scale use of the fuel in commercial facilities.   
* The current TRL for this technology is highlighted in blue. 
. 
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Table E-7.  GNEP Overall Cost Estimates to Achieve Milestones in the Report 
Cost Element FY-2007 FY-2008 FY-2009 FY-2010 FY-2011 FY-2012
Systems Integrationa 10.3 16 25 25 25 25
LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies
CFTC Design & Constructionb 16.6 41 125 150 170 190
LWR Separations Technology Development  and R&D
22.3 46 78 79 60 32
NRCc  0.5
Subtotal 39.4 87 203 229 230 222
Transmutation Technologies
ABR Design & Constructionb 8 25 56 62 87 67
ABR Technology Development and R&D 8.28 44 92 187 184 224
NRCc 0.5
Subtotal 16.78 69 148 249 271 291
Transmutation Fuels and Separations
AFCF Design & Construction 9 30 40 95 110 110
Fuel Technology Development and R&D 35.5 78 89 89 89 89
Reprocessing and Waste Form Development 9.65 35 35 39 42 42
Safeguards Development 0.6 10 15 17 17 17
Subtotal 54.75 153 179 240 258 258
GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 0 5 11.5 14 22 23
Modeling and Simulation 9 53 100 100 100 100
University Programsd 24.5 4
Othere 12.77 8 TBD TBD TBD TBD
TOTAL 167.5 395 666.5 857 906 919
Overall Cost Estimates
Cost Estimates ($M)
 
aIncludes Systems Analysis and Technical Integration 
bIncludes industry support. 
cNot explicitly called out after FY-07  
dFY-08 includes only on going grants, after ’08 fund are embedded in the rest of the cost estimates 
eIncludes International Collaboration, Internal Commitments, SBIR/STTR, etc. 
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Table E-8. GNEP Milestone Projection 
 Date 
FY07 
Systems Integration and Analysis 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE January 2007 
FY-07 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2007 
Establish Partnership Knowledge Center (PKC) Steering Committee consisting of 
representatives inside and outside of the GNEP community. 
April 2007 
Initial GNEP waste form descriptions August 2007 
Small reactors requirements August 2007 
Report on waste form and waste process technology specific data developed to 
support an Integrated Waste Management Strategy 
August 2007 
DOE-NE technical input for Secretarial recommendation to congress on the need for 
a second repository 
September 2007 
Initial Qualitative Program Risk Factor Assessment September 2007 
GNEP deployment systems analysis September 2007 
LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies 
Complete Engineering Alternatives Study (EAS) inputs to the Programmatic 
environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for a spent fuel recycling facility 
June 2007 
Provide input for industry engagement on conceptual design studies June 2007 
Develop remote contactor design concepts and initiate test component fabrication September 2007 
Transmutation Technologies 
Develop Reference commercial ABR Concept September 2007 
First mechanical tests performed on 155 dpa HT-9 Duct (AC)3) September 2007 
Transmutation Fuels and Separations Technologies 
AFCF 30% conceptual design for review January 2007 
Insert FUTURIX-FTA irradiation test in Phenix reactor (external) May 2007 
Begin ATR irradiation of metal transmutation fuels containing Ln September 2007 
Revision of fuels handbook/with available characterization data September 2007 
GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 
Select SMR technology for near-term deployment May 2007 
Complete initial needs/requirements assessments September 2007 
Modeling and Simulation 
Complete simulations of heat transport and oxygen diffusion coupled with thermal 
expansion in UO2 fuels with metal cladding 
September 2007 
Complete models of thermo-mechanical properties and phase stability of metal fuels September 2007 
Status report on oxide model development for SE2 September 2007 
Report on uncertainty quantification for selected ATWS sequences September 2007 
FY08 
Systems Integration and Analysis 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE December 2007 
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 Date 
GNEP Technical Requirements December 2007 
FY-08 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2008 
Input and support for NEPA alternatives and technology options evaluations March 2008 
Complete input to 2008 Decision Package March 2008 
Integrated Waste Management Strategy March 2008 
Global Benefits Analysis of GNEP March 2008 
Report on evaluation of GNEP fuel cycle deployment options April 2008 
Report on initial assessment of global proliferation risk and GNEP impact May 2008 
Report on GNEP Facilities and Fuel Cycle Strategy June 2008 
Decision on startup fuel (oxide or metal) for fast reactor August 2008 
Implement pilot PKC that demonstrates multiple predefined use cases for specific 
applications. 
August 2008 
Evaluation of material management requirement for fuel take-back strategies September 2008 
Report on domestic and global demand for GNEP technology September 2008 
GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2008 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2008 
LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies 
Develop Tc solidification flowsheet and initiate bench-scale tests March 2008 
Support 30% completion of industrial conceptual designs April 2008 
Complete pilot-scale testing of Cs/Sr steam reforming process April 2008 
Complete EAS design package for review April 2008 
Develop instrumentation and control systems conceptual designs May 2008 
Initiate procurement of off gas system components for testing June 2008 
Demonstrate metallic waste form for cladding hulls incorporating technetium September 2008 
Transmutation Technologies 
Retrieve FFTF irradiated (up to 200 dpa) mechanical test specimens January 2008 
ABR Prototype Design Study Complete May 2008 
Sodium component testing infrastructure evaluation May 2008 
Initiate sodium component technology development evaluation September 2008 
Identification of Prototype Design Tools by Industrial Team September 2008 
Complete Study on Alternate Configurations Options September 2008 
Identify key experiments using representativity techniques September 2008 
Transmutation Fuels and Separations Technologies 
Complete AFCF system trade studies  April 2008 
Begin ATR irradiation of oxide transmutation fuels April 2008 
Establish a list of advanced instruments to be further developed for demonstration June 2008 
AFCF 70% Conceptual Design for Review September 2008 
Metal Fuel RFFL ready for operation September 2008 
Complete JOYO irradiation test plan September 2008 
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 Date 
Complete FUTURIX-FTA PIE plan September 2008 
SESAME framework completed September 2008 
GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 
Initial screening of next-generation SMR concepts March 2008 
Select next-generation SMR(s) for pre-conceptual design June 2008 
Modeling and Simulation 
Document the GNEP business (why) and functional (what) requirements for all 
Modeling and Simulation activities.  
December 2007 
Formal software releases in support of ABR design studies  September 2008 
GNEP System Level Planning Tool Design Document  September 2008 
FY09 
Systems Integration and Analysis 
AFCI Status Report to Congress– draft to DOE December 2008 
FY-09 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2009 
Report on evaluation of international implementation issues March 2009 
Detailed fuel cycle performance data for GNEP reference technology option July 2009 
Generate the specification for the hardware system necessary to support the PKC July 2009 
Databases that contain historical data not currently accessible from modern 
repositories will be developed and made available to PKC users 
August 2009 
Integrated total quantitative GNEP risk analysis September 2009 
Update GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2009 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2009 
Report on cost and performance experience for GNEP technologies September 2009 
LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies 
Develop initial waste formulation for fission product HLW  December  2008 
Develop reference off-gas treatment process January 2009 
Complete initial characterization of mixed transuranic solid product January 2009 
Initiate demonstration of remote waste form packaging March 2009 
Complete evaluation of HLW forms April 2009 
Complete initial demonstration of steam reforming Cs/Sr product May 2009 
Validate UREX process performance with solvent recycle  May  2009 
Complete demonstration of Tc solidification process May 2009 
Complete bench-scale demonstration of mixed transuranics solidification June 2009 
Complete bench-scale demonstration of Cs/Sr solidification technology  September 2009 
Complete initial integrated testing of separation processes with surrogates September 2009 
Support completion of conceptual design for nuclear fuel recycling center September 2009 
Transmutation Technologies 
Sodium Component Test Infrastructure Design/Build Start October 2008 
Retrieve Specimens from MATRIX irradiation in Phoenix Reactor November 2008 
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 Date 
Startup Fuel Fabrication Options Study with Down Selection January 2009 
Implementation Plan for TREAT Restart April 2009 
ABR Prototype Preliminary Hazards Analysis Complete June 2009 
ABR Prototype Conceptual Design Complete September 2009 
ABR Prototype CD-1 Approval September 2009 
Plan for Prototype Design Tools V&V September 2009 
Complete Initial Design Options Evaluation September 2009 
Produce new evaluations from and covariance for priority isotopes September 2009 
Transmutation Fuels and Separations Technologies 
Complete AFCF alternatives analysis strategy December 2008 
Acquisition strategy submittal for approval March 2009 
Complete CD-1 package for AFCF June 2009 
Complete FUTURIX-FTA irradiations (external) June 2009 
Develop baseline pyrochemical flowsheets for treating spent metal and oxide 
transmutation fuel 
July 2009 
Demonstrate feasibility of fast reactor MOX fuel to metal conversion by electrolytic 
reduction process 
August 2009 
Demonstrate metal fuel fabrication in RFFL’s September 2009 
Demonstrate feasibility of voloxidation of fast reactor MOX fuel September 2009 
Define framework for advanced control logic September 2009 
Evaluate alternative crucibles for TRU recovery September 2009 
GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 
Select near-term PRIMR design for safety evaluation support January 2009 
Modeling and Simulation 
M&S tools (legacy and developing) directly supporting the ABR will be identified, 
qualified through V&V assessments, and placed under configuration control in 
conformance with a QA plan. 
December 2008 
M&S tools (legacy and developing) directly supporting the CFTC will be identified, 
qualified through V&V assessments, and placed under configuration control in 
conformance with a QA plan.  
December 2008 
M&S tools (legacy and developing) directly supporting the AFCF will be identified, 
qualified through V&V assessments, and placed under configuration control in 
conformance with a QA plan.  
December 2008 
Formal V&V assessment of ABR software  March 2009 
Issue Initial GNEP System Level Planning Tool 1.0.  September 2009 
Formal software releases for ABR design studies  September 2009 
FY10 
Systems Integration and Analysis 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE December 2009 
FY-10 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2010 
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Transition the pilot into the production level PKC August 2010 
Create a specification for the addition of future data sets into the PKC that will be 
automatically curated 
August 2010 
Update GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2010 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2010 
LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies 
Complete initial Cs/Sr waste form characterization October 2009 
Demonstrate off-gas treatment system and waste forms November 2009 
Complete bench-scale demonstration of fission product waste form March 2010 
Complete mockup testing of prototype head-end equipment July 2010 
Transmutation Technologies 
Code validation facilities plan October 2009 
Conceptual Design of Startup Fuel Fab Line January 2010 
Complete tensile and fracture toughness testing of FFTF irradiated materials January 2010 
Restart/construct required validation facilities September 2010 
Scaled demonstration of supercritical CO2 Brayton Cycle September 2010 
Prepare material specimens of advanced materials for JOYO irradiation September 2010 
Issue new revision of materials handbook with FFTF material data September 2010 
Perform uncertainty analysis with new covariance date September 2010 
Transmutation Fuels and Separations 
Oxide Fuel RFFL ready for operation December 2009 
Demonstrate scale-up of ceramic waste process March 2010 
Complete initial testing of synroc and zeolite waste forms for cesium/strontium April 2010 
Identify safeguards requirements for pyroprocessing facility May 2010 
Identify optimum fission product loading and decay heat for ceramic waste form May 2010 
Select product processing / consolidation technology for uranium product and TRU 
product 
August 2010 
Begin PIE of FUTURIX-FTA specimens (dependant upon external schedule) September 2010 
Develop Sphere-pac fuel design concepts September 2010 
Develop Dispersion fuel design concepts September 2010 
Complete Feasibility assessment of innovative processes (microwave, combustion) September 2010 
Identify and evaluate alternative product processing technologies selecting preferred 
alternative 
September 2010 
Establish preliminary TRU recovery process parameters September 2010 
Validate performance of novel crucible materials in cathode processor system September 2010 
Conduct feasibility studies for preferred alternative product processing  technology September 2010 
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Establish a test bed with relevant environment for instrument testing September 2010 
GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 
Submit application for NRC design approval for near-term SMR September 2010 
Modeling and Simulation 
Conduct demonstration of simulation capabilities for ABR  December 2009 
Issue GNEP System Level Planning Tool 2.0.  June 2010 
FY11 
Systems Integration and Analysis 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE December 2010 
FY-11 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2011 
First Release of New Systems Level Planning Tool August 2011 
Per need-to-know, extend PKC user base to include universities and private industry August 2011 
Update GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2011 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2011 
LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies 
Demonstrate process monitoring and control system for separation processes May 2011 
Convert AMUSE code to higher level platform, and incorporate transients July 2011 
Support completion of preliminary design for nuclear fuel recycling center September 2011 
Transmutation Technologies 
ABR Prototype Preliminary Safety Analysis Report Complete April 2011 
Preliminary Design of Startup Fuel Fab Line July 2011 
Initiate Validation Studies for Advanced Methods September 2011 
Transmutation Fuels and Separations Technologies 
Begin ATR irradiation of remotely fabricated fuels October 2010 
TRU metal-fuel specimens for JOYO fabricated in RFFL December 2010 
Complete voloxidation demonstration and make go/no go decision of inclusion in 
initial UREX+ testing. 
April 2011 
Develop process simulation model for treating spent advanced burner reactor fuel August 2011 
AFCF 70% preliminary design review September 2011 
Start ATR irradiation of dispersion, sphere-pac fuels, targets September 2011 
Complete Nitride fuel fabrication process baseline design September 2011 
Demonstrate electrorefining with salt containing a high TRU concentration September 2011 
Initial model for AFCF aqueous processing module September 2011 
GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 
Down-select to 2 next-generation SMR conceptual designs January 2011 
Modeling and Simulation 
GNEP System Level Planning Tool 3.0 March 2011 
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FY12 
Systems Integration and Analysis 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE December 2011 
FY-12 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2012 
Update GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2012 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2012 
Decision on Transmutation Fuel for Fast Reactor September 2012 
LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies 
Complete initial characterization of high-level waste forms July 2012 
Transmutation Technologies 
Complete mechanical testing of specimens from MATRIX irradiation (advanced 
materials irradiated up to 70 dpa) 
November 2011 
Validate multiscale materials performance modeling code February 2012 
ABR Prototype Preliminary Design Complete April 2012 
ABR Prototype CD-2 Approve Performance Baseline May 2012 
Complete Validation of First Improved Structural Material September 2012 
Transmutation Fuels and Separations Technologies 
Begin ATR irradiation for high temperature limits October 2011 
Domestic fast spectrum rodlet irradiation capability available December 2011 
Evaluate UREX+1a flowsheet for transmutation fuel  August 2012 
Demonstrate on-line product recovery from uranium electrorefiner system August 2012 
Complete AFCF preliminary design September 2012 
Ship initial fuel for JOYO irradiations  September 2012 
Complete ATR irradiations of dispersion and sphere-pac fuels, targets September 2012 
Down-select instrumentation for initial demonstration September 2012 
Initial demonstration of advanced control logic September 2012 
Initial model for AFCF pyroprocessing module September 2012 
GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 
Award up to two contracts for conceptual designs of next-generation SMR March 2012 
Modeling and Simulation 
GNEP System Level Planning Tool 4.0  September 2012 
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There are two important but distinct crosscutting areas that are considered in this plan: modeling and 
simulation (M&S) and international safeguards and proliferation risk reduction. M&S offers the prospect 
of reduced costs and accelerated demonstration if the advances in modern computation can be harnessed 
to support the development of nuclear technology. International safeguards and proliferation risk 
reduction is a core element of the GNEP vision that must be viewed as an integral part of the technology 
demonstration. In both cases, the basic technology functions identify their needs in terms of these cross-
cutting technologies. These needs are then integrated into a separate program element with associated cost 
estimates and milestones. 
Establishing the highest degree of safety for the facilities and operations of the entire GNEP system as 
currently envisioned is essential both for the success of the program and for the future of nuclear energy 
in the U.S. The outstanding overall safety record of commercial nuclear power in the U.S., along with a 
decades-long trend of improving operational and personnel safety statistics, is steadily overcoming public 
concerns about nuclear safety. However, the GNEP infrastructure will require the development of several 
new types of facilities, as described in the previous section, for which there is no relevant commercial 
experience within the U.S. To support the successful development of the commercial GNEP facilities, the 
first GNEP facilities (ABR, CFTC, and AFCF) would establish that the desired level of safety for all 
facilities can be achieved.  
This report documents a proposed plan for the GNEP Technology Development Program, which will 
continue to evolve. More detailed planning now in progress will include consideration of systems 
analyses, improved risk identification and management, and incorporation of additional decisions on 
facility sizing and technology selections. This plan provides a basis for merging technology planning with 
DOE project management for the GNEP program. It also provides a basis for initiating work among DOE, 
national laboratories, universities, industry, and the international community to define and develop areas 
of technical cooperation for the program. 
A key assumption in the development of this plan is that the cost information for FY-2007 is based on the 
actual budget of $167.5M, and the FY-2008 cost estimate total is set to the president’s request.  Cost 
estimates beyond FY-2008 are unconstrained. 
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1.0 Introduction to the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) 
Technology Development Plan 
This plan is the combined effort of ten Department of Energy national laboratories: Savannah River 
National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratory, Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory, Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Idaho National Laboratory, Brookhaven National Laboratory, 
and Argonne National Laboratory. The plan describes the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) 
Technology Development Program as envisioned by the laboratories.  It has been prepared to guide the 
development by DOE of integrated plans for realizing the domestic portion of the GNEP vision as well as 
providing a basis for developing international cooperation. The cost information in this document is based 
on estimates from the national laboratory participants, and does not represent annual budget estimates 
from the Department of Energy.   
Beginning with the GNEP overall goals, this plan describes the basic technical objectives for each 
element of the program, summarizes the technology status and identifies the areas of greatest technical 
risk. On this basis a proposed technology development program is described that can deliver the required 
information for a Secretarial decision on the path forward of GNEP in 2008 and support construction of 
new advanced fuel cycle facilities, if the chosen path includes them.  
The proposed TDP is predicated upon the construction of an integrated suite of fuel cycle facilities in the 
following decade. However, at this time the United States (U.S.) Government has not finalized a specific 
process for facility construction or the scope of international cooperation. Furthermore, siting of any of 
the proposed facilities will be determined by a separate process, following applicable laws and 
appropriate decision-making precesses. Therefore, this document focuses entirely on what the technology 
needs are, why they are needed, and when it could be completed and not on where or by whom any of 
the required development work is to be done. This plan does not necessarily reflect the views and 
decisions of DOE with regard to current and future activities of the GNEP program, and may be updated, 
as needed. 
The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership Strategic Plan (GNEP-167312) describes the strategy for 
realizing the GNEP vision. A brief summary of the Strategic Plan is included in this section to set the 
stage for the TDP. 
1.1 The GNEP Strategy 
1.1.1 GNEP Objectives 
GNEP seeks to bring about a significant, wide-scale use of nuclear energy and to take actions now that 
will allow that vision to be achieved while decreasing the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and 
effectively addressing the challenge of nuclear waste disposal. GNEP will advance the nonproliferation 
and national security interests of the U.S. by reinforcing U.S. nonproliferation policies, reducing the 
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spread of enrichment and reprocessing technologies abroad, and eventually eliminating excess civilian 
plutonium stocks that have accumulated. 
To enable the expansion of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and make a major contribution to global 
development into the 21st century, the U.S. seeks to pursue and accelerate cooperation to: 
• Expand nuclear power to help meet growing energy demand in an environmentally sustainable 
manner. 
• Develop, demonstrate, and deploy advanced technologies for recycling spent nuclear fuel that 
do not separate plutonium, with the goal (over time) of ceasing separation of plutonium and 
reducing or eliminating excess stocks of civilian plutonium and drawing down existing stocks 
of civilian spent fuel. Such advanced fuel cycle technologies would substantially reduce nuclear 
waste requiring disposal in a geologic repository, and help to ensure the need for only one 
geologic repository in the U.S. through the end of this century. 
• Develop, demonstrate, and deploy advanced reactors that consume transuranic (TRU) elements 
from recycled spent fuel. 
• Establish supply arrangements among nations to provide reliable fuel services worldwide for 
generating nuclear energy, by providing nuclear fuel and taking back spent fuel for recycling, 
without spreading enrichment and reprocessing technologies. 
• Develop, demonstrate, and deploy advanced, proliferation-resistant nuclear power reactors 
appropriate for the power grids of developing countries and regions. 
• In cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), develop enhanced nuclear 
safeguards to effectively and efficiently monitor nuclear materials and facilities to ensure 
commercial nuclear energy systems are used only for peaceful purposes. 
Most industrialized nations now recognize the need for nuclear energy to play a major role in meeting 
base-load electrical energy requirements. Similarly, there is growing recognition within the U.S. of the 
need to start building new nuclear power plants as soon as possible and to rebuild our national nuclear 
infrastructure—needs supported by both the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and DOE’s Nuclear Power 2010 
program. DOE produced a strategic plan that outlines an implementation strategy to enable a world-wide 
increase in the use of nuclear energy safely, without contributing to the spread of nuclear weapons 
capabilities, and in a manner that responsibly disposes of the waste products of nuclear power generation. 
The GNEP strategic plan describes (1) some key evaluative criteria any GNEP fuel cycle must meet to be 
successful; (2) the GNEP technology requirements for government and industry, with a focus on those 
facilities of GNEP to be built and proven in the U.S.; and (3) a two year GNEP Program Technology 
Action Plan that will inform a DOE Secretarial decision in 2008 on the path forward for GNEP.  
1.1.2 GNEP Criteria 
GNEP must meet the following criteria: 
1. Proliferation/Safeguards Risk: The risk of non-peaceful use of the civilian nuclear fuel cycle comes 
from two principal sources: (1) a nation wanting to advance toward the capability to build nuclear 
weapons in a short period of time following the withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and (2) 
a terrorist group seeking to obtain nuclear materials to quickly fabricate and explode an improvised 
nuclear device or a dirty bomb.  GNEP aims to address both of these issues by providing incentives to 
limit the number of countries possessing enrichment and reprocessing facilities, and by eliminating 
over time excess stockpiles of civil plutonium and strengthening controls over materials. 
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2. Proliferation Prevention: Preventing the spread of commercial nuclear technology does not by itself 
prevent the spread of weapons capability.  The plutonium contained in spent fuel discharged from a 
light water reactor (LWR) is not considered “weapons grade.”  However, plutonium separated from 
spent nuclear fuel could be fashioned into a weapon and achieve a nuclear yield of some magnitude. 
While the safeguarding of bulk-handling facilities will continue to pose significant technical 
challenges, advances have been made in developing processes that: are easier to safeguard, allow 
improved materials accountability, are more resistant to terrorist threats, and offer the possibility of 
placing a much reduced burden on our waste disposal facilities.  However, there is no technology 
“silver bullet” that can be built into an enrichment plant or reprocessing plant that can prevent a 
country from diverting these commercial fuel cycle facilities to nonpeaceful use.  GNEP seeks to 
develop advanced fuel cycle technology for civil purposes, centered in existing fuel-cycle states, that 
would allow them to provide fuel services more cheaply and reliably than the remaining states could 
provide indigenously.  
3. Terrorist Threat Reduction. In the most general terms, GNEP seeks to eliminate (over time) excess 
stocks of separated plutonium and reduce stocks of spent fuel worldwide, thereby strengthening 
nuclear security worldwide. In more specific terms, a key objective with respect to any GNEP 
recycling facility is to deny access to fissile nuclear materials of critical mass that could be readily 
made into a nuclear device. Supportive policies can be implemented in this regard: (1) minimize 
transportation—keep fissile materials inside one integrated facility from the time used fuel enters until 
recycled material leaves; (2) maintain a mixture of fissile material with nonfissile material in a ratio 
that is not easily useable as a weapon; (3) use advanced safeguards and security techniques; and (4) 
maintain a goal of minimizing the buildup of, and eventually eliminating, stockpiles of separated 
civilian plutonium or its near equivalent. 
4. Reduce Repository Burden. Commercial spent nuclear fuel can either be disposed of directly into a 
repository or reprocessed/recycled and the byproduct high-level waste sent to a repository. 
Reprocessing and recycle using proven and currently available technologies (variants of PUREX and 
light-water reactor recycle with a mixed oxide fuel) would offer some minor benefit to the repository 
but not meet the GNEP objectives. The full benefit envisioned for the separations process in GNEP 
anticipates substantial repository benefits (by separating out all the actinides) and a reduction in liquid 
process waste. The most significant repository benefits can be achieved by removing the very long-
lived minor actinides and recycling them as part of the fuel for fast reactors.  Further repository benefit 
can be achieved by removing the fission products cesium and strontium from the high-level waste 
stream and allowing them to decay separately. These elements have a relatively short half-life, and, 
after decay, could be disposed of as low level waste. Additionally, removing the technetium and fixing 
it in a matrix with the cladding hulls could reduce the possibility of this fission product migrating 
away from the repository area.  
5. Assured Fuel Supply. The U.S. seeks to encourage the world’s leading nuclear exporters to create a 
safe, orderly system that spreads nuclear energy without proliferation. States that refrain from 
enrichment and reprocessing would have reliable access at reasonable cost to fuel for civil nuclear 
power reactors. If the U.S. is going to participate in assuring access to nuclear fuel and, in the longer 
term, spent fuel services to these countries as they enter the nuclear arena, it must have the capability 
to provide the needed fuel cycle services—capability that we do not currently possess. Our fuel-cycle 
technology should also build our ability and that of our partners to establish and sustain cradle to grave 
fuel service or leasing arrangements over time and at a scale commensurate with the anticipated 
expansion of nuclear energy by helping in a major way to solve the nuclear waste challenge. 
6. Capability and leverage. The GNEP vision has been well received by the international nuclear 
community, particularly among the leading fuel-cycle states. Sustaining and building on that 
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enthusiasm depends on the ability of the U.S. to get back in the commercial nuclear business and 
assume an active role. Participating fully in that business is essential in shaping the rules that apply to 
it. We have a vision of a future world that can universally enjoy the benefits of safe, economical, 
emission-free energy; and we have programs and plans to put the U.S. back in the nuclear energy 
game in a leadership role. Access to our market is itself a form of leverage.  
1.1.3 GNEP implementation model 
The implementation of GNEP is based on the concept of a government/industry partnership. 
There are three facilities required to implement and thus affirm our commitment to GNEP: (1) an 
advanced separations facility to separate the components of spent fuel required by GNEP (here termed a 
Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center [CFTC]); (2) a fast reactor to burn the actinide based fuel (here 
termed an Advanced Burner Reactor [ABR]) to transform the actinides in a way that makes them easier to 
store as waste, not a proliferation concern, and produce electricity; and (3) an Advanced Fuel Cycle 
Facility (AFCF) to serve as an R&D center of excellence for developing transmutation fuels and 
improving fuel cycle technology. 
The pursuit of these three facilities constitutes a pathway with two complementary components. The first 
component, the CFTC and the ABR, could, as an option, be led by industry with technology support from 
laboratories, international partners, and universities. The second component, R&D led by the national 
laboratories, would include the AFCF funded by DOE and located at a government site. The two 
components would work closely together to move GNEP forward by integrating the national laboratories’ 
capabilities with the needs of industry. 
Although technical challenges for the implementation of the closed-fuel cycle as envisioned under GNEP 
exist, many of the technologies essential for the successful implementation of GNEP have been 
demonstrated at laboratory and bench-scale. Such uncertainties as scaling up the chemical separations for 
the recycle process or fabricating and qualifying the transmutation fuel for the advanced burner reactor 
require consideration. These technical risks warrant continued R&D and technology development for 
GNEP. 
A government-industry partnership is desired to implement GNEP. The approach outlined requires 
expanded involvement of industry in the design of facilities in preparation for expansion to commercial 
scale.  The approach is to define a technology roadmap to resolve those uncertainties in conjunction with 
assets available to the government (i.e., National Laboratories, universities, and international partners), 
but does so in a way that obviates the need to build engineering scale facilities. If successful, the approach 
could reduce overall costs and increase the speed of arriving at a commercially operated system of 
prototype GNEP facilities without significantly increasing programmatic risk. 
1.1.4 GNEP Program Technology Action Plan 
The objective of the GNEP technology and facilities implementation plan is to harness and coordinate the 
strengths, capabilities, and resources of industry, national laboratories, universities, and international 
partners with the clear objective of getting commercial-scale facilities that accomplish our GNEP vision 
into use as quickly and economically as possible. At the core of this effort will be the development of a 
sound, achievable business plan. The primary task for the next year is to assemble the requisite 
technology, economic, and environmental information that can present a path forward to commercial-
scale facilities that can be considered by the Secretary of Energy in reaching a decision whether to 
proceed with plans for a closed nuclear fuel cycle and whether to construct and operate the proposed 
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GNEP facilities. Specific programmatic actions planned—subject to funding, risk, and project 
management processes specified in DOE Ordersa—to reach this decision-point include: 
• Obtain input from U.S. and international industries and governments on how best to bring the 
needed GNEP facilities into being, what technology and policy issues must be resolved, and 
what business obstacles must be overcome.  
• Develop a detailed GNEP technology roadmap for demonstrating solutions to the remaining 
technical issues in order to support commercial GNEP facilities. Inform and adjust this roadmap 
with input received from industry, international partners, and other interested stakeholders.  
• Pursue industry participation in the development of conceptual design and other engineering 
studies that support both the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC) and the Advanced 
Burner Reactor (ABR).  
• Prepare a programmatic GNEP Environmental Impact Statement.  
• Prepare a decision package for the Secretary of Energy to consider whether to proceed with 
development of proposed GNEP facilities. 
1.1.5 GNEP as a Transformation Tool for Nuclear Engineering Research 
Nuclear research in the U.S. has known its heyday from the 1950s until the early 1980s. At that time, 
strong research budgets and an enthusiastic community had evolved a model where they had created 
strong links between basic science as the generator of knowledge in the form of data and computational 
models, the computer science community as the builder of simulation tools, and the nuclear research 
community as the user of these tools. Since then, these links have disappeared due to much reduced 
budgets. The nuclear engineering community has only slowly evolved the tools it uses, while at the same 
time the possibilities of basic science and advanced simulation have significantly progressed. In the early 
1980s, simulation capabilities were almost always limited to lumped parameter models. Today it is 
possible to envision models with their roots in first principles and the capability to model nuclear systems 
with very high precision and accuracy. 
In consequence of this lack of engagement, the research model used by the nuclear engineering 
community is still characterized by a heavy dose of empiricism with significant reliance on expensive and 
time consuming representative mock-up experiments. The goal of GNEP is to modernize nuclear research 
by creating the basic science and simulation tools that will lead to higher quality products with lower 
costs and shorter development schedules. 
That transformation has already occurred in other industries such as the aeronautics industry. The nuclear 
weapons programs at DOE, which are more like GNEP, have very successfully implemented this vision 
and their example, significantly adapted to the physical and regulatory differences between the products, 
can be used to achieve this goal. 
Three workshops organized by the Office of Science and the Office of Nuclear Energy during the summer 
of 2006 have paved the way to implementing this approach. They focused successively on the role of 
basic sciences, nuclear data, and simulation and modeling in GNEP, and indicated the key areas where 
these disciplines will help improve the quality of the GNEP technologies: 
• Separations technologies, which are currently characterized by an empirical research model, 
will, in the short term, benefit from better measurements of fundamental properties, better 
thermodynamic modeling of processes, and better optimization tools for integrating the 
 
a E.g., DOE Order 413.3 on Program and Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets. 
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processes and designing nuclear facilities. In the longer term, novel processes could be 
developed based on better simulation capabilities at the molecular level. 
• Waste forms are one of the ultimate products of GNEP and must be demonstrated to survive for 
extremely long times in complex geological environments. Currently, that demonstration is 
essentially empirical and therefore affected with rather large uncertainties. Better understanding 
of the fundamental physical phenomena and the capability to model the evolution of waste 
forms in complex geological media will bring added confidence to the nuclear enterprise. 
• Nuclear fuels are probably the most technically demanding element of the GNEP technologies 
as they undergo a series of phenomena during fabrication and irradiation: from physical, to 
chemical, to metallurgical, to thermo mechanical. In GNEP, these difficulties are compounded 
by the fact that fuel forms must contain significant amounts of minor actinides. The 
understanding of these phenomena and, even more so, their modeling are still in their infancy; 
consequently, the fuels development process is extremely empirical based today on a “cook-
and-look” approach. The current development cycle length of a fuel form is about 15 years, 
with successive irradiation and post-irradiation examinations at increasing scales consuming 
most of that time. Better understanding of the fundamental phenomena and the capability to 
model the evolution of fuels in reactor environments have the potential to reduce the length of 
that development cycle, but will also pave the way for developing novel fuel forms with 
significantly improved characteristics. 
• Advanced reactors that can effectively transmute the isotopes of interest from spent fuel are the 
most costly component of a fully deployed GNEP system. The current design and licensing 
approach for these reactors is based on older lumped parameter models that not only imply 
significant design margins, but also limit the capability of innovation in new designs, new 
materials, and new concepts. The key areas where significantly improved performance is 
expected with modern simulation techniques are thermal hydraulics, mechanical behaviour, and 
safety analyses. Significant cost reductions are expected from implementing these techniques. 
The detailed process for implementing these advances and fundamentally modifying nuclear engineering 
research is still being defined and is by itself a key challenge that the GNEP community of scientists and 
engineers must address. The current plan is to organize GNEP R&D in a series of campaigns focused 
around each key technology—separations, fuels, waste forms, and reactors—that will associate the 
engineering and scientific disciplines and define a requirements-driven process to build and implement 
better tools to meet the overall GNEP objectives. 
1.2 Key Assumptions 
This TDP provides the following initial data to meet two key objectives of the DOE GNEP Strategic Plan: 
• A summary of the current knowledge needed to develop a detailed GNEP technology roadmap 
for demonstrating solutions to the remaining technical issues in order to support commercial 
GNEP facilities.  
• A summary of the current knowledge needed to prepare a decision package for the Secretary of 
Energy to proceed with a government-industry partnership to build a CFTC and prototype ABR. 
Two key assumptions for developing the TDP were made: 
• Cost information: The total cost for FY 2007 reflects the actual FY 2007 budget; the total FY 
2008 cost estimate matches the president’s budget request. Cost estimates for the following 
years are unconstrained. 
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• Reference technologies: Reference technologies have been chosen that meet the GNEP goals. 
LWR spent fuel separation will be based on the UREX+ concept, which separates all 
constituents of the spent fuel into manageable streams. TRU elements will be recycled in 
sodium-cooled fast reactors, and uranium will be separated at high enough purity that it might 
be disposed of as low-level waste or easily stored for future use. The remaining material will be 
disposed of in waste forms optimized for long-term disposal. 
1.3 GNEP Deployment System Architecture 
1.3.1 Domestic System Architecture 
The domestic portion of the overall GNEP deployment system architecture must be defined and used to 
guide the determination of performance requirements and criteria for technology selection. This system 
architecture has been identified based on previous studies carried out in the Advanced Fuel Cycle 
Initiative and will be documented in the GNEP Deployment System Architecture Reportb.   
The performance of transmutation systems based on both thermal and fast reactor systems has been 
assessed by many international teams. From these studies an international consensus has emergedc: 
• Thermal reactors are well suited for a partial transmutation of plutonium, as implemented in 
today’s commercial mixed oxide (MOX) approach. Nevertheless, total transmutation of 
plutonium and transmutation of the minor actinides does not seem practically feasible in these 
reactors, essentially, because the fuel cycle requirements for these schemes make the approach 
impractical. 
• Fast reactors are well suited for transmuting all transuranics. 
These capabilities have led the international teams to propose two system architectures to manage and 
recycle nuclear materials: 
• A dual tier approach, where plutonium is first recycled in thermal reactors and the remaining 
plutonium and all other transuranics are recycled into fast reactors. This approach has the 
advantage of making use of the existing thermal reactors, and reduces the need to build fast 
reactors.  
• A single tier approach, where all transuranics are extracted as a group from the spent 
commercial nuclear fuel and recycled into the fast reactors. 
A key issue for the U.S. in the use of thermal reactors for recycling as implemented in today’s 
commercial MOX approach is that the process requires the separation of relatively pure plutonium, which 
is contrary to current U.S. nonproliferation policy. The AFCI program has done limited research on MOX 
fuels containing the minor actinides in addition to the plutonium, but recycle in fast reactors is still needed 
to realize significant repository benefits. 
Countries such as France and Japan already have an installed commercial MOX infrastructure and differ 
with the U.S. on the policy of separation of plutonium. They have therefore chosen the dual tier approach 
to maximize the use of the existing infrastructure. The U.S., which does not possess the commercial oxide 
infrastructure, has initially identified the single tier approach as its preferred architecture. 
Figure 1 shows the proposed system architecture for the U.S. under GNEP.  
 
b This report is planned to be prepared by 9/30/07. 
c. The Physics of TRU Transmutation – A Systematic Approach to the Intercomparison of Systems, PHYSOR 2004, 
April 24–29, 2004. 
 
8 GNEP Technology Development Plan 
  July 25, 2007 
 
Figure 1. Initial GNEP deployment system architecture. 
This initial GNEP deployment system architecture shown in Figure 1 is described as follows: 
1. U.S. commercial reactors, which are all LWRs, are the major producers of electricity; during 
their operation they also produce spent nuclear fuel at a rate of more than 2000 MT per year. 
These may eventually be augmented by ALWRs and/or Generation IV reactors. 
2. The LWR spent nuclear fuel separations plant separates the constituents of that SNF into a 
series of product and waste streams that facilitate waste management: fission products for 
storage and disposal, uranium for storage, structural elements for disposal, and transuranic 
elements destined to be destroyed through transmutation. To improve security against terrorism 
and to improve proliferation risk management, transuranic elements should be kept together 
and diluted as much as practical. This material form is less easily used in a nuclear weapon 
than concentrated, chemically pure forms of plutonium. 
3. The transuranic elements are fabricated into transmutation fuelsd 
4. The transmutation fuel is irradiated in fast reactors, which results in a partial destruction of the 
transuranics with a fraction of the original transuranics remaining in the irradiated fuel along 
with newly created fission products. 
5. A separations process, likely different from the LWR spent nuclear fuel separations process, is 
then used to extract the remaining transuranics from the transmutation fuel. As with LWR 
spent nuclear fuel separations, other constituents, including fission products, processing losses, 
and structural materials are encased in specific waste forms suited for ultimate disposal. 
6. The separated transuranics are then refabricated into a new transmutation fuel and again 
irradiated in a fast reactor. This closed cycle continues to destroy the initial transuranics while 
also accepting additional transuranics from the LWR spent nuclear fuel.  
 
d Transmutation fuels contain a significant amount of transuranic elements, along with uranium or a non-fuel matrix material. 
GNEP Technology Development Plan 9 
July 25, 2007   
 
1.3.2 International System Studies 
Although the architecture for the domestic deployment system has been determined, studies will continue 
throughout the program on architectures that might provide alternatives for domestic deployment and also 
those architectures being implemented in other countries. 
The full GNEP strategy includes establishment of reliable fuel cycle services. This may also require the 
development of reactors that are deployable in countries that do not possess the infrastructure for large 
systems as well as an overall approach to proliferation risk reduction. These elements are also addressed 
in the systems portion of this plan. 
1.4 The GNEP TDP 
Development of technology for an integrated implementation of the proposed system is the purpose of the 
GNEP TDP. Such an integrated program will be driven by technology demonstration at prototype 
facilities, together with a supporting TDP in specific facilities that delivers the required technologies as 
well as research and development programs that address the areas of highest risk and provide technical 
alternatives for risk mitigation.  
1.4.1 The GNEP Facilities 
Three facilities are needed to demonstrate the key technologies in the GNEP deployment system: 
• The CFTC, which will conduct LWR spent nuclear fuel separations at an appropriate scale (to 
be determined in conjunction with the 2008 Secretarial Decision) using commercial reactor 
spent nuclear fuel. The CFTC will also have the future capability to fabricate transmutation fuel 
at a production scale, once the technology is sufficiently demonstrated at an engineering-scale. 
The CFTC may also provide the future capability to recycle spent fuel from an advanced 
recycling reactor. 
• An AFCF to separate limited quantities of LWR spent nuclear fuel, fabricate and recycle the 
transmutation test fuels needed for qualifying these fuels, and provide the experience needed to 
design and operate the commercial-scale fuel fabrication and separations facilities. The AFCF 
will also provide the nation during the 21st century with the ability to develop and demonstrate 
advanced aqueous and pyroprocessing separations technologies, transmutation fuel fabrication 
technologies, and state-of-the-art safeguards instrumentation and monitoring systems. 
• A prototype ABR that will demonstrate transmutation of actinides and inform fast reactor 
technology development for the commercial ABR and eventually fast breeder reactor fuels in 
support of the Generation IV program. 
The sizes and scopes of the initial facilities are currently being determined. 
1.4.2 Timing of the GNEP Facilities 
Based on the actual 2007 budget, and the 2008 budget request, the following planning milestones have 
been established:  
• FY 2020 for initial operation of the LWR spent nuclear fuel separations facility (CFTC) 
• FY 2022 for the startup of the prototype fast spectrum reactor designed to demonstrate the 
destruction of transuranics (ABR) 
• FY 2020 for operations to commence in the first module of a multipurpose separations and 
transmutation fuel fabrication and research facility (AFCF).  
The actual timing of the GNEP facilities will be evaluated via a structured analysis based on facility 
integration needs, technical readiness, actual budgets, and other considerations. From the point of view of 
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system integration, the start-up and initial operation dates of each facility will depend on when that 
facility is needed to support the other facilities in the program. Based on current understanding of the 
technology development schedules, an initial assessment of the relative timing of the facilities has been 
made. This initial assessment worked backwards from the time that the first lead test assemblies (LTAs) 
of transmutation fuels are needed for the ABR, and assumed that: 
• Thirty percent of the core of the ABR would be converted from the startup fuel to the 
transmutation fuel over a to–be-determined period once the size of the prototype ABR is 
established. Earlier stages of that conversion would be performed with transuranics processed in 
the AFCF; 30% conversion of a large reactor will likely require operation of the CFTC to 
provide adequate separated transuranics. 
• Each LTA is resident in the reactor for 3 years (assumes 8% burnup). The first LTA would be 
available for insertion in the ABR in 2022. 
• The AFCF will process at least 10-25MT SNF/year (the actual scale of the aqueous separations 
component of the AFCF will be determined by an expert panel; this scale was assumed only for 
this assessment). 
Based on our current technology development schedule:  
• AFCF must begin fabricating transmutation fuels 2 years prior to the time at which the first 
LTA is inserted in the ABR. This includes a contingency for shakedown testing of the 
fabrication process.  
• In this plan, the cost constraints imply an operational range for the AFCF of 2020–2022 and 
2022–2024 for ABR operations (start-up testing will need to be at least 2 years earlier for 
ABR). The CFTC will begin operations around 2020, providing additional transuranics for ABR 
fuel fabrication. 
This assessment was based only on technical requirements, and it should be recognized that other 
requirements may affect these estimates. In particular, the acquisition strategies for the three facilities 
are still being developed by DOE. Therefore, the cost and schedule ranges for design and construction of 
the facilities, as described in this plan, do not yet reflect a specific approach to acquisition of design and 
construction services. Once the acquisition strategies are finalized, the cost and schedule range will be 
updated accordingly. 
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Figure 2. GNEP First Facilities Architecture  
1.4.3 Safety of the GNEP Facilities 
Establishing the highest degree of safety for the facilities and operations of the entire GNEP system as 
currently envisioned is essential both for the success of the program and for the future of nuclear energy 
in the U.S. The outstanding overall safety record of commercial nuclear power in the U.S., along with a 
decades-long trend of improving operational and personnel safety statistics, is steadily overcoming public 
concerns about nuclear safety. However, the GNEP infrastructure will require the development of several 
new types of facilities, as described in the previous section, for which there is no relevant commercial 
experience within the U.S. To support the successful development of the GNEP facilities, the first GNEP 
facilities (ABR, CFTC, and AFCF) will establish that the desired level of safety for all facilities can be 
achieved.  
A strong and effective framework for commercial facilities exists in the U.S. that can be used to achieve 
the desired safety levels. The safety framework has the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at its 
center with a well-developed regulatory philosophy that is implemented through an equally well-
developed set of regulations and regulatory practices. This framework, although mostly developed for the 
safety regulation of LWRs, could be adapted to apply to both the GNEP advanced fast-spectrum reactor 
and the other GNEP facilities and activities. The safety framework also includes a strong and effective 
group of nuclear industry companies and organizations who, together, have successfully achieved the 
desired safety objectives. Industry codes and standards support all of the above along with major research 
institutions that maintain and enhance understanding of safety principles and address new safety issues as 
they arise. As a result, it is expected that any new safety issues that arise during the development of the 
first GNEP facilities can and will be successfully resolved. 
1.4.3.1 Safety Objectives 
Safety encompasses all aspects of facility design, construction, and operation. While safety can be defined 
in many ways, the following general comments describe the overall extent of safety considerations: 
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• Personnel safety. The probability of any person being subjected to exposure in excess of 
regulatory limits from potential hazards, including radiation exposure and chemical exposure, as 
a result of designing, constructing, or operating a GNEP facility is acceptably low. 
• Environmental safety. There are no harmful environmental consequences in excess of those 
judged to be acceptable as a result of designing, constructing, or operating a GNEP facility.  
• Facility safety. The probability for creating conditions in a GNEP facility that would result in 
severe damage or destruction to the facility, potentially threatening personnel and the 
environment as well as resulting in a major economic loss, is judged to be acceptably low. 
1.4.3.2 Achieving Safety 
Since all of the facilities for the GNEP program will require the handling or use of highly radioactive 
materials as well as potentially hazardous chemicals, it is essential that all aspects of safety are considered 
and addressed for each of the proposed GNEP facilities. Consistent with past experimental or production 
facilities of a similar nature, the GNEP facilities are expected to be designed, constructed, and operated 
with adherence to all personnel, environmental, chemical, and nuclear safety regulations as set forth by 
the NRC and/or the DOE (e.g. 10 CFR Part 830). It is expected that safety will be integrated into the 
design of each facility and augmented by operational procedures designed to result in potential exposures 
and releases which are as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA). 
It is expected, and in some cases required, that safety be designed into the facility so that certain classes 
of accidents are not possible. An example of this is using size, inventory, and geometry to prevent nuclear 
criticality events during all operations outside of the reactor core (e.g., separations, fuel fabrication and 
handling, etc.). The safety principle is to design each facility so that certain potentially unsafe operations 
are not possible, or that unsafe conditions are not achievable. This “intrinsic” safety is widely accepted as 
being part of good design and engineering practice. It is expected that “intrinsic” safety will be 
implemented to the greatest extent practicable in the GNEP facilities. 
Safety, however, includes much more than what can be done in the design and during operations. For 
each of the GNEP facilities, it is also of utmost importance that the appropriate attitude towards safety, 
the “safety culture,” be an integral part of all aspects of facility design, construction, and operation. A key 
component of safety culture is the development of appropriate operating procedures, along with the 
understanding and adherence by all personnel to not only the procedures, but also to the principles of 
working safely.  
It must also be stressed that "safety" and "licensing" are two very different things. The latter describes 
how the U.S., through the NRC and other regulators, assures that the required safety performance is 
actually achieved in practice. But achieving "safety" is and must be the responsibility of the 
designing/operating entities and the individuals within them, and typically goes beyond meeting all 
applicable regulations. The safety philosophy that underlies all of GNEP's efforts will attempt everywhere 
to do as well as, if not better than, the current nuclear industry, which has to its credit already achieved a 
strong safety record in the U.S.  It will do this by building on existing practices and adapting them to the 
new GNEP technologies. 
The approach taken to achieve the desired safety objectives is different for each facility because each 
facility has its own set of hazards and regulatory requirements and is reviewed in the respective section 
for each facility. However, it is also important to be cognizant of other aspects of the GNEP infrastructure 
that may have potential safety implications that are not related to one of the three GNEP facilities. The 
major components in this category are storage facilities and transportation activities. An existing 
regulatory infrastructure and a strong safety culture already exist for these activities and have been very 
successful in that the safety record for storage and transportation has been exemplary. The importance of 
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transportation for the GNEP program will depend on the siting of the facilities—the extent to which the 
three facilities are co-located. In the most challenging case, each facility would be located at a significant 
distance from the other facilities, maximizing the transportation of hazardous materials between sites. 
While shipments of nuclear materials occur routinely in the U.S., shipment of materials similar to the 
spent LWR fuel or processing products and waste forms is much less frequent. Part of the GNEP program 
will be to develop the systems and components needed for transport of these materials, and establish that 
transportation of these materials can be done with the required level of safety. 
Similarly, while the handling and storage of spent LWR fuel is a routine occurrence in the United States, 
there is little experience with the handling and storage of the expected products from processing spent 
LWR fuel and the new and irradiated fast reactor fuel.  The GNEP program will establish that the 
handling and storage of these materials can be done with the required level of safety as well.  
1.4.3.3 Evaluating and Verifying Achievement of Safety 
A significant aspect of ensuring that the desired level of safety has been achieved for all parts of the 
GNEP infrastructure is through independent verification and regulatory oversight. Both the NRC and the 
DOE have extensive regulations governing nuclear reactor design and operation and the handling and use 
of hazardous radioactive materials. They also have the responsibility for assessing the adequacy of the 
planned designs and operations in meeting the safety objectives. Successful outcome for these 
assessments results in a license being granted (NRC) or an authorization issued (DOE). These 
verifications and subsequent approvals not only provide for the independent review of the proposed 
designs and operations, but provide assurance to the public that the facilities and operations can achieve 
the safety objectives. The NRC, for example, continuously monitors the licensees to ensure that the public 
health and safety are being adequately protected. 
None of the above can be achieved without thinking about safety at all times and in every aspect of design 
and operation of the GNEP nuclear facilities. This requires long-term commitments and follow-through, 
systems-type thinking of the broadest type, and a continuing endeavor to keep abreast of safety issues as 
they arise through safety research that is translated into safety practice. 
1.4.4 Technology Development 
Each part of the GNEP program has within it a Technology Development task designed to deliver the 
necessary technologies to support the facilities. It also identifies those areas that require research and 
development for risk mitigation. If particular technologies to be implemented in the three facilities are not 
proven, the associated R&D will provide technology alternatives that could be incorporated into the 
GNEP Program System Architecture. Furthermore, each technology implementation identifies needs for 
supporting capability in safeguards, security, and safety plus modeling and simulation. 
1.4.5 Coordination and Crosscut Elements 
In addition to the facility projects and associated technology development, the GNEP TDP contains 
several important coordination and crosscut elements. The first of these is the Systems Integration 
element, which serves three purposes: 
• Technical Integration, which supports DOE program management of GNEP, risk management, 
and decision management.  
• System Analysis of the deployment of GNEP facilities beyond the CFTC, ABR, and AFCF, 
including the global system. Analysis is undertaken of a variety of deployment system 
alternatives and continually evaluates the predicted performance of various deployment systems 
as new performance and cost data come available. 
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• System Analysis of the first GNEP facilities (CFTC, ABR and AFCF), where these facilities, 
the system to support them, and the technology choices employed to implement the system are 
continually reevaluated to ensure that the optimum technology path is being followed and to 
allow for a structured decision making approach. 
The Deployment System Analysis is responsible for the preparation of the GNEP Deployment System 
Architecture Report which will provide the basis for the initial system architecture and identifies those 
alternatives which need to remain under consideration as the program progresses. The Systems Analysis 
of the first GNEP facilities (CFTC, ABR, and AFCF) develops the technical requirements for the first 
facilities and the criteria that the technologies must meet for identification as the baseline or reference 
technologies. 
The second major crosscut element of the program is that of Proliferation Risk Reduction. Global 
proliferation risk reduction is a major goal of the GNEP program and will involve international 
safeguards as well as the development of transformational safeguards technology using the domestic 
facilities as a test bed. Included here will be modeling and simulation, process control and 
safeguardability, advanced measurement technologies and data integration and analysis. 
The third major crosscut element of the program is Modeling and Simulation, which will support the 
development and deployment of advanced fuel cycle technologies and ensure their safe and effective 
operation. This element will include objectives of a short, intermediate, and long-term character. The 
short-term objectives will focus on the development and validation of those tools required to help develop 
the three key technologies, probably focused on the modernization of existing codes rather than the 
creation of entirely new tools. The experience gained with the immediate activities will guide the 
identification of tools from other industries that can be readily adapted to problems associated with 
GNEP. The intermediate term objectives will be the adaptation and validation of these tools. Finally, the 
long-term objectives include the development of entirely new tools for modeling the fuel cycle and the 
associated technologies. Although the objectives, and therefore the benefits, are spread in time, it is 
important to recognize that they must proceed concurrently for maximum benefit to accrue to the GNEP 
program and to nuclear technology generally. 
The design and construction of the three facilities, the associated technology research and development 
programs, a focus on proliferation risk reduction combined with robust systems analysis, and the 
development of modern tools to underpin the whole program, represents an integrated approach to 
demonstrating that technologies exist and are viable to make the GNEP vision a reality. 
1.5 International Cooperation 
International cooperation will be an important part of the TDP. This plan identifies some of the areas 
where such cooperation might be beneficial to the program, but not in a systematic fashion. The full 
international cooperation strategy will be developed using this plan as a guide but will also have to fully 
consider other factors such as governmental policies on cooperation, the capability of any country to 
contribute to the program and funding, in addition to the technical basis for cooperation. 
The GNEP seeks to create an international regime to support large-scale growth in the worldwide use of 
nuclear energy. Fully meeting the GNEP vision may require the deployment of thousands of reactors in 
dozens of countries, many of which are in the developing world and currently do not use nuclear energy. 
Some of these needs will be met by large-scale Generation III and III+ reactors (>1000 MWe) and 
Generation IV reactors when they are available. However, many developing countries have small and 
immature electricity grids that make the currently available Generation III (+) reactors unsuitable because 
they are too large, too expensive, and too complex. GNEP therefore envisions new types of reactors that 
must be developed for international deployment that are “right sized” for the developing countries and 
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based on technologies, designs, and policies focused on reducing proliferation risk. Other countries such 
as France, Russia, Japan, Korea, and South Africa are moving forward with the development of such 
reactors, so it is vital that the U.S. also embark on the development of suitable reactor systems in order to 
influence the technologies that are deployed internationally and position U.S. industry for leadership in 
this growing international market. In the U.S., the Generation IV R&D program is already investigating 
several small and medium-sized reactor concepts for various domestic applications, and some of these 
concepts may prove relevant to GNEP application. 
The primary objective of the “GNEP Reactors for International Deployment (GRID)” element of GNEP is 
the development and demonstration of appropriately-sized reactor designs that can provide the world— 
particularly developing countries—with safe, simple, and robust sources of energy to meet their 
expanding needs for electricity, potable water, and district heating at an affordable price, while 
minimizing the negative impacts on the local and global environment associated with large-scale burning 
of fossil fuels. Moreover, a deployment of these reactors, combined with a policy of reliable fuel services, 
can provide an attractive energy solution to many countries without the need for them to develop the more 
proliferation-vulnerable parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. 
1.6 GNEP Program Interfaces 
Proliferation Risk Reduction will be an activity carried out jointly with the National Nuclear Security 
Administration, which has the responsibility for international safeguards and associated technologies. 
Two other important program interfaces within DOE are the Office of Science (SC) and the Office of 
Civilian Radioactive Waste Management (RW).  
SC has begun an activity to attract the best scientists to try and resolve the scientific problems that occur 
within the application of nuclear technology to energy production. This activity follows on the heels of 
similar ones addressing subjects such as Solar Energy and Hydrogen and will be carried out in analogous 
manner. The target for the SC is nuclear technology generally, rather than specifically GNEP, but the 
activity will be informed by GNEP and the results ultimately should come to benefit GNEP. In particular, 
the modeling and simulation element above will be carried out in cooperation with the Office of 
Advanced Scientific Computing Research within SC. 
Since one of the main goals of GNEP is aimed at the current and future use of geologic repositories, there 
has to be an interface with RW. This interface will primarily be necessary to ensure that waste forms 
proposed by the GNEP program can indeed meet performance criteria for disposal in a geologic 
repository or be safely dispositioned in some other way. This interface will also facilitate the evaluation 
of the potential for future evolution of waste management requirements in order to optimize the waste 
management benefits from the GNEP closed fuel cycle. 
1.7 GNEP TDP Implementation 
Table 1 shows the cost estimates developed by the national laboratories to support this program plan to 
the end of fiscal year 2012. Planning is in a very early stage, and cost estimates will evolve as more 
detailed planning takes place, including determination of the acquisition strategy.  A high-level schedule 
based on the cost estimates in Table 1 follows Table 1.  Table 2 shows milestones for the program 
associated with these cost estimates. 
1.8 Report Structure 
The sections that follow will describe in more detail the GNEP systems integration, facilities, 
technologies, and crosscutting areas and their corresponding detailed objectives, mission needs, technical 
requirements, technology development needs, longer-term research and development needs, and cost and 
schedule. A brief justification will also be provided for the selection of the three technologies that will be 
implemented in the facilities.  
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Section 2.0 describes the systems integration approach, in which the goal is to define and subsequently 
refine the technical requirements for both the deployment system and the initial GNEP facilities. To 
achieve this objective, strategic systems analyses are required to evaluate a variety of nuclear fuel cycle 
issues. Key results of existing domestic and international fuel cycle studies must be synthesized with 
consideration of GNEP priorities and mission objectives. Ongoing GNEP technology development and 
R&D results must be integrated to evaluate evolving technology performance and risk evaluations.  
The LWR spent fuel separations TDP is described in Section 3.0. This program aims at demonstrating 
LWR spent nuclear fuel separations technologies at large scale in an adequate facility, the CFTC.  
Sections 4.0 and 5.0 describe the ABR and Transmutation Fuels and Separations technologies, 
respectively. These two technologies are composed of a research and demonstration program to fabricate 
those transuranics removed from the LWR spent nuclear fuel into fuel elements suitable for irradiation in 
a fast reactor, and to develop a fast spectrum reactor that can be used to demonstrate the conversion of 
transuranics into isotopes that would pose a lower long-term risk. These programs will rely on two 
facilities: the AFCF where fuels and relevant separations technologies are demonstrated and the ABR 
where transmutation is demonstrated. The second facility must also possess the capability to recycle the 
fast reactor fuel to ensure more complete conversion of the transuranics.  
Section 6.0 discusses GNEP reactors for international deployment.  
Section 7.0 describes the crosscutting area of advanced modeling and simulation.  
Section 8.0 describes the crosscutting section on safeguards and proliferation risk reduction. 
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1.9 Overall Cost Estimates and Schedule  
Table 1.  GNEP Overall Cost Estimates Needed to Achieve Milestones in the Report 
Cost Element FY-2007 FY-2008 FY-2009 FY-2010 FY-2011 FY-2012
Systems Integrationa 10.3 16 25 25 25 25
LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies
CFTC Design & Constructionb 16.6 41 125 150 170 190
LWR Separations Technology Development  and R&D
22.3 46 78 79 60 32
NRCc  0.5
Subtotal 39.4 87 203 229 230 222
Transmutation Technologies
ABR Design & Constructionb 8 25 56 62 87 67
ABR Technology Development and R&D 8.28 44 92 187 184 224
NRCc 0.5
Subtotal 16.78 69 148 249 271 291
Transmutation Fuels and Separations
AFCF Design & Construction 9 30 40 95 110 110
Fuel Technology Development and R&D 35.5 78 89 89 89 89
Reprocessing and Waste Form Development 9.65 35 35 39 42 42
Safeguards Development 0.6 10 15 17 17 17
Subtotal 54.75 153 179 240 258 258
GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 0 5 11.5 14 22 23
Modeling and Simulation 9 53 100 100 100 100
University Programsd 24.5 4
Othere 12.77 8 TBD TBD TBD TBD
TOTAL 167.5 395 666.5 857 906 919
Overall Cost Estimates
Cost Estimates ($M)
 
aIncludes Systems Analysis and Technical Integration 
bIncludes industry support. 
cNot explicitly called out after FY-07  
dFY-08 includes only ongoing grants, after FY-08 funds are embedded in the rest of the cost estimates 
eIncludes International Collaboration, Internal Commitments, SBIR/STTR, etc. 
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Table 2. GNEP Overall Milestones Projection 
 Date 
FY07 
Systems Integration and Analysis 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE January 2007 
FY-07 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2007 
Establish Partnership Knowledge Center (PKC) Steering Committee consisting of 
representatives inside and outside of the GNEP community. 
April 2007 
Initial GNEP waste form descriptions August 2007 
Small reactors requirements August 2007 
Report on waste form and waste process technology specific data developed to 
support an Integrated Waste Management Strategy 
August 2007 
DOE-NE technical input for Secretarial recommendation to congress on the need for 
a second repository 
September 2007 
Initial Qualitative Program Risk Factor Assessment September 2007 
GNEP deployment systems analysis September 2007 
LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies 
Complete Engineering Alternatives Study (EAS) inputs to the Programmatic 
environmental Impact Statement (PEIS) for a spent fuel recycling facility 
June 2007 
Provide input for industry engagement on conceptual design studies June 2007 
Develop remote contactor design concepts and initiate test component fabrication September 2007 
Transmutation Technologies 
Develop Reference commercial ABR Concept September 2007 
First mechanical tests performed on 155 dpa HT-9 Duct (AC)3) September 2007 
Transmutation Fuels and Separations Technologies 
AFCF 30% conceptual design for review January 2007 
Insert FUTURIX-FTA irradiation test in Phenix reactor (external) May 2007 
Begin ATR irradiation of metal transmutation fuels containing Ln September 2007 
Revision of fuels handbook/with available characterization data September 2007 
GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 
Select SMR technology for near-term deployment May 2007 
Complete initial needs/requirements assessments September 2007 
Modeling and Simulation 
Complete simulations of heat transport and oxygen diffusion coupled with thermal 
expansion in UO2 fuels with metal cladding 
September 2007 
Complete models of thermo-mechanical properties and phase stability of metal fuels September 2007 
Status report on oxide model development for SE2 September 2007 
Report on uncertainty quantification for selected ATWS sequences September 2007 
Status report on multiphysics coupling algorithms and their application to nuclear 
reactor simulation 
September 2007 
FY08 
Systems Integration and Analysis 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE December 2007 
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 Date 
GNEP Technical Requirements December 2007 
FY-08 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2008 
Input and support for NEPA alternatives and technology options evaluations March 2008 
Complete Input to 2008 Decision Package March 2008 
Integrated Waste Management Strategy March 2008 
Global Benefits Analysis of GNEP March 2008 
Report on evaluation of GNEP fuel cycle deployment options April 2008 
Report on initial assessment of global proliferation risk and GNEP impact May 2008 
Report on GNEP Facilities and Fuel Cycle Strategy June 2008 
Decision on startup fuel (oxide or metal) for fast reactor August 2008 
Implement pilot PKC that demonstrates multiple predefined use cases for specific 
applications. 
August 2008 
Evaluation of material management requirement for fuel take-back strategies September 2008 
Report on domestic and global demand for GNEP technology September 2008 
GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2008 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2008 
LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies 
Develop Tc solidification flowsheet and initiate bench-scale tests March 2008 
Support 30% completion of industrial conceptual designs April 2008 
Complete pilot-scale testing of Cs/Sr steam reforming process April 2008 
Complete EAS design package for review April 2008 
Develop instrumentation and control systems conceptual designs May 2008 
Initiate procurement of off gas system components for testing June 2008 
Demonstrate metallic waste form for cladding hulls incorporating technetium September 2008 
Transmutation Technologies 
Retrieve FFTF irradiated (up to 200 dpa) mechanical test specimens January 2008 
ABR Prototype Design Study Complete May 2008 
Sodium component testing infrastructure evaluation May 2008 
Initiate sodium component technology development evaluation September 2008 
Identification of Prototype Design Tools by Industrial Team September 2008 
Complete Study on Alternate Configurations Options September 2008 
Identify key experiments using representativity techniques September 2008 
Transmutation Fuels and Separations Technologies 
Complete AFCF system trade studies  April 2008 
Begin ATR irradiation of oxide transmutation fuels April 2008 
Establish a list of advanced instruments to be further developed for demonstration June 2008 
AFCF 70% Conceptual Design for Review September 2008 
Metal Fuel RFFL ready for operation September 2008 
Complete JOYO irradiation test plan September 2008 
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 Date 
Complete FUTURIX-FTA PIE plan September 2008 
SESAME framework completed September 2008 
GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 
Initial screening of next-generation SMR concepts March 2008 
Select next-generation SMR(s) for pre-conceptual design June 2008 
Modeling and Simulation 
Document the GNEP business (why) and functional (what) requirements for all 
Modeling and Simulation activities.  
December 2007 
Formal software releases in support of ABR design studies  September 2008 
GNEP System Level Planning Tool Design Document  September 2008 
FY09 
Systems Integration and Analysis 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE December 2008 
FY-09 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2009 
Report on evaluation of international implementation issues March 2009 
Detailed fuel cycle performance data for GNEP reference technology option July 2009 
Generate the specification for the hardware system necessary to support the PKC July 2009 
Databases that contain historical data not currently accessible from modern 
repositories will be developed and made available to PKC users 
August 2009 
Integrated total quantitative GNEP risk analysis September 2009 
Update GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2009 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2009 
Report on cost and performance experience for GNEP technologies September 2009 
LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies 
Develop initial waste formulation for fission product HLW  December  2008 
Develop reference off-gas treatment process January 2009 
Complete initial characterization of mixed transuranic solid product January 2009 
Initiate demonstration of remote waste form packaging March 2009 
Complete evaluation of HLW forms April 2009 
Complete initial demonstration of steam reforming Cs/Sr product May 2009 
Validate UREX process performance with solvent recycle  May  2009 
Complete demonstration of Tc solidification process May 2009 
Complete bench-scale demonstration of mixed transuranics solidification June 2009 
Complete bench-scale demonstration of Cs/Sr solidification technology  September 2009 
Complete initial integrated testing of separation processes with surrogates September 2009 
Support completion of conceptual design for nuclear fuel recycling center September 2009 
Transmutation Technologies 
Sodium Component Test Infrastructure Design/Build Start October 2008 
Retrieve Specimens from MATRIX irradiation in Phoenix Reactor November 2008 
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 Date 
Startup Fuel Fabrication Options Study with Down Selection January 2009 
Implementation Plan for TREAT Restart April 2009 
ABR Prototype Preliminary Hazards Analysis Complete June 2009 
ABR Prototype Conceptual Design Complete September 2009 
ABR Prototype CD-1 Approval September 2009 
Plan for Prototype Design Tools V&V September 2009 
Complete Initial Design Options Evaluation September 2009 
Produce new evaluations from and covariance for priority isotopes September 2009 
Transmutation Fuels and Separations Technologies 
Complete AFCF alternatives analysis strategy December 2008 
Acquisition strategy submittal for approval March 2009 
Complete CD-1 package for AFCF June 2009 
Complete FUTURIX-FTA irradiations (external) June 2009 
Develop baseline pyrochemical flowsheets for treating spent metal and oxide 
transmutation fuel 
July 2009 
Demonstrate feasibility of fast reactor MOX fuel to metal conversion by electrolytic 
reduction process 
August 2009 
Demonstrate metal fuel fabrication in RFFL’s September 2009 
Demonstrate feasibility of voloxidation of fast reactor MOX fuel September 2009 
Define framework for advanced control logic September 2009 
Evaluate alternative crucibles for TRU recovery September 2009 
GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 
Select near-term PRIMR design for safety evaluation support January 2009 
Modeling and Simulation 
M&S tools (legacy and developing) directly supporting the ABR will be identified, 
qualified through V&V assessments, and placed under configuration control in 
conformance with a QA plan. 
December 2008 
M&S tools (legacy and developing) directly supporting the CFTC will be identified, 
qualified through V&V assessments, and placed under configuration control in 
conformance with a QA plan.  
December 2008 
M&S tools (legacy and developing) directly supporting the AFCF will be identified, 
qualified through V&V assessments, and placed under configuration control in 
conformance with a QA plan.  
December 2008 
Formal V&V assessment of ABR software  March 2009 
Issue Initial GNEP System Level Planning Tool 1.0.  September 2009 
Formal software releases for ABR design studies  September 2009 
FY10 
Systems Integration and Analysis 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE December 2009 
FY-10 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2010 
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 Date 
Transition the pilot into the production level PKC August 2010 
Create a specification for the addition of future data sets into the PKC that will be 
automatically curated 
August 2010 
Update GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2010 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2010 
LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies 
Complete initial Cs/Sr waste form characterization October 2009 
Demonstrate off-gas treatment system and waste forms November 2009 
Complete bench-scale demonstration of fission product waste form March 2010 
Complete mockup testing of prototype head-end equipment July 2010 
Transmutation Technologies 
Code validation facilities plan October 2009 
Conceptual Design of Startup Fuel Fab Line January 2010 
Complete tensile and fracture toughness testing of FFTF irradiated materials January 2010 
Restart/construct required validation facilities September 2010 
Scaled demonstration of supercritical CO2 Brayton Cycle September 2010 
Prepare material specimens of advanced materials for JOYO irradiation September 2010 
Issue new revision of materials handbook with FFTF material data September 2010 
Perform uncertainty analysis with new covariance date September 2010 
Transmutation Fuels and Separations 
Oxide Fuel RFFL ready for operation December 2009 
Demonstrate scale-up of ceramic waste process March 2010 
Complete initial testing of synroc and zeolite waste forms for cesium/strontium April 2010 
Identify safeguards requirements for pyroprocessing facility May 2010 
Identify optimum fission product loading and decay heat for ceramic waste form May 2010 
Select product processing / consolidation technology for uranium product and TRU 
product 
August 2010 
Begin PIE of FUTURIX-FTA specimens (dependant upon external schedule) September 2010 
Develop Sphere-pac fuel design concepts September 2010 
Develop Dispersion fuel design concepts September 2010 
Complete Feasibility assessment of innovative processes (microwave, combustion) September 2010 
Identify and evaluate alternative product processing technologies selecting preferred 
alternative 
September 2010 
Establish preliminary TRU recovery process parameters September 2010 
Validate performance of novel crucible materials in cathode processor system September 2010 
Conduct feasibility studies for preferred alternative product processing  technology September 2010 
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 Date 
Establish a test bed with relevant environment for instrument testing September 2010 
GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 
Submit application for NRC design approval for near-term SMR September 2010 
Modeling and Simulation 
Conduct demonstration of simulation capabilities for ABR  December 2009 
Issue GNEP System Level Planning Tool 2.0.  June 2010 
FY11 
Systems Integration and Analysis 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE December 2010 
FY-11 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2011 
First Release of New Systems Level Planning Tool August 2011 
Per need-to-know, extend PKC user base to include universities and private industry August 2011 
Update GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2011 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2011 
LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies 
Demonstrate process monitoring and control system for separation processes May 2011 
Convert AMUSE code to higher level platform, and incorporate transients July 2011 
Support completion of preliminary design for nuclear fuel recycling center September 2011 
Transmutation Technologies 
ABR Prototype Preliminary Safety Analysis Report Complete April 2011 
Preliminary Design of Startup Fuel Fab Line July 2011 
Initiate Validation Studies for Advanced Methods September 2011 
Transmutation Fuels and Separations Technologies 
Begin ATR irradiation of remotely fabricated fuels October 2010 
TRU metal-fuel specimens for JOYO fabricated in RFFL December 2010 
Complete voloxidation demonstration and make go/no go decision of inclusion in 
initial UREX+ testing. 
April 2011 
Develop process simulation model for treating spent advanced burner reactor fuel August 2011 
AFCF 70% preliminary design review September 2011 
Start ATR irradiation of dispersion, sphere-pac fuels, targets September 2011 
Complete Nitride fuel fabrication process baseline design September 2011 
Demonstrate electrorefining with salt containing a high TRU concentration September 2011 
Initial model for AFCF aqueous processing module September 2011 
GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 
Down-select to 2 next-generation SMR conceptual designs January 2011 
Modeling and Simulation 
GNEP System Level Planning Tool 3.0 March 2011 
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 Date 
FY12 
Systems Integration and Analysis 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE December 2011 
FY-12 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2012 
Update GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2012 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2012 
Decision on Transmutation Fuel for Fast Reactor September 2012 
LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies 
Complete initial characterization of high-level waste forms July 2012 
Transmutation Technologies 
Complete mechanical testing of specimens from MATRIX irradiation (advanced 
materials irradiated up to 70 dpa) 
November 2011 
Validate multiscale materials performance modeling code February 2012 
ABR Prototype Preliminary Design Complete April 2012 
ABR Prototype CD-2 Approve Performance Baseline May 2012 
Complete Validation of First Improved Structural Material September 2012 
Transmutation Fuels and Separations Technologies 
Begin ATR irradiation for high temperature limits October 2011 
Domestic fast spectrum rodlet irradiation capability available December 2011 
Evaluate UREX+1a flowsheet for transmutation fuel  August 2012 
Demonstrate on-line product recovery from uranium electrorefiner system August 2012 
Complete AFCF preliminary design September 2012 
Ship initial fuel for JOYO irradiations  September 2012 
Complete ATR irradiations of dispersion and sphere-pac fuels, targets September 2012 
Down-select instrumentation for initial demonstration September 2012 
Initial demonstration of advanced control logic September 2012 
Initial model for AFCF pyroprocessing module September 2012 
GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 
Award up to two contracts for conceptual designs of next-generation SMR March 2012 
Modeling and Simulation 
GNEP System Level Planning Tool 4.0  September 2012 
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2.0 Systems Integration and Analysis 
The Systems Integration and Analysis Activity serves three purposes, which taken together, guide and 
enable the GNEP program: 
• Technical Integration, which supports DOE program management of GNEP, risk management 
and decision management.  Technical integration includes ensuring close collaboration between 
the facility projects, technology development, and R&D.  The following two activities provide 
the analysis support for this activity. 
• System Analysis of the deployment of GNEP facilities beyond the CFTC, ABR, and AFCF, 
including the global system. Analysis is undertaken of a variety of deployment system 
alternatives and continually evaluates the predicted performance of various deployment 
systems as new performance and cost data come available 
• System Analysis of the first GNEP facilities (CFTC, ABR, AFCF), where these facilities and 
the system to support them, as well as the technology choices employed to implement the 
system, are reevaluated throughout their development to ensure that the optimum technology 
path is being followed and to allow for a structured decision making approach. 
Technical Integration will ensure the coordination of the GNEP program.  The systems analysis activities 
will build on previous nuclear fuel cycle analyses conducted in the U.S. by the AFCI program, as well as 
international nuclear systems analyses. These analyses will require integration of information from the 
diverse technology development and R&D efforts. High-level systematic assessment of GNEP 
technology and deployment options will be conducted to guide and confirm program decisions. In 
addition, key factors contributing to overall programmatic schedule, cost, and risk will be identified and 
quantified.  
The systems analyses activities are keyed to the 2008 Secretarial decision and the overall success of the 
program. 
2.1 Technical Integration 
DOE has designated the INL as the lead for Technical Integration (TI) of GNEP. The objective of TI is to 
provide optimal efficiency to GNEP by coordinating the various technical tasks towards achieving the 
common GNEP goals, and by providing support to program management in the areas of budget and 
financial controls and programmatic review. 
The activities described in Sections 2.2 through 2.6 provide the analyses needed to define the program 
requirements and identify program risks and key decisions. This activity provides the overall technical 
coordination for the program, using this information to provide risk management, decision making 
support, interface coordination, and program and project integration. 
The GNEP Technical Integration function will provide support to DOE, which has overall management 
responsibility for the program, including program communications, mission requirements management, 
and decision management. Technical Integration will assist DOE in maintaining focus of the GNEP 
mission. A number of key decisions will be required to focus the program, including early decisions on 
primary features of the facility projects and risk management decisions as the program proceeds. 
Technical Integration will support DOE in the decision-making process, including coordination of review 
teams and support to the Assistant Secretary for Nuclear Energy as needed. Technical Integration is also 
the primary source for communications and overall program information. 
The Technical Integration activity will integrate the information from the GNEP systems analyses, which 
implicitly integrate information from the other parts of the GNEP program. The systems analysis results 
will be synthesized to guide and confirm program decisions. In addition, key factors contributing to 
GNEP Technology Development Plan 29 
July 25, 2007   
 
overall programmatic schedule, cost, and risk will be identified and quantified. This activity will also be 
responsible for reporting, as required, to the Department of Energy, Congress, etc. 
Technical Integration will support the technical input to the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
process, including comparison with alternatives considered in the Programmatic Environmental  
Impact Statement (PEIS). In conjunction with the GNEP timeline for a decision on the GNEP path 
forward in June FY08, input and integration support will be provided for the CD-1 packages for GNEP 
facilities; and a Report to Congress on GNEP Facility and Fuel Cycle Strategies is anticipated in the same 
time frame. In addition, to facilitate communication within GNEP, annual program reports will be 
developed to communicate highlights within the technology development areas and international 
partnerships. Finally, the integration area will also provide coordination and oversight of the system 
analysis activities.  
The three facility projects (the CFTC, ABR, and AFCF) must be tightly coordinated, together with the 
technology development that supports them. Each facility is part of a large system, and the requirements 
of the technology associated with one facility affect the requirements for each of the others.  The GNEP 
Technical Integrator will work with DOE to ensure consistency and compatibility of detailed 
requirements, schedules, and associated budgets and management of project interfaces. 
Another role of this integration activity is to provide risk assessment for the complex GNEP program. 
GNEP technologies will continue to mature, and the facility capabilities will adapt to changing 
circumstances and lessons learned. By intent, GNEP considers the global fuel cycle with a range of 
locations, technologies, economic systems, regulatory structures, waste criteria, and related factors. Thus, 
it is important to apply modern risk assessment techniques to assess both the program and deployment 
risks. In particular, an identification of the key risk contributors can help focus GNEP activities.  
Technical Integration will assist DOE with risk management for the program; ensuring risks associated 
with the program have been identified, analyzed and mitigated. Risk management is concerned with 
future events, whose exact outcome is unknown, and how to deal with these uncertainties. Risk is a 
measure of the potential inability to achieve overall program objectives within defined scope, cost, 
schedule, and technical constraints. The two components of risk are the likelihood of failing to achieve a 
particular outcome and the consequences of failing to achieve that outcome. The GNEP-TDP will follow 
the risk management principles of DOE Order 413.3, including the development of a risk management 
plan. 
An initial qualitative risk factor assessment will be conducted (prior to the 2008 decision by the Secretary 
of Energy), covering the technology development, design, and construction activities. This assessment 
will be based on the project schedule and cost baselines provided in this GNEP technology development 
plan. This risk assessment provides baseline data for an updated quantitative assessment as the program 
evolves.  
The GNEP Technical Leads for the facilities and technology development will participate in the technical 
evaluations and risk assessment for the program, including coordination of technology development 
activities and alternatives management. While the primary function of the Technical Leads is focused on 
their individual technology development areas, they are important participants in the Integration activities. 
An important role of this activity is to manage the information produced by the program. Because data 
resulting from experiments, analysis, and reports are expected to reach the petabyte level, a distributed 
Partnership Knowledge Center (PKC) will be implemented.  The PKC includes participants from ten 
DOE national laboratories where several areas of expertise will be integrated into one open-source 
distributed framework. This framework will allow the sharing of data and execution of programs, 
interoperability and collaborative workflow between sites, government, and private enterprise, as well as 
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operating system access control across firewalls to maintain individual site and data security.  This 
activity will provide a central repository for detailed information that meets quality and configuration 
control requirements including the preparation of periodic and requested reports to the DOE and 
Congress.  
The PKC will be implemented to benefit the GNEP program including the scientists within the modeling 
and simulation community. At the highest level, the PKC will make available the information required to 
assess and analyze the accuracy of advanced nuclear energy systems and associated future capabilities. It 
will utilize the best-in-class data management technologies from each of the ten laboratories to solve 
some of the most difficult data management challenges. Specifically the PKC will:  
• Establish a virtual knowledge center to manage (identify, describe, format, integrate, collect, 
protect, and disseminate) all forms of data to enable analysis relevant to the overall goals of the 
NE program. 
• Lead the national and international efforts to adopt, develop, and maintain the standardization 
of critical data and metadata formats to validate and improve data accuracy, consistency, and 
accessibility.   
• Establish GNEP collaboration architecture for sharing data and information within the 
partnership through the adoption and support of open protocols, tools, services, and distributed 
data resources. 
• Identify and resolve access control issues including those arising from export controlled and 
proprietary information.   
The Technical Integration activity is essential to the coordination of the complex GNEP program.  
Technical integration is responsible for close collaboration between the facility projects, technology 
development, and R&D through coordination of the other campaigns with multiple participants, including 
national laboratories, industry, and universities.   In summary, the Technical Integration activities include 
the following: 
• TI guides systems analyses tasks to ensure that GNEP technologies are optimized for meeting 
the GNEP objectives 
• TI develops review mechanisms for the program to ensure overall coordination and consistency 
with the program objectives 
• TI establishes processes that allow for the integration of novel technical concepts in the 
program 
• TI manages the technical risk of the GNEP technologies by developing strategies that prioritize 
technical work and provide for risk mitigating alternatives  
• TI completes and updates at regular intervals the TDP 
• TI focuses the R&D on key issues for the 2008 secretarial decision 
• TI develops and implements a campaign structure within GNEP that takes full advantage of the 
opportunities offered by modeling and simulation 
• TI coordinates GNEP technology work with fundamental aspects that are studied by the Office 
of Science 
• TI provides an overview of technology alternatives and recommends their inclusion in the 
program 
GNEP Technology Development Plan 31 
July 25, 2007   
 
• TI establishes a technology baseline and maintains configuration control 
• TI develops a detailed GNEP Technology Roadmap 
• TI supports the development of an international collaborative framework 
• TI supports DOE in developing an effective communication strategy 
TI is also responsible for supporting DOE in key program management tasks: 
• TI reviews and coordinates all campaigns and work packages, insures consistency and 
eliminates redundancies 
• TI establishes an integrated schedule for the program and ensures consistency in the timelines 
of all campaigns and projects 
• TI ensures that program baselines including those of technical activities, cost, and schedule are 
established and maintained. 
• TI provides a monthly detailed review of financial data, conducts variance analyses based on 
financial data and technical progress, and provides recommendations for corrective actions to 
DOE 
• TI leads the national efforts to adopt, develop, and maintain the standardization of critical data 
and metadata formats to validate and improve data accuracy, consistency, and accessibility 
• TI leads the efforts to identify and resolve access control issues including those arising from 
export controlled and proprietary information  
• TI leads the efforts to ensure that the proper mechanisms and tools exist that will allow 
scientists and engineers to access information, collaborate, and have a common platform that 
enables them to make informed decisions 
• TI establishes program wide standards for documentation and records control and ensures that 
these standards are followed 
• TI establishes QA standards consistent with DOE practices and program objectives 
The Technical Integrator provides overall leadership to this process. He is assisted by two Deputies. This 
team provides overall technical leadership to the program and ensures coordination through the campaign 
directors. A technical integration office will be established that supports all program management tasks, 
and will assemble the key personnel for financial planning and control, information science and 
engineering, communication, QA and documentation control. 
2.2 Systems Analysis to Support GNEP Deployment 
Deployment systems analyses will be conducted to assess the performance impact of GNEP technologies 
in the domestic and global context with respect to future deployment. Favorable deployment strategies 
will be identified and the potential means to optimize their performance will be explored. The four major 
analysis areas are fuel cycle analysis, waste disposition analysis, economic analysis, and proliferation risk 
analysis using the approach defined in Section 2.4.1. 
The first Deployment Systems Analysis will be completed in FY 2007. The results of this analysis will 
drive the performance requirements for the technologies and criteria for system technology selection. 
There will be large uncertainties in some areas (costs, for example), and this information will help target 
where more information is needed from the technology and facility development program. The 
Deployment Systems Analysis will be updated yearly. 
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The dynamic fuel cycle analyses will address global fuel cycle strategies. The first step is to extend the 
existing domestic AFCI fuel cycle model to a regional/global fuel cycle. The impact of existing 
infrastructure and eventual transition to GNEP technology will be evaluated for current nuclear fuel cycle 
countries (e.g., Japan and France). The fuel cycle dynamics between fuel cycle and reactor states will also 
be explored for a variety of nuclear growth scenarios. Alternate fuel cycle scenarios based on differing 
international paradigms or deployment strategies will be identified. The impact of international options 
with different technology decisions (e.g., LWR recycle, plutonium separation), and impact of specific 
deployment strategies (e.g., different cooling times, reactor types, fuel burnup, etc) will be assessed. 
In the longer-term, a comprehensive evaluation of fuel cycle impacts for transuranic recycle will be 
conducted. The fuel fabrication, handling, and storage impacts will be quantified, with a focus on safety 
parameters such as worker dose, criticality, and shielding requirements. This analysis provides important 
data for the AFCF project, in particular. The impact of uncertainties on the reactor and fuel cycle 
performance, such as separations efficiencies in the recycling plant, will also be assessed. Furthermore, 
the identification and evaluation of fuel cycle scenarios will continue as the GNEP technology nears 
deployment, and the generation of consistent fuel cycle data will be required.  
Waste disposal, material storage, and transportation analyses will evaluate how GNEP technology can 
optimize the future management of used nuclear fuel, high-level radioactive waste, and other storage and 
waste forms. This includes evaluating both potential impact and remaining uncertainties of closing the 
fuel cycle on the evolution of waste management, including potential repository benefits. 
In the longer term, waste disposition analyses will investigate the waste disposal impact of refined GNEP 
waste forms and repository design, and perform optimization studies of the storage/transportation and 
materials management. In addition, global fuel cycle approaches related to spent fuel take-back and 
alternative international technologies (and disposal sites) will be addressed, including the deployment of 
reactors in developing countries.  
In the economic analyses, international implementation issues will be explored in detail, including the 
cost of international facilities, partnership agreement impacts, and financing options.  The cost estimate 
data will be updated as the GNEP technology and facility activities progress. In addition, uncertainty 
analyses will be performed to generate realistic contingency values for facility life cycle costs. The 
economic analyses will include: 
• GNEP Deployment Options 
o Projection of ultimate life cycle costs as facilities progress from “1st-of-a-kind (FOAK)” 
to more mature “Nth-of-a-kind” (NOAK) status. 
o Evaluation of economic impact of various ownership/financing options. 
• GNEP International Deployment Options 
o Calculation of U.S. dollar-based life cycle costs for fuel cycle facilities constructed and 
operated in “full fuel cycle service” nations such as Japan, Russia, France, etc. 
o Calculation of U.S. dollar-based life cycle costs for small nuclear power reactors 
constructed in “user” nations where fuel cycle services are provided. 
o Support of economic analysis of an overall “supplier-user” international GNEP system, 
including international transportation, safeguards compliance, and economic 
compatibility of international facilities. 
o Estimation of the economic impact of safeguards and security (including positive 
economic impact) required to ensure nonproliferation objectives are met.  
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For the proliferation risk analysis, feedback will be provided to GNEP technology designers regarding 
means to reduce the overall fuel cycle proliferation risk. Refinements of the proliferation risk measures 
will be incorporated into the systems dynamic analysis tools. In addition, the global fuel cycle 
proliferation risk evaluations will be continually updated, and specific regional analyses will be 
conducted. 
2.3 Systems Analysis to Support First GNEP Facilities 
This activity will analyze the technology choices for the first GNEP facilities, and identify alternatives 
and the underlying R&D that will be needed to successfully design, build, and operate these facilities. 
This will be an ongoing activity that takes information learned in the technology and facility development 
activities. This analysis will identify where reorientation of the GNEP system may be needed, and provide 
technology level integration. 
Finally, the technologies must operate together as a system to achieve the GNEP program objectives. 
System optimization must consider the proposed technologies and how they will interact with the U.S. 
infrastructure. Implementation of spent nuclear fuel recycling significantly alters the requirements for 
transportation, storage and disposal of nuclear materials. The once-through cycle requires extensive 
transportation of intact commercial spent nuclear fuel from reactors to a repository, interim storage at 
reactor or other sites, and eventual disposal of intact spent nuclear fuel in a geologic repository. Recycle 
brings changes to each of these requirements and adds new ones for storage and transport of the recycle 
products and disposal of waste streams. The broad scope of the recycle system will require consideration 
of these solutions from a systems viewpoint to ensure the whole system is optimized. This will introduce 
detailed requirements on the nature of the waste forms produced from the separations and recycle 
facilities. 
2.4 Development of Technical Requirements 
An important role of systems analysis is to define the requirements for the development and deployment 
of the technologies that are necessary to meet the GNEP mission. Thus, the end result of the systems 
analyses described here is to specify technical requirements. These requirements quantify the GNEP 
mission and guide the important technology decisions. 
2.4.1 GNEP Deployment System Requirements 
Having identified reference system architecture for the GNEP system, a second tier of decisions 
concerning technology choices can be made. These decisions are based upon technical requirements 
derived from the general goals of the GNEP program and other considerations such as U.S. proliferation 
policy, U.S. environmental laws, and good engineering and business practicesa. 
These considerations result in seven technical requirements that must be met by the GNEP deployment 
system of technologies:  
1. The system must be protective of public health, safety, and the environment through up-front 
consideration in design and incorporation of integrated safety and environmental 
management systems in accordance with applicable polices, directives, regulations and 
statutes throughout all phases of the life-cycle. 
2. The system must result in a significant improvement in repository utilization, preferably 
avoiding the need for a second geologic repository this century. 
 
a The GNEP Technical Requirements Document is under development. 
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3. The system must allow for adoption of optimized waste management strategies for safe, 
timely, and economic disposition of waste materials, including use of appropriate waste 
reduction technologies and technologies for producing robust waste forms. 
4. The system must make available the energy value of separated materials for future use. 
5. The system must reduce proliferation risk compared to a future global system based on 
nuclear fuel recycling technologies currently in use in other countries today. 
6. The system must be deployable in a timeframe so as to reassert U.S. leadership, and 
influence fuel cycle development worldwide (20-25 years). 
7. The system must remain as economical as possible. 
2.4.2 System Requirements for Initial GNEP Facilities  
The requirements identified in Section 2.4.1 lead to the technical requirements that the GNEP system 
must meet to be acceptable. 
The first requirement ensures that the GNEP system meets health, safety and environmental laws. 
The second requirement addresses the technical capacity of a representative repository, which is limited 
by a set of criteria that include a maximum dose rate, maximum temperature at the drift wall, and 
maximum temperature at the mid-point between drifts.  Studies have been conducteda that demonstrate 
that the technical capacity of a geologic repository can be dramatically increased by the following 
strategy: 
• The transuranic elements that generate long term heat loads and almost the entire long-term 
dose need to be destroyed through a transmutation process. 
• The cesium and strontium isotopes that dominate the short term heat loads need to be separated 
from the spent nuclear fuel for separate management such as decay storage until low activity 
levels are reached or for disposal in a facility optimized for short-term but high-heat-generation 
wastes. 
• Appropriate wastes forms need to be developed that allow volume reduction and/or packaging 
changes to account for the reduced heat load. 
The potential increase of repository utilization depends on the efficiency of separating cesium, strontium 
and the transuranic elements. Eliminating 99% of cesium and strontium and 99% of all transuranics 
would result in a potential for ~90 times capacity increase for a typical repository, based on repository 
thermal design goals. These are then chosen as technical criteria for the separations technology. 
The third requirement derives from the waste minimization goal and translates directly into a requirement 
that the LWR spent nuclear fuel separations facility not produce any high-level liquid waste streams. 
Other facilities will be required to minimize waste streams. 
The fourth requirement leads to criteria that the transuranics must be isolated for future destruction, or 
destroyed immediately, and that the uranium, which forms the bulk of the spent nuclear fuel, must be 
recovered at a level of purity (greater than 99.9% efficiency of recovery) that enables it to be easily stored 
for future use or eventual efficient disposal. 
The fifth requirement is that the level of proliferation risk must conform to U.S. policy. In particular the 
system must not include or encourage the separation of pure plutonium. The whole system architecture 
 
a Separations and Transmutation Criteria to Improve Utilization of a Geologic Repository, Nuclear Technology, Vol. 154, p. 95 
(2006). 
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should utilize a combination of intrinsic proliferation risk reduction features, safeguards technologies and 
physical protection features to ensure that materials remain unattractive and are very difficult to divert, 
and that equipment is very difficult to misuse. 
The sixth requirement, that the system must be deployable in a timeframe so as to reassert U.S. leadership 
and influence fuel cycle development, drives the selection of only those technologies that can be 
implemented in the near-term with minimum technical risk.  However, once such leadership is regained, 
maintaining it over the long term requires robust ongoing R&D toward more advanced technologies. 
The seventh requirement is a general constraint on the system. 
2.4.3 Requirements for Internationally Deployed Reactors 
Success of the full GNEP strategy requires that many countries forgo development of full fuel cycle 
capabilities in return for assurance of fuel supply and take back for nuclear reactors in their country. Of 
particular significance will be developing countries whose economies are growing and whose 
corresponding demand for power and energy is increasing rapidly. If these countries are to avail 
themselves of the benefits of nuclear power, and install less fossil burning capacity, there must be 
products geared to these markets.  Because many countries in the developing world do not have extensive 
electricity grids, current commercially-available Generation III reactors are unsuitable due to their size, 
cost, and complexity.  Therefore new types of reactors must be developed for international deployment 
that are “right-sized” for developing countries, and that are based on technologies, designs, and policies 
focused on reducing proliferation risk. 
Studies are underway to develop an overview of the current energy supply and demand picture in 
countries representing potential GNEP participants (Poland, Korea, and Brazil are used as representative 
of potential participants), addressing the supply and end use markets.  These studies include the review of 
estimates of future demand and supply, including the need for new electricity generation and alternatives 
for achieving that generation.  Current government policy and market structures are being analyzed, 
especially in the electricity sector.  This will enable the identification of opportunities for deployment of a 
new nuclear power facility consistent with the country energy projections that could be implemented in a 
manner that meets the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP) goals and objectives. 
Many countries have reactor systems under development that address these markets (Argentina, South 
Africa, Russia, Japan, and South Korea are all examples). These reactors have been developed 
independently and have not been assessed from a GNEP requirements perspective. 
GNEP systems analysis will perform a requirements study for internationally deployed reactors to inform 
any recommendation on a path forward for the U.S. in this arena. Such a study will require extensive 
international participation and may take advantage of the existence of international organizations such as 
the Generation IV International Forum and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) -led 
International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO).  Section 6 describes the 
program to develop and demonstrate reactors for international deployment. 
2.5 Systems Integration Tools and Approaches 
There are two types of systems analyses within the Systems Integration task:  an analysis of the 
deployment system and an analysis of the first GNEP system and facilities. The results of these analyses 
will be used in Technical Integration and will provide the foundation for performance requirements of the 
facilities. The analyses will require similar approaches, and will initially be performed using existing 
tools.  The tools will be continually updated (as will the analyses) as information becomes available from 
the technology development program. The systems analysis tools as well as all other tools, will be 
appropriately benchmarked (and some will go through formal verification and validation) as discussed in 
Section 6. 
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As technology refinements are developed and GNEP alternatives are identified for evaluation, key 
technical questions will be addressed and solved. This will result in the generation of new performance 
data for new scenarios and the evolution of refined techniques for quantifying nuclear fuel cycle 
performance. Tools used for Systems Analysis will range from simplified repository performance models 
to specific reactor transmutation depletion analysis to complex dynamic models. In the AFCI systems 
analysis activity, a sustained multi-laboratory team has developed a comprehensive set of analysis tools 
for evaluating the nuclear fuel cycle. Quantification of the fuel cycle benefits often requires a detailed 
performance evaluation of specific issues (i.e., reactor safety, repository thermal behavior) and/or the 
development of large, well validated database (e.g., unit costs). Furthermore; these analyses must provide 
a systematic comparison of fuel cycle scenarios and alternatives. The primary technical areas for these 
performance evaluations are fuel cycle analysis, waste disposition analysis, economic analysis, and 
proliferation risk analysis, as described below. The performance data and identified key parameters from 
the detailed analyses comprise the initial data and comparison basis for the Verifiable Fuel Cycle 
Simulation Model (VISION) a code that has been developed in the AFCI program to model the complete 
fuel cycle. 
VISION is a computer-based simulation model that performs dynamic simulations of fuel cycles to 
quantify infrastructure requirements and identify key trade-offs between alternatives. VISION is intended 
to serve as a broad systems analysis and study tool applicable to work conducted as part of the AFCI and 
Generation IV reactor development studies. The model tracks the mass flow of nuclear materials within 
the fuel cycle and includes different types of delays and feedbacks associated with the construction of 
nuclear facilities and the decisions to build such facilities. The model provides several time-dependent 
outputs including mass, long-term heat intervals, long-term dose, total Pu-239, Pu-239/total Pu, and Pu-
239 equivalent masses. For recycle fuels, the model’s major flow control is the availability of elemental 
Pu to make recycle fuels. In FY 2006, the VISION model added (1) isotopic flow control and decay, (2) 
additional data from transmutation analyses (3) simplified models for fuel separation and fabrication, (4) 
cost parameters, and (5) increased flexibility in transitions and combinations of individual fuel cycle 
technologies. 
The VISION model will be updated, and additional tools will be developed under the Modeling and 
Simulation Activity (see Section 6). An important metric will be the reduction of uncertainties in the 
analyses using VISION (and other models). More sophisticated models as well as better data (available 
through the technology and development program) will be used to inform the 2008 Secretarial decision.  
The following sections describe the types of analyses that will be done to support Systems Integration. 
2.5.1 Analytic Approaches 
A variety of systems analyses are required to assess the viability, performance, and dynamic impact of 
diverse nuclear fuel cycle technology options. There are four major areas identified for specific systems 
analyses: 
• Fuel cycle analysis 
• Waste disposition analysis 
• Economic analysis 
• Proliferation risk analysis. 
 
a. A. M. Yacout, et al., Waste Management 2006 Conference, Tucson, Arizona, February 26 – March 2, 2006.  
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2.5.1.1 Fuel Cycle Analysis 
The purpose of this task is to systematically assess the fuel cycle performance of proposed GNEP 
technology and implementation options. Results of previous and ongoing fuel cycle analyses will be 
synthesized, and key programmatic systems inquiries regarding fuel cycle materials and reactor 
performance will be answered. In addition, detailed fuel cycle analyses will be performed to address key 
performance measures and fuel cycle impacts.  
Furthermore, dynamics analyses will examine the timing and interaction of fuel cycle system 
components, including feedbacks from each facility change, option change, or decision; time lags 
between decisions and impacts; and how the system is expected to respond to changes. The current AFCI 
fuel cycle models must be extended for global nuclear fuel cycle analysis. A wide variety of scenarios for 
future nuclear energy capacity (both domestic and international), GNEP deployment strategies, and 
international technologies will be considered. Furthermore, the uncertainties in process, reactor, and waste 
disposal performance will be evaluated. 
These analyses will provide the consistent fuel cycle data required by the integration, waste disposal, 
economics, and proliferation risk analysis activities. To complement the detailed design work conducted 
for the facilities, expected variations of the GNEP fuel cycle implementation will be analyzed. For each 
study, the GNEP simulation tools will be adapted to the specific scenario, and fuel cycle performance data 
(material compositions, mass flows, inventories, etc.) will be generated for use in the dynamic analysis or 
other Systems Analysis areas. 
Some of the specific types of analyses and scenarios to be analyzed include the following: 
• Impact of fuel cycle on resource utilization. 
• Impact of different selections for ABR fuel type, ABR fuel separation technology (UREX+1a, 
pyroprocessing), and degree of centralization of ABR fuel separation. 
• Technical trade-off between sending waste residual after separations back to “reactor states” or 
kept and disposed in “fuel cycle states.” 
• Examination of options for uranium disposition, as waste (possibly low-level in the U.S.), 
storage for use in future fast reactors, use in CANDU reactors, or re-enrichment and re-
fabrication for use in Light Water Reactors (LWR). 
• Impact of adding different reactor types (e.g., gas reactors or other Generation-IV systems) to 
the U.S. baseline of Boiling Water Reactors and Pressurized Water Reactors. 
• Impact of planned retirement of the existing global nuclear infrastructure – power plants, 
uranium mines, conversion plants, enrichment plants, separation plants, and fuel fabrication 
plants. 
• Impact of planned new facilities, especially those envisioned as part of GNEP. 
The dynamic analyses will evaluate the timing and material flows for application of the GNEP facilities. 
The impact of changes in schedule and performance will be assessed. In addition, technology options will 
be considered to support the NEPA evaluations. This work will culminate in a FY08 report on the 
evaluation of GNEP facility options.  
2.5.1.2 Waste Disposition Analysis 
Waste disposal, material storage, and transportation analyses will assess the management of the material 
streams used or generated within GNEP. This includes evaluation of separated product streams for 
eventual reuse and waste streams for eventual disposal. GNEP activities and facilities are likely to 
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produce several different types of waste, each of which must be analyzed in a systematic, comprehensive 
manner. This includes evaluating both potential impact and remaining uncertainties of closing the fuel 
cycle on the evolution of waste management, including potential repository benefits such as increased 
technical capacity from reduction in decay heat, improved performance from reduced long-term 
radiotoxicity and dose per unit of energy generated, and increased repository design flexibility. 
This analysis area is the focal point for technical integration and cooperation between the GNEP and the 
U.S. geologic repository program, and will be used to maximize the benefit to both programs. This 
cooperation is needed to evaluate repository design alternatives with technical potential for dramatic 
improvements in capacity and performance. The analyses will build off of the fuel cycle analyses 
discussed above and also incorporate all aspects of waste storage (temporary) and disposal (permanent), 
material storage, and transportation. This supports future decisions on the implementation of GNEP such 
as the ability of a single geologic repository to support expansion of domestic nuclear energy use. An 
important product of these systems analyses and the cooperation with the U.S. geologic repository 
program will be technical input for the Secretarial recommendation to Congress on the need for a second 
repository. 
Within planned GNEP activities and facilities, there are a variety of material storage, transportation, and 
waste disposal requirements. This activity will also evaluate alternatives for meeting these requirements, 
including storage of radioactive material prior to processing, reuse or disposal, transportation of material 
between GNEP facilities, and disposal of GNEP wastes. Current storage and transportation cask designs 
and procedures must be evaluated for GNEP use. Alternative storage and transportation strategies to 
reduce cost and schedule of packaging and transportation of waste will also be evaluated.  
An important activity within analysis is the development of an integrated waste management strategy for 
the GNEP fuel cycle.  This strategy will ensure an optimized, safe, acceptable pathway is available for 
disposition of all wastes.  Separation of the components of spent fuel enables tailored management to be 
developed for each component.  Development of the strategy includes evaluation of all separated streams, 
byproducts, and process wastes from fuel fabrication, reactor operation, and spent fuel separations.  
Options for disposition of each stream are assessed, including recycle or disposal pathways, appropriate 
waste forms, and conversion and transportation requirements. 
The integrated waste management strategy will also assess the impact of regulations on disposition 
options. This will include assessing differences in waste classification between the U.S. and other nations 
which impact the purity requirements for separated materials. It will also include analyses to inform 
policy makers of areas where current regulations were developed before information was available on the 
unique characteristics of separated materials. In these areas, regulatory changes may be warranted to help 
optimize the commercial fuel cycle and safe disposition of all materials. 
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2.5.1.3 Economics Analysis 
Economic analysis, including a considerable cost estimation effort, is an activity that cross-cuts many 
elements of the GNEP program, including the demonstration facilities. Program funding requirements 
must be generated from credible cost estimates to satisfy program sponsors. The economic analysis will 
require input from the GNEP facility designers and architect-engineer contractors. Where appropriate, life 
cycle cost analyses will be conducted to demonstrate the economic consequences of major decisions. The 
Economic Analysis activity will be closely integrated with other Systems Analysis subgroups and the 
Modeling and Simulation activity, especially in the area of defining the nature of the economic outputs 
generated by simulation models. Work will also be coordinated with the Generation IV Reactor Systems 
Economic Modeling Working Group, which is looking at international reactor options. Among the type of 
analyses and results expected are the following: 
• Projected life cycle costs for major GNEP facilities (domestic “capability demonstration” 
facilities, domestic and international commercial facilities) 
• Year by year spending profiles for selected GNEP scenarios 
• Projected unit costs of electricity from burner and small modular reactors with breakdown of 
capital, fuel cycle, and operating costs 
In the near-term, economics activities are oriented mainly toward assisting the selection of the most 
economical, reliable, and productive technologies for the facilities envisioned by GNEP. To this end, the 
AFCI cost database will be continually updated and integrated into the dynamic fuel cycle model. In 
addition, a “lessons learned” report on cost and performance experience in the areas of fast reactors, 
commercial spent fuel reprocessing facilities, recycle fuel fabrication, and major waste handling facilities 
will compile historical information on facilities such as THORP, Rokkashomura, LaHague, FFTF and 
BN-600.  During initial NEPA planning, support will be provided to scenario formulation and the 
development of data requirements for socio-economics, transportation, and life-cycle cost analysis. In 
addition, the initial estimate of domestic and international demand for the GNEP technology will be 
conducted.  
2.5.1.4 Proliferation Risk Analysis 
An important requirement for the GNEP fuel cycle is that it employs separations and recycling 
technology that will reduce overall proliferation risk relative to a future global system based on 
technologies in use outside of the U.S. today. The main principles being followed to achieve this goal are 
1) to facilitate global nuclear power expansion without the spread of enrichment and separations 
technology, 2) to use processes that do not separate plutonium from the other materials, and 3) to 
minimize the time in the overall system where the radiation levels associated with the plutonium-bearing 
materials are low. The safeguards technology for the separations and fuel fabrication facilities will be 
addressed in the specific facility design tasks and the tools for the evaluation of proliferation risk and 
physical protection at these facilities will be addressed in the Safeguards crosscutting activity (see Section 
8). 
These analyses will be utilized to provide an ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness of the complete 
GNEP fuel cycle relative to proliferation resistance, as compared to current and developing global 
alternatives. The initial work will develop a reference assessment of global civilian nuclear power 
conditions. An initial set of measures for proliferation risk will be identified, and a reference assessment 
of global proliferation risk from civilian nuclear power activities will be performed. Using this evaluation, 
the potential impact of using GNEP facilities on a global scale will be determined, with feedback 
provided to the GNEP FY 2008 decision. 
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The results of these analyses should provide an assessment of the potential global impact of GNEP. They 
should also allow judgments to be made on an ongoing basis as to the suitability of the current GNEP 
directions, and to guide alterations or modifications to planned GNEP activities to best address 
developing global conditions. As more sophisticated proliferation risk analysis tools become available, 
earlier results will be updated to provide a dynamic assessment of the impact of GNEP technology. 
2.6 Systems Analysis Support to 2008 Decision on GNEP Path Forward 
The systems analysis activity will provide important information in support of the 2008 Secretarial 
Decision on the path forward for GNEP. By this date, several systems analysis activities will be 
completed and products produced: 
• Detailed system dynamic studies will be performed to evaluate the planned path forward and 
identify possible impediments. These studies will include size, timing, and configuration of 
storage, separations, fuel fabrication, reactors, material transportation paths, and waste 
disposal. These dynamic studies will lead into system optimization studies that incorporate 
technical and regulatory issues. 
• The economic data and associated uncertainties that have been accumulated by the program 
will be used for economic studies that assess the value of GNEP both in financial terms, and in 
external benefits (sustainability, carbon emissions, etc.). 
• A waste management strategy will be completed that identifies the path of each waste stream, 
identifies storage requirements, regulatory issues, transportation needs, and ultimate 
disposal paths. 
• A technical path forward will be produced that identifies for each technology the risks, existing 
solutions, or – if no solution has yet been demonstrated – a path forward. 
• A deployment scenario will be developed that identifies possible deployment paths, risk, cost, 
economic analyses, and infrastructure needs and requirements. 
• Systems analysis will support the development of a business plan for the deployment of a 
closed fuel cycle, including international partners. 
• Finally, a technical information package will be prepared that includes data and analysis results 
from R&D, design studies, and systems analysis studies.  This package will be provided to the 
Secretary to use, along with NEPA information and other considerations, in making an 
informed decision on the technical and business path forward for GNEP. 
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2.7 Cost Estimates and Milestones 
 
Table 3. Cost Estimates for Systems Integration and Analysis 
Cost Estimates ($M) 
Activities FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 
Systems Analyses & 
Technical Requirements 
5.3 10 12 12 12 12 
Technical Integration* 5 6 13 13 13 13 
Total 10.3 16 25 25 25 25 
*Includes funding for Partnership Knowledge Center, with additional funding supplied by the Modeling 
and Simulation Activity. 
 
Table 4. Systems Integration and Analysis Milestones 
Milestones Date 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE January 2007 
FY-07 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2007 
Establish PKC Steering Committee consisting of representatives inside and 
outside of the GNEP community. 
April 2007 
Initial GNEP waste form descriptions August 2007 
Small Reactors Requirements August 2007 
Report on waste form and waste process technology specific data developed to 
support an Integrated Waste Management Strategy 
August 2007 
DOE-NE technical input for Secretarial recommendation to Congress on the need 
for a second repository 
September 2007 
Initial Qualitative Program Risk Factor Assessment September 2007 
GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2007 
GNEP Technical Requirements December 2007 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE December 2007 
FY-08 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2008 
Input and support for NEPA alternatives and technology options evaluations March 2008 
Complete Input to 2008 Decision Package March 2008 
Integrated Waste Management Strategy March 2008 
Global Benefits Analysis of GNEP March 2008 
Report on evaluation of GNEP fuel cycle deployment options April 2008 
Report on initial assessment of global proliferation risk and GNEP impact May 2008 
Report on GNEP Facilities and Fuel Cycle Strategy June 2008 
Decision on startup fuel (oxide or metal) for fast reactor August 2008 
Implement pilot PKC that demonstrates multiple predefined use cases for specific 
applications. 
August 2008 
Evaluation of material management requirement for fuel take-back strategies September 2008 
Report on domestic and global demand for GNEP technology September 2008 
GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2008 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2008 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE December 2008 
FY-09 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2009 
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Milestones Date 
Report on evaluation of international implementation issues March 2009 
Detailed fuel cycle performance data for GNEP reference technology option July 2009 
Generate the specification for the hardware system necessary to support the PKC. July 2009 
Databases that contain historical data not currently accessible from modern 
repositories will be developed and made available to PKC users. 
August 2009 
Integrated total quantitative GNEP risk analysis September 2009 
Update GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2009 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2009 
Report on cost and performance experience for GNEP technologies September 2009 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE December 2009 
FY-10 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2010 
Transition the pilot into the production level PKC. August 2010 
Create a specification for the addition of future data sets into the PKC that will be 
automatically curated 
August 2010 
Update GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2010 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2010 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE December 2010 
FY-11 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2011 
First Release of New Systems Level Planning Tool August 2011 
Per need-to-know, extend PKC user base to include universities and private 
industry. 
August 2011 
Update GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2011 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2011 
AFCI Status Report to Congress – draft to DOE December 2011 
FY-12 Comparison Report to Congress – draft to DOE February 2012 
Update GNEP Initial Facilities Systems Analysis September 2012 
Update GNEP Deployment Systems Analysis September 2012 
Decision on Transmutation Fuel for Fast Reactor September 2012 
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3.0 LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies 
The main objectives for LWR spent fuel separations technology development are to develop a separations 
system that can be effectively deployed in next-generation spent fuel processing plants of the GNEP 
supplier nations such that the proliferation risk of reprocessing is reduced relative to current practice, and 
to extend the U.S. geologic repository capacity by: 1) recycling of transuranic elements for ultimate 
destruction and recovery of energy content, and 2) reducing the volume of waste, long-term radiotoxicity 
and heat load in a geologic repository.  
The large inventory of accumulated spent commercial reactor fuel in this country (50,000 metric tons 
now, 70,000 metric tons by 2015) will exceed the statutory capacity at Yucca Mountain.  Additional SNF 
could be processed in order to minimize the quantity of spent fuel disposed directly in a geologic 
repository. Processing of that large quantity of spent fuel requires a technology with known capacity for 
high-throughput operation. Aqueous processing, which has been operated at the rate of hundreds of metric 
tons per year in commercial plants in other countries, is ideally suited for this application.  
The goals of LWR spent fuel separations technology development are to enhance the performance of the 
geologic repository, to provide an advanced fuel cycle that reduces the risk of proliferation, and recover 
transuranic elements from spent fuel so that they can be transmuted or “burned” to recover their energy 
value and eliminate the health risk that they pose. All of the UREX+ processes provide enhanced use of 
the repository, improved proliferation resistance over traditional PUREX processing, and a variety of 
options for energy recovery and transmutation of actinides. UREX+1a has some key advantages over the 
other UREX+ processes; in particular, by separating and recycling transuranic elements in fast reactors; 
the inventory of transuranics never goes to the repository, which further enhances repository performance. 
Additionally, any of the UREX+ processes could recycle separated transuranics for different degrees of 
transmutation, but the GNEP program has selected fast reactors for the most efficient transmuting of 
actinides. The UREX+1a process is most amenable to this approach, and requires the least number of 
separations processes to meet the criteria for recycle of transuranics into a fast reactor. Also, by not 
separating plutonium from any of the transuranic elements, the UREX+1a process provides an additional 
degree of proliferation resistance as compared to many of the other UREX+ processes. Because of these 
criteria, the UREX+1a process has initially been identified as the reference process for near-term 
development. 
3.1 Performance Objectives 
Recover the Uranium from Spent Fuel at sufficient purity that it can be conveniently stored for future use: 
To achieve substantial benefits in reduction of waste volume, it is necessary to recover the uranium from 
spent fuel. The recovered uranium could be stored for future use or disposed as a Class C low level waste.  
Separate the transuranics as a group in a solid product form:  Substantial benefits in repository capacity 
can be obtained by significantly reducing the amount of transuranic elements to be disposed of in a 
geologic repository. This will be achieved by recovering and fissioning them in fast spectrum reactors.  
Separate short-lived isotopes, Cesium and Strontium:  It is also necessary to recover and isolate the 
fission products that contribute to spent fuel heat load for the first century after discharge. The key fission 
products are cesium and strontium, which need to be extracted for separate management, such as decay 
storage to low activity levels or disposal in an optimized facility.  By making the extraction process 
highly selective and efficient, the resulting cesium/strontium product can be made non-TRU. 
Recover and immobilize Technetium and Iodine: To reduce long-term dose at the repository boundaries, it 
is necessary to recover two key fission products, technetium and iodine, and immobilize them in waste 
forms suitable for geologic disposal. 
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Recover and immobilize other fission gases:  To mitigate the environmental issues related to a large spent 
fuel processing plant, it will be necessary to recover gaseous radionuclides such as tritium, krypton-85, 
and carbone-14 (as CO2) at reasonably high efficiency and to immobilize them in durable waste forms. 
Provide Robust Waste Forms:  All other constituents of the spent nuclear fuel, including structural 
materials and residual fission products, will be incorporated into suitable waste forms for disposal. 
3.2 Status of Technology 
LWR fuel recycling will be carried out in nuclear fuel recycling centers.  A prototype Consolidated Fuel 
Treatment Center (CFTC) is planned for design and construction in collaboration with industry as part of 
the GNEP implementation strategy; the UREX+1a process has been initially identified as a reference 
technology for engineering alternative studies of a commercial-scale facility. The UREX+1a process was 
initially selected as the reference technology because it separates key isotopes from LWR spent fuel into 
streams that can be managed in a way that meets the GNEP objectives.  DOE also believes the UREX+1a 
process can be used as a bounding case during the GNEP NEPA analysis.  It is recognized that there are 
other processes that may be used to meets these objectives and DOE plans to evaluate the most attractive 
alternatives during the course of possible industry engagement.  The separation steps in the UREX+1a 
process, illustrated schematically in Figure 4, have been demonstrated at bench-scale. The UREX+1a 
process separates uranium in the UREX process step, at a level of purity that permits (1) re-enrichment, 
(2) storage in unshielded facilities for near-term or future use, or (3) disposal as low-level waste. The 
long-lived fission products iodine and technetium are recovered in the front-end processes and the UREX 
process step, respectively, and immobilized in durable waste forms. The UREX process is a modification 
of the PUREX process; it is based on extraction of only uranium and technetium from nitric acid solution 
with tributyl phosphate in n-dodecane. The chemistry of the UREX process is well-understood and builds 
on the over 50 years of industrial-scale experience of the PUREX process. Although the PUREX process 
is currently the only large-scale method used to treat spent nuclear fuel world-wide, the UREX solvent 
extraction process has only been demonstrated with spent nuclear fuel at the bench-scale. However, the 
demonstrated success of the PUREX process suggests that UREX should scale-up readily. 
3.2.1 Current Knowledge 
PUREX 
The U.S. has extensive experience in spent fuel reprocessing and large-scale radiochemical operations. 
Dating back to the Manhattan Project days, the U.S. has been a leader in development of aqueous 
separation processes on an industrial scale. In the defense nuclear complex, the PUREX process was 
successfully used in large-scale production operations at Hanford and Savannah River. This process 
separated pure plutonium for defense applications. Over the course of the 50+ years of large-scale 
PUREX operations, several significant flowsheet changes have been made to allow for recovery of 
special nuclear materials. These campaigns have demonstrated the versatility of aqueous separation 
processes. The downside of the defense-related PUREX process operations is that they produce liquid 
high-level waste, which must be further treated for long-term disposal. This legacy waste has created a 
large cleanup effort, primarily because the liquid waste was accumulated over several decades. The goal 
of the PUREX operations was to produce weapons usable material, not to minimize waste, and this 
priority is evident by the current legacy of wastes. 
The PUREX process was adapted for commercial use and significant improvements were made in waste 
generation. Commercial facilities were constructed in the U.S. at West Valley, NY, Morris, IL, and 
Barnwell, SC. Only the West Valley facility was successfully started up and operated. The facility was 
shutdown when the U.S. policy on spent fuel reprocessing changed and costly plant upgrades were 
determined to be required. The Morris plant never operated because of design flaws noted during cold 
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start-up testing and the Barnwell facility was not commissioned because of changing U.S. policy. 
Nevertheless, the PUREX process continues to be used in large commercial plants in France, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan, and these plants have an excellent safety record. The PUREX process was designed 
to separate pure plutonium, which has been raised as a potential proliferation concern. 
Suite of UREX+ processes 
A number of potential flowsheets for the processing of commercial LWR spent fuel have been developed 
and tested with actual spent fuel at laboratory-scale over the past five years. These processes have been 
given the generic name UREX+, reflecting the design of the processes for initial extraction of uranium, 
followed by the extraction of cesium/strontium and the transuranic elements. All of the UREX+ processes 
are distinguished by the fact that they do not separate pure plutonium.  
Each of the UREX+ processes, shown in Figure 3, has been designed for different applications. The 
UREX+1 and UREX+1a processes are group extractions of the TRU elements, in which there is no 
separation of the TRUs. These processes are intended for use in a single-tier system, with the TRUs being 
directed to fast spectrum reactors as a group for burning. The UREX+3 and UREX+4 processes can be 
used for fast reactor recycle of plutonium plus neptunium as a recycle fuel product that can be fabricated 
in a glovebox facility rather than a hot cell, and more easily qualified due to the large relevant database on 
fuel performance from prior testing programs carried out in EBR-II and FFTF.  The UREX+4 process 
provides the added option of burning americium in specially-designed target assemblies. The residual 
fission products remaining after these separations steps are comparatively benign (low radiation level and 
heat generation rate) and can be immobilized at high concentrations in durable ceramic waste forms.  
 Process
UREX+1
UREX+1a
UREX+2
UREX+3
UREX+4
Prod #1
U
U
U
U
U
Prod #2
Tc
Tc
Tc
Tc
Tc
Prod #3
Cs/Sr
Cs/Sr
Cs/Sr
Cs/Sr
Cs/Sr
Prod #4
TRU+Ln
TRU
Pu+Np
Pu+Np
Pu+Np
Prod #5
FP
All FP
Am+Cm+Ln
Am+Cm
Am
Prod #6
FP
All FP
Cm
Prod #7
All FP
Notes: (1) in all cases, iodine is removed as an off-gas from  the dissolution process.
            (2) processes are designed for the generation of zero liquid high-level wastes
U: uranium (removed in order to reduce the mass and volume of high-level waste)
Tc: technetium (long-lived fission product, prime contributor to long-term dose at Yucca Mountain)
Cs/Sr: cesium and strontium (primary short-term heat generators; repository impact)
TRU: transuranic elements (Pu: plutonium, Np: neptunium, Am: americium, Cm: curium)
Ln: lanthanide (rare earth) fission products
FP: fission products other than cesium, strontium, technetium, iodine, and the lanthanides  
Figure 3. Suite of UREX+ Processes 
 
Many of the head-end operations required for an advanced reprocessing plant using the UREX+1a 
process are similar to those currently used at the spent fuel reprocessing facilities at LaHague (France), 
Sellafield (United Kingdom), and Rokkasho (Japan). Dissolution of spent nuclear fuel has been 
demonstrated at the plant scale, ~800 MTU/yr. While there may be qualities unique to the fuel to be 
processed that require some head-end conditioning differing from that used at these facilities, the major 
operations and process streams will be similar. As these facilities are designed for PUREX, the major 
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change would be adjusting the dissolver product conditions to meet the lower-acid requirements of the 
UREX process. Dissolution at lower acid may result in greater amounts of undissolved solids or require 
longer reaction time. Although spent fuel dissolution is a decades-old technology, conditions that 
minimize the formation of insoluble solids or increase the solids recycle rate must be fully defined for the 
UREX feed.  
Off-gases emanating from the fuel-chopper and the dissolver will contain radioactive 129I, tritium, 14C, 
and 85Kr and Xe. In the current reprocessing plants in Europe and Asia these are not fully captured. If 
capture and sequestration of volatile radionuclides is required, data on the effectiveness of capture by 
various adsorbents or scrubbers must be evaluated, and methods to recover the radionuclides and 
incorporate them into a waste or storage form must be developed.  
Post-process treatment of effluents and solidification appear to be where data are most limited. There is 
extensive plant-scale experience in converting U and Pu to solid oxides, and high-level liquid wastes to 
solid forms, either by calcination or vitrification. Extensive data exist for acid-water evaporation, acid 
recycling, and waste-water treatment. Information on reagent cleanup and recycle is less extensive.  Data 
on recovery and calcination of trace organics in aqueous streams is likely available, though not for all of 
the organic species used in a UREX+1a process.  
Though the bench-scale results have shown excellent agreement with model predictions, the specific 
UREX process has only been run for short periods and with fresh solvent, therefore any variations in 
process chemistry over the longer-term have not been truly elucidated. Because the solvent composition is 
the same as the PUREX solvent, 30% TBP in n-dodecane, its long-term stability is well-known. 
Additionally, due to the similarity to PUREX, treatment of many of the secondary process waste streams 
is also well understood. 
The recovery of uranium from dilute nitric acid streams has been demonstrated at the plant scale. The 
simplest route involves precipitation as ammonium diuranate or de-nitration of the uranium, followed by 
calcination to produce an oxide form; the nitric acid is collected and recycled.  
Soluble technetium is coextracted in the UREX process with uranium. There are several options for 
recovering Tc from the uranium product, an anion exchange method has been shown to be effective in 
laboratory-scale hot tests. Following separation from the uranium, the Tc must be immobilized in a 
suitable waste form. Because Tc is highly mobile in the oxidized pertechnetate form and because it has a 
long half-life (210,000 yrs) it is desirable to immobilize the Tc in a reduced valence state, such as metal. 
The amount of data available for Tc recovery and immobilization is relatively small. The most promising 
processes must be studied at the lab-scale to first demonstrate feasibility and then to evaluate their scale-
up. Pyrolysis of the Tc-bearing ion exchange resin has been shown to produce free-flowing metallic Tc 
beads in laboratory-scale experiments and such beads have been converted to a zirconium/technetium 
alloy, but more work is necessary to confirm the efficacy of this process. 
Cesium and strontium are separated by the chlorinated cobalt dicarbollide-polyethylene glycol (CCD-
PEG) process, and placed in a waste form suitable for long-term decay storage until they have decayed for 
a few hundred years; at that point the waste could be classified in the US as low-level. The CCD-PEG 
process was originally developed in the mid 1970’s in Czecholslovakia and later used at Mayak, Russia, 
to recover tens of megacuries of cesium and strontium from high-level waste streams. Developments to 
the process were later made to make the process more suitable for use in the U.S. (e.g. replacement of 
nitrobenzene based diluent with phenyltrifluorosulfone). Recently, this diluent was made available from 
commercial suppliers. Studies have demonstrated that the solvent components are highly stable to 
radiolytic and hydrolytic degradation and are less flammable than the PUREX solvent. The polyethylene 
glycol component has a slight solubility in the aqueous phase, and needs to be replenished in the solvent. 
The product from the CCD-PEG process is a guanidinium carbonate (100 g/L), DTPA (20 g/L) stream 
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containing the cesium and strontium, along with barium and rubidium. The reference process for 
solidification of the product stream is steam reforming. With the addition of clays, the steam reforming 
product is a mineralized aluminosilicate granular material.  
The CCD-PEG process is relatively mature, having been implemented at industrial scale in Russia. Some 
process chemistry changes have been made from the demonstrated process, namely the solvent diluent 
and the strip reagent (Russian strip reagent was hydrazine nitrate). Both the diluent and strip reagent have 
been extensively studied in the U.S. and no technical issues have been identified. Uncertainties of the 
process are the solvent wash reagent, and when removing entrained solvent components from aqueous 
streams, what diluent wash reagent should be used.  
The solidification of the product stream for the CCD-PEG process has been verified in bench-scale 
feasibility tests. The steam reforming technology has been used, at an industrial scale, to immobilize low 
level waste streams, and is currently being investigated for treatment of highly radioactive wastes. The 
process chemistry for solidification using the CCD-PEG strip reagent as a feed has successfully been 
through feasibility testing. The acceptance criteria for long-term storage for the solidified cesium and 
strontium product is somewhat unclear, and must be resolved in parallel with technology development 
efforts 
The transuranic elements are extracted in a two-step process: the first step, TRUEX, efficiently separates 
the transuranics from all fission products except the lanthanides. The TRUEX process has not been 
demonstrated with spent fuel beyond the bench-scale, though the process has also been demonstrated at a 
larger scale for treating PUREX high-level waste in Japan. The TRUEX process has been extensively 
studied for the past 20 years and is very well understood for the treatment of high-level radioactive 
wastes. The TRUEX raffinate containing the non rare-earth fission products could be distilled to recover 
nitric and acetic acids, or acid mixtures for recycle, and to concentrate the fission products for further 
processing. Whether the fission products are concentrated in a nitric, acetic, or mixed-acid solution is not 
certain at this time. The nature of the fission product stream will affect the solids processing.  
The solidification process also requires further development. In a calcinations process, additives (e.g. 
silica, alumina, carbon) that will yield a material suited as a high level waste glass or crystalline ceramic 
precursor must be defined for the expected solid product composition. An interim storage form for the 
calcined waste that takes into account heat dissipation and chemical compatibility requirements must be 
designed or selected from available options. Treatment of off-gases containing nitrogen oxides or carbon 
dioxides will be required. Demonstration of the processing of the TRUEX fission product stream, 
combined with the lanthanides from the second step, the TALSPEAK process, has not been demonstrated. 
If this stream is to be vitrified, then waste formulations and envelopes must be developed.  
The actinide/lanthanide product from TRUEX is fed to the TALSPEAK process feed adjustment 
operation. In the feed adjustment process, the pH of the feed is adjusted by addition of lactic acid and 
NH4OH. The feed adjustment process is straightforward and does not require development. The kinetics 
of the stripping step of the TALSPEAK process have been studied and shown to be important in 
determining the efficiency of separation of the transuranic elements from lanthanide fission products. 
Methods for dealing with the comparatively slow kinetics of the TALSPEAK process reactions are 
currently being studied to ensure adequate separation of the actinides and lanthanides. The TALSPEAK 
process has been extensively tested for the separation of Am and Cm from lanthanides in varying process 
configurations. There is, however, only a limited amount of data available for the separation of mixed 
transuranics, including plutonium and neptunium, using the TALSPEAK process. Laboratory-scale 
testing with actual fuel has been performed with very positive results, but there is additional work that is 
needed to better understand and define process operating conditions and envelopes, process kinetics, 
contacting equipment requirements, solvent stability and solvent wash reagents.  
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The concentrated lanthanide stream is then combined with the TRUEX raffinate and either converted to 
solid oxides or liquid fed to a melter to form high level waste glass or another waste form, yet to be 
defined. The issues involved in producing the final product for the TRUEX raffinate also apply to the 
TALSPEAK lanthanide product. 
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Figure 4.  Schematic Illustration of the Reference UREX+1a Separations Process.  The process is 
operated with very dilute solutions of transuranics, making the process streams quite unattractive 
for diversion.  The process streams are categorized as Attractiveness Level D or E, as defined in 
DOE Order 470.4. 
The transuranic (TRU) product stream is concentrated in an evaporator. Lactic acid from the evaporator 
will likely be recycled. Lactic acid is widely used in the pharmaceutical industry and thus vapor-liquid 
equilibrium and/or thermal degradation data are available in the open literature. The TRU product from 
the evaporator may be concentrated in a lactic acid solution, water, or degradation products. Slow 
calcination of the TRU product will destroy the lactic acid and DTPA present in this stream and convert 
the TRU to oxides. The degradation products for DTPA and lactic acid may be a complex mix of organic 
species that must be either compatible with the final solid form or completely converted to gaseous 
products and treated in the off-gas system. The TRU oxides will then be converted to a stable form for 
storage and eventual fuel fabrication. The final form of the TRU species must be defined based on the 
eventual fuel composition and the heat characteristics of the storage form. The primary component will be 
Pu, though significant quantities of Np, Am, and Cm will make handling much more difficult than the Pu 
product from PUREX.  
GNEP Technology Development Plan 49 
July 25, 2007   
 
Appendix A discusses the Technology Readiness Levels for the light water reactor spent nuclear fuel 
separations technologies. 
3.2.2 Separations Technology Development Needs 
Deployment of an industrial-scale spent fuel recycling facility requires a focused effort on process and 
facility design including the chemical partitioning process segments that make up the UREX+1a process 
and the supporting technologies for production of the resulting waste forms and for packaging the various 
products. A modern spent fuel reprocessing plant has not been operated in the U.S. for decades, and much 
of the related process equipment development and, more importantly, operating experience, has been 
achieved in other countries. Although many of the design details for certain critical items of equipment 
are retrievable, it may prove necessary to acquire some designs from foreign sources. An even closer 
collaborative arrangement with other countries may be required in order to achieve this end. At the same 
time, many of the needed equipment items are standard chemical engineering hardware and the requisite 
experience and design details may be available from domestic sources.  
 
The approach used to determine technology development needs is to identify and prioritize technical 
maturity in the current UREX+1a process and equipment designs, and to demonstrate individual 
processes with radioactive materials at the bench-scale. Prototypic engineering-scale unit operation 
demonstrations will be performed using depleted uranium and surrogate materials in order to provide 
critical design information for the spent fuel recycling facility project by the start of preliminary design 
activities. This intermediate testing and demonstration phase will ensure equipment designs and operation 
will meet the requirements of the facility, prior to the commitment of the significant funding required for 
the facility, and will support to a reasonable extent a secretarial decision in 2008 on proceeding with the 
program. The engineering-scale testing will include integrated operation of all of the separation steps, 
along with key solidification process steps that are not easily decoupled from the separation processes.  
3.2.2.1 LWR Fuel Technology Development Needs 
Product and Waste Forms 
The UREX+1a process generates a number of product and waste streams that must be converted to 
appropriate forms for recycle or disposal. These streams include uranium, technetium, iodine 
cesium/strontium, transuranics (Np, Pu, Am, Cm), lanthanide/fission product waste stream, cladding hulls 
and undissolved solids, and secondary waste streams. Methods for conversion of these streams to solids 
are in various states of development, ranging from conceptual to full-scale demonstration.  
Transuranic Solidification for UREX+1a Product 
The solidification of a mixed transuranic stream, containing plutonium, neptunium, americium and 
curium, has never been attempted on a large-scale. Development and demonstration of a calcination 
process for the mixed transuranic stream at bench-scale using radioactive materials, is needed. 
Construction and testing of an engineering-scale calciner with surrogate materials is needed to validate 
scale up and identify and resolve operational issues. The blending and solidification of the 
uranium/transuranic streams, with emphasis on production of a homogeneous solid product will also need 
to be demonstrated at bench-scale using actual radioactive materials. 
Cs/Sr Product Solidification 
Similarly, the solidification of a combined cesium and strontium product stream from the UREX+ process 
has never been done on a large scale. Recent tests on a laboratory-scale steam reformer have shown that 
an insoluble mineralized product containing the cesium and strontium can be produced. Steam reforming 
is a commercialized technology, and is being investigated for the treatment of acidic radioactive liquid 
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legacy wastes. This program must develop baseline process data for Fluidized Bed Steam Reforming 
(FBSR) solidification of the Cs/Sr product into an alkali aluminosilicate mineral waste form. Testing of 
the process with non-radioactive materials that are at engineering or larger scale, needs to be performed. 
The use of stable isotopes of cesium and strontium permits testing to be done in unshielded facilities at 
reduced costs. Follow-on laboratory and pilot testing must be continued to optimize and validate process 
parameters and perform product characterization. Special emphasis will be placed at quantifying the 
effects of radiation on the long term stability and durability of the final storage forms including the 
potential secondary reactions that may be catalyzed by either radiation or temperature effects. 
Tc Conversion and Waste Form  
Technetium is separated from the spent nuclear fuel in the UREX process step. Technetium conversion 
and solidification methods must be resolved before final design of an advanced spent fuel recycling 
facility. The conversion of the technetium product fraction to a stable waste form presents a number of 
challenges. Many current methods for producing stable waste forms involve high temperature conversions 
or metal alloying to produce forms suitable for long-term storage or disposal. The volatility of the 
technetium oxide species becomes a limiting factor in selecting a conversion process. Investigations into 
methods for the separation and recovery of technetium as an individual product fraction must be coupled 
with the conversion method used to generate the waste form to yield the best combination. Although an 
ion exchange method has proven effective for the purpose, alternate means for separating the technetium 
from the uranium product must be investigated, with a focus on obtaining a technetium product that can 
readily be converted to a stable waste form. With the separation method established, the conversion 
methods will also need to be demonstrated to yield samples for further evaluation of stability and 
durability. A detailed evaluation of processing options will be completed and a reference process selected. 
Laboratory-scale verification of the process must be completed using technetium. 
Fission Product Waste Forms 
The final high-level waste stream, containing mostly lanthanide and transition metal fission products, will 
be converted into a durable waste form such as glass or ceramic. The current reference process for high-
level waste in the U.S. is incorporation into a borosilicate glass. This waste form will be assumed as the 
reference for the advanced spent fuel recycling facility. The glass formulation for this waste stream will 
need to be developed in order to ensure that requisite durability requirements are met with the high fission 
product loadings that are planned. Glass formulation alternatives could include either low-temperature or 
high-temperature systems, balancing process or product performance criteria with waste loading 
requirements or restrictions. Optimal glass formulations need to be developed and tested in bench-scale 
melters using simulated feed materials. Glass properties, including leach rates, must be determined for 
various formulations.  
Product and Waste Form Packaging and Transport 
Development of container designs for interim storage of the transuranic and Cs/Sr products from UREX+ 
process is needed. Currently there are no DOE approved storage containers for these products, which 
have very high decay heat generation rates. Container designs will be developed through close interaction 
with other organizations, such as OCRWM and NNSA. Remote product packaging and transfer systems 
will be designed and equipment procurement initiated. The remote packaging and transfer equipment will 
need to be proof-tested in a mockup facility. 
Cladding Hull Disposition 
Cladding hulls represent a large waste stream from recycle of spent LWR fuel. Current practice at the La 
Hague facility in France is to compact the hulls for volume reduction and then dispose as an intermediate 
level waste. The U.S. is investigating hull treatment methods to determine if the washed hulls can be 
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disposed as a low level waste, which will require the removal of transuranic contamination to a level less 
than 100 nCi/g. Cladding hull handling equipment and process parameters for baseline compaction of the 
hulls must be developed. The initial input to the development and evaluation of this compaction 
technology approach will focus on final compaction product requirements and LLW waste acceptance 
criteria. The French compaction process will form the baseline process for initial test runs. Initial work 
will be done on surrogate hulls and remote operation will be demonstrated in facilities designed to 
provide the required technical bases for facility operations. A fraction of the cleaned cladding hulls is 
intended for use as a matrix material for immobilization of soluble Tc as an alloy and undissolved solids 
as an imbedded matrix. 
Secondary Waste Stream Minimization 
A number of secondary liquid streams are produced in the UREX+ process: (1) spent solvents (after 
extensive recycle) (2) acid and water that are recycled within the demonstration facility, (3) solvent wash 
streams to remove degradation products from solvents, and (4) other miscellaneous waste streams. As 
solvents are recycled in the processes, radiolytic and hydrolytic degradation products are formed. For 
tributyl phosphate, these degradation products are well known and understood, and most degradation 
products can easily be removed from the solvent by washing with sodium carbonate solution. For other 
UREX+ solvents, the nature of the degradation products is less understood as are the methods to remove 
them from the solvent. Solvent wash methods must be developed for all of the UREX+ processes and 
demonstrated on the laboratory scale. Eventually, all solvents will degrade to the point where their 
performance is marginal and solvent washes cannot restore them. A disposal path for each spent solvent 
must be determined. It is anticipated that each solvent can be cleaned to low contamination levels, and it 
must be determined if the spent solvents meet any RCRA criteria for hazardous waste (which would 
render the solvent as a mixed waste). Final solvent disposal paths for each UREX+ solvent must be 
identified, including methods for solvent decomposition. Methods for treatment of other miscellaneous 
wastes, as well as determining acid and water recycle mass balances; need to be completed in the 
conceptual design of the CFTC. Limited testing will be necessary to demonstrate the efficacy of the 
treatment methods and validate effective acid recovery methods. 
Off-gas Capture and Waste Form Development 
The chopping and dissolution of spent nuclear fuel releases numerous volatile by-products, including 
iodine-129, tritium, carbon-14, krypton, xenon and NOx. Current international practices include releasing 
iodine to the sea or atmosphere, release of krypton and xenon to the atmosphere, aqueous scrubbing of 
tritium and carbon-14, and either release or partial abatement of NOx. Next generation recycling 
technologies in the U.S. will need to improve on existing practice. There has been extensive research 
performed on various off-gas treatment methods, but most of these methods have yet to be demonstrated 
at a large scale. Iodine, for example, can be efficiently trapped in silver/zeolite filters or with KI, and 
tritium and C-14 can be trapped in scrubbers. In addition to removing these constituents from the off-gas 
stream, each by-product must be recovered and converted to an appropriate waste form. Many of these 
methods and products are yet to be defined for the CFTC. The management of process off-gas and 
contamination control is critical to the safe operation of any nuclear facility. Information related to 
technology selection and test performance for off-gas management and contamination control during both 
chopping and leaching operations will provide the technical bases to support the development and 
management of the safety basis of the CFTC. A determination of the extent to which the recovery of the 
noble gases will be demonstrated in the CFTC should be made during of FY-2008 to enable small-scale 
testing in FY-2008 and 2009. 
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3.2.2.2 LWR Fuel Partitioning Processes 
Centrifugal Contactor Design for Remote Operation 
The UREX+1a process is based on liquid-liquid extraction processes that separate the fuel components 
into desired fractions. Industrial-scale equipment used for liquid-liquid processing includes mixer-settlers, 
pulsed columns and centrifugal contactors. Each of these different types of contacting equipment has been 
demonstrated on a large scale in nuclear applications, and each has inherent advantages and 
disadvantages. Development work on the UREX+1a process has been performed in laboratory-scale 
mixer-settlers and centrifugal contactors, but the focus for scaled processes has been primarily on 
centrifugal contactors. This equipment has many potential advantages, but requires detailed remote 
capabilities for maintenance of the contactors. Most of the centrifugal contactors used for testing are 
laboratory scale and only preliminary remotely-maintainable designs have been formulated for a large 
facility. New remote design concepts need to be developed and demonstrated to ensure that contactors can 
be effectively used in any particular remote environment. In addition, new contactor designs that 
incorporate advanced features, to enhance operational flexibility, must be developed, fabricated or 
modified, and tested. All engineering and production scale contactors must be designed to be criticality-
safe by geometry. This constraint may limit the size of the contactor or design features (e.g. water 
jackets). 
Engineering-scale Integrated Centrifugal Contactor Testing 
Over time, impurities or degradation products can accumulate in the solvent and cause operational 
problems with centrifugal contactors. Additionally, the solution hydraulics of laboratory-scale centrifugal 
contactors and engineering- or industrial-scale contactors are different. Testing can be performed with an 
equipment mockup at the engineering-scale, at a fraction of the cost of testing with actual spent nuclear 
fuel. An engineering-scale integrated centrifugal contactor test mockup will be assembled in an area to 
allow for testing with limited amounts of radioactive materials, primarily depleted uranium. Additionally, 
secondary processes, such as waste treatment or product conversion operations, that are closely coupled 
with the separations processes must be included in the demonstration. However, many of the waste 
treatment or product conversion processes can be decoupled from the separations process and therefore 
parallel testing can be performed, utilizing the existing capabilities around the DOE complex. 
UREX+1a Flowsheet Validation/Optimization 
The current reference process for the engineering-scale demonstration is the UREX+1a process. This 
process is a series of four solvent-extraction process segments that perform the following operations: 
(1) recovery of U and Tc (UREX), (2) recovery of Cs and Sr (CCD-PEG), and (3) separation of Pu, Np, 
Am and Cm from fission products (TRUEX followed by TALSPEAK). In a large-scale facility, it may be 
difficult to control flow rates, feed compositions, temperature and other process variables as accurately as 
was done in the bench-scale testing. Historically, flowsheets are developed with a level of conservatism to 
meet processing targets for purity and recovery of elements, and allow for variations in process 
conditions. However, if the process is designed too conservatively, it can result in higher cost or greater 
waste generation than necessary. This envelope of process operating conditions is best defined and 
verified in pilot-scale testing. Optimization of process conditions can be done to a certain extent with 
process modeling, using limited laboratory-scale testing to validate model results.  
Specific process optimization testing needed to support the UREX+1a process design is: 
• Separation of technetium from uranium in the UREX process segment 
• Uranium/technetium strip product flow rate 
• Evaluation of the hydrolysis and potential precipitation of Pu under low acid (~1 M) conditions 
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• Technetium partitioning behavior in acid/water recycle processes 
• Cesium/strontium strip reagent concentration and flowrate 
• Optimal reductant for feed and method for addition of reductant to feed 
• Vapor-liquid equilibria for lactic acid and degradation of lactic acid 
• Feasibility of lactic acid recovery/destruction 
• Partitioning of fission products in lactic acid recovery 
• Process kinetics for the TALSPEAK process 
• Solvent stability and lifetime under process conditions for TALSPEAK solvent  
• Effects of complexing agents on transuranic stream solidification 
• Destruction of complexing agents as necessary to avoid deleterious interaction with other 
separation processes or solidification processes. 
Remote Maintenance/Operation Equipment Mockup 
Equipment designs must be tested for fit-up, maintenance, and operation in a remote test mockup to 
ensure that all aspects of operation and maintenance can be performed by remote manipulation. A remote 
equipment test mockup will mitigate the risk of serious and costly equipment problems for equipment to 
be installed in a highly radioactive environment.  
Geometrically-safe Evaporator Design/Demonstration 
DOE orders dictate that when possible, engineering controls shall be used in lieu of administrative 
controls for criticality safety. Criticality-safe-by-geometry evaporators are certain to be needed in the 
separations facility for applications where uranium or transuranic elements will be present. Innovative 
design concepts should be developed and tested with non-radioactive solutions, at an appropriate scale, to 
demonstrate the effectiveness of the evaporator design(s).  
Process Monitoring and Control 
Implementation of advanced process monitoring and control systems has the potential to improve the 
quality of product materials and decrease the operating costs of the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant. The 
need for automated controls will be particularly important for closely coupled systems that must respond 
rapidly to process upset conditions. Similar systems have the potential to provide near real-time 
measurements needed for materials accountability and control, enhancing the proliferation resistance of 
the system.  Process automation technologies have been pursued vigorously in the chemical processing 
industries, but implementation in fuel reprocessing has lagged because of the delay in deploying such 
technology in the U.S. A new fuel recycle plant will need a state-of-the-art “command and control” center 
where all data for materials accountancy and process operation are collected, interpreted, and readily 
available for operations personnel. The amount and level of data and information incorporated into this 
system has never been attempted before: integrating head-end operations, four discrete separation 
processes, and five or more product/waste solidification processes. Comprehensive studies need to be 
made prior to the CFTC preliminary design phase to determine the extent to which advanced process 
monitoring and materials accountancy instrumentation can be introduced into the demonstration. 
While the goal of advanced process monitoring and control is to reduce the numbers of samples taken in a 
recycle facility, it is inevitable that liquid samples will need to be pulled from remote process locations. 
Chemical process sampling has made significant improvements in industries such as semi-conductors, 
pharmaceuticals, etc. Investigation of these new methods to determine if they are adaptable to a remote 
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environment could lead to breakthroughs in sample reliability, availability, and reduce waste volume from 
large sample volumes.  
3.3 Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center (CFTC) 
In concept, the CFTC is an industrial-scale facility for processing spent LWR oxide fuel.  The GNEP 
Strategic Plan indicates that one option is that the plant design would be industry-directed, with technical 
support provided by the GNEP Technology Development Program. Conceptual design studies, including 
a business plan and input to a GNEP technology roadmap, would serve as a valuable input to the 
Secretarial decision in 2008 on the GNEP path forward.  The Secretarial decision will determine if, or 
how, DOE will proceed in developing a nuclear fuel recycling center, targeting for Approve Alternative 
Selection and Cost Range (CD-1) decision by the end of FY-2009.  The project would then continue with 
industry engagement as decided by the Secretary of Energy. 
3.3.1 CFTC Design Activities 
It is envisioned the CFTC will be produced, as an option, through an industry-led design effort.  Still, 
GNEP will comply too the extent applicable and appropriate, with the principles of DOE Order 413.3 in 
each design stage as follows: 
Conceptual Design: This task includes completing the activities in support of Critical Decision 1 
(Approve Alternative Selection and Cost Range) including the requirements definition, conceptual design, 
acquisition planning, risk assessments, alternative analysis, preliminary hazards analysis, preliminary 
technology needs assessments, NEPA documentation preparation, and preliminary project execution 
planning, and updated project baselines. 
Preliminary Design: This task includes completing the activities in support of Critical Decision 2 
(Approve Performance Baseline) including design (sufficiently detailed to support the following) risk 
analysis, site selection, acquisition plan, technology development, final project execution plan, updated 
project baselines, and independent reviews. 
Final Design: This task includes completing the activities to support Critical Decision 3 (Approve Start of 
Construction) including detailed design, specifications for long lead procurements, approved safety 
documentation, independent reviews, technology innovations evaluations, and updated project baselines. 
3.3.2 Technology Development Activities 
Technology development in support of CFTC design and operation will proceed during the design, 
construction, and startup phases of the project.  Activities in FY-2007 and -2008 will be directed toward 
guiding the conceptual design efforts.  They will also provide a basis for evaluating the conceptual design 
studies and for informing the 2008 Secretarial decision and subsequent down-selection decisions at the 
completion of the conceptual design stage. 
In the near term, the development of separations technology in support of alternatives that may be used in 
the CFTC will be accomplished in a series of laboratory-scale experiments with actual LWR spent fuel 
and spent fuel simulants.  These experiments have the purpose of optimizing process design, 
demonstrating process reliability and reproducibility, and gaining fundamental information on pertinent 
chemical reactions for input into the development of advanced process models and plant simulations. 
For the purposes of this plan, the UREX+1a process is the reference technology for planning CFTC 
technology development activities.  As engagement with industry proceeds and other process alternatives 
emerge, the technology development activities will be adjusted to meet program needs.  It should be noted 
that many of the technologies being considered for waste and product management are process 
technology neutral and will support the product objectives of GNEP under a variety of spent fuel 
separations processes. 
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3.3.2.1 Bench-Scale Demonstration 
Transuranic Solidification for the UREX+1a Process 
Bench-scale calcination testing of the mixed TRU (Pu, Np, Am, Cm) product, in a lactic acid stream will 
be performed with actual transuranics. The goal of this work will be to demonstrate that all of the 
transuranics can be converted in a single process to oxides. Additional bench-scale testing will be 
required to demonstrate that the TRU product can be blended with uranium in proportions to meet the 
ABR fuel fabrication specification, and denitrated to meet the appropriate specifications and can be 
redissolved. Product rheology will be important for the blended product, as well as chemical composition 
(complete conversion to oxides). Currently, the fuel fabrication specifications for this material, including 
the possible need to convert oxides to metal, have not been determined. 
Cs/Sr Product Solidification 
Bench-scale testing of the cesium/strontium product will be performed to develop feed and additive 
ratios, additive compositions, and characterize products. Because this waste stream chemistry can be well 
represented with non-radioactive elements, this work will be done with stable cesium and strontium. 
Characterization of the waste product will include physical characterization, leachability, and the thermal 
conductivity. Bench-scale tests will also be conducted using actual radioactive materials in order to 
quantify the effects of radiation on the long term stability and durability of the final storage forms 
including the potential secondary reactions that may be catalyzed by either radiation or temperature. 
Tc Conversion and Waste Form 
Methods for conversion of technetium, from pertechnetate to a reduced metallic state, from either a nitric 
acid stream or an anion exchange resin will be developed in laboratory testing. Both methods are needed, 
as a final Tc separation scheme in UREX has not been selected, and both Tc separation and conversion 
will need to be developed in parallel. Technetium metal will then be alloyed with Zircalloy, with or 
without other metal additives, to produce determine a viable alloy formulation. Upon development, the Tc 
conversion and waste form preparation will be made with actual material in a bench-scale demonstration.  
Fission Product Waste Forms 
In addition to technetium and the gaseous fission products, the fission product waste contains the 
transition metals stream from the TRUEX process, the lanthanide stream from the TALSPEAK process. 
A borosilicate glass has been initially identified as the waste matrix, due to existing HLW qualification 
for Yucca Mountain.  Waste formulation development capabilities are well developed at several DOE 
laboratories and initial waste formulations will be developed by modeling and use of surrogates. 
Validation testing of candidate waste formulations will be made with actual radioactive materials (either 
actual waste streams from bench-scale testing or representative radioactive amounts in surrogate streams). 
Cladding Hull Disposition 
Compaction is the baseline process currently selected for disposition of the cladding hulls. Depending on 
the level of residual contamination, the compacted hulls may be disposed of as low-level or high-level 
waste. Bench-scale demonstration of hull cleaning methods are needed to demonstrate the effectiveness of 
cleaning methods, so that a determination can be made on the disposition of the hulls as low-level or 
high-level waste. 
Secondary Waste Stream Minimization  
Other important secondary streams need to be accounted for an overall plant waste minimization. These 
include: 
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• the acid recovery derived from three operations: (1) dissolver and hull wash, (2) extraction 
processes, and (3) off-gas recovery 
• all of the solvents used in the extraction processes  
• treated radionuclide-free water generated by the various unit operations. 
Bench-scale test will be conducted with radioactive solutions to determine the most efficient methods for 
acid recovery, solvent reconditioning and eventual disposal and treatment of process water to generate a 
radionuclide-free water. 
Off-gas Capture and Waste Form Development  
Several alternative trapping systems such as molten hydroxides (NaOH/KOH), solid sorbents, 
impregnated membranes, etc. will need to be tested at bench-scale. One or two of the most promising 
candidates may have to be developed for deployment at the engineered demonstration scale.  
The long half-lives of 129I and 14C will require development of a robust waste form that sequesters the 
radionuclides over geologic time-frames. Conceptually, the two disposal paths are to (1) capture 
concentrated tritiated water on molecular sieves from a dry head-end process and (2) allow the tritiated 
water to accumulate in the plant water-based systems until the entire water inventory must be treated and 
discarded. Isotopic separation of the tritiated water from the plant water is possible, but is thought to be 
prohibitively expensive. 
Disposition options will have to be re-analyzed against present regulations. Disposal forms need to be 
investigated, which will include materials (e.g. cement) that tightly bind the tritiated water long enough 
for the tritium to decay. Recovery of tritium for beneficial use should also be analyzed in consideration of 
demand and avoidance of disposal costs. The implications, if any, of the 3H embedded in the cladding will 
have to be also analyzed. 
Environmental impact analysis of emissions from the CFTC, and the nature of the spent fuel, particularly 
age and burnup, will determine whether or not the release of Kr/Xe is acceptable. The possible separation 
and trapping of Kr and Xe may be needed. If this were the case, then processes such as pressure swing 
absorption or scrubbing off-gases with fluorocarbons will have to be tested, compared and developed. It is 
almost certain that an industrial scale plant will be required to separate these gases cryogenically and store 
the short-lived Kr for decay. The non-radioactive Xe may have some commercial value that could offset 
some of the extra cost.  
The recovery and scrubbing of NOx will be an essential component of the off-gas treatment. Depending 
on the overall design of the dissolver an effective system will have to be designed for recovery and 
recycle of the nitrogen oxides as nitric acid. This implies the need to fractionate concentrated acid and 
process water for recycle. Some alternatives will have to be tested at bench-scale for deployment at the 
CFTC.  
UREX+1a Flowsheet Validation/Optimization 
Laboratory testing of various portions of the UREX+1a process, where uncertainty or potential for 
optimizing the process (reducing flows, reagent concentrations, etc) will be tested in the laboratory using 
surrogate materials, or solutions from actual tests, if available. The primary focus of this work will 
include Tc separation in the UREX process and better understanding the process chemistry for 
actinide/lanthanide separation in the TALSPEAK process, and possible tests of curium isolation for future 
flowsheet applications. 
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3.3.2.2 Scale-up Demonstration using Surrogate Materials 
Understanding process interaction and issues associated with longer term operation with solvent recycle 
may also be addressed by operation of an engineering-scale demonstration using depleted uranium and 
surrogate feed materials. This demonstration may be important to identify and resolve issues that have not 
have been addressed by bench-scale testing of individual unit operations. The four solvent extraction 
processes may be operated in an integrated manner, as well as, any associated processes that are close-
coupled. Waste processing may be decoupled from the extraction process by surge tankage, and can be 
demonstrated separately using existing infrastructure around the DOE complex. Issues relative to the 
integrated demonstration also include development of process monitoring and control systems, which will 
be far more complex that those found in existing radiochemical facilities.  
Specific engineering-scale integrated demonstration activities that may be carried out are described 
below. 
Integrated operation of UREX+1a solvent extraction processes 
Operation of all four UREX+1a process segments in an integrated manner is important to understand 
process interactions, as well as to begin to develop control and monitoring schemes. To ensure 
representative hydraulic performance, all solvent extraction processes could be operated with 5-cm 
centrifugal contactors. The UREX process can be closely coupled to the CCD-PEG process (no surge 
capacity between them). The TRUEX and TALSPEAK processes will probably require some 
intermediate surge tankage, and possibly treatment, between processes to ensure complexants are not 
carried over from one process to the other. Process operations will include feed adjustment, solvent wash, 
and diluent washes of the aqueous streams leaving the process.  
Transuranic Solidification for the UREX+1a Process 
Scale-up testing of the calcination equipment to prototypic-scale will be required, and can be done with 
surrogates. It is recognized that it is difficult to simulate the transuranics, particularly plutonium, but this 
effort will focus on equipment design issues, rather than product properties. 
Cs/Sr Product Solidification 
Engineering or full-scale testing can be performed in existing pilot facilities using the formulation data 
obtained from bench-scale testing. Again, this testing can be performed with stable cesium and strontium. 
Product materials can be characterized in the same manner as the material from bench-scale testing. 
Tc Conversion and Waste Form 
Optimum methods for the conversion of Tc-99 to a chemically stable, unreactive zirconium-technetium 
mixture, using zirconium from the cladding, will be investigated. This would immobilize both fission 
product Tc-99 and activation product Zr-93 from the cladding by converting them to a metallic 
zirconium-technetium alloy. The cladding hulls are about 96% metallic zirconium and could in principle 
be used directly to make a Zr-Tc alloy suitable for disposition. If, however, the zirconium is purified, (see 
below) the hulls could be converted directly to high purity zirconium (free of most fission products and 
free of actinides). A portion of the purified zirconium metal could be melted with technetium metal to 
produce the alloy. Performance tests will be performed with Tc/Zr alloys to identify and resolve issues 
associated with this waste form. Once a viable process and waste form are developed and demonstrated, 
scaled testing of the conversion process can be performed, if necessary, using rhenium as a surrogate 
material. Depending on process parameters, it may be possible to prepare a metal alloy waste form in 
prototypic equipment at an existing DOE facility. If not, a prototypic-scale product could be produced 
using rhenium. Due to the lack of maturity of the conversion process, it is unlikely that scaled testing 
could be completed by 2008. 
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Fission Product Waste Forms 
Engineering-scale testing can be performed in existing melter pilot plants within the DOE or research 
complex, using surrogate materials. Because these waste streams can be adequately decoupled from the 
separations process, they do not need to be part of any integrated engineering-scale cold demonstration 
that may be required. 
Waste Form Packaging 
The recovered radiochemical forms developed in the bench-scale work will require specific waste 
packaging or conversion to a form for which cost effective packaging can be developed. The waste forms 
will be very dependent upon the site specific waste acceptance criteria (WAC), as well as on Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) and Department of Transportation (DOT) regulations. Heat transfer will 
also be key issue for the storage form packages for the cesium/strontium and mixed TRU products. 
Secondary Waste Stream Minimization  
Secondary waste minimization can be accomplished by identifying which stream can economically be 
recycled. To accomplish this, an efficient plant design that accounts for the integration between unit 
operations is key. This integration will require a detailed chemical process simulation of the entire plant. 
A steady state model can quickly provide the information needed for this optimization. A model will be 
developed to support this need. 
Off-gas Capture and Waste Form Development  
Alternatives tested at bench-scale will result in a down-select process that can be developed at 
engineering-scale. Design parameters for off-gas capture equipment will be determined. The waste forms 
will be tested to verify waste acceptance criteria and transportation requirements. In nearly every case, the 
radioactive species may be replaced with a non-radioactive isotope for the development and, if needed, 
demonstration phases.  
Remote Maintenance/Operation Equipment Mockup 
During preliminary design of the CFTC, when facility and remote concept specific information should be 
available, the availability of a remote test mockup must be assessed. Either an existing mockup facility 
will be equipped with equipment for testing of remote operation, maintenance, etc. or a new mockup 
facility must be designed, constructed and equipped with remote equipment in a layout representative of 
the reference process chosen for initial deployment in the CFTC. 
Online Monitoring and Process Control 
Online monitoring of process parameters including process chemicals and fissile material is needed to 
enhance safeguards and reduce the dependency on process samples. Sampling introduces bias, requires 
tankage between unit operations contributing to facility footprint expansion, generates liquid wastes, and 
generally requires several hours before the analytical results are available to make process decisions. Test 
solutions containing single components and their mixtures will be analyzed and a chemometric model will 
be developed for quantitative monitoring of target analytes. Online monitoring techniques will be tested 
and selected for these analytes. The data acquisition /archiving /storage capability and real-time computer 
display of analyzed data will be customized for the reference separations process application. Such a 
system will yield great advances in the tracking and accountancy of fissile materials throughout the entire 
separations process. A process control system will be included in the tests with surrogate materials.  
3.3.3 R&D in Support of Technology Development (risk mitigation and alternatives)  
The activities described in this section are carried out to provide alternative solutions for important parts 
of the process where a high or moderate risk is present. 
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TALSPEAK Process Alternatives 
Recent advances in molecular agents more efficient for selective component sequestrations have been 
based on a more fundamental understanding of agent-component molecular interactions. It has been 
shown that optimum interactions have two features: optimum sizing and optimum group orientations. 
Taken together, agents that are orders of magnitude more effective at sequestration have been identified 
and their performance documented. Application of this methodology could provide improvements in the 
lanthanide/TRU separation portion of the UREX+ process. To accomplish this, structural information and 
high-level quantum calculations can be applied to develop a validated molecular model using elements 
previously shown to provide for an intrinsic lanthanide/actinide separation. Combinatorial computational 
chemistry using public computational codes then can be used to design candidate separations agents 
optimized for complexation and separation of lanthanides from transuranics. These materials in turn can 
be synthesized and tested with the major radionuclides found in the lanthanide/TRU part of the UREX+1a 
process. Because such highly specific extractants also tend to be unstable against hydrolysis and 
radiolysis, laboratory testing under representative process conditions will be necessary to validate these 
materials for practical applications. 
Centrifugal Contactor Design for Remote Operation 
New remote design concepts will be developed and demonstrated to ensure that contactors can be 
effectively used in any particular remote environment. In addition, new contactor designs that incorporate 
advanced features, to enhance operational flexibility, must be developed, fabricated or modified, and 
tested. The goal of this work is to create a complex-wide contactor design that incorporates the best 
features of existing DOE and commercial designs and remote maintenance features, to generate a design 
that could be fabricated in commercial shops, using cost effective production methods (e.g. casting vs. 
milling). A commercial-scale processing facility would require several hundred contactors, and existing 
DOE and U.S. commercial designs and capabilities are not adequate to meet future requirements.  
Alternative Tc Waste Forms 
Stabilization of Tc-99 presents challenges due to the relative volatility of technetium. However, there are 
several alternative stabilization technologies that could mitigate the volatilization issue by utilizing low 
temperature stabilization processes to produce a durable form. 
A low temperature phosphate ceramic form was developed to stabilize an eluted Tc-99 waste stream. A 
magnesium potassium phosphate ceramic was developed to treat the separated technetium stream. Dense 
and hard ceramic forms were fabricated from acidic reactions of the waste and precursor chemicals. The 
resultant forms were characterized and leach tested using the American Nuclear Society (ANS) 
ANSI/ANS 16.1 test and the Product Consistency Test. The relative durability was relatively good as 
measured by both tests. Additionally, iron-phosphate waste forms were developed and demonstrated for 
the immobilization of DOE mixed wastes. 
Low temperature glass waste forms were developed for the vitrification of Rocky Flats plutonium-bearing 
wastes. Dense glass forms were fabricated at temperatures as low as 700° C. The process temperatures 
used to fabricate these glasses were much lower than typical borosilicate glasses and would be expected 
to minimize Tc-99 volatilization. A prime objective of the study was to demonstrate limited recovery of 
plutonium from the form utilizing chemical means. From this perspective, the glasses preformed well. 
The aqueous leach response of the glasses was not specifically measured. However, based on the response 
to acid dissolution testing and understanding of the leach behavior of borosilicate glasses, the durability is 
expected to be relatively good. 
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Development of Co-precipitation Processes for Actinide Recovery 
The present scheme for the UREX+ processes is to solidify the actinide product streams by direct 
denitration or calcinations to produce a form usable for recycle fuel fabrication if oxide is the chosen fast 
reactor fuel. Such processes, however, may not produce the best particle morphology and size distribution 
for high-quality fuel fabrication. An alternative method is to use an oxalate precipitation method for the 
co-precipitation of actinides in the appropriate composition blend. Such a process is the current reference 
in the French program, and extensive information is available through the CEA-DOE collaboration. 
Experiments will be carried out to ensure that there is not a selective precipitation of one species, and the 
process will be evaluated for feasibility of industrial-scale application. This technical activity in an 
alternative product conversion method addresses a high technical risk issue of TRU product form. 
Cs/Sr Separation Process Alternatives 
The Fission Product Extraction (FPEX) process simultaneously separates cesium and strontium from 
spent nuclear fuel (UREX raffinate). Preliminary testing has been performed on this process, and 
indicates that it has potential advantages over the baseline cesium strontium process (CCD-PEG). The 
cesium/strontium product stream from the CCD-PEG process contains about 120 g/l organics, which 
complicate the solidification process. The FPEX process back-extracts the cesium and strontium in a 
dilute nitric acid stream, which is much easier to concentrate and solidify. The technical maturity of this 
process is not sufficient for it to be considered for the baseline separations processes. Laboratory testing 
of the FPEX process chemistry will be performed, including studies to determine the affects of 
complexants from the UREX process on cesium and strontium separation, as well as solvent stability, 
solvent cleanup, etc. Recent testing with a monocrown calixarene cesium extractant indicates that the 
extractant can be used at higher concentration than the previous extractant and is more stable to acid 
hydrolysis. Characterization testing of this new extractant will be performed. Finally, laboratory and cold 
pilot plant testing of the process in centrifugal contactors will be performed to validate the process 
performance. 
Alternative Extraction Contacting Equipment for Solids Handling and/or Kinetics 
Alternative, proven contacting equipment, such as pulsed columns and mixer settlers, will also be 
evaluated and tested with certain UREX+ processes, at the appropriate scale, to ensure that processes 
which may require equipment providing longer residence times, or greater tolerance of solids, will 
function properly. Equipment mockups will be designed and constructed for scaled testing of select 
portions of the UREX+ process, as required. In particular, the two vulnerable areas of the UREX+1a 
flowsheet, in terms of contacting equipment, are the capability to handle solids in the UREX process, and 
the possible residence time requirements for the TALSPEAK process, which may be  greater than 
available with current, conventional centrifugal contactors. 
Alternative Cs/Sr Waste Form  
Alternative product forms for cesium and strontium (zeolites, or taylored wasteforms for cesium and 
strontium such as Synroc), were identified as viable alternatives in an AFCI engineered product 
assessment. These wasteforms will be evaluated as alternatives to the mineralized steam reforming 
product. At this time, there are no waste or storage form criteria for the cesium and strontium product, so 
there is some risk in focusing on a single waste form meeting the criteria ultimately selected.  
Feed Clarification 
Clarification of the dissolved fuel product prior to separation processes is required to prevent fouling of 
the separations equipment. In order to design an effective feed clarification system, it is necessary to 
understand the ability of the downstream processing equipment to tolerate solids. The design of feed 
clarification and separation process equipment are interrelated and each must be selected with 
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consideration of the other process. An evaluation will be made of how solid/liquid separations are 
performed at commercial reprocessing plants and identification, to the extent possible, of any pertinent 
information and processing issues that may lead to process efficiencies and improved economic 
performance. Potential enhancements to separation efficiency may be necessary for the reference process, 
depending on the selection of separations equipment.  
Thermodynamic Data for Process Modeling 
Laboratory data (distribution coefficients, extraction constants, etc.) will be obtained and incorporated 
into AMUSE or other process models to improve model predictive performance and/or provide new 
modeling capabilities. Collection of thermodynamic data to incorporate into process and simulation 
models are needed for separation and product conversion processes. These data will be used to expand the 
capabilities of existing models or fill in gaps where data currently are not available. The UREX+1a 
process flowsheet utilizes aqueous-soluble hydroxamic acids to control Pu and Np partitioning from that 
of U and Tc. As hydroxamic acids have not been widely been used on an industrial scale in nuclear fuel 
processing, there is a need to understand the thermodynamic properties of these materials under process-
relevant conditions. The various species formed by complexation of hydroxamic acids with tetravalent 
and hexavalent actinides (U, Np and Pu) must be characterized and the thermodynamic parameters for 
these complexation reactions over conditions relevant to the UREX+1a processing flowsheet measured. 
The fundamental chemical knowledge generated will allow for more accurate modeling and simulation of 
the UREX+1a flowsheet and will support developing the safety/regulatory basis for the UREX+1a 
processing facilities. This technical activity addresses several technical risks including TALSPEAK 
process chemistry, Pu stability, technetium partitioning, and zirconium and molybdenum extraction 
behavior.  
Chemistry of Entrained Phases 
Previous work has shown that the primary means for metals of low extractability (e.g. cesium in the 
PUREX process) to contaminate the organic product stream is by their dissolution in small drops (~1 µm 
diameter) of entrained aqueous phase in the organic extractant. Such small drops, or hazes, can be formed 
by the dispersive mechanisms of drop breakage and by chemical precipitation. The formation, behavior 
and mitigation of hazes is most important at industrial scale but can be investigated in focused small-scale 
tests and by examination of the system chemistry and turbulence characteristics of the process equipment. 
Studies will be performed to understand and improve the decontamination performance of the liquid–
liquid extraction processes. This technical activity addresses several technical risks, primarily carryover 
of complexants, but also including Pu stability, technetium partitioning, and zirconium and molybdenum 
behavior.  
Geometrically-safe Evaporator Design/Demonstration  
Existing designs of geometrically-safe evaporators will be evaluated, and if engineered controls are 
preferred or required in addition to administrative controls for criticality safety in the CFTC, a 
geometrically-safe evaporator will be constructed and tested with surrogate feed materials. 
Zirconium Refining and Recycle 
Given the large volume of the cladding hull waste stream, significant savings could be achieved if the 
Zircalloy hulls could be decontaminated to ‘free-release’ levels. It is conceivable that the hulls could be 
decontaminated to a level suitable for beneficial reuse in fuel fabrication. Processing of the metal cladding 
waste by refining can be used to separate pure zirconium from the contaminants.  
Investigation of the technical feasibility of refining spent hulls for recovery/reuse of zirconium will be 
investigated. This task will be coordinated with interested industrial partners to determine if the recycle 
hulls could be used to fabricate transmutation fuels. Small-scale Zircalloy hull refining tests will be 
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performed and the purity of the products determined. Such an approach may have to be combined with an 
enhanced decladding process. An oxidative decladding process, where the fuel is segmented and oxidized 
at elevated temperatures or with oxidative agents in aqueous solution may provide enhanced 
decontamination to support cladding recycle. An alternative head-end treatment using nitrogen oxides to 
effectively release the volatile radionuclides by oxidizing the UO2 to U3O8 potentially provides another 
effective decladding and volatile species release treatment. Additionally, decontamination of the Zircalloy 
hulls via the ZIRFLEX process or by HF dissolution will be examined. Before beginning investigation of 
these alternatives, an evaluation will be performed, including discussions with interested commercial 
companies, to determine the level of interest and technical feasibility of refining cladding hulls for re-use. 
GNEP Transformation 
The development of the UREX+1a process as a possible alternative for the CFTC can benefit in the short 
and medium term from the new tools provided by work in the fundamental sciences and in the computing 
sciences. 
Better modeling of the chemical processes and better understanding of their fundamental chemistry will 
lead to better control of the reaction dynamics, and better estimates of the losses that need to be dealt 
with. Accurate modeling of the equipment might lead to more optimized designs, in particular for the 
processes that require interface chemistry to occur such as the contactors. 
High fidelity modeling of the equipment and of the whole plant can result in significant short term capital 
and operating cost savings by reducing the footprint of the plant, increasing its operating efficiency, and 
reducing waste form production. 
In the longer term, better separations technologies, which are currently characterized by an 
empirical research model will benefit from better measurements of fundamental properties, better 
thermodynamic modeling of the processes, and better optimization tools for integrating these 
processes and designing plants. In the longer term, novel processes could be developed based on 
better simulation capabilities at the molecular level. 
Waste forms are one of the ultimate product of GNEP and must be demonstrated to survive for 
extremely long times in complex geological environments. Currently that demonstration is 
essentially empirical and therefore affected with rather large uncertainties. Better understanding 
of the fundamental physical phenomena and the capability to model the evolution of waste forms 
in complex geological media will bring added confidence to the nuclear enterprise. 
3.4 Engineering Alternatives Study 
The Engineering Alternative Studies (EAS) will evaluate alternatives supporting an industrial-scale 
(3,000 metric tons of LWR spent fuel per year) spent fuel recycling plant. These studies, a near-term 
effort to be completed in FY-2007, is intended to provide an engineering basis for developing the Draft 
GNEP PEIS, as well as guiding and evaluating possible conceptual design studies for the CFTC.  A 
comprehensive set of Functional and Operational Requirements (F&ORs) has been developed to provide 
a basis for the studies, and the evaluation of the influence of these requirements on plant design will be 
used to help establish the specifications for conceptual design of the CFTC.  The EAS completed a 30% 
progress review in December 2006, and a 60% progress review in February 2007, with completion of the 
studies planned for June 2007.  Subsequent studies may be identified to complement conceptual design 
studies and support the 2008 Secretarial decision.  
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3.5 Development of Enabling Technologies  
A successful demonstration of LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separations will require significant efforts in 
three key enabling technology areas, Safety, Safeguards and Proliferation Risk Reduction, and Modeling 
and Simulation. 
3.5.1 Safeguards and Proliferation Risk and Safety 
The PUREX process is used at several international plants to reprocess spent fuel in order to recover 
uranium and plutonium for mixed oxide (MOX) fuel. The IAEA has established guidelines to prevent the 
diversion of nuclear material at reprocessing plants based on two scenarios: abrupt diversion and 
protracted diversion. These guidelines are established to maintain accountancy of fissionable material to 
ensure that significant quantities of weapons-grade nuclear material are not diverted over a specified time 
frame. At reprocessing plants, the accountancy of Pu drives the nuclear material accountability. 
Reprocessing plants maintain Pu accountancy by a combination of containment and surveillance, process 
monitoring, and chemical analysis of selected samples. 
For the front end of the reprocessing cycle, the initial plutonium inventories for the spent fuel prior to 
shearing and dissolution are based upon burn-up profile calculations. The fuel compositions obtained 
from these calculations have large uncertainties, and more detailed analyses are performed once the fuel is 
dissolved. The dissolved spent fuel solution is sent to the accountability input tank, the analysis of which 
is the input for Pu accountancy. The spent fuel treatment process is monitored using a system based on 
both a book inventory (obtained from chemical analyses of process samples) and a process inventory 
(obtained from process data). In process, bulk quantities of Pu are measured in real time by monitoring 
bulk volumes, process flow rates, solution densities, etc. using sophisticated computerized accounting 
systems. Chemical analysis is most appropriately done in an on-site laboratory. The Pu content of the 
hulls and process waste are obtained prior to compaction or vitrification. The liquid PUREX Pu product 
stream is usually not analyzed; rather samples of the PuO2 or MOX powder derived from the solutions 
are collected, weighed and analyzed. The bulk mass and volume are measured, and samples of the powder 
are taken from a batch or individual canisters for more detailed analysis. An authentication system is to be 
employed at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant to authenticate that each sample was obtained from a 
specific batch. Neutron coincidence measurements and high-resolution gamma spectroscopy are used to 
analyze the bulk powder in the processing glovebox to obtain the Pu content of the entire glovebox. At 
the LaHague plant of AREVA, the solution volume and density of the liquid uranyl nitrate product are 
monitored while at Rokkasho, the U3O8 powder is analyzed by low-resolution gamma emission 
spectroscopy to monitor the enrichment. 
The primary analytical techniques used to maintain plutonium material accountancy in large reprocessing 
plants include mass spectrometry, hybrid K-edge X-ray fluorescence densitometry, spectrophotometry, 
potentiometry, alpha, beta and gamma spectrophotometers, neutron coincidence counters, and gravimetry. 
Other techniques are also available for specific Pu accountancy applications. An analysis of the 
uncertainty associated with the application of analytical techniques (uncertainties from methods alone) to 
Pu accountancy showed that accumulated uncertainties for dissolver and product solutions are high when 
compared to the IAEA goal of detecting 8 kg of Pu in a 30-day period. However, it should be possible to 
meet the IAEA goals if the techniques with lowest measurement uncertainties are used. In addition, the 
IAEA has additional monitoring measures in place for reprocessing plants, including continuous 
monitoring and sample authentication.  
Under the current strategy for processing LWR fuel, it will be necessary to monitor and account for all 
transuranics, not just plutonium (neptunium, americium and curium). This will require that new 
accountancy methods (or modifications to the current methods) be developed in order to track 
transuranics. New instrumentation that will reduce analysis time and increase accuracy will be necessary. 
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It should be recognized that some of the streams will be easier to monitor, relative to a PUREX facility, 
given that some of the high gamma emitters (from the decay of Cs) will be separated from the transuranic 
elements.  
In a group actinide recovery process, such as UREX +1a, the lanthanide fission products may be 
recovered together, along with the actinides. The lanthanide fission products produce a significant 
radiation field. A quantity of 10 kilograms of the TRUEX product, upon solidification, will have a 
radiation field well in excess of 100 Rem/hour at one meter. The TALSPEAK process step separates the 
transuranics from the lanthanide fission products. In the UREX+1a process, the TALSPEAK product 
would be blended with a liquid uranyl nitrate solution in the proportions required to meet the fuel 
specifications for the Advanced Burner Reactor fuel. In this manner, the products of the UREX+1a 
process may be maintained as Attractiveness Level D material (as defined in DOE Order 470-4), making 
possible significant reductions in cost for plant security in the future. Close interaction with process and 
safeguards personnel, at an early stage of design, allows for the inclusion enhanced safeguards methods. 
The benefits of this interaction are that the LWR separations process flowsheet will be reconfigured to 
optimize material accountability, physical protection, and proliferation resistance, before completion of 
facility design. 
The Physical Protection System (PPS) for preventing theft and sabotage at the CFTC will be designed to 
defend against a Design Basis Threat (DBT), addressing both insider and outsider threats. The physical 
protection measures will monitor and enable authorized access and activities and detect, delay and 
respond to prevent unauthorized access, activities, or events. A global perspective will be taken to enable 
international acceptance and broad implementation.  
The PPS will satisfy the relevant DOE and NRC regulatory requirements derived from their statutory 
authority and jurisdiction. In addition, the PPS will be designed to meet IAEA requirements in the 
amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and to be consistent with the IAEA 
guidelines for The Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities (INFCIRC/225/current 
version). Furthermore, the ABR PPS will be integrated with the material control and accountability 
(MC&A) systems to increase the effectiveness of each system, especially against the potential insider 
adversary, and to further reduce costs.  
The technical approach is to design-in physical protection throughout all phases of the project to improve 
effectiveness and to reduce intrusiveness and costs. The physical protection program will be based on the 
internationally recognized Design and Evaluation Process Outline (DEPO) system engineering 
methodology. In addition, GEN-IV Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) assessment 
methodologies will be incorporated, as appropriate, to evaluate the design. Gap analyses will be 
conducted to identify and define security technology research and development needs and will be 
coordinated with the NNSA R&D program for funding consideration. 
As a result of new policy requirements or identified technology gaps, new security R&D needs may be 
identified. For example, new policy requirements may be necessary to institutionalize multinational 
facilities that support joint ownership and operations while protecting materials, information, and 
technologies. Security R&D may be needed to facilitate large system integrated physical protection 
modeling and analysis, to accommodate unprecedented secure transportation systems and to enable the 
cost-effective implementation of strengthened capabilities.  
Safety of spent fuel reprocessing and high-level waste chemical treatment facilities is well established and 
currently practiced in the U.S. and worldwide. Future facilities will be designed to meet all regulations 
related to chemical and radiological safety, as well as current environmental standards. A comprehensive 
safety risk analysis would be performed consistent with DOE 10 CFR 830. In addition safety data 
collected during the CFTC would be used to support design certification of the commercial scale facility. 
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3.5.2 Safety and Licensing of the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center 
The safety and licensing requirements of spent fuel reprocessing and high-level waste chemical treatment 
facilities are well-established in the US. However, only one commercial reprocessing plant has operated 
under an NRC license in the US: the Nuclear Fuel Services West Valley Plant in New York licensed in 
1966. Of course, several fuel fabrication facilities are licensed by the NRC. Most of these have undergone 
recent review. 
Over the years there has been an evolution in the details of the licensing process for commercial 
nonreactor nuclear facilities. For DOE facilities, 10CFR830 became effective in 2001 and with DOE 
Standard 1189 provides the requirements and implement guidance for the authorization basis of DOE’s 
nuclear facilities. For commercial facilities, Subpart H, “Additional Requirements for Certain Licensees 
Authorized to Possess a Critical Mass of Special Nuclear Material”, has been added to 10 CFR Part 70. 
This section supplements the general requirements for nuclear facilities specified in 10 CFR Part 20, 10 
CFR Part 50, 10 CFR Part 70.22 and 70.23 and 10 CFR Part 100.  Subpart H is being exercised in the 
ongoing licensing review for the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility to be constructed for the disposal of 
excess weapons grade plutonium. The review of this license application is being done using guidance 
found in NUREG-1520, “Standard Review Plan for the Review of a License Application for a Fuel Cycle 
Facility” (March 2002). This review standard provides description of the areas of review, purposes of 
reviews, review procedures and acceptance criteria.  The hallmark feature of subpart H is the requirement 
to submit an Integrated Safety Analysis that differs in detail from a conventional PRA.   
There are several categories of information required by the NRC in a license application and comparable 
information is required for DOE. These are: 
• General information on the applicant and resources as specified in 10 CFR 50.33 and 10 CFR 
Part 70.22(a) (1).   
• The activities for which special nuclear material is requested.  
• The location and equipment that will be used for this work. 
• Technical qualifications and training program 
• Proposed program to protect health and minimize danger to life or property. 
• Technical Information 
• An Environmental Report per subpart A of 10 CFR 51 
• A Safety Analysis Report (SAR) 
• A listing of “inspections, tests & analyses”, together with their acceptance criteria, that are to 
be performed to show the facility is safe to operate 
• An emergency plan to be activated in the event of a radiological emergency at the plant 
• Evidence that local authorities deem the emergency plans workable, are willing to participate in 
their further evolution and will fulfill their roles. 
It is expected that the CFTC will reflect through its design, construction and operation an extremely low 
probability for accidents that could result in the release of significant quantities of radioactive fission 
products or actinide elements. This would be demonstrated through a Safety Analysis Report, which 
would contain information delineated in 10CFR70.22. 
The application must include an Integrated Safety Analysis to demonstrate compliance with the 
requirements that: 
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• The risks of each credible, high-consequence event are limited.  [High consequence events are 
those that result in (1) worker exposures in excess of 100 rem, (2) acute exposures to a person 
outside the controlled area in excess of 25 rem, (3) intake of 30 mg or more of soluble uranium 
outside the controlled area, or (4) acute chemical exposure that could endanger the life of a 
worker or could lead to irreversible or serious, long-lasting health effects to an individual 
outside the controlled area.] 
• Engineered controls and administrative controls are available that will limit the consequences 
of credible events initiated internally or externally to the facility. 
• Nuclear criticality under normal and credible abnormal events is prevented. 
• A safety program is in place that will assure compliance with the requirements 
The Integrated Safety Analysis required of the license applicant must identify: 
• Radiological hazards associated with processing special nuclear material 
• Chemical hazards  
• Facility safety hazards 
• Potential accident sequences caused by process deviation or other internal or credible external 
events 
• Baseline design criteria 
• Quality standards and records for design and construction 
• Fire protection systems provisions 
• Natural phenomena hazards 
• Items relied upon for safety 
• Facility/site emergency plan 
• Provisions for continued operation of essential utility services in the event of an accident 
• Qualifications of the facility designers, constructors, and operators 
It is further required that facility and system design and facility layout be based on defense-in-depth 
practices. 
Separations plants and fuel fabrication plans will be required to be licensed to hold Special Nuclear 
Material (SNM) in accordance with 10CFR70. These requirements include consideration of physical 
protection and safeguards and control and accounting of SNM. 
3.5.3 Simulation and Modeling of LWR Spent Fuel Processing 
An efficient plant design and process control requires extensive thermal and material integration between 
unit operations and at a larger scale between the major process segments. This integration will require a 
detailed chemical process simulation of the entire plant. For many unit operations, e.g. heat exchangers, 
pumps, and tanks, the data currently available are sufficient for an integrated design. However, some 
operations will require data that are currently unavailable. In key critical areas, notably conversion of 
process streams to final solid forms, significant unknowns exist.  
Much of the data required to simulate a chemical reprocessing plant for spent nuclear fuel based on a 
UREX+1a extraction process already exist in the open literature or have been incorporated into process 
codes such as AMUSE or Aspen®. Experimental data are required for the front end fuel dissolution; 
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where high-acid processes have been demonstrated and low-acid processes do not generally yield 
complete dissolution. Tank designs have been developed for process plants, though novel designs and 
instrumentation may require some optimization; criticality analysis for each process stream is required to 
size and select tanks. Although the processes that comprise UREX+1a have not been demonstrated in 
long-term tests, the existing data for UREX, TRUEX, and CCD-PEG are likely sufficient for initial plant 
simulations, given the other uncertainties.  
Post-process treatment of effluents and solidification appears to be where data are most limited. Though 
Aspen® does contain databases on waste-water treatment and solids drying and handling, there is not 
much plant-scale experience in converting spent fuel components, other than U and Pu, to solid forms. 
Extensive data exist for acid-water evaporation, and waste-water treatment. Data on recovery and 
calcinations of trace organics in aqueous streams are likely available, though not for all of the organic 
species used in a UREX+1a process. There are extensive data on gas treatment in Aspen® though 
experimentation may be required for the specific adsorbents used in radionuclide capture.  
The need exists to develop a LWR reprocessing steady state process model using existing tools, such as 
Aspen® in conjunction with AMUSE. The needs of these models are: 
• Short-term – steady state model to be used for process design 
• Intermediate term – transient model that will be used to predict process response to changes in 
flowsheet conditions. The goal is to use this model in conjunction with safeguards 
instrumentation in order focus development needs. This model will also be used to train 
operators to understand process operation and response to upsets.  
• Long-term – develop chemical process models more tailored to actinide elements. These 
models will better predict actinide thermodynamic and thermo-chemical behavior. 
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3.6 Cost Estimates and Milestones  
Table 5. Cost Estimates for the LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separation Technologies 
Cost Estimates ($M) 
Activities FY-07 FY-08 FY-09 FY-10 FY-11 FY-12 
LWR Separations 
Technology Development 22.8 46 78 79 60 32 
CFTC Design & 
Construction Support* 16.6 41 125 150 170 190 
TOTAL 39.4 87 203 229 230 222 
* Includes safety and licensing analysis 
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Table 6. LWR Spent Nuclear Fuel Separations Technology Development Milestones 
Milestones Date 
Complete EAS inputs to the PEIS for a spent fuel recycling facility June 2007 
Provide input for industry engagement on conceptual design studies June 2007 
Develop remote contactor design concepts and initiate test component fabrication September 2007 
Develop Tc solidification flowsheet and initiate bench-scale tests March 2008 
Support 30% completion of industrial conceptual designs April 2008 
Complete pilot-scale testing of Cs/Sr steam reforming process April 2008 
Complete EAS design package for review April 2008 
Develop instrumentation and control systems conceptual designs May 2008 
Initiate procurement of off gas system components for testing June 2008 
Demonstrate metallic waste form for cladding hulls incorporating technetium September 2008 
Develop initial waste formulation for fission product HLW  December  2008 
Develop reference off-gas treatment process January 2009 
Complete initial characterization of mixed transuranic solid product January 2009 
Initiate demonstration of remote waste form packaging March 2009 
Complete evaluation of HLW forms April 2009 
Complete initial demonstration of steam reforming Cs/Sr product May 2009 
Validate UREX process performance with solvent recycle  May  2009 
Complete demonstration of Tc solidification process May 2009 
Complete bench-scale demonstration of mixed transuranics solidification June 2009 
Complete bench-scale demonstration of Cs/Sr solidification technology  September 2009 
Complete initial integrated testing of separation processes with surrogates September 2009 
Support completion of conceptual design for nuclear fuel recycling center September 2009 
Complete initial Cs/Sr waste form characterization October 2009 
Demonstrate off-gas treatment system and waste forms November 2009 
Complete bench-scale demonstration of fission product waste form March 2010 
Complete mockup testing of prototype head-end equipment July 2010 
Demonstrate process monitoring and control system for separation processes May 2011 
Convert AMUSE code to higher level platform, and incorporate transients July 2011 
Support completion of preliminary design for nuclear fuel recycling center September 2011 
Complete initial characterization of high-level waste forms July 2012 
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4.0 Transmutation Technologies using Fast Reactors 
Transmutation is one of the three key technologies necessary for the successful implementation of GNEP. 
The role of the fast reactor in the GNEP fuel cycle is to produce neutrons for consuming the TRU product 
separated from LWR spent fuel, as described in Section 3.0. This process is commonly called “actinide 
burning” and relies on the transmutation of TRU into fission products with more desirable waste 
characteristics. 
A wide variety of reactor transmutation strategies were considered in the AFCI Program; this program 
included extensive international collaborations for systematic comparison of transmutation performance. 
Two major criteria for the reactor transmutation technology decision are: (1) the capability for repeated 
recycle of grouped TRU (the UREX+1a product) and (2) low technical risk. Based on the first criterion, a 
fast reactor system with an associated closed fuel cycle (see Section 5.0 for fuel cycle technology 
description) was chosen as the reference technology; recycle of TRU in thermal reactors would likely be 
limited to a fraction of the original inventory. A variety of fast reactors can be considered for the 
transmutation demonstration, but the sodium-cooled fast reactor technology has superior technical 
maturity; the other options (lead-cooled or gas-cooled fast reactors or accelerator-driven systems with 
either coolant option) require viability research and development that could delay or prevent successful 
technology demonstration. Therefore, the sodium-cooled fast reactor technology is being pursued as the 
reference, or baseline, technology for the GNEP transmutation demonstration. 
The development and deployment strategy for the transmutation reactor has already been described as 
part of the overall GNEP strategy. It will rely on a government-industry relationship, where one option is 
that industry could build a prototype ABR and the government will support industry by running the R&D 
and technology development tasks that support that prototype; the government will also run a longer-term 
R&D program that will develop advanced technologies that contribute to the long-term pathway for 
commercially competitive transmutation reactors. 
4.1 Advanced Recycling Reactor Performance Objectives 
Specific criteria will be applied to each demonstration project to assure technology performance will be 
adequate for the comprehensive GNEP mission. The GNEP program will follow the process described in 
Section 3. As the demonstration proceeds, the performance objectives will be refined to reflect the 
mitigation of technical risk and interaction of the key technology areas. For the fast reactor transmutation 
technology, performance objectives have been identified based on the need for future commercial 
deployment. 
4.1.1 Demonstrate Transmutation of Transuranics 
The TRU present in LWR spent fuel (primarily Pu, Am, Np, and Cm) are the primary contributors to key 
waste disposal parameters (e.g., long-term heat load, peak repository dose, and radiotoxicity). The TRU 
also comprises the primary proliferation concern in the spent fuel materials; and the GNEP strategy 
utilizes group separation of the transuranics, avoiding a pure plutonium product. Therefore, a critical goal 
of the GNEP advanced fuel cycle strategy is to exclude the TRU from the final waste. The TRU is 
contained in the fuel cycle by application of the LWR separations and fast reactors recycle technologies 
described in Sections 3.0 and 5.0. Each recycle pass, a fraction of the TRU are consumed by fissioning in 
the fast reactor, producing additional power and gradually eliminating the TRU inventory in the nuclear 
fuel cycle. The integrated development of all three technologies will fully demonstrate the waste 
management benefits possible using the GNEP closed fuel cycle. 
The fast reactor transmutation technology demonstration must successfully irradiate transmutation fuels 
created from TRU recovered from LWR spent nuclear fuel. The remaining TRU must be recovered to 
demonstrate the net consumption of TRU and recycled back to the fast reactor for further destruction. 
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Thus, the reactor demonstration utilizes transmutation fuels fabricated by the fuel recycle demonstration 
from both LWR and fast reactor sources, and provides spent fuel to the fuel recycle demonstration.  
4.1.2 Demonstrate Cost Reduction Design Features 
Although the sodium-cooled fast reactor technology is mature, the capital cost of previous experimental 
reactors has been high. Recent cost studiesa  estimate that the capital cost of current designs may be ~25% 
greater than conventional LWRs. Furthermore, the capital cost of the fast reactor is the primary driver for 
any cost difference between the current once-through cycle and the GNEP closed fuel cycle. It should be 
noted that fast reactors have never been commercially deployed and, thus, have not yet benefited from 
significant return on experience that would help reduce costs via design simplification and innovative 
design features; likewise, fast reactor research has been implemented at a relatively low level for at least a 
decade, and technology options for cost reduction have remained in paper form without experimental 
R&D and demonstration. For the GNEP application, it is important to achieve a level of economic 
competitiveness that enables system installation in accordance with market principles. To this end, a 
variety of innovative SFR design features and technologies are being considered, possibly including 
configuration simplifications (e.g., reduced number of coolant loops, improved containment design), 
advanced reactor materials (e.g., improved fuel burnup, higher temperatures, improved reliability), and 
advanced energy conversion systems (e.g., supercritical CO2 Brayton cycle for higher efficiency). In 
addition, current design techniques introduce conservative design margins as a result of lack of certainty 
and validation of analysis techniques. The eventual goal is to ensure competitive energy cost (per unit 
power generation) compared with other energy sources. 
4.1.3 Demonstrate Fast Reactor Safety 
The most recent fast reactor constructed in the U.S., FFTF, was designed and built in the 1970’s, before 
many of the modern safety principles had been developed.  The ABR design will incorporate the proven 
safety features for a fast reactor in order to demonstrate the safety of this type of reactor.  This will 
include traditional safety principles, including “defense-in-depth”, along with more recent developments 
in passive or “inherent” safety.  To achieve defense-in-depth usually requires the incorporation of 
multiple, diverse and redundant safety systems in the design so that the probability of an accident that 
would result in large releases of radiation to the environment is extremely low.  It also incorporates 
multiple barriers between the radioactive material and the public 
Traditionally, the reactor design has achieved safety through active defense-in-depth using engineered 
systems that require an action to have an effect.  Passive safety is a different and complementary 
approach, where the design takes advantage of the inherent characteristics of a fast reactor to provide 
additional protection without requiring any system action, whether automatic or manual.  For example, it 
has been shown that sodium-cooled fast reactors (SFR) can have favorable reactivity feedbacks that 
promote passive response to off-normal conditions. In previous reactor experimentsb, inherent shutdown 
for extreme conditions was demonstrated.  For GNEP, the safety of fast reactors used for commercial 
purposes will be demonstrated through analysis and testing of the ABR, designed using both traditional 
and advanced concepts to achieve superior safety performance. 
4.1.4 Provide Capability for Fast Spectrum Fuel Irradiation 
Previous experimental and demonstration SFRs have utilized plutonium and enriched uranium fuel forms. 
The application of transmutation fuels containing the entire mix of transuranics must be demonstrated. In 
 
a “Accelerator-Driven Systems (ADS) and Fast Reactors (FR) in Advanced Nuclear Fuel Cycles,” Nuclear Energy Agency, 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2002 
b. Planchon et al., “Implications of the EBR-II Inherent Safety Demonstrate Test,” Nuclear Engineering and Design, 101. 
Campbell et al., “FFTF Loss of Flow Without SCRAM Experiments with GEMs,” HEDL-TC-2947. 
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addition, the utilization of advanced fuels (high burnup) and structural materials is important to cost 
reduction; extensive irradiation testing is required. 
4.1.5 Demonstrate Reactor Safeguards and Security 
The transmutation technology demonstration will also employ modern reactor safeguards. The safeguards 
objective is to provide for the timely detection of diversion of a significant quantity of nuclear material 
and to provide for the detection of undeclared nuclear materials and activities, as outlined by the IAEA.  
In addition, design features and operational protocols important for reactor security will be demonstrated. 
The PPS, which prevents theft and sabotage, will be designed to defend against a Design Basis Threat, 
addressing both insider and outsider threats. The physical protection measures will monitor and enable 
authorized access and activities and detect, delay, and respond to prevent unauthorized access, activities, 
or events. 
4.2 Status of Technology 
The SFR chosen for the GNEP transmutation demonstration relies primarily on technologies already 
developed and demonstrated for sodium-cooled reactors and associated fuel cycles that have successfully 
been built and operated in worldwide fast reactor programs. The first usable nuclear electricity was 
generated by a fast reactor, EBR-I, in 1951. In the U.S., SFR technology was employed in the 20 MWe 
EBR-II that operated from 1963 to 1994. EBR-II R&D included development and testing of metal fuel, 
demonstration of a closed fuel cycle, and passive safety tests. The 400 MWt Fast Flux Test Facility 
(FFTF) was completed in 1980. FFTF operated with a full core of mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, and 
performed SFR materials and component testing. The U.S. SFR development program stalled with 
cancellation of the Clinch River demonstration reactor in 1983, although DOE research for advanced SFR 
technology continued until 1994. 
Significant SFR research and development programs have also been conducted in Russia, Japan, France, 
India, and United Kingdom. The only currently operating fast power reactor is BN-600 which has reliably 
operated since 1980 with a 75% capacity factor (note that BN-600 uses highly enriched uranium fuel and 
does not recycle transuranics). Currently operating test reactors include PHENIX (France), JOYO 
(Japan), BOR-60 (Russia), and FBTR (India). The most modern fast reactor construction project was the 
280 MWe MONJU in Japan that was completed in 1990. In addition, SFR technology programs have 
recently been started in both Korea and China, with the Chinese Experimental Fast Reactor scheduled for 
startup in 2008 and the Indian demonstration reactor to start in 2010. 
The Transmutation Fuel for the GNEP fast reactors is required to perform the primary mission. Both 
metal and oxide fuels are under consideration. The development of this fuel is a major function of the 
“fast recycle technology” section and requires that the transmutation reactor be built and operated in an 
expeditious manner. Between now and when the reactor is operational, alternatives such as use of foreign 
irradiation facilities will be evaluated regarding their ability to contribute to the mission of accelerating 
the development of transmutation fuel. 
Coolant Control Technology includes the necessary engineering and knowledge base to fill, drain and 
operate flowing sodium systems; clean up and purify the sodium coolant; and operate chemistry control, 
heating and cooling systems and instrumentation and control. This technology was well established in the 
U.S. with the liquid metal reactor programs in the 1990s and needs to be re-established to effectively 
build domestic sodium systems. Extensive technology exists in France, Japan and Russia. 
Core Materials include cladding, wire wrap, grid spacers, ducts, sockets, and reflectors. A tremendous 
amount of materials development has occurred as part of previous liquid metal fast reactor programs. 
New alloys have been developed in the U.S. and elsewhere which allow very high radiation damage with 
good performance. These will be evaluated against design and safety requirements for use in technology 
GNEP Technology Development Plan 73 
July 25, 2007   
 
demonstration. Core materials demonstrated in the past will be used for the initial startup core with 
advanced materials phased in after appropriate technology development. 
For Startup Fuel there has been significant U.S.  experience with metal (EBR-II) and oxide (FFTF) fuel 
forms. However, there is no current domestic capability to fabricate such fuels in sufficient quantities for 
fast reactor transmutation demonstration, although it may be possible to refurbish existing facilities.  
The Primary System includes the primary heat exchangers, pumps and subsystems. Coolant 
temperatures range from 300ºC to 510ºC and operate at low pressure (less than 2 atm). Austenitic 
stainless steels are appropriate. Vendors in the U.S. can produce these components with a good deal of 
development work. 
The Reactor Vessel and Structures for fast reactors includes the vessel, guard vessel, redan, lower core 
support structure, core barrel/restraint system, upper internal structure, and the reactor vessel enclosure. 
These structures are typically austenitic stainless steel (either 304 or 316 series). For long system lifetime 
(60+ years), there are a number of high-temperature materials usage and codification issues that will need 
to be resolved in preparation for licensing.  
The Balance of Plant power conversion technology for a standard steam cycle includes the steam 
generator, turbine, condenser, and associated piping and instrumentation. The sodium to water heat 
exchanger technology is mature in foreign countries, but needs to be established in the U.S. The other 
balance of plant components and subsystems are well established for the steam cycle.  Sodium leak 
prevention and detection is an issue that must be addressed. Supercritical CO2 Brayton cycle is also an 
option for power conversion that may lead to overall cost reductions for SFR technology. This technology 
is low maturity and needs significant development. The other balance of plant components and 
subsystems are well established for the steam cycle but need development for the CO2 Brayton cycle. 
The Containment includes the containment structure and associated systems that provide consequence 
mitigation for severe accidents. These systems are similar to existing power reactor containment systems, 
and are a very mature technology. 
A Seismic Isolation system is being proposed for the fast reactor to demonstrate the feasibility and 
benefit of seismic isolation systems to nuclear applications. Seismic isolators are a reasonably mature 
technology; however, they need to be demonstrated in nuclear applications especially their ability to 
withstand harsher environments such as higher temperatures and radiation fields without degradation. 
The Instrumentation and Control for the advanced recycling reactor is expected to adopt advanced 
digital control systems proposed for advanced LWRs. The project will investigate advancements in 
instrumentation to increase reliability and ability to withstand the harsh operating environment of a 
sodium-cooled fast reactor. 
The opaque sodium coolant presents Maintenance and Inspection challenges that require some 
engineering development. Significant improvements in detection and repair techniques are envisioned 
beyond the existing technology utilized in SFR test reactors. Innovative ideas are being considered for in-
service inspection and repair. Remote handling and sensor technology for use under sodium are being 
developed worldwide, including ultra-sonic techniques. 
The Fuel Handling techniques and components employed in previous fast reactors were reliable but very 
complicated and expensive (e.g., double-rotatable plugs, in-core storage of spent fuel); therefore, the 
technical risk is low. Recent design innovations may simplify the approach but require the development 
and demonstration of a specialized in-vessel handling machine. 
Appendix A discusses the Technology Readiness Levels for the fast reactor transmutation technologies. 
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The Fast Reactor Component Design resources and tools are available from the previous U.S. fast 
reactor program and in most cases, reflect international standards. However, the current design process 
includes conservative margins, and significant cost savings may be possible with higher fidelity 
simulation and optimization methods (see Section 4.4). A limited group of trained designers are available 
in the national labs and through international collaborations, and it is important to transfer their 
knowledge and experience to a new generation. 
The Fast Reactor Component Testing infrastructure is virtually non-existent in the U.S. to support a 
fast reactor development program. During the history of fast reactor development in the U.S., the science 
and technology community had at their disposal small, medium, and large component testing facilities 
used to mature the sodium component technology through an appropriate technology maturity level (TRL 
7) that ensured programmatic success. Most of these testing facilities have either been decommissioned or 
mothballed to the degree that they cannot be utilized for technology maturation. In addition, the 
international fast reactor science and technology community has either decommissioned or not maintained 
their testing infrastructure that supported their past fast reactor development programs. 
The Fast Reactor Component Manufacturing Infrastructure is also virtually non-existent in the U.S. 
because of the lack of demand for fabricating sodium technology components. The manufacturing 
infrastructure for conventional components that are used in other energy production systems, such as 
balance of plant component for a steam cycle, do exist today, and the manufacturing base infrastructure 
will contribute very little programmatic risk (other than competition of resources with the anticipated 
deployment of advanced light water reactors) to the fast reactor transmutation program.  
The available fast reactor Safety Analysis tools developed in the U.S. also reflect the current standard and 
are utilized in all the major international fast reactor programs. Improvements are envisioned to provide 
more accurate analyses with modern simulation techniques that could be used to simplify the reactor 
design and reduce capital cost. A limited group of trained analysts are available in the national labs and 
thru international collaborations. The transmutation demonstration project provides the opportunity to re-
establish U.S. leadership in this important technology area. 
The Licensing strategy and regulations are under development. The international standard for fast 
reactors is severely outdated since the last fast reactor was built in 1990.  The NRC has never licensed a 
fast reactor, although the Advisory Committee for Reactor Safeguards (ACRS) supported review of the 
FFTF. The FERMI-1 (1966) reactor was licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission. Thus, the 
regulatory resources and competency to review fast reactor safety needs to be re-established.  
The technical risks described above potentially impact the project schedule and cost and, thus, add a 
certain level of programmatic risk to project execution. Because of the need to develop fast neutron 
irradiation capability for fuel and materials development quickly, various project tasks such as sodium 
component and testing infrastructure proceed in parallel with the transmutation reactor design effort. This 
parallel approach, although it adds project execution risk, is necessary to rapidly re-establish the domestic 
capabilities for sodium fast reactor technology. 
4.2.1  Key Technology Development Needs 
Based on the current status of SFR technology summarized in Table A-2, four key technology needs have 
been identified: 
1. Closed fuel cycle demonstration. Previous experimental and demonstration SFRs have utilized 
plutonium and enriched uranium fuel forms. The application of transmutation fuels containing the 
entire mix of transuranics must be demonstrated. To achieve the transmutation mission, the 
subsequent self-recycle of the TRU must also be demonstrated. 
2. Establishment of domestic infrastructure. The viability of SFR technology is well established; 
however, the U.S. infrastructure for this technology is severely eroded. A focused, sustained 
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demonstration project will be required to reinvigorate the domestic SFR capability as well as the 
needed human resources. In the interim, international partners are expected to play an important 
role in the initial technology testing and may also be needed as an early source of SFR 
components. 
3. Capital cost reduction. A variety of innovative technologies and design features are being 
considered for SFR cost reduction including configuration simplifications (e.g., reduced number 
of coolant loops, improved containment design), advanced reactor materials (e.g., improved fuel 
burnup, higher temperatures, improved reliability), and advanced energy conversion systems (e.g., 
supercritical CO2 Brayton cycle for higher efficiency). An important part of the transmutation 
demonstration will be to test the efficacy of these advanced technologies and design options and to 
validate design margins. 
4. Reactor safety validation and licensing. Technology gaps center around two general areas: 
assurance of passive safety response and techniques for evaluation of bounding events. The 
advanced SFR designs exploit passive safety measures to increase reliability, and the ability to 
measure and verify these passive features must be demonstrated. The approach to identify 
bounding events for specific designs and investigate the fundamental phenomena to mitigate 
severe accidents is a key issue for SFR licensing. 
An important activity for the 2008 project decision is to translate these needs into technical requirements 
for the fast reactor transmutation demonstration. The relative priority of the performance objectives given 
in Section 4.1 needs to be firmly established; the development program will clearly be configured to 
assure the demonstration of transmutation. However, the cost and schedule impact required to address the 
other objectives and needs (e.g., safety, cost reduction design features) will need to be assessed. Thus, the 
near-term design activity (Section 4.3.1) must separately evaluate the cost and schedule impact for each 
performance objective.  
4.3 Fast Reactor Development Program 
The complete GNEP vision requires development and demonstration of an integrated fuel cycle including 
LWR and fast reactor spent fuel processing, fast reactor recycle fuel fabrication and irradiation, and safe 
and reliable reactor operation using transmutation fuel. Few test fast reactors are in existence today, with 
at least one, PHENIX in France, scheduled for shutdown within a few years. Thus, the development, 
design, and operation of a fast reactor that is specifically tasked with resolving near- and long-term 
transmutation technology issues is critical to the success of GNEP. The fast reactor transmutation 
demonstration must account for the four key technology issues identified in Section 4.2.1: closed fuel 
cycle demonstration, establishment of domestic infrastructure, capital cost reduction, and reactor safety 
validation and licensing. The basic construct of the Fast Reactor Development Program consists of three 
elements: (1) the near-term activity of preparing the 2008 secretarial decision (2) the medium term 
activity of designing and building a prototype ABR, and (3) the long-term activity of developing the 
advanced technologies and tools for the evolution and deployment of commercially-viable next 
generation advanced recycling reactors. 
4.3.1 Technical Information 
To inform the 2008 Secretarial decision on whether to proceed with proposed GNEP facilities, technical 
input will be provided to answer the following eight questions: 
1. What is the technology maturity and associated technical risks? 
2. What is the economic projection for a closed fuel cycle?  
3. What is the program business plan, including cost estimates, schedules, and the role of industry? 
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4. What are the implications on U.S. infrastructure? 
5. What is the international interest? 
6. What are the non-proliferation implications? 
7. What are the nuclear sustainability implications? 
8. What are the implications on U.S. leadership? 
The work performed under the advanced recycling reactor technology development program will address 
all elements. To this end, five significant tasks that will contribute most of the information are: 
A gap analysis for sodium fast reactor technologies will review the current US status of these 
technologies, will point out areas where expertise or infrastructure has been lost and will provide 
priorities for recreating the needed expertise and infrastructure. This gap analysis will be developed on the 
basis of generic concepts, with input from potential industrial partners where available.  
A technology development plan for sodium reactors that will prioritize the needed technology and 
infrastructure development to meet the objective of building an advanced recycling reactor. This plan will 
include anticipated cost and schedule estimates. 
Industrial input that will describe schedules and costs for designing and building the first advanced 
recycling reactor. 
An options study that will overview possible advanced technologies and design options for the advanced 
recycling reactor, estimate their technical risk and potential for performance improvement, in particular 
cost reduction. 
A simulation plan that will define the needs for advanced simulation, outline the possible benefits in 
terms of cost savings and safety improvements, and define the validation path for the new generation of 
software. 
4.3.2 Advanced Burner Reactor Prototype Design and Construction  
The primary objective of the fast reactor transmutation technology demonstration is to demonstrate 
destruction of transuranics recovered from the LWR spent fuel and thereby demonstrate the benefits of 
the fuel cycle closure to nuclear waste management. To facilitate this demonstration, a fast reactor, the 
ABR Prototype, is required to provide an environment prototypic of future commercial reactors. This 
phase of the fast reactor transmutation technology demonstration program is comprised of the Phase 2 
activities discussed in Section 4.0 
The Advanced Burner Reactor Prototype will support development of the necessary licensing database for 
the ultimate commercial reactors that are required to transmute large quantities of transuranics recovered 
from the LWRs. Two different categories of the licensing database are required. The first is associated 
with the performance characteristics of fuel containing transuranics. Essentially all thermal and fast 
spectrum reactor fuel experience has been with uranium fuel and some with plutonium containing fuel. 
There is little experience with fuel fabrication including other transuranics, such as neptunium (Np), 
americium (Am), and curium (Cm). A large-enough demonstration, involving representative 
compositions of transuranics, is necessary to establish the feasibility and viability of transmutation in fast 
spectrum reactors. These transmutation fuels will be developed in another facility and produced in 
sufficient quantities for testing. 
Second, the Advanced Burner Reactor Prototype will also play a key role in establishing the licensing 
database in terms of demonstrable safety characteristics. The inherent passive safety potential of the 
sodium-cooled fast reactor needs to be demonstrated through a combination of tests and analyses in order 
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to take advantage of its application in the future commercial plants. In addition, the impact of recycled 
transuranics on safety performance of the fast reactor needs to be fully resolved to support the licensing of 
commercial plants. 
The ABR Prototype design and construction project deliverables include the design, development, 
installation, and checkout of the reactor systems with its primary auxiliary systems, the balance of plant 
systems with its secondary auxiliary systems, the reactor core, the nuclear buildings and conventional 
facilities, and a training program for new operators and support staff. The fast reactor will be designed 
and constructed to all applicable DOE and NRC regulations with an appropriate emphasis on public and 
personnel safety and the safeguards of special materials. 
The ABR Prototype design and construction project will be performed in accordance with DOE O 413.3, 
“Project Management for the Acquisition of Capital Assets,” starting with the establishment of Critical 
Decision-0, Mission Need through Critical Decision 4 – Approve Operations. After the design and 
construction project is complete, there will be a period of time, approximately one year, in which the plant 
systems will be operated at reduced power to verify proper overall integrated system performance and 
functionality, safety system performance verification, before full power reactor operations can begin. The 
facility will be designed to meet safety requirements and ensure high reliability and availability for the 
user programs. The fast reactor design will take full advantage of the infrastructure available at the target 
installation site to ensure that capabilities and infrastructure are not duplicated and associated project cost 
savings are realized.  
The Advanced Burner Reactor Prototype development project is divided into a number of project 
elements: 
• Conceptual Design 
• Preliminary Design 
• Final Detailed Design 
• Reactor Plant Systems Procurement 
• Balance of Plant Systems Procurement  
• Startup Reactor Fuel Fabrication 
• Conventional Facilities construction 
• Equipment installation and commissioning 
• Safety Analysis, Licensing, and Environmental Impact activities 
• Integration Activities 
• Project Management. 
It is imperative that the ABR Prototype design and construction project be initiated expeditiously because 
the domestic fast reactor technology base is being lost due to attrition of the experts. The project will 
provide the avenue to maintain the technology base, advance it further through concurrent R&D activities, 
train and develop the next-generation of experts, develop critical industrial infrastructure, and facilitate 
international cooperation to achieve non-proliferation goals.  
The ABR Prototype reactor design and construction project has the following project activities: 
• Design Activities – The reactor design activities will go through a three-phase process of 
increasing design detail; conceptual design where the feasibility of the reference reactor concept 
is created and alternatives are evaluated preliminary design where the design is detailed 
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sufficiently to create a baseline cost and schedule estimate that can be placed under 
configuration management, and detailed design where detailed drawings of the final design are 
created and procurement specifications are produced. The design activities will be accelerated 
for the critical path items once they are known. 
• Procurement Activities – After detailed design is complete, specifications for the nuclear steam 
supply system and balance of plant systems and component will be prepared. The systems and 
components will be competitively procured in accordance with appropriate procurement rules. 
Long-lead items will have been identified during the preliminary design activities and their 
procurement will occur early in the procurement phase to reduce their impact on the critical 
path. It may be desirable to obtain some components overseas rather than in the U.S. 
• Startup Reactor Fuel Fabrication – The startup core for the reactor will be fabricated from 
known fuel types, either uranium-plutonium metallic alloy, uranium metallic alloy, or mixed 
oxide. The startup fuel will be fabricated in accordance with the fuel specifications generated 
during the detailed design phase of the project. Depending upon the ultimate size of the ABR 
Prototype machine, a new startup fuel fabrication facility may need to be developed to handle 
throughput requirements. If the fuel fabrication requirements are modest (meaning for a smaller 
reactor size), then modifications to an existing facility may provide a more cost effective 
solution. In addition, other source options for the startup fuel, besides from new or existing U.S. 
facility are being explored. 
• Conventional Facilities Construction – The start of conventional facilities construction will 
occur after the detailed design activities are complete and the appropriate licensing process has 
been completed. The conventional facilities include the reactor building, balance of plant 
building, control and personnel building, cooling towers, and balance of plant auxiliaries 
building, among other auxiliary building. The reactor construction project will take advantage 
of the infrastructure at the site where it is located to ensure that new facilities do not duplicate 
the existing site infrastructure. 
• Equipment Installation and Commissioning activities – After the conventional facilities are built 
and the reactor and balance of plant systems are fabricated and procured; the equipment will be 
installed in their respective buildings and will be individually checked out to verify operability. 
After initial checkout and testing, the components of a system will be verified to operate in 
accordance with the systems specifications. In addition, during this phase of the project, the 
necessary operating and maintenance manuals will be prepared, reviewed, and instituted for 
reactor operations. The operating and maintenance crews will be trained and qualified on these 
procedures to ensure that the reactor plant is operated in an efficient and compliant manner. 
• Safety Analysis, Licensing, and Environmental Impact activities – During the design of the 
reactor, safety analyses will need to be conducted to demonstrate that the reactor, as-designed, 
meets the safety criteria. The safety analysis activities will result in documents such as a 
preliminary hazards assessment, a preliminary safety analysis report, a final safety analysis 
report, a preliminary probabilistic risk assessment, and a final probabilistic risk assessment. 
Assuming NRC licensing, the final goal of the licensing activities will be obtaining 
authorization to construct and then operate the reactor. The environmental impact activities 
include a programmatic environmental impact statement that reviews the reactor mission, the 
strategies to accomplish that mission, and various alternatives, and then finally select an 
appropriate site for the reactor.  
• Integration activities – Because the reactor project needs to interface closely with the other parts 
of the overall GNEP project (e.g., the GNEP project elements that produce the startup fuel, 
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transuranic fuel, and transuranic material for the reactor), integration activities will be essential 
to ensure that the overall project succeeds.  
• Project Management – The reactor design and development work will be performed in 
accordance with the DOE Order on Project Management, DOE O 413.3.  The activities under 
the project management element include the project office, project quality assurance, 
environment safety and health, engineering oversight, and home office activities. 
4.3.3 Technology Development and R&D for the ABR Prototype reactor 
The overall technology development program will support the ABR Prototype reactor and the ultimate 
commercial deployment of the advanced recycling reactors. This program is subdivided into a near-term 
technology development program and a longer-term R&D component. The expected scope of the near-
term technology development program is discussed in this section. The longer-term R&D component is 
discussed in Section 1.3.3. In addition, the facility needs and the role of international collaborations are 
highlighted in subsequent sections. 
Technology Development 
The technology development consists of the near-term activities needed to facilitate the fast transmutation 
reactor design and construction project. This consists first of a preliminary design activity to provide basic 
performance and design features to guide the technology development efforts. The remaining engineering 
development activities will be clarified as priority needs for reactor design and construction are identified. 
One obvious priority is the development of fuel fabrication facilities to support the reactor. Other 
technology development activities are expected to support design activities (e.g., sodium components, 
fuel handling, etc.); this work will be guided by the 2008 gap analysis to specify and prioritize the 
component demonstration requirements based on the specification of the transmutation reactor design. 
Another important activity is to validate the design tools used for the reactor. 
Advanced Recycling Reactor Reference Concept 
Early in the ABR project, a preconceptual level reference concept must be specified to provide input to 
the prototype reactor requirements and goals, to guide the technology development priorities, and to 
provide input to the systems analysis team for defining the relevant performance requirements. The 
general approach will be to start with existing sodium fast reactor designs and perform a series of options 
studies to establish initial technology down selection. The technology development and research activities 
will be designed to reflect the targeted advanced recycling reactor operating conditions.  
Reactor Fuel Supply for the Advanced Recycling Reactor Prototype Startup Core  
Fast reactor fuels will need to be fabricated for the startup reactor core and the subsequent cores. The 
AFCF will provide transmutation fuels for testing and qualification; however, the AFCF will not be able 
to provide fuel for the startup core or early fuel replacement batches. Furthermore, the conversion of the 
reactor to transmutation fuel will be a gradual process; in addition, there may be an extended need for a 
supplemental fuel supply to support operation and testing. Therefore, the initial reactor core will be 
composed of conventional fast reactor fuel, either a metallic U-Pu-Zr enriched U-Zr fuel or a mixed U-Pu 
oxide fuel. This section will describe the selection and fabrication of this initial startup fuel for the fast 
reactor. 
A critical short-term decision relates to the form of the fast reactor startup fuel. Mixed oxide fuel and 
metal alloy fuel are the most mature fuel forms available for fast reactor application, and the U.S. has 
substantial experience with either fuel type. Selection of a startup startup fuel for the reactor will be based 
on a combination of factors, including fabrication schedule and objectives, fuel performance and 
reliability, reactor safety and the impact that safety-related design accommodations have on construction 
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and operating cost, and mission schedules. The required facilities and schedule for the fuel fabrication and 
qualification will be specified as well as the schedule for the final design decision. 
The strategies for qualifying the initial startup core will depend on the choice of fuel type, the nature of 
the as-fabricated fuel, the fuel operating conditions in the reactor, and the specifics of the existing 
database for that fuel type. If U-Pu-Zr is selected, the most likely strategy will adapt the EBR-II Mark-
V/VA safety case. Initial burnup and temperature limits for the startup fuel will be set to conservative 
values, such as 5 to 8 at% burnup and 475°C to 525°C peak cladding temperature, which might require 
some initial reactor operation at less than design power. A number of qualification assemblies will be 
identified and placed within the first core, intended to lead the core startup fuel in attaining design 
burnup. These assemblies will collectively operate over the range of operating conditions while the 
remainder of the core operates at less than design-basis power. Some number of these assemblies will also 
address startup core operation near the uncertainty design limits of power and temperature. Some of the 
assemblies will be placed for the purpose of interim-lifetime examination, which will provide the basis for 
increasing the burnup and temperature limits to the design basis. Depending on the exposure capabilities 
for cladding and assembly hardware in the startup core, further irradiation of the qualification assemblies 
could be pursued to provide a basis for additional increases to startup fuel burnup limits to values of 20 
at% or greater. 
If mixed oxide fuel is selected for the startup core, then the logical strategy would be to adapt the safety 
case used for FFTF Series I and II fuel (for mixed fuel in 316SS cladding and assembly hardware) or for 
FFTF Series III.a fuel (for mixed oxide fuel in D9 cladding and assembly hardware). Initial burnup limits 
could be set at values established for FFTF operation – 8 at.% burnup for mixed oxide fuel in 316SS 
cladding, or 10 at.% for mixed oxide fuel in alloy D9 cladding – and core power and temperature could 
likely be set at design values after initial startup physics testing. However, a number of qualification 
assemblies would need to be identified for surveillance and end-of-life examination. Again, depending on 
the exposure capabilities for cladding and assembly hardware in the startup core, further irradiation of the 
qualification assemblies could be pursued to provide a basis for additional increases to startup fuel burnup 
limits to values of 20% or greater. 
Design Component Testing and Demonstration 
As discussed in Section 1.3.1, one of the first major activities in the overall technology development 
program is to perform a gap analysis regarding the current state of the sodium component technology 
development. One of the major SFR technology needs is to re-establish a domestic infrastructure for this 
fast reactor technology. Because the U.S. has not had a fast reactor development program for decades, it 
is expected that this gap analysis will find that the U.S. lacks the technical and commercial infrastructure 
to support sodium component technology development. Therefore, the performance testing needs for the 
reactor components requires either (a) new facilities for SFR technology testing, (b) restart or 
refurbishment of dormant existing facilities, or (c) reliance on international partners to conduct such 
technology testing. Some potential facilities are noted in Section 1.3.2, and the role of international 
collaboration is highlighted. 
One option is that if defined by industry, the technology development for the ABR Prototype  reactor is 
expected to be executed in the following four phases: (1)Phase I, Feasibility Tests, (2) Phase II, Key 
Features Tests, (3) Phase III, Component and Subsystems Tests, (4) Phase IV, Systems Tests. 
• Phase I will determine whether various design aspects of the reactor design are considered 
feasible to proceed through the design phase. 
• Phase II tests key features of the proposed component technology to verify that the options will 
work as anticipated. 
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• Phase III of the technology development program will include the testing of key plant 
components to verify performance characteristics and safety responses in a prototypical 
environment. 
• For Phase IV, safety tests will be scheduled with the reactor. These tests will confirm the 
anticipated performance of the various systems and components as integrated in the reactor 
system.  
Specific features will be defined by the ABR Prototype reactor design and construction project.  In 
addition, the national labs will prepare a long-term plan for utilizing the Advanced Burner Reactor 
Prototype to test and demonstrate GNEP advanced recycling reactor advanced technologies. These 
advanced technologies may include the heat transfer components and power conversion systems, reactor 
and balance of plant control systems, fuel handling equipment, instrumentation, seismic isolation system 
and component studies, reactor core design, shielding, in-service inspection methods and component 
development and testing, and structure materials among others that support the long-term goals of 
commercially deploying the advanced recycling reactors. 
Validation of Reactor Performance and Simulation Tools and the ABR Prototype 
An existing suite of fast reactor analysis tools was developed as part of the U.S. sodium-cooled fast 
reactor technology program, and these tools will be used extensively for the initial ABR design efforts. 
However, many of these codes are based on the computer architecture of twenty years ago when 
significant modeling assumptions were required to approximate the physics phenomena in a reasonable 
computer running time. In the long term, a new generation of simulation tools will be identified and 
tailored to the fast reactor transmutation technology, as discussed in Section 6.0 (Modeling and 
Simulation). However, the first step for the reactor design will be to update and apply existing codes. The 
existing U.S. suite of fast reactor analysis tools was developed in parallel with the U.S. sodium-cooled 
fast reactor technology program; and these tools underwent extensive validation against domestic 
experiments. However, the quality assurance of this process would not meet modern standards, and an 
explicit validation of the current state of these design tools will likely be needed for the reactor licensing. 
The validation of the design tools is part of the project and requires the compilation of significant work in 
this field to produce a formal documentation procedure to enable the licensing process. The development 
of new simulation tools will be articulated around a team composed of designers and analysts who will 
concentrate on developing a priori specifications and will validate the codes for their specific applications 
and software experts who will design, develop, and verify the computational tools. 
A large volume of experimental data is available for code validation applications, with varying levels of 
quality, completeness, and accessibility. Historical U.S. data from the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF), the 
Experimental Breeder Reactor (EBR-II), the Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) and possibly from the 
earlier series of Zero-Power Reactors (ZPR) is particularly pertinent, as is complementary data from a 
number of European, Russian, and Japanese facilities. A broad range of experimental benchmarks will be 
established for subsequent comprehensive evaluation and application during the course of the overall 
project. This selection will be accomplished with the aid of formal covariance data and sensitivity-based 
techniques in some cases. The effort will initially involve detailed evaluation and documentation of a 
broad range of benchmarks to provide benchmark specifications that can then be directly used and 
referenced in the code validation process. A particularly challenging component in this process will be the 
need to encompass reactor operating data, particularly from EBR-2 and FFTF. This data is required to 
evaluate the fuel depletion, criticality prediction, reactivity coefficients, and control rod worth against 
reactor experience. This was a key requirement for the existing fast reactor tools, but needs to be captured 
into a well-documented and comprehensive qualification package according to current standards. A 
formalized validation approach that makes optimum use of the information available in existing 
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benchmarks needs to be developed and utilized. Validation analyses will also involve a definition of 
needs for further, not currently available, experimental data (e.g., experiments that are sensitive to Minor 
Actinides remain very limited today). As discussed above, the prototype ABR will be a test bed for these 
new simulation and validation tools and processes. 
Fast Reactor Technology Demonstration and Research Support Facilities 
There are a number of support facilities that will be required to execute the technology development plan 
in support of the ABR prototype. As noted above, several potential partners (France, Japan, and Russia) 
have currently operating fast test reactors. Therefore, significant opportunities exist for international 
collaboration on SFR research and technology development as noted in Section 2.4. Given the desire for 
U.S. leadership and impact on GNEP technology, the development or restart of domestic facilities must 
also be considered.  
Sodium Component Testing 
ABR prototype components will need to be tested in a prototypic environment before introduction into 
the reactor to reduce the project risk. A sodium component testing facility would also provide for the 
training of engineers, scientists, designers, operators and maintenance personnel who will be responsible 
for designing, operating, and maintaining sodium components and systems. Some components can be 
tested in water loops, but eventually all components should be tested in a prototypic environment.  
DOE had a facility named Liquid Metal Engineering Center (LMEC) located in California that was used 
to conduct R&D in liquid metal applications and for testing large sodium components in a prototypic 
environment. However, the LMEC, along with most U.S. fast reactor development facilities, has been 
decommissioned and is no longer available for use. 
In addition, FFTF had a sodium test loop for testing equipment and training operators. This facility is in 
the process of being permanently deactivated.  A facility, on the scale of the LMEC or the FFTF sodium 
test loop, may be needed for the testing and development of ABR prototype components. This facility 
must contain and heat large quantities of sodium to high temperatures and circulate it through loops and 
prototypic test components. Such a facility can be designed and constructed on an accelerated basis 
concurrently with the design activities. 
ABR Prototype Reactor Start-Up Fuel Fabrication 
Depending upon the size of the ABR prototype reactor and the commercial vendor intent, two fuel 
fabrication facilities may be utilized for fabricating ABR prototype fuel. In addition, other alternatives, 
besides these two facilities are being explored such as commercial facilities and obtaining the start-up 
ABR prototype fuel from international sources. 
The Fuel Manufacturing Facility (FMF) at INL has previously fabricated metal and oxide fast reactor 
fuels. This facility was commissioned in 1986 for consolidation of all EBR-II fuel fabrication activities 
requiring use of special nuclear material. For much of the operating life of the EBR-II, all its fuel was 
manufactured in FMF. The building includes a large uranium vault, an induction furnace, gloveboxes and 
hoods, and radiography and non-destructive assay equipment. The FMF layout consists of two rooms 
with operating space and a special nuclear materials storage vault. 
Although the FMF is currently operational, this facility would require installation or reinstallation of fuel 
fabrication equipment and modifications to the building ventilation system to accommodate additional 
plutonium containment requirements. Some of the necessary equipment is available in storage, but much 
of it would need to be redesigned or modified, and an updated safety analysis would be required for fuel 
fabrication operations in FMF. The requirements for fuel fabrication and a plan for preparing the facility 
will be developed in FY 2006 and 2007 and will serve subsequent budgeting and planning needs.  
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Rooms 125 and 126 of the Plutonium Facility –4 (PF-4) at Los Alamos National Laboratory have been 
used historically for ceramic fuel fabrication in support of several nuclear energy missions. Currently, the 
facility is being used to support fabrication development and sample fabrication of nitride transmutation 
fuels for the AFCI program. This facility has been proposed for fabrication of mixed oxide startup fuel for 
the ABR. The facility houses a large number of plutonium gloveboxes and fabrication equipment 
necessary for ceramic fuels, such as hydraulic presses and dies and sintering furnaces.  
Although the PF-4 ceramic fuel fabrication facility is currently operational, this facility would require 
installation or reinstallation of fuel fabrication equipment for mixed oxide fuel fabrication at the rates 
necessary to support operation. The requirements for fuel fabrication and a plan for preparing the facility 
will be developed in FY 2007 and will serve subsequent budgeting and planning needs. 
If existing facilities do not prove capable of manufacturing sufficient startup fuel for the ABR, a new 
facility will be considered. 
4.3.4 Next Generation Advanced Recycling Reactor Research and Development 
As a benefit of previous investments in SFR technology discussed in Section 1.2, the majority of the R&D 
needs that remain for the SFR are related to performance rather than viability of the system. Therefore, 
no technical “show-stoppers” are anticipated for SFR reactor technology. The primary issue that may 
inhibit SFR introduction is a perception of higher capital costs, as compared to conventional nuclear 
power (LWR) technology. Thus, future R&D activities have an emphasis on improved economics; this 
includes innovative design features for cost reductions (e.g., advanced materials, improved thermal 
efficiency), simplification of safety systems (e.g., favorable and verifiable inherent responses), and 
improved systems reliability (e.g., refined techniques for in-service inspection and repair). The 
comprehensive gap analysis and fast reactor concept evaluations conducted for the March 2008 decision 
will guide the specification of a targeted long-term R&D plan. Four avenues are envisioned for the 
investigation and demonstration of the next generation advanced recycling reactor technology: 
1. Technology development (for cost reduction design options) 
2. Advanced simulation  
3. International collaborations 
4. Facilities for SFR technology testing 
Technology Development for the Next Generation Advanced Recycling Reactor 
Much of the technology development is an extension of the prototype ABR approach described in Section 
1.3.2. Two examples of major new areas that require an extended development period are advanced 
materials and advanced energy conversion technology. 
Advanced Materials   
The focus of this research activity is to develop advancements in materials for use in commercial fast 
reactor transmutation. The development of advanced materials may allow design refinements and/or 
improved reliability. Potential benefits include simplified heat transfer configurations, improved 
containment design, and refined component design. For example, low thermal expansion structural 
materials utilized in the Japanese JSFR design allow much larger sodium pipes reducing the number of 
coolant loops required. These new structural materials need to be qualified, and the potential for higher 
temperature operation evaluated 
The R&D approach for advanced material development is to continue the efforts of the multi-lab 
materials working group established under the AFCI program. In the near term, data will be mined from 
FFTF-irradiated samples and hardware that was irradiated to high dose. In order to use these materials for 
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fast reactors, they must be qualified by the NRC under the specific advanced recycling reactor conditions. 
Reviews conducted by/for the NRC of General Electric’s conceptual design of the Power Reactor 
Innovative Small Module Liquid-Metal Reactor (PRISM LMR) clearly identified additional materials 
data, design methodology, environmental effects, and regulatory needs for 60 year lifetime fast reactors 
operating at high temperatures. The longer-term development of advanced materials will also require new 
irradiations. A more detailed description of several advanced material activities is given below: 
Retrieval and testing of previously irradiated FFTF irradiated materials - Numerous materials were 
irradiated in the Fast Flux Test Facility and testing was not completed before the research was stopped. 
This includes hexagonal ducts, which surrounded the fuel assemblies and specimens (tensile, Charpy, 
compact tension, TEM specimens of HT-9 and Mod9Cr-1Mo) irradiated in the Materials Open Test 
Assemblies. The total dose accumulated in these materials was up to 200 dpa, and the irradiation 
temperatures ranged from 350 – 700ºC. The ACO3 duct will be available in late FY 2006, allowing for 
specimen machining in FY 2007 and testing in late FY 2007 and FY 2008, as funding allows. The MOTA 
specimens could be available in FY 2007 to begin testing through FY 2008. Testing of these materials 
will be directly relevant to the design of the transmutation reactor. 
PHENIX irradiations-MATRIX-SMI - To investigate the effects of fast reactor irradiation on the 
mechanical properties of fast reactor materials, specimens are being irradiated in the Phenix reactor. 
Materials include HT-9, Mod 9Cr-1Mo, and as well as oxide dispersion strengthened alloys such as 
14YWT and 12YWT. Total dose is up to 70 dpa at irradiation temperatures of 400 – 500ºC. Irradiations 
are presently underway. It is anticipated that the irradiations will be completed by 2009 to begin PIE in 
late 2010. Results from this testing with provide additional qualified data on ferritic/martensitic steels and 
advanced alloys for design of the transmutation reactor, as appropriate. 
ASME Codification of Materials - There are a limited number of materials approved for use at elevated 
temperature by ASME, where elevated temperature is temperatures at or above 371°C for ferritics and 
427°C for austenitics. ASME code acceptance of a new material typically requires testing of three heats 
of material; minor modifications of an alloy may not require extensive additional testing. Test data such 
as tensile, creep, fatigue, creep-fatigue, and other relevant data will be gathered and analyzed from 
numerous sources. Evaluation of the long-term stability of other 12Cr steels and weldment reduction 
factors by international researchers such as Japan will be made. 
ASME Codification of Design Methodology - Design methods and criteria that address all failure modes 
for SFR components will be reviewed and developed. First, identification of all materials, construction, 
design, and operating issues will be made. This activity will be highly integrated with the ASME 
Codification of Materials activity, as the two effectively cannot be addressed separately. Issues that will 
be addressed include but are not limited to those previously identified for the 60-year PRISM LMR and 
the CRBRP:  weldment safety evaluation, elevated-temperature seismic effects, design analysis methods, 
elastic follow-up, notch weakening, creep-fatigue evaluation, plastic-strain concentration factors, 
degradation of properties due to long-term exposure and irradiation effects; strain limits; thermal striping; 
flaw assessment; and construction and operating experience. 
Advanced Energy Conversion Systems   
Cost reduction R&D activities currently being conducted in the Generation-IV program are development 
of a supercritical CO2 Brayton cycle and development of advanced, high-reliability steam generators. 
The use of Brayton cycles offers the possibility of increasing the thermal efficiency of the plant and 
decreasing the capital costs by replacing the usually larger components in a steam Rankine cycle.  
Supercritical CO2 (SC-CO2) has been identified as a candidate fluid because of the temperatures involved 
in the cycle and the potential compactness of the BOP equipment, the turbine in particular. The SC-CO2 
cycle offers the potential for surpassing 40% efficiency in energy conversion, even at the typical 550°C 
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sodium coolant outlet temperature of the reference SFR designs. The initial R&D should focus on the 
conceptual design of an SC-CO2 power generating system coupled to a reference SFR and the evaluation 
of its performance and potential safety implications. R&D activities of interest include: 
• Conceptual design study and assessments, including thermodynamic optimization for the SFR 
conditions, studies of the SC-CO2 cycle components, conceptual designs for the sodium-to-CO2 
heat exchangers, and investigation of material implications  
• Study of technical performance and cost, including investigation of the safety implications of 
failure of the Na-CO2 boundary   
• Experiments to assess the behavior of Na-CO2 reactions and the performance of heat exchangers 
The primary purpose in the development of high reliability steam generators (SGs) is to reduce the 
probability of a tube leak (causing a steam-sodium reaction) and to enhance the response time and 
reliability of detection systems if steam generator tube leak occurs. Higher reliability SGs will result in 
better operating costs and longer design lifetimes. The main R&D elements are as follows: 
• Steam generator tube leakage is minimized by design or by the use of advanced materials. 
Advanced designs include the possible use of double-walled SG tubes, the use of shell bellows 
for mitigating thermal expansion differences between shell and tube-bundle, the possible use of 
an intermediate medium Pb-Bi, and the use of advanced steels in the SG tubes.  
• Enhanced leak detection techniques are required to protect against small leaks and to prevent 
the propagation of tube ruptures. The main activities focus on the development of hydrogen 
detection sensors, acoustic detection systems, and enhancement of remote field eddy current 
techniques and ultrasonic techniques for in-service inspection of double-walled SG tubes.  
Advanced Simulation for the Next Generation Advanced Recycling Reactor 
The simulation plan described in Section 7 includes a significant campaign to develop advanced reactor 
simulation tools for the modeling of reactor physics, heat transfer and flow dynamics, structural 
mechanics, and safety. Improved modeling techniques reduce the uncertainty of computed reactor 
performance and will have a direct benefit for cost reduction by allowing a relaxation of conservative 
design margins. Realization of improved precision limits in a licensing environment will require a 
corresponding validation activity, as described below.  
To fully realize the benefit of advanced simulation, an integrated advanced recycling reactor design tool 
will also be developed concurrently with the modeling improvements. The current reactor design process 
involves sub-optimizations in a variety of technical areas (e.g., core design, thermal analysis, safety). 
However, an integrated tool can provide a comprehensive design optimization and streamline the design 
process. This allows a more detailed and timely evaluation of design changes for cost reduction.  
The first step required in the transformation of the GNEP research process for reactor development is a 
characterization and quantification of all sources of uncertainty in the design process, and their 
subsequent analysis.  This process will serve as the basis for defining development needs and priorities. 
The R&D program to support fast reactor transmutation includes fast reactor technology experiments to 
validate basic data and simulation models. One ongoing important area is the generation and validation of 
precise nuclear data, as described in the following subsection. Similar efforts need to be initiated for the 
validation of thermal, structural, and safety modeling. These new activities will be guided by the 
simulation plan developed for the 2008 decision. 
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Transmutation Physics   
The focus of this activity is to reduce nuclear data uncertainty for actinide transmutation and provide 
validated physics design codes. Where needed, efforts will be taken to measure new data (cross sections, 
temperature coefficients, etc.), evaluate data for new cross section sets (for Evaluated Nuclear Data File 
inclusion), develop data for material assay, and validate codes for physics analysis for the design of fast 
reactor transmutation systems. The general approach is to make use of existing capabilities and resources 
in a multi-lab team and to collaborate with international and university participants. 
Differential Fission and Capture Cross Section Measurements - Guidance based on evaluation 
comparisons and sensitivity analyses are used to identify high-priority measurements. New measurements 
over the appropriate energy range are performed using existing facilities and detectors. New 
measurements also require production of pure target material of the isotope of interest, production of the 
thin target, placement in the detector, taking the data and reducing the data.  
Produce Nuclear Data Evaluations and Covariance Data - High-quality evaluated nuclear data files and 
corresponding uncertainty quantification data are needed to reduce and understand the uncertainty in 
nuclear design calculations. Code capabilities will be enhanced to minimize design uncertainty and 
provide new user features. For example, once new covariance data is available, a covariance matrix 
propagation capability within physics design codes will be added in order to quantitatively assess and 
prioritize the nuclear data needs. 
Neutron-induced reactions on major and minor actinides play a significant role in the neutronics and 
material damages of a nuclear reactor. For fast reactor applications, evaluated nuclear data, fission 
product production, delayed neutron, and covariance files are needed for all Pu, U, Am, Cm, and Np 
isotopes. Also, evaluations on neutron interactions with structural materials (e.g., Fe, Ni) are crucial to 
correctly predicting the behavior of the reactor.  
Measure Gas Production and Displacement Damage - Hydrogen and helium are produced when 
energetic neutrons interact with materials, and these gases can lead to significant changes in materials 
properties, such as embrittlement and swelling. For the development of advanced reactors, new structural 
materials are proposed, and the amount of gas production must be known to assess the properties of these 
materials under radiation damage. The objective of this research is to measure gas-production (hydrogen 
and helium) cross sections on materials of importance to new reactor designs. A second objective is to 
validate nuclear reaction model codes to improve the predictive capabilities of these codes to calculate 
gas production. 
Neutron damage to structural materials occurs in reactors during irradiation resulting in atomic 
displacements. Data are needed for materials of interest, over a range of neutron energies (10 keV to 10 
MeV), to reduce the uncertainties in calculated material damage estimates, to guide the materials program 
in their choices of advanced materials for fast reactors, and to provide data for the validation of the 
nuclear design codes. 
Sensitivity/Uncertainty Studies – As described in the previous section, fast reactor computational tools 
will be validated against a select set of evaluated benchmarks. Rigorous computational procedures are 
available to propagate uncertainties and estimate the accuracy of the performance predictions. This 
approach can also be used to adjust performance predictions based on the totality of the existing 
experiment database, with a significant reduction in the total uncertainty. In addition, these analysis 
techniques are also useful to identify and prioritize needs for additional physics data and to evaluate the 
efficacy of proposed of measurements. 
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International Collaboration for the Next Generation Advanced Recycling Reactor 
The existing U.S. infrastructure is insufficient to meet GNEP objectives for technology development, and 
there is a strong need to leverage our capabilities with foreign capabilities.  Several potential GNEP 
partners (France, Japan, and Russia) currently have operating fast test reactors. These countries also have 
limited fast reactor technology infrastructure facilities. However, like the U.S. capability, many of the 
foreign partners are poorly equipped and have a similar erosion of their capabilities. This opens the 
possibility for very fruitful collaborations for sharing new capabilities and/or refurbishment of existing 
facilities; specific discussions are ongoing for many specific activities (e.g., BOR-60, MASURCA, 
TREAT, etc.). 
Agreements have already been negotiated for fast reactor fuels testing in both PHENIX and JOYO; 
however, these agreements take a long time (years) to negotiate and implement. The basic sodium 
technology R&D testing will be required for fast reactor development programs, and many of the design 
innovations can be tested in a new generation of reactors planned by the U.S., China, Russia, and France. 
Coordination of these international efforts can help both reduce technical risk and leverage resources; for 
example, the French have proposed a focused effort on oxide fuels to exchange R&D results with a U.S. 
effort on metal fuels. Although international collaborations are a useful pathway for expanded R&D on 
fast reactor technology, they are not a substitute for the fast transmutation reactor. U.S. leadership for the 
GNEP international fuel cycle vision requires domestic fast reactors, which are a critical component of 
the GNEP fuel cycle nation technology. 
Another potential channel for international joint R&D is the SFR work in the Generation-IV International 
Forum. The key research areas in the SFR system research plana include actinide management, innovative 
design features for cost reduction, safety assurance, reduction in environmental burden, and resistance to 
nuclear proliferation; thus, the goals are very consistent with the GNEP approach. Specific research items 
are currently being negotiated for joint projects on SFR Design and Safety, Advanced Fuels, and 
Component Design and BOP. Sharing U.S. results in advanced recycling reactor R&D in the Generation-
IV context may allow access to significant international work being conducted abroad (e.g., recent 
technology testing in the PHENIX and JOYO fast test reactors) 
Research Facilities for the Next Generation Advanced Recycling Reactor 
A variety of facilities are needed for the development and demonstration of the next generation advanced 
recycling reactor. This includes the sustained operation of general nuclear testing facilities and 
complementary SFR technology specific facilities. The precise facility requirements may depend greatly 
on the level of successful international collaboration. Some key facilities in the previous U.S. fast reactor 
development program that could be restarted include the following examples. 
The Transient Reactor Test Facility (TREAT) is an air-cooled test facility designed to evaluate reactor 
fuels and structural materials under conditions simulating various contingencies in nuclear reactors. 
TREAT was designed to study fuel meltdowns, metal-water reactions, interactions between overheated 
fuel and coolant, and the transient behavior of fuels for high-temperature systems. In 1994, the facility 
was placed in a standby status.  The instrumentation and control systems have been maintained in an 
operable status, and the fuel is still in excellent condition. Some of the data acquisition systems lack 
adequate vendor support and will need to be modernized.  A nuclear facility restart process would need to 
be completed before the reactor operation can be resumed.  
The Annular Core Research Reactor (ACRR) also offers a capability to address certain transient testing 
needs in support of transmutation development.  Specifically, the ACRR may prove to be well suited for 
 
a The Generation-IV “Draft R&D Program Plan for the Sodium Fast Reactor (SFR)” revision September 2006  
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initial investigations of transient overpower phenomena in transmutation fuel, using shorter fuel rods or 
perhaps rodlets from ATR testing.  ACRR has a harder spectrum, shorter pulse, larger diameter (20cm)  
but shorter length (50cm) exposure cavity. ACRR has programmed transient capabilities to simulate a 
range or power histories and accident scenarios, and has similar total fluence and energy deposition 
capabilities. Thus, these types of tests are considered complementary to those that could be performed in 
TREAT but could be performed sooner. ACRR is in routine operation and preliminary tests are being 
considered for near-term evaluation transmutation fuel performance.   
The Zero Power Physics Reactor (ZPPR) was the U.S. facility for testing the physics properties of 
advanced fast-spectrum reactors. Testing is done by assembling and operating a reactor that closely 
resembles the particular design that is under consideration. The facility has a very large inventory of these 
materials that could be assembled in various combinations to construct any fast reactor configuration. For 
future configurations of the advanced recycling reactor or commercial fast reactors, critical experiments 
may be necessary in the ZPPR or other similar facility; the importance and need for such experiments will 
need to be clarified early in the transmutation reactor safety and licensing activity.  There is currently no 
budget for ZPPR restart in the ABR cost estimates. 
One critical need is for fast spectrum fuel irradiations. Once the ABR prototype is operational, it would 
be the primary vehicle for transmutation fuel testing. However, early fuel testing would be highly 
desirable. Foreign facilities are one option, and agreements have already been negotiated for limited fast 
reactor fuels testing in both PHENIX and JOYO; however, these agreements take a long time (years) to 
negotiate and implement.  Another option is modify existing domestic facilities as proposed for the 
LANSCE Materials Test Station or ATR Gas Test Loop. 
The proposed Materials Test Station (MTS) may provide a near-term option to perform fuel and materials 
irradiation in a fast spectrum (prior to Prototype ABR startup). The MTS could be available to start 
irradiations starting in FY 2011 at a fast spectrum flux level of 1.3E15 n/cm2s. MTS would be located in 
an existing experimental hall at the LANSCE facility, making use of existing infrastructure. Researchers 
will independently be able control the flux level and irradiation temperature.  Closed loops will allow 
irradiations of fuel and materials in a liquid metal coolant environment. 
The Advanced Test Reactor Gas Test Loop (ATR GTL) is being designed to provide fast spectrum 
controlled irradiation of fuels and materials.  The GTL could be operational by 2010 and feature a 
minimum unperturbed fast flux of 1.0E15n/cm2s over a test volume of 2.54 cm (diameter) by 15 cm 
(length).  As with other large test rigs within the ATR, the GTL will possess a state-of-the-art 
instrumentation and control system that will deliver precise flux and temperature conditions to targets 
within a controlled gaseous environment.  A purpose-built booster fuel system will amplify and focus the 
ATR's driver fuel flux on the test train while configurable absorber filters will allow precise control over 
the fast: thermal flux ratio, He/dpa rate, and target heating rate.  Off-midplane capsules provide additional 
irradiation test space at slightly lower flux levels.  Cost estimates for MTS and/or ATR GTL are 
contained in the Fuels section and not ABR cost estimates. 
4.4 Enabling Technology Needs  
4.4.1 Safeguards and Security  
The safeguards features that are typical of reactor sites are focused on the tracking and accounting of fuel 
assemblies. These features include: 
• Fresh fuel assembly input gate monitors 
• Reactor head seals and surveillance 
• Reactor reload monitors and surveillance 
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• Fresh and spent fuel storage monitors 
• Spent fuel discharge monitors. 
For example, at the MONJU fast reactor in Japan, two detectors are used to monitor the refueling 
machine, and one detector monitors fuel transfers between storage and the refueling machine. There are 
IAEA seals on the fresh fuel storage vault and an IAEA seal on the fresh fuel storage room access portal. 
These types of features meet or exceed the IAEA timeliness detection goal which is detection of diversion 
of significant quantities within: 
• 1 month for unirradiated direct-use materials, 
-  Ex: HEU fresh fuel elements, separated Pu, MOX 
• 3 months for irradiated direct-use materials  
-  Ex: All spent fuel ; LEU LWR fuel, MOX, HEU research reactor fuel 
• 12 months for indirect-use materials  
-  Ex: NU and LEU UF6, NU CANDU fresh fuel, LEU fresh fuel 
Where significant quantities are defined as: 
• Pu  8 kg Total element – except Pu with >80% Pu-238 content which is 
not under safeguards 
• U-233      8 kg Total U-233 isotope 
• U (U-235 < 20%) 75 kg U-235 contained in uranium (indirect use material) 
• U (U-235 ≥ 20%) 25 kg U-235 contained in uranium (direct use material) 
The fast reactor transmutation demonstration will provide an opportunity to test improvements in 
safeguards capabilities. Besides the assembly unit tracking that is the current state of the art, techniques 
can be developed to predict with great accuracy the nuclear material content of each fuel assembly 
coming in and out of the reactor, enhancing the accuracy of the nuclear materials control system. This 
spent fuel characterization would also be useful for subsequent processing in the transmutation fuel 
recycle demonstration (possibly reducing the measurements requirements), as well as giving early 
feedback on the transmutation performance. 
The transmutation demonstration will also guide the development of advanced technologies for remote 
inspection and maintenance. The long-term operation of advanced recycling reactors in environments 
with low technical infrastructure will demand a level of autonomous inspection and maintenance 
operations that is not available today. 
For security purposes, the fast transmutation reactor PPS, which prevents theft and sabotage, will be 
designed to defend against a design basis threat and addressing both insiders and outsider threats. The 
physical protection measures will monitor and enable authorized access and activities and detect, delay 
and respond to prevent unauthorized access, activities, or events. A global perspective will be taken to 
enable international acceptance and broad implementation.  
The PPS will satisfy the relevant DOE and NRC regulatory requirements derived from their statutory 
authority and jurisdiction. In addition, the PPS will be designed to meet IAEA requirements in the 
amended Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and to be consistent with the IAEA 
guidelines for The Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities (INFCIRC/225/current 
version). Furthermore, the reactor PPS will be integrated with the material control and accountability 
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(MC&A) systems to increase the effectiveness of each system, especially against the potential insider 
adversary and to further reduce costs.  
The technical approach will be to design-in physical protection throughout all phases of the transmutation 
reactor project to improve effectiveness and to reduce intrusiveness and costs. The physical protection 
program will be based on the Design and Evaluation Process Outline system engineering methodology. In 
addition, GEN-IV Proliferation Resistance and Physical Protection (PR&PP) assessment methodologies 
will be incorporated, as appropriate, to evaluate system performance. Gap analyses will be conducted to 
identify and define security technology research and development needs and will be coordinated with the 
NNSA R&D program. 
As a result of new policy requirements or technology gaps, new security R&D needs may be identified. 
For example, new policy requirements may be necessary to institutionalize multinational facilities that 
support joint ownership and operations while protecting materials, information, and technologies. 
Security R&D may be needed to facilitate large system integrated physical protection modeling and 
analysis, to accommodate unprecedented secure transportation systems and to enable the cost-effective 
implementation of strengthened capabilities. These needs and costs will be addressed by the activities in 
Section 6.0 (Modeling and Simulation). 
4.4.2 Safety and Licensing of the Advanced Burner Reactor 
Safety Considerations 
Evaluation of the safety of a reactor concept involves consideration of the following categories of events 
based on their likelihood of occurrence: 
• Anticipated Operational Occurrences (AOO) 
• Design Basis Accidents (DBA) 
• Severe Accidents/Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDA) 
• Emergency Planning Events involving potential offsite releases beyond specified limits. 
The AOOs and DBAs are events that are designed to be accommodated by the plant without radiological 
releases.  This implies that the transient response of the reactor to possible perturbations will be 
controlled/limited before any potential core damage by inherent feedback mechanisms (i.e., passive 
safety) and/or effective implementation of engineered systems (e.g., control rod scram).   
The transient response is determined to a large extent by its kinetic parameters (neutron lifetime and βeff) 
and feedback coefficients. The kinetic parameters are determined by the fissile components of the fuel 
which are based on mission and criticality considerations, while the magnitude and sign of the feedback 
coefficients can be influenced by choices made during the reactor design (e.g., fuel form, fuel and coolant 
volume fractions, etc.).  These feedback coefficients, coupled with the spectrum of potential transient 
initiators (e.g., reactivity insertion accidents), the magnitude and sign of temperature/power changes, 
available control rod worth serve to define the safety response of the system. 
The feedback coefficients of primary interest are: 
• Coolant density-coolant void  
• Doppler effect 
• Fuel axial expansion 
• Core radial expansion 
• Control rod driveline expansion 
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In most acceptable SFR designs, the expansion coefficients are negative, while the void coefficient is 
positive.  The progression and consequences of transients are determined by these coefficients, such as 
the sign and magnitude of temperature changes.  The major Beyond Design Basis Accidents (BDBAs) 
that are generally considered are: 
• Loss of main heat sink without scram 
• Uncontrolled withdrawal of a control rod resulting in an a transient overpower condition 
• Loss of flow without scram (also known as unprotected loss of flow). 
A significant variable that also affects the safety characteristics of an SFR is the fuel form selected (e.g., 
oxide, metal, nitride, etc.).  The physical/thermal properties of the fuel are important in accident 
progression and in the ability to achieve a passively safe design.  Several earlier studies have determined 
that, in general, metal fuel is better in this regard, but additional work and considerations will be involved 
in the selection of the preferred fuel form for the advanced recycling reactor.  Fuel swelling, possible fuel-
clad mechanical and chemical interactions and compatibility with the sodium coolant in case of fuel clad 
failures due to defects or during the progression of an accident are also important considerations. 
Both the design and development of the safety case for the advanced recycling reactor will rely on a 
combination of modeling/simulations and experiments. Sodium-cooled fast reactors have been designed 
and operated throughout the world over the past 50 years (e.g., FFTF, EBR-II, JOYO, PHENIX, BN-600, 
etc.). Most, however, were “one-of-a-kind”, and several were designed as test reactors. The designs were 
based on relatively old computational methods and data and under different safety regimes and public 
climate than at present. The “burner” role and anticipated large-scale commercial deployment of 
advanced recycling reactors under the GNEP program breaks new ground and presents particular 
challenges. In the past, the model and data uncertainties were accommodated by increasing safety 
margins; however, utilizing such an approach for the advanced recycling reactor would likely impose 
significant penalties in the final cost of the system. Therefore, in addition to the use of currently available 
design tools (which will likely be the basis for the design and safety analysis for the prototype ABR), it is 
envisioned that a new generation of advanced computational tools would be developed under the 
Modeling and Simulation element of the GNEP program. Validation and verification (V&V) of these 
advanced tools, as well as the current methodologies for design and safety analyses, will be performed 
under the advanced recycling reactor element. The prototype ABR will include a significant testing-upon-
start-up sequence that will provide V&V for the design and advanced computational tools that will be 
used for the commercial advanced recycling reactor fleet. Combined with separate effects testing, the 
prototype start-up testing will be used to provide the verification and validation of the computational tools 
for the licensing process.  
Advanced Recycling Reactor Design Certification and Licensing  
Decisions regarding the licensing authority for the prototype Advanced Burner Reactor have yet to be 
finalized; however, the NRC will have licensing authority for eventual commercial advanced recycling 
reactors. The NRC currently licenses commercial nuclear power reactors under Parts 50 and 52 of Title 
10 of the Code of Federal Regulations (10 CFR Part 50 and 10 CFR Part 52).  While the NRC has over 30 
years experience (NRC was established as a result of the Energy Reorganization Act of 1974) with 
licensing and regulating nuclear power plants plus additional experience through its predecessor 
organization, the Atomic Energy Commission, this experience has been focused on light-water-cooled 
reactors (LWRs) and may have limited applicability to new reactor types such as the advanced recycling 
reactor.  There are design and operational issues associated with the advanced recycling reactor that are 
distinctly different from current LWR issues.  The current set of regulations do not necessarily address 
safety concerns that may be posed by new designs, and the current set may contain specific requirements 
that do not pertain to new designs.  There is also an issue associated with the limited 
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background/knowledge at best, and comfort level of NRC staff with sodium-cooled fast reactor 
technology.  Although the NRC has never licensed a sodium fast reactor, it should be recognized that 
there is a prior history of addressing the safety of sodium-cooled fast reactors, including the Fast Flux 
Test Facility (by the NRC ACRS), the proposed commercial Clinch River Breeder Reactor, and the 
PRISM reactor under the Advanced Liquid Metal Reactor program.  Several SFR issues were identified 
and discussed in the course of these reviews that can serve as a basis for the licensing of the advanced 
recycling reactor. 
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission has embarked on a program of re-examining the regulatory 
framework for all future power reactors that they might license. Particular attention is given to the varied 
design features of future reactors and the roles of defense in depth, safety margins, and adequate 
protection. An important underpinning of the new emerging framework is the role that probabilistic risk 
assessment (PRA) plays in the gauging of safety for the review of the various new concepts and designs. 
It is widely recognized that PRA has resulted in a great safety benefit to the operation of the current fleet 
of reactors and that it can also play a very useful role in the design phase of a nuclear system. Safety 
Goals for nuclear reactors that relate to the health risks of the public from reactor operation were 
approved by the Commission in 1986.  
The NRC staff, at the Commission’s direction, has developed a proposed plan to develop an integrated 
risk-informed and performance-based revision to 10 CFR Part 50 that would cover power reactor 
applications, including non-LWR reactor designs.  The staff proposes to achieve the Commission's 
direction to make a risk-informed and performance-based revision to 10 CFR Part 50 by creating a 
completely new risk-informed and performance-based alternative to Part 50 (to be codified at Part 53; an 
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking for Part 53 was released on May 4, 2006) that is applicable to 
all reactor technologies. The development of this new Part 53 will integrate safety, security, and 
preparedness. This approach will ensure that the reactor regulations, staff processes and programs, are 
built on a unified safety concept and are properly integrated so that they complement one another.  An 
important objective of this proposed new regulatory structure is to allow for different reactor technologies 
in a manner that will, in the long term, promote efficiency, stability, and predictability in the licensing of 
the power plants resulting from these new reactor technologies. 
Two major tasks are envisioned by the NRC staff for the creation of 10 CFR Part 53: (1) development of 
the technical basis for rulemaking and (2) rule development in terms of the needed regulations and 
associated guidance.  Current activities associated with the development of the technical basis are 
described in SECY-05-0006 [2].  Rule development has to await the establishment of the technical basis.  
The NRC staff’s approach to establishing the technical basis involves development of a Technology-
Neutral Framework (TNF).  The TNF is meant precisely to address the innovative features of new and 
different reactors like the advanced recycling reactor.  The framework is a hierarchal structure that 
combines deterministic and probabilistic criteria for developing technology-neutral requirements, and as 
such it addresses the difficult technical and policy issues that arise with the development and 
implementation of this new licensing structure.  The TNF could be used to develop technology neutral 
regulations to be used in conjunction with a technology specific regulatory guide or could serve as an aid 
for developing technology specific regulations for new technologies individually. 
The objective of the technology-neutral framework is to provide the necessary guidance and criteria for a 
risk-informed regulatory structure for licensing new reactors.  To meet this objective, the guidance and 
criteria need to address the following: 
• Safety, security, and emergency preparedness expectations 
• Defense-in-depth treatment of uncertainties 
• Safety fundamentals 
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• Design objectives 
• PRA technical acceptability 
• A process for the identification of requirements 
The framework also addresses R&D and the use of prototype testing as part of the licensing process.  The 
current version of the framework encourages applicants to propose the research and development 
necessary to support the licensing of their designs.  Such research and development may consist of 
separate effects and/or integral system tests and may be conducted in full scale or partial scale facilities.  
In general, the requirements should specify that R&D would be expected on key plant safety features 
when these features are new (not previously licensed) or are to be used under conditions that go beyond 
previous use or experience.  The scope of R&D should be sufficient to verify performance of the features 
over the range of conditions for which they are expected to function, including the effects of fuel burnup 
and plant aging.   
For the advanced recycling reactor, development of technology specific requirements likely will require 
that the General Design Criteria (10CFR Part 50 Appendix A), and the contents of the Standard Review 
Plan be modified for applicability to a sodium-cooled fast reactor.  The recommended approach would be 
for the advanced recycling reactor team to develop draft proposed versions of these documents, and 
submit them to NRC for review and consideration for possible adoption.  Should the DOE be authorized 
to provide safety authority for the prototype ABR, such development is still recommended; the technical 
approaches recommended in DOE regulations (10CFR830 and associated Orders) are closely aligned with 
the NRC’s regulations for reactors.    
The radioactive source term that would be released under the severe accident conditions is used in 
evaluating the suitability of potential reactor sites and establishing Emergency Planning Zones (EPZs) 
around them. The radioactive source term defined for LWRs, published in Title 10 Code of Federal 
Regulations (CFR) Part 100, specify the percent of the core fission product inventory to use for the 
analysis. For the ABR, the presence of heavy loadings of transuranics, and their potential release and 
transport in accident scenarios will need to be established.  A risk-informed approach, with a PRA, can be 
used for performing the accident evaluation because potential hazards can be identified and accident 
scenarios can be evaluated realistically. 
The design of the prototype advanced recycling reactor should take the need to address these questions 
into consideration.  Optimally, the prototype advanced recycling reactor will be sufficiently flexible to 
demonstrate innovative technologies and design features that could be applied to follow-on commercial 
plants (e.g., incorporate design features that provide the capability to conduct testing for the purposes of 
collecting information needed to properly assess the safety performance of actinide burners, including test 
data to support safety code validation). It should be noted that this additional flexibility may increase the 
programmatic risk related to licensing under the NRC. Because it is expected that the advanced recycling 
reactor will be licensed as a passively safe reactor, the prototype ABR should be designed to demonstrate 
the inherent passive safety characteristics of sodium-cooled fast reactors and simple operation.  The 
prototype ABR reactor could be used to test these passive safety features, including measurement of key 
feedbacks and autonomous control, as well as demonstrating the commercial feasibility and viability of 
the advanced recycling reactor design to various utilities throughout the country. 
Potential Safety Questions and Issues 
• Uncertainty on licensing requirements because much of the trade study efforts, and initial down 
select of a preferred design option for the advanced recycling reactor will likely precede 
requirements/criteria that are promulgated by NRC.   
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• Experimental databases and analytical tools available to address safety and licensing issues for 
sodium cooled reactor are not as comprehensive and mature as for LWRs.  This implies a 
significant V&V effort and experimental program at the advanced recycling reactor plant, along 
with separate effects tests to generate data satisfactory for NRC. 
• As with previous fast sodium reactor designs, the existence of a positive sodium void reactivity 
coefficient must be addressed thoroughly.  The demonstration that compensating negative 
feedback processes will prevent energetic neutronic excursions must be convincing and valid 
over all conceivable operating conditions, with substantial quantified margins.  Thorough in-
pile fuel testing will be required on which to base such analyses, and early development of 
advanced, high-resolution multi-physics simulation codes will be critical for them. 
• A key strategy will be to develop an early, independent, and credible capability to simulate 
accidents that pose very large challenges to the active and passive safety features of the plant 
but that do not result in a large release.  In other words, it will be more important for the DOE 
and NRC to be able to map out the region of accident space that does not result in large releases 
than to be able to accurately calculate the large releases for the more severe accidents.  Doing 
that mapping will allow the establishment of probabilities for the large releases, as well as the 
sizes of the consequences for each major accident type, to support decisions on which are 
important, which are not, and why. 
• Another difficult challenge will be quantification of the source term to be used for emergency 
planning analysis under 10CFR 100.  The existing NRC formulations for sitting source terms 
are not applicable to the advanced recycling reactor; thus, a compelling argument for a new 
source term that is in some sense equivalent to them must be developed.  PRA will be important 
for any such analysis, and consequently this requirement establishes a very early deliverable for 
the advanced recycling reactor program’s risk analysis activities. 
• A similar situation applies to the advanced recycling reactor containment, in that the traditional 
LWR design basis accident does not apply.  The advanced recycling reactors licensing 
documents must define a new containment design basis that convinces the NRC staff that the 
advanced recycling reactor containment would offer the equivalent (or greater) level of defense 
in depth as a conventional LWR containment.  Again, this analysis would depend on highly 
credible and early PRA results.  
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4.5 Cost Estimates and Milestones 
 
Table 7. Cost Estimates for Transmutation Technologies 
Cost Estimates ($M 2006 dollars) 
Activity FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 
Advanced Burner Reactor Prototype Design, Construction, Commissioning Cost Estimates. 
Costs are highly dependent on reactor plant power level (to be evaluated as part of design 
studies, ~1 GWt plant assumed for this profile).  The current funding profile supports 
reactor startup in 2023 and is based upon sodium-cooled fast reactor technology. 
Industry Engagement and Conceptual 
Design* 
7.5 20 47    
ABR Prototype Preliminary Design   1 50 73 39 
ABR Prototype Detailed Design      6 
Startup Fuel Fabrication Facility 0.5 5 8 12 14 20 
Subtotal 8 25 56 62 87 67 
Advanced Burner Reactor – Prototype Technology Development Cost Estimate 
Safety Analysis and Licensing (includes 
NRC support through FY08) 
1 4 10 12 10 9 
Technology Development* 2.1 16 14 14 14 39 
Code and Analysis Tool Verification and 
Validation* 
0.4 3 4 23 23 23 
Startup Fuel Research, Development, 
Qualification, and Testing* 
0 1 4 7 7 7 
Reactor Component Testing Facilities 0 3 22 63 64 85 
Subtotal 3.5 27 54 119 118 163 
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Cost Estimates ($M 2006 dollars) 
Activity FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 
Research and Development to Support Long-Term Fast Reactor Commercialization 
Advanced Concepts 
Study,,Requirements Definition, and 
Engineering Development and 
Demonstration* 
2.28 7 10 20 21 21 
Research and Development for Fast 
Reactor (includes Transmutation 
Science) 
3 10 23 23 22 22 
Support Facilities for Fast Reactor 
Commercialization  (TREAT Restart and 
ABR Prototype Operations) 
0 0 5 25 23 18 
Subtotal 5.28 17 38 68 66 61 
 Transmutation Engineering**       
Overall TOTAL 16.78 69 148 249 271 291 
*Supports the FY08 Secretarial Decision in part 
**Included in Technology Development after FY-06 
***Any Materials Test Station work is covered under fuels development area 
 
Table 8. Transmutation Technologies Milestones 
Milestones Date 
ABR Prototype Design and Construct  
 ABR Prototype Design Study Complete May 2008 
 ABR Prototype Preliminary Hazards Analysis Complete June 2009 
 ABR Prototype Conceptual Design Complete September 2009 
 ABR Prototype CD-1 Approval September 2009 
 ABR Prototype Preliminary Safety Analysis Report Complete April 2011 
 ABR Prototype Preliminary Design Complete April 2012 
 ABR Prototype CD-2 Approve Performance Baseline May 2012 
 ABR Prototype Detailed Design – Complete May 2017 
 Draft Final Safety Analysis Report May 2015 
 CD-3A – Approve Procurement of Long Lead Items November 2015 
 Initiate Procurement on Long-Lead Items November 2015 
 CD-3 – Approve Start of Construction June 2017 
 Site Preparation Complete November 2017 
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Milestones Date 
 Start ABR Prototype Facilities Construction November 2017 
 Reactor and BOP Systems Installation - Start June 2019 
 Complete Procurement of Long-Lead Items June 2020 
 Initiate Reactor Startup Preparations June 2020 
 Startup Fuel Fabrication (2 cores) Complete August 2020 
 Reactor and BOP Systems Installation – Complete June 2021 
 Fill Primary and Secondary Systems with Sodium July 2022 
 ABR Prototype Reactor Facilities Construction complete July 2022 
 Load First Core December 2022 
 Pre-Critical Checks with First Core May 2023 
 Perform Operational Readiness Review for Startup and Safety Testing June 2023 
 Reactor Startup July 2023 
 ABR Prototype Startup Testing Complete June 2024 
  
Startup Fuel Development and Fabrication  
 Startup Fuel Fabrication Options Study with Down Selection January 2009 
 Conceptual Design of Startup Fuel Fab Line January 2010 
 Preliminary Design of Startup Fuel Fab Line July 2011 
 Final Design of Startup Fuel Fab Line July 2013 
 Startup Fuel Fab Line Construction Complete August 2017 
 Start Startup Fuel Fabrication Line ready for fuel fabrication August 2017 
  
ABR Prototype Technology Development  
 Initiate Sodium Component Technology Development Evaluation September 2008 
 ABR Prototype Key Features Test Complete October 2013 
 ABR Prototype Detailed Design – Phase II Complete November 2015 
  
Code and Analysis Tool Verification and Validation  
 Identification of Prototype Design Tools by Industrial Team September 2008 
 Plan for Prototype Design Tools V&V September 2009 
 Code Validation Facilities Plan October 2009 
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Milestones Date 
 Restart/Construct Required Validation Facilities September 2010 
 Initiate Validation Studies for Advanced Methods September 2011 
  
Reactor Component Testing Facilities  
 Sodium Component Testing Infrastructure Evaluation May 2008 
 Sodium Component Testing Infrastructure Design/Build Start October 2008 
 Sodium Component Testing Infrastructure complete – Phase I October 2012 
 Reactor Component Testing Initiation October 2012 
  
Advanced Concepts Engineering Study, Development, and Demonstration  
 Develop Reference Commercial ABR Concept September 2007 
 Complete Study on Alternate Configurations Options September 2008 
 Complete Initial Design Options Evaluation September 2009 
 Scaled Demonstration of Supercritical CO2 Brayton Cycle September 2010 
 Prepare material specimens of advanced materials for JOYO irradiation September 2010 
 Complete Validation of first improved structural material September 2012 
  
Transmutation Research and Development  
 First Mechanical Tests Performed on 155 dpa HT-9 Duct (ACO3) September 2007 
 Retrieve FFTF irradiated (up to 200 dpa) mechanical test specimens January 2008 
 Identify key experiments using representativity techniques 2008 
 Retrieve Specimens from MATRIX irradiation in Phoenix Reactor November 2008 
 Produce new evaluations and covariance for priority isotopes 2009 
 Complete tensile and fracture toughness testing of FFTF irradiated 
 materials 
January 2010 
 Issue new Revision of Materials Handbook with FFTF Material Data September 2010 
 Perform uncertainty analysis with new covariance data  2010 
 Complete mechanical testing of specimens from MATRIX Irradiation 
 (advanced materials irradiated up to 70 dpa) 
November 2011 
 Validate Multiscale Materials Performance Modeling Code February 2012 
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Milestones Date 
TREAT Restart and Testing  
 Implementation Plan for TREAT Restart April 2009 
 TREAT Startup (if required) October 2013 
  
*Note: Phase II of the Detailed Design Activities shows a completion date that would appear to be rather 
long in duration compared with the completion date of Phase I of the detailed design.  The Phase II 
completion date results from a schedule restraint where the ABR prototype technology development 
activities are tied to the Phase II detailed design activities. 
The schedule assumes that the sodium component technology development work is conducted in parallel 
with the transmutation reactor design activities which adds a certain amount of project level risk. It also 
assumes that a conventional fuel type will be used for the initial startup core and subsequent startup fuel 
reloads until the transmutation fuel is available for use. 
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5.0 Transmutation Fuels and Separations Technologies 
The mission for the Transmutation Fuels and Separations element of the GNEP program is to develop and 
demonstrate the technologies required to recycle spent nuclear fuel into fast reactors for transmutation. 
This mission includes fabrication of processed spent fuel from LWR for use in FR and recycling the 
resulting FR spent fuel, after irradiation, back into the FR, thus demonstrating closure of the nuclear fuel 
cycle. 
Fast Reactors with their accompanying fuel cycle technologies have the mission of destroying, via the 
fission and transmutation process, the transuranic elements that contribute to the long term heat load, 
dose, and proliferation risk of spent nuclear fuel. Fast reactor fuel cycle technologies include:  
• the fabrication of fuel matrices that can contain significant amounts of transuranic elements that, 
when inserted in the fast reactor for a sufficient period, achieve destruction of a significant 
fraction of the transuranic elements; and 
• recycling technologies for these fuels that achieve very low fractional losses during the 
separations and re-fabrication steps, and produce robust waste forms from secondary streams with 
minimum impact on the performance of a geologic repository. 
The objective of the GNEP technology program is to complete the technology development and 
demonstration at an adequate-scale (engineering-scale) such that decisions can be taken for subsequent 
commercialization without having to resolve additional extensive scale-up issues. 
The major technology categories targeted by the Transmutation Fuels and Separations element of the 
GNEP program are as follows: 
• Transmutation fuels development and performance testing 
• Reprocessing of spent transmutation fuels for recycle 
• Waste forms resulting from transmutation fuel recycling operations 
• Safeguards of the recycling plants. 
The Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF) is proposed by GNEP to provide advanced, state-of-the-art 
research facilities to perform the research, technology development and engineering scale demonstration 
to meet the GNEP objectives.    
5.1 Performance Objectives 
Performance objectives that measure the success of the GNEP Technology and Demonstration Program 
for transmutation fuels and separations have been established for each of the major technology categories. 
These performance objectives will guide the Technology Development and Demonstration Program 
priorities and provide the criteria for determining successful demonstration. 
Transmutation Fuels Performance Objectives 
The transmutation fuel performance objectives are as follows: 
• Demonstrate pin quantity scaled remote fabrication of one transuranic fuel form, suitable for 
irradiation testing. 
• Develop AFCF capability of fabricating up to 10 ABR lead test assemblies per year (based on 
20 kg TRU per assembly). 
• Qualify transuranic fuels for ABR testing following ABR startup. 
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Reprocessing of Spent Transmutation Fuel Performance Objectives 
The performance objectives of the AFCF for recycling irradiated transmutation fuel are as follows: 
• Develop AFCF capability of processing approximately 1 metric ton of fast reactor 
transmutation spent fuel per year. 
• Establish acceptable impurity levels for feedstocks and products. 
Waste Form Development for Performance Objectives 
The performance objectives of the AFCF for waste forms are as follows: 
• Provide a suitable waste form for immobilization of cesium and strontium 
• Demonstrate enhanced performance of advanced ceramic waste forms for fission products 
Safeguards for the Recycling Demonstration 
• Establish MC&A instrumentation and techniques that meet the IAEA significant quantity 
tracking objectives 
• Provide a test-bed for the testing and demonstration of MC&A tools. 
Modeling and Simulation Performance Objectives 
The performance objective for modeling and simulation are as follows: 
• Provide the necessary fuels performance data needed to validate and verify the modeling and 
simulation tools. 
Consistent with the GNEP objectives, the primary objective of the Transmutation Fuels and Separations 
element of the program is to prepare a set of baseline technologies for commercialization within the next 
two decades. These technologies will be used in the earlier commercial recycling and fabrication plants, if 
supported by the national and international nuclear energy and fuel cycle strategies. Thus, it is expected 
that the activities associated with the early deployment objective will be the major focus of the technology 
development plan to establish the U.S. leadership as quickly as possible. 
To support this early deployment objective for the demonstration of a qualified transuranic nuclear fuel, 
some initial selections as to fuel types must be made since this decision may drive other technology 
choices and determine the development in recycling and reactor design. This choice is critical in that it is 
known that 10 to 15 years of development and qualification activities will be required to obtain a fully 
licensed fuel for operation in a reactor system. The GNEP transuranic fuel development program has 
chosen to target two potential fuel systems for accelerated development and demonstration, a metal-based 
fuel system and an oxide-based fuel system. Targeting these two fuel systems is pragmatic, based on 
multiple successful fast reactor programs conducted in the U.S. and abroad. 
Oxide based fuel is currently operated in sodium cooled fast reactor systems in Japan, France, and Russia. 
In the U.S., oxide fuel was used successfully as the startup fuel in the Fast Flux Test Facility (FFTF). 
Traditional MOX fuels have been successfully tested to an excess of 220 MWd/kgM (~24%) burnups in 
fast spectrums in cold worked stainless steel cladding. Challenges to using an oxide based transuranic fuel 
lie in the difficulties associated with fabrication of the fuel in a remote environment and demonstrating 
that the oxide fuel matrix containing significant quantities of minor actinides is stable in the reactor 
environment. 
Metal composition fuel has also been operated in sodium cooled reactor systems and provides safety and 
performance improvements over other fuel types and systems including oxide. The binary alloy (U, Zr) 
and the ternary (U, Pu, Zr) metal composition fuels were successfully demonstrated in the Experimental 
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Breeder Reactor-I (EBR-I) and the Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) programs in the U.S. In the 
EBR-II program, metal composition fuels were qualified to 100 MWd/kgM burnups in austenitic stainless 
steel claddings and have been successfully demonstrated up to 220 MWd/kgM burnup in ferritic steel 
claddings such as HT-9. The fabrication route to metal composition transuranic bearing fuel is well 
understood since this technology was originally developed towards the end of the EBR-II and Integral 
Fast Reactor (IFR) programs. The challenge to utilization of metal composition fuel for transmutation lies 
in demonstration of controlling the Americium volatility during fabrication. Metal and oxide fuels provide 
the highest probability of success for the GNEP program. 
In addition to an early deployment objective, the secondary objective of the GNEP program is to continue 
long-term research (as started under the AFCI program) in technology areas that require longer-term 
development with potentially large payoff. Maintaining a long-term R&D element is important because of 
the following considerations: 
• If the commercial deployment is delayed for any reason, the research may lead to the 
availability of more effective technologies prior to commercialization 
• If the currently targeted technologies for early deployment fail to meet the technical and 
economic requirements during the development and demonstration phase, the development of 
an alternative technology may be accelerated to meet the objective without extensive delay 
• Finally, the R&D element of GNEP can advance the state of the art and provide more efficient 
technologies for the subsequent generation commercial plants to retain the U.S. leadership. 
In the next section, a brief description of the current state of knowledge and needs in each technology area 
is presented. 
5.2 Status of Transmutation Fuels and Separations Technologies 
In general, the technologies required to demonstrate transmutation fuels and separations are at the early 
stages of the feasibility research. However, the maturity level is different depending on the technology 
type and the various components of the process technology. 
5.2.1 Transmutation Fuels and Separations Technology Current Knowledge 
The relevant technologies of interest require additional development to achieve readiness for potential 
commercialization. However, the nature and effort of the additional work required is different for the 
various technology areas. The current status of the major technology areas is discussed in the following 
subsections. 
5.2.1.1 Transmutation Fuel Technology Status 
The GNEP objective is to demonstrate fuels that can be fabricated and satisfy the transmutation 
performance requirements using group TRU. While the current thinking is mostly concentrated in 
homogenous core design for fast burner reactors (requiring fertile fuels where uranium is blended with 
TRU), transmutation targets (TRU included in an inert matrix without uranium) also are a possibility. The 
knowledge to date with all the fuel types of interest is primarily confined to uranium-bearing fuels. For 
some of the fuel types (e.g. mixed oxide fuels), considerable experience also exists with fuel containing 
mixed plutonium/uranium oxides. Currently, there is no minor actinide (MA) -bearing transmutation fuel 
type qualified for utilization in fast reactors. For all fuel types of potential interest for minor actinide 
transmutation, the development is still in its early stages of feasibility studies.  Based on development to 
date the most promising fuel types for early deployment are the metal and oxide composition fuels.  Since 
significant unknowns still exist in both fuel systems, development of both fuel systems will be pursued in 
the near term.  Once more information is obtained in initial testing fuel selection will take place. 
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Oxide Fuels 
There is considerable domestic FFTF and International (French, Japan, Russia) experience for mixed 
oxide fuels [(U, Pu)Ox]. The status of the research for MA-bearing oxide fuels is still in its early stages. 
Some pellets and rodlets containing Pu, Am and Np have been irradiated in the SuperFact experiment in 
Phenix (France). Oxide TRU fuel compositions are also being prepared for irradiation in JOYO (Japan). 
The compositions, linear heating rates and burnup levels in these tests are not prototypic. Additional 
parametric tests are also required for optimizing the fuel design for transmutation. 
The feasibility research conducted to date indicates that there are no showstoppers. The limited 
experience to date indicates that these fuels can be fabricated and a robust fuel pellet can be obtained and 
irradiated to reasonable burnup levels. The effect of small amounts of Cm addition to the fuel is not 
known at this point. Furthermore, no fabrication experience exists with prototypic materials obtained 
from actual separation processes and using prototypic fabrication processes amenable for remote 
operations. Also within the general chemical form, the different mechanical forms of the oxide fuels (e.g. 
homogeneous pellets fabricated by powder processing versus sphere-pac fuel fabricated by gelation 
processes) are at different maturity levels. Some mechanical forms may be targeted for initial 
demonstrations while others may be continued under long-term R&D for potential future payoff. 
Metal Fuels  
There is considerable domestic experience for the metal composition U/Pu/Zr from EBR-II reactor related 
activities. The HEU-Zr version of metal fuel was qualified and used in EBR-II. The Pu containing version 
of the metal fuel was never licensed but most of the qualification testing was completed under the IFR 
program. The status of the research for MA-bearing metal fuels also is at the early stages. Metal fuels can 
be cast at laboratory scale without extensive loss of MA. A conceptual design for large-scale fabrication 
has been developed but not yet tested. The limited range of compositions (Pu, Np, and Am.  Zr with and 
without U) investigated to date show good metallurgical properties with no low-melting eutectics. 
Burnups up to 10% do not show any unexpected behavior in the fuel. Higher burnup tests are ongoing. 
The effect of small amounts of Cm addition to the fuel is not known at this point. Furthermore, no 
fabrication experience exists with prototypic materials obtained from separation processes and using 
prototypic processes amenable for remote operations. Innovative fabrication processes can be continued 
under the long-term research while an initial low-risk process may be developed for early demonstration. 
Nitride Fuels 
Domestic research on MA bearing nitride fuels (Pu, Np, Am with and without U) show that achieving 
high densities (>85% theoretical density) without excessive loss of Am and Np is difficult. Partly because 
of the low-density of the pellets and also, possibly, because of very high-sensitivity of MA nitride 
compounds to exposure to small amounts of oxygen, maintaining the mechanical integrity of the pellets is 
proving to be difficult. Pellet fragmentation is observed in low burnup tests (up to 10%) possibly due to 
the low density fabrication. The fuel design requires further optimization. While it is too early to give up 
on nitride fuel development for transmutation, nitride fuels offer higher risk than oxide and metal fuels 
and would not be the candidate form for the initial phases of an accelerated program. Furthermore, nitride 
fuel requires N-15 enrichment and N-15 recycling for economical purposes. Because of their promise for 
high heavy metal loading coupled with high thermal conductivity, it is proposed that feasibility research 
(laboratory-scale) should continue for deployment in the long-term (20-25 years). Nitride fuels also may 
be of interest in the future because this fuel type is the primary candidate for lead-alloy cooled breeder 
reactors considered under the GEN IV program and this technology may be the candidate for the later 
generation transmutation reactors. Advanced fabrication process research such as combustion and 
microwave sintering, primarily targeting the nitride fuels so far, may also prove quite beneficial to other 
fuel forms. The adoption of a non-homogeneous fuel system (e.g., Pu/Np-nitride fuel or Am/Cm oxide 
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targets) may solve key technical fabrication issues such as Am-volatility during high temperature 
processes. 
Dispersion Fuels   
The experience with dispersion fuels (mostly carbides) is very limited and MA additions to dispersion 
fuels have not been tried yet. The fabrication process for such fuels is inherently more difficult. Because 
of the possibility of achieving high-burnup with such fuels, it is recommended that the feasibility research 
should continue but such fuels would not be ready for deployment for at least another 20-25 years. 
Dispersion fuels also are quite suitable for high-temperature reactor applications and are being considered 
for gas-cooled fast reactors under the GEN IV program. If such reactors are deployed in the future to meet 
the GEN IV sustainability requirement, they may also prove to be good candidates for transmutation. Fuel 
system selection, design optimization, and fabrication process selection must be an early focus of 
dispersion fuel R&D. 
5.2.1.2 Transmutation Spent Fuel Reprocessing Technology Status 
In broad categories, aqueous processing and pyroprocessing are being considered for the demonstration of 
the fast reactor fuel reprocessing. The choice of the reprocessing type depends on multiple factors: (a) fast 
reactor transmutation fuel type, (b) process efficiency requirements in terms of decontamination factors 
and separation factors, (c) throughput requirements and its implications on the commercial deployment 
cost, (d) spent fuel cooling time, (e) waste form requirements for disposition, (f) technological risk for 
each separations step leading to TRU product, etc. Neither aqueous processing nor pyro-processing for 
group TRU extraction from fast reactor spent fuel has been tested at an adequately large scale to assess 
their viability for commercialization.  
Pyroprocessing   
Pyrochemical processes recover actinide materials for recycle by electrochemical or selective oxidation 
and reduction processes using molten salts and liquid metals as the process solvent. Pyrochemical 
processes have been under development since the 1950s because of advantages in processing short-cooled 
fast reactor fuels. Pyrochemical process development and demonstration was an integral part of the U.S. 
fast reactor program (e.g. EBR I and EBR II). The largest scale application of this technology is the 
treatment of sodium-bonded spent nuclear fuel in the Fuel Conditioning Facility (FCF) currently 
conducted at the Idaho National Laboratory (INL). The fuel treatment process is designed to condition 
spent EBR-II fuel by separating uranium from the transuranic and fission product elements. The uranium 
product is stored for future use while the transuranic and fission product elements are encapsulated in 
durable, leach resistant waste forms. 
Initially, the goal of the EBR-II/FCF program was to develop an advanced closed fuel cycle for a metal 
fueled fast breeder reactor. Plutonium was to be co-recovered with the other transuranic elements (Np, 
Am, and Cm), a small fraction of the rare earth fission products, and uranium, and used to fabricate fresh 
fast reactor fuel. However, when EBR-II was shutdown in 1994, the FCF technology was redirected to 
treatment of EBR-II fuel for disposal. EBR-II fuel contains elemental sodium within the fuel elements as 
a thermal bond. Because sodium is a reactive metal, this fuel cannot be directly disposed in the repository. 
The FCF pyroprocessing equipment has been updated over the years following 1994 to improve 
performance and efficiency of the process. 
Aqueous Processing   
The aqueous process status is discussed under Section 3.2 for LWR Fuel Separations. Some fast reactor 
fuel types, specifically sodium-bonded metal fuel, is not readily amenable to aqueous processing due to 
the need for nearly complete removal of sodium from the fuel material prior to contact with water.  This is 
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problematic in the case of metal fuel, because the bond sodium becomes dispersed throughout the fuel 
matrix during irradiation.  Other complications also arise when considering the aqueous processing of fast 
reactor fuels.  Compared to LWR fuels, transmutation fuels from fast reactors will have a different 
elemental composition than LWR fuels, in particular, the amounts of certain actinides and fission 
products. To process these fuels with the UREX+1a process, flowsheet adjustments will be necessary to 
achieve the separation criteria. These changes are primarily feed adjustments (possibly dilution) to the 
dissolved fuel, and/or changes in the flow ratios of solvents and aqueous feed/reagents. Both of these 
process adjustments may be necessary to ensure that metal concentrations in the solvents do not exceed 
solubility limits, and cause third phase formation, or other process upsets. The equipment used for 
aqueous processing of transmutation fuels would be identical to that for LWR fuel. Thus, the readers are 
referred to Section 3.2 for the technology status. 
While spent oxide fuel recycle from fast reactors is not commercially performed at this time, the 
reprocessing of fast oxide fuel was demonstrated in the 1980’s under the Consolidated Fuel Recycle 
Program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Several kilograms of spent fuel from the FFTF (~100,000 
MWD/MTHM) were chopped, dissolved and co-processed using the PUREX process to recover the U/Pu 
product stream.  This program demonstrated the feasibility of aqueous processing of fast oxide (breeder in 
this case) fuel.  Spent fuel discharged from the SuperPhenix reactor in France was also processed in an 
aqueous system in the reprocessing plant at La Hague.  Further development will be needed, however, to 
adapt the LWR spent fuel processing parameters to a fast spectrum fuel. 
5.2.1.3 Waste Form Technology Status 
Waste form process development for conditioning EBR II fuels is partially developed at production scale. 
Cladding hulls along with noble metal fission products are immobilized in a metal high-level waste form, 
while salt wastes, containing TRU and fission products are immobilized in a ceramic high-level waste 
form. Demonstration waste forms have been prepared and characterized with actual EBR-II spent fuel, 
and a data qualification package has been provided to the Yucca Mountain project for review. These same 
waste forms are well suited for fission product disposal from advanced burner reactor fuel but it will be 
necessary to modify processing parameters to meet the GNEP objective. To benefit the repository, it will 
also be necessary to recover cesium and strontium from the spent salt, prior to immobilization in a 
ceramic waste form. Methods for recovery of cesium and strontium from spent salt need to be developed. 
Alternatively, it may be more efficient to allow for Cs and Sr to decay prior to final disposal. 
5.2.1.4 Recycling Plant Safeguards Technology Status 
There are a small number of PUREX reprocessing and MOX fuel fabrication plants operating around the 
world. Safeguards implementation at PUREX plants is complex and expensive. First, the amounts of 
plutonium and uranium in the spent fuel cannot be measured accurately until after the spent fuel is 
sheared and dissolved. Second, because of the intense radiation environment, all activities are carried out 
remotely, behind biological shielding. This complicates measurements and the applications of 
containment and surveillance. Third, the chemical operations are not always stable, and process holdups 
that may accumulate. Fourth, homogenization of solutions may be problematic, and obtaining 
representative samples for analysis may limit overall measurement performance. 
The international target values for the measurement uncertainty of nuclear materials in a reprocessing 
plant are very stringent, and continue to push the limit of analytical capability. As IAEA detection goals 
are defined in absolute amounts, as the scale of facilities increases, there comes a point when 
measurement uncertainties limit the ability of material balance accountancy to detect losses (or 
diversions) at the detection goal amounts. For spent fuel reprocessing plants, the IAEA relies on a layered 
approach of complementary measures to meet its overall verification goals. 
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Applying safeguards at reprocessing plants is the most difficult challenge the IAEA faces in terms of 
declared operations. It is equally challenging for the operators of recycle facilities to maintain the 
performance of their MPC&A systems, which are the starting point for IAEA safeguards. 
The IAEA goals for allowable uncertainty in nuclear materials accounting are strict and not easily met. 
Even in the state-of-the art reprocessing plants, the IAEA goal of plutonium inventory error cannot be met 
with measurements alone. Typically, supplemental measures such as continuous process monitoring, 
access limitations, continuous inspector presence, containment and surveillance measures are required for 
operations. Obviously, the supplemental measures along with frequent shutdowns required for inventory 
(at least annual shutdown inventory under IAEA requirement, sometimes weeks in duration) add 
complications to commercial-scale operations. In general, meeting materials accountancy goals are easier 
in fuel fabrication plants (MOX plants) than reprocessing plants. 
In the U.S., there is no commercial reprocessing or MOX fuel fabrication facilities. The Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission has not licensed a reprocessing plant since 1977. In the early 1980’s NRC 
published its performance-based requirements but those requirements have not been applied to a 
reprocessing or fuel fabrication facility. If one uses the requirements proposed for the future Savannah 
River MOX plant as a guide, it is clear that such requirements would be very stringent for reprocessing 
plants and would be very difficult to meet using current technologies. It is important to note that, at 
present, NRC requirements are expressed as a percent of the active inventory, contrary to IAEA goals 
expressed in terms of absolute values in kg of plutonium. Thus, for small throughput facilities, NRC 
requirements could become very difficult to meet.  
Like the NRC requirements, the DOE requirements are expressed as percent of the active inventory. 
However, they are less stringent than the NRC requirements. For commercial-size plants, meeting DOE 
requirements would be easier than IAEA goals but for small-scale facilities, meeting DOE requirements 
by materials accounting measurements alone also is challenging.  
Appendix A discusses the Technology Readiness Levels for the transmutation fuels and separations 
technologies.  
5.2.2 Description of Near-Term Needs 
As evidenced in the technology status summary above, the relevant technologies of interest require 
additional development to achieve readiness for potential commercialization. However, the nature of the 
additional work required is different for each technology area. Near-term technology specific needs are 
discussed in the following subsections. Priority is evident in the cost estimates and establishment of early 
milestones in Section 5.5. Risk mitigation is evident through-out this plan extending from the primary 
choice of two fuel types (oxide and metal) for early deployment through the pursuit of long term research 
and development of risk mitigating technologies and the utilization of separations and recycling 
technologies that are applicable to multiple fuel forms.  
5.2.2.1 Transmutation Fuel Technology Needs 
The development of MA-bearing transmutation fuels offers a number of challenges that are unique, 
compared to currently used power reactor fuels and represent the areas where development activities will 
be concentrated:   
• The TRU fuels must be fabricated containing multiple elements (U, Pu, Np, Am, Cm) 
compared to U and Pu used as feedstock in current commercial fuels. In addition there will be a 
wide range of isotopic mixes that a fuel fabrication plant will need to process due to the wide 
range of fuel in the light water reactor industry and fast reactor fuel in a fast reactor recycle 
system. The multi-element fabrication complicates the control of the resulting phase diagrams 
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and the stoichiometry (in the case of ceramic fuels). The redistribution of certain transuranics 
within the fuel matrix during irradiation is not very well understood at this time. 
• The varying thermodynamic properties of the transuranic elements require special attention 
during the fabrication process development (for example, the high vapor pressure of Am 
requires low temperature or rapid fabrication processes).  
• Unlike conventional fuels fabricated using well-controlled feedstocks, the transmutation fuels 
must be fabricated using the separated products and must accommodate the outcome of the 
separation process including impurities (high lanthanide carryover in some separation 
processes and Curium in short cooled spent nuclear fuel).  
• Because of the high-radiation fields resulting from spent nuclear fuel, the transmutation fuels 
must be fabricated remotely in adequately shielded hot-cells. The major challenge with hot-cell 
operations is associated with equipment maintenance and quality control, which require hands-
on operations in current fuels.  
• For efficient transmutation, the fuel is required to achieve high burnup (20 to 30%) to minimize 
the number of recycles. This requires lengthy irradiation tests.  
• Finally, fuels with high Am content generate helium at a much higher rate than conventional 
fuels. The fuel design (both the fuel microstructure and the pin design with adequate plenum 
space) must accommodate the increased helium generation during irradiation. 
Because the fundamental mechanisms characterizing the fuel fabrication and performance are not well 
understood, the fuel development relies heavily on empirical approaches. Thus, extensive testing is 
required to address the above issues. 
The fuel development process may be divided into multiple phases. Phase I is aimed at developing the 
technical specifications of the fabrication process and resulting fuels. During that phase, small fuel 
samples are fabricated, characterized and irradiated. If the post-irradiation examination indicates good 
fuel performance, based on the results of bench-scale studies, the fabrication process and fuel 
specifications are developed. If the results indicate questionable fuel performance, another fabrication 
process or fuel configuration is tried. The whole process is fundamentally based on trial-and-error, which 
is lengthy and expensive. The fabrication may start with stockpile materials that can be blended together 
to investigate certain targeted phenomenology. However, co-precipitated TRU materials resulting from 
representative separations processes also must be used to define the process technical specifications and 
provide validation that the entire fuel fabrication process is adequate. In addition to extensive 
characterization, this phase also includes considerable out-of-pile testing to identify some of the early 
problems (e.g. diffusion-couple testing for fuel-clad interactions, ion-beam irradiations, phase-diagram 
studies, material properties as a function of burnup, etc.). The work required to complete Phase I is quite 
extensive. 
In Phase II, pin-scale fabrication and irradiation takes place. The objective is to complete the fuel and 
process design leading into the verification and qualification phases. During the fabrication, fuel 
characteristics are compared to the initial specifications and the irradiation (and PIE) assures that the fuel 
performance can be predicted based on matching the initial parameters after fabrication. At this point, 
transient testing of some of the irradiated pins also is used to develop the limits and safety margins of the 
given design.  
Phase III, which is the verification phase, requires larger-scale fabrication (assembly-scale) to assure that 
the process quality can be maintained at a scale large enough to justify commercial-scale fabrication. The 
fabricated fuel is characterized to assure that the measurable meet the specification tested in Phase II. If 
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assembly-scale irradiation yields the predicted results without failure or without any unexpected behavior, 
the fuel design and fabrication process is verified.  
Completing Phases I through III requires typically 10-15 years for relatively simple fuel forms. For TRU 
fuels, to achieve the end of the verification phase in 10-15 years requires a highly resource intensive 
effort. In Phase I multiple alternatives will be pursued in parallel (both fuel types and fabrication process) 
until a robust set of technical specification is defined at the end of Phase I. An added complication for 
transmutation fuels is that the fuel must be qualified for a variable range of composition. The relative ratio 
of the TRU elements in the fuel is not fixed because of the age and burnup of the LWR spent fuel used to 
generate the feedstock is not fixed. In addition, there are small changes in the TRU composition through 
each recycle of the fuel into the fast reactor. Finally, the build-up of impurities through multiple recycle 
results in varying compositions. Obviously, each step of the development process will not be repeated for 
every conceivable composition. Composition ranges must be investigated and a technical basis must be 
established to qualify the fuel for a range of compositions as opposed to a very tight composition 
specification that is common to current commercial fuels.  Advanced modeling and simulation will play 
and important role in developing and qualifying fuels for a variable composition within the range of 
interest. 
The steps described above apply to all fuel types even though the degree of difficulty may vary depending 
upon the fuel type and fabrication process. The assessments to date indicate that each fuel type has some 
advantages and disadvantages compared to others. The development schedule and facility requirements 
are not a major discriminator in the technology choice.  
The fuel development strategy summarized above requires a number of facilities and equipment. 
Unfortunately, current infrastructure to support this effort is incomplete and requires considerable new 
investments. 
Fuel Fabrication and Characterization   
Typically, glove-boxes are used for fabricating fuel samples in Phase I. The existing infrastructure to 
continue with the ongoing research on MA-bearing fuels on an accelerated schedule (with the exception 
of Cm addition) requires additional glove-box resources. The addition of Cm, however, restricts the 
glove-box fabrication option considerably and requires a small-scale hot cell fabrication capability even 
in Phase I. Installation of the necessary characterization equipment into a hot-cell environment also is 
needed when Cm is introduced into the fuel. Phase II scale fabrication and characterization requires hot-
cell operations with and without Cm. Existing hot-cells are of adequate size to meet the needs but must be 
configured with the necessary equipment. Phase III operations require large hot-cells to accommodate 
assembly-scale fabrication equipment and such hot-cells currently do not exist in the DOE complex. 
In summary, the major needs are as follows: 
• TRU materials feedstock 
• A bench-scale remote fabrication capability in existing hot-cells for fabrication for the next 10 
years 
• An engineering-scale (assembly-scale) hot cell fabrication capability in ~ 10 years. 
• Characterization equipment installed in hot-cells. 
Fuel Irradiation 
At present, the early irradiations are performed primarily in the Advanced Test Reactor (ATR), which is a 
water-cooled thermal reactor. A domestic fast spectrum irradiation capability does not exist and requires 
the use of International facilities. Some limited irradiations are planned in Phenix reactor in France before 
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it is shutdown (2008-2009). Possibilities also exist to perform a limited number of small-scale (10-20 cm 
rodlets) irradiations in Joyo reactor in Japan after 2009-2010. However, the irradiation space is expected 
to be limited at any given time. If BOR60 in Russia remains operational beyond 2010, it provides another 
possibility for fast spectrum irradiation on a limited number of fuel samples.   Until the availability of a 
fast test reactor with unlimited access, most of the irradiation will be done in ATR. ATR flux must be 
filtered for fast spectrum tests and as such requires long irradiation times to develop adequate burnup. 
Two other limited alternatives would be to construct a fast-flux booster in ATR but such an approach 
would result also in limited irradiation space with limitations on the fast flux (on the order of 
1015 n/cm2-s) resulting in long duration irradiations to achieve high burnups. Furthermore, previous 
experience indicates that a fast flux booster in a thermal reactor cannot completely mimic a fast spectrum 
and the data requires additional interpretation to account for thermal tail of the spectrum.  The High-Flux 
Isotope Reactor (HFIR) at Oak Ridge also is available for testing small fuel samples with or without 
thermal flux suppression.  An alternative is to develop a spallation neutron source, as proposed by the 
Material Test Station (MTS) concept at the end of the LANSCE proton accelerator. However, the 
achievable neutron fluxes in this approach also are limited by the accelerator current to ~1015 n/cm2-s. 
The data from the MTS also requires additional interpretation as the high-energy tail of the spectrum is 
not typical of a fast reactor spectrum. Both the ATR booster and MTS concepts will provide meaningful 
data to partially fulfill the needs for the Phase I activities, reducing the needs for irradiation in foreign 
facilities.  However, the availability of the MTS or a fast flux booster in the next 3-4 years is suspect and 
either approach does not eliminate the need of a fast reactor testing. 
For oxide transmutation fuels, the MONJU reactor in Japan also may be used for pin-scale and assembly-
scale testing. However, the reactor is not expected to be available for such testing before 2014. It is also 
not clear that the reactor can be authorized to irradiate specific assemblies of TRU bearing fuel.   
Transient phenomenological testing on small samples in Phase I and II of the development can be 
performed in the Annular Core Research Reactor that is currently operational and has been used in the 
past for similar testing. However, the restart of TREAT could be required for pin-scale testing under 
typical design basis accident conditions needed in Phases III and IV. 
In summary, the major needs are as follows: 
• Readily accessible and quick turn around fast spectrum testing capability at rodlet and pin scale 
up to high burnups for the next ~10 years (This may be the single most critical obstacle to 
implement an accelerated fuel development program). 
• TREAT restart in 8 to 10 years. (Note that TREAT restart may be required earlier to support 
startup fuel qualification) 
• A fast test reactor for irradiation of full-length transmutation fuel pins and lead test assemblies 
(LTAs) in 8 to10 years. 
Post Irradiation Examination. Existing hot cells can be used for another decade, but the PIE equipment 
must be upgraded and some of the older equipment refurbished. Typical examples:  micro-probe, thermal 
property measurement on irradiated samples. Considerable investment is required in the next five years to 
support the fuel development and qualification objectives. 
In summary, the major needs requiring modest investments are as follows: 
• Installation of new PIE equipment and refurbishment of some of the old equipment in existing 
hot cells. 
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5.2.3 Transmutation Fuel Recycling Technology Needs 
5.2.3.1 Aqueous Based Processing 
Flowsheet Development for Aqueous Processing of Transmutation Fuel 
Flowsheet modeling and testing of group actinide separation processes with transmutation fuel 
compositions is needed. It would be expected that process parameters may need to be adjusted to 
accommodate the chemical differences between light-water reactor fuel and transmutation fuel. While 
much of the head-end, separations and product conversion steps would be very similar, process chemistry 
and equipment performance will need to be verified. Metallic transmutation fuel incorporating sodium 
bonding would present a challenge for aqueous processing, and is not considered for such processing at 
this time.  
Further enhancements and optimization of the chemical flowsheets will be performed to improve 
economic performance, the inherent proliferation resistance of the process, and the operational envelope. 
Such concepts will be sought out by the program and criteria will be established for pursuit. Processes 
that meet performance criteria based on economic competitiveness and proliferation resistance will be 
explored through performance confirmation tests.  
Thermodynamic Data of Actinide Reductants/Complexants to Support Flowsheet Modeling 
Collection of thermodynamic data to incorporate into process and simulation models are needed for 
separation and product conversion processes. These data will be used to expand the capabilities of 
existing models or fill in gaps where data currently are not available. The UREX+1a process flowsheet 
utilizes aqueous-soluble hydroxamic acids to control Pu and Np partitioning from that of U and Tc. As 
hydroxamic acids have not been widely used on an industrial scale in nuclear fuel processing, there is a 
need to understand the thermodynamic properties of these materials under process-relevant conditions. 
The various species formed by complexation of hydroxamic acids with tetravalent and hexavalent 
actinides (U, Np and Pu) must be characterized and the thermodynamic parameters for these 
complexation reactions over conditions relevant to the UREX+1a processing flowsheet measured. The 
fundamental chemical knowledge generated will allow for more accurate modeling and simulation of the 
UREX+1a flowsheet and will support developing the safety/regulatory basis for the UREX+ processing 
facilities. 
FPEX Process for Cesium/Strontium Separation 
The Fission Product Extraction (FPEX) process simultaneously separates cesium and strontium from 
spent nuclear fuel (UREX raffinate). Preliminary testing has been performed on this process and indicates 
that it has potential advantages over the baseline cesium strontium process (CCD-PEG). The 
cesium/strontium product stream from the CCD-PEG process contains about 120 g/l organics, which 
complicate the solidification process. The FPEX process back-extracts the cesium and strontium in a 
dilute nitric acid stream, which is much easier to concentrate and solidify. The technical maturity of this 
process is not sufficient for it to be considered for the baseline UREX+ processes.  
Chemistry of Entrained Phase 
Previous work has shown that the primary means for metals of low extractability (e.g. cesium in the 
PUREX process) to contaminate the organic product stream is by their dissolution in small drops (~1 µm 
diameter) of entrained aqueous phase. Such small drops, or hazes, can be formed by the dispersive 
mechanisms of drop breakage and by chemical precipitation. The formation, behavior and mitigation of 
hazes is most important at the engineering scale but can be investigated in focused small scale tests and 
by examination of the system chemistry and turbulence characteristics of the process equipment.  
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Online Monitoring 
Online monitoring of process parameters and in particular fissile material is needed to enhance safeguards 
and reduce the dependency on process samples. Sampling introduces bias, requires tankage between unit 
operations contributing to facility footprint expansion, generates liquid wastes, and generally requires 
several hours before the analytical results are available to make process decisions.  
Non-aqueous Head-end Fuel Treatment for UREX+ (Voloxidation) 
Control of the volatile radioactive fission products carbon, iodine, tritium, xenon and krypton could be 
greatly simplified by effectively separating them from the fuel before the fuel is introduced into the nitric 
acid dissolver. The tritium and iodine distribute between the process off-gas and the dissolver solution 
and are subsequently distributed throughout facility. One method involving high temperature air oxidation 
(voloxidation) of the principally uranium dioxide spent fuel has been investigated as an approach for 
causing release of the volatiles and decladding the fuel. The basis for this approach is that conversion of 
UO2 to U3O8 with its crystal expansion would affect release of the volatile radionuclides and would cause 
the fuel to powder. Release of the volatiles prior to the aqueous nitric acid dissolution would simplify the 
management and control of the volatile radionuclides iodine and tritium, both of which are regulated.  
Alternative Lanthanide/TRU Separations via Molecular Design 
Recent advances in molecular agents more efficient for selective component sequestrations have been 
based on a more fundamental understanding of agent-component molecular interactions. It has been 
shown that optimum interactions have two features: optimum sizing and optimum group orientations. 
Taken together, agents’ orders of magnitude more effective at sequestration have been identified and their 
performance documented. Application of this methodology could provide improvements in the 
lanthanide/TRU separation portion of the UREX+ process. 
5.2.3.2 Pyrochemical Processing 
Oxide Reduction and UREX+ Product Conversion  
Oxide reduction technology is applicable to conversion of the transuranic oxide or uranium oxide product 
from UREX+ to metal for re-fabrication into fast reactor fuel and the treatment of spent oxide fast reactor 
fuel. Systematic study of the thermodynamics, electrochemical transport, and reaction kinetics of the 
conversion process to metallic fuel forms will be necessary to design an optimal system. Further work is 
also needed in optimizing material selection for long-lasting anodes that support high current density and 
structural materials. Highly conductive ceramic anodes have been developed that meet the process 
requirements but additional evaluation is required. Platinum electrodes have been used for process 
development studies, because they support a high current density but are prone to chemical attack by 
lithium. For process development studies, MgO ceramics and stainless steel were used to avoid structural 
material corrosion. However, for larger-scale implementation this may not be practical. Thus, there is a 
need for development of corrosion-resistant materials of construction, including but not limited to 
coatings. This should include testing with fission product loaded salt in hot cells to verify that proposed 
materials are robust in conditions truly representative of those that will be encountered in the electrolytic 
reduction process. 
TRU Recovery  
It is necessary to develop an efficient and commercially-viable method for transuranic element recovery 
from transmutation fuels. Liquid cadmium cathode technology has been used to co-deposit U and 
transuranics from electrorefiner systems, which is critical for recycled fuel fabrication in a fast reactor 
system. It has been successfully demonstrated at the engineering scale with blanket fuel from EBR-II, 
which contains low concentrations of rare earth elements. Further electrochemical experimentation of 
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alternative TRU recovery methods is needed, however, to develop a thorough understanding of 
equilibrium and non-equilibrium distribution of rare earth fission products and TRUs between the cathode 
product and molten salt phases. Once that information is available, the design, fabrication, testing and 
evaluation of a commercial-scale system will be performed. Optimization studies for product recovery 
and TRU/lanthanide partitioning will be performed after the initial TRU recovery tests. 
Online actinide Monitoring  
The molten salt electrolyte used in electrorefining contains varying amounts of U and transuranic 
chlorides. The absolute and relative concentrations of these species are important for MC&A as well as 
chemical process control. Time-consuming sampling and computer modeling are currently used to 
monitor actinide concentrations. An online or near-real-time method of monitoring these concentrations, 
such as square wave voltammetery, would dramatically improve the ability to maintain MC&A as well as 
general process control. The ability to produce U or U/TRU products to the desired specifications may 
also be improved.  
Modeling of Pyroprocessing 
Commercial chemical process simulation software is inadequate for modeling pyroprocessing, due to the 
unique nature of its unit operations. However, there is a great need for such a tool to optimize process 
configuration and parameters. The impacts of process changes on product purity, recycle efficiency, and 
waste characteristics often need to be quickly determined. Development of a comprehensive yet 
configurable model of pyroprocessing would provide this functionality, guide future research and 
development activities, and be an invaluable tool in designing an optimized pyrochemical fuel cycle. 
Uranium Electrorefining  
In order for pyroprocessing to be cost-effectively scaled up for reasonable production operations, new 
electrorefiner designs need to be considered. Key features of a next generation electrorefiner should 
provide efficient product recovery, yield desired decontamination of fission products from the uranium 
product, and possess a simplified design for more efficient remote handling, operation, and maintenance. 
The next generation electrorefiner should also be well integrated with the TRU recovery system. One 
concept for the next generation electrorefiner is the PEER (Planar Electrode Electrorefiner) concept, 
which has been developed and is currently being tested for the AFCI program. This concept, and perhaps 
others, needs to be fully evaluated for development for treating transmutation fuel.  
Product Processing/Consolidation 
Coated crucibles are currently used in the cathode processor; metal waste furnace, and casting furnace 
within the pyrochemical fuel cycle. The coatings are designed to prevent adherence between metal ingots 
and the crucible walls. However, application of these coatings is labor-intensive, and currently the 
coatings react with uranium to form a uranium oxide dross. To improve processing throughput, reduce 
costs, and minimize the need for handling secondary waste streams such as dross and spent crucibles, 
advanced crucible materials need to be developed. Current work on this area is on developing techniques 
for fabricating large crucibles with surfaces composed of hafnium nitride. Work in this area needs to 
continue, and other concepts need to be developed and investigated. Alternative methods for product 
processing or consolidation will also be examined, including continuous casting and containerless 
techniques. These methods avoid the need for crucibles altogether, may ease material handling 
requirements in a remote facility, and yield products of the desired purity.  
Criticality Safety  
Pyroprocessing with significant amounts of Np, Pu, Am, and Cm will require specific criticality analysis 
to properly size and control the process. The existing criticality experiment database may not be adequate 
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to validate the criticality analysis. Experimental data on the group actinides to support criticality 
calculations may be needed to reduce the uncertainty in criticality safety analyses. 
5.2.3.3 Waste Form Technology Needs 
Advanced ceramic Waste Forms for Pyroprocessing 
In the EBR-II Spent Fuel Treatment or conditioning process, fission product-loaded salt from the 
electrorefiners is blended with zeolite and glass and heated to produce a ceramic waste form. Ideally, the 
transuranics should be recycled to fuel fabrication, and only fission product (non-transuranic) chlorides 
would partition into the salt. The LiCl-KCl should be returned to the electrorefiner. It may be necessary to 
develop an advanced process for removing actinide chlorides from the salt, possibly using a chemical 
reduction-based drawdown or electrolysis process. Other innovative methods of isolating cesium and 
strontium from the waste salt and encapsulating them for decay storage need to be investigated, e.g. 
zeolite ion exchange, in order to meet the GNEP criteria for enhanced repository benefits. Another key 
issue that needs to be addressed is fission product waste loading in the ceramic waste form. Increasing the 
loading would reduce waste volume; therefore, it is necessary to determine maximum viable waste 
loading and associated decay heat for the ceramic waste form. 
Technetium Waste Forms 
The conversion of Tc-99 to a chemically stable, unreactive zirconium-technetium mixture, using 
zirconium from the cladding, will be investigated. This would immobilize both Tc-99 from fission 
product and Zr-93 from the cladding by converting them to a metallic zirconium-technetium alloy. The 
LWR spent fuel cladding hulls are about 96% metallic zirconium and could in principle be used directly 
to make a Zr-Tc alloy suitable for disposition. If, however, the zirconium is purified, (see Next 
Generation Technology), the hulls could be converted directly to high purity zirconium (free of most 
fission products and free of actinides). The purified zirconium metal could be melted with electrolytic 
technetium metal to produce the alloy. Performance tests will be performed with Tc/Zr alloys to identify 
and resolve issues associated with this waste form.   
In the case of transmutation fuel, the cladding material will not be Zircaloy but stainless steel.  The same 
approach can be used for immobilization of technetium extracted by aqueous processing from 
transmutation fuel.  If pyroprocessing is used for treatment of spent transmutation fuel, however, the 
fission product technetium is collected in the anode basket together with other transition metal fission 
products and with the stainless steel cladding hulls.  The complete contents of the anode basket are 
intended for melting/alloying to produce a metallic waste form that is known to be very effective in 
retaining technetium in environmental conditions representative of the Yucca Mountain repository. 
Alternative Waste Forms for Cesium/Strontium Product 
Alternative product forms for cesium and strontium (e.g. zeolites, or an Australian technology called 
Synroc) will be evaluated as alternatives to the mineralized steam reforming product. At this time, there 
are no waste form criteria for the cesium and strontium product, so there is some risk in focusing on a 
single waste form meeting the criteria ultimately selected.  
Refining LWR Spent Fuel Cladding Hulls for Potential Reuse 
Processing of the metal cladding waste by refining can be used to separate pure zirconium from the 
contaminants. Obviously 93Zr, which is formed by neutron activation, can not be separated. However, 
Zirconium-93 has a half-life of 1.5 × 106 years and emits very weak beta decay (60 keV) to 93mNb, which 
subsequently decays to the stable 93Nb by emitting a 30-keV X-ray. Because of the long half-life and the 
very weak emissions, 93Zr is not a significant radiological hazard. An evaluation will be performed, 
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including discussions with interested commercial companies, to determine the level of interest and 
technical feasibility of refining cladding hulls for re-use. 
5.2.3.4 Safeguards Needs 
Compared to current International practice of PUREX processing and MOX fuel fabrication, an additional 
level of proliferation resistance would be added by full-TRU recovery and recycling technologies being 
developed under GNEP. This approach reduces the proliferation risk by reducing the attractiveness level 
of the materials that are separated and re-fabricated into fresh fuel, but the proliferation risk is not totally 
eliminated. Even under this strategy, adequate materials accounting and other safeguards measures will be 
needed for the recycling plants. 
One of GNEP objectives is to develop and demonstrate a new world standard for the safeguards 
technology and proliferation resistance associated with the spent fuel recycling plants. One could argue 
that, by separating a TRU mixture as a group instead of plutonium and by limiting the recycling 
operations to limited number of states around the world, a new world standard would be achieved. On the 
other hand, the need for accounting for the materials still exists. It can be argued that diversion and theft 
risk increases with increasing number of plants, even if such plants are only located in Fuel Cycle States. 
The accuracy of the current MC&A instrumentation and techniques may be decreased by the proposed 
flow-sheets compared to PUREX flowsheets with a separate Pu stream. As discussed before, even for 
PUREX plants, the current MC&A techniques are not adequate to meet the IAEA goals. The additional 
measures such as continuous presence of inspectors, lengthy shutdown for inventory, may prove to have 
adverse effects in large-scale commercial deployment.  
In the long-run the required technologies must be developed and consistent with potential NRC 
requirements, which must evolve in parallel to the GNEP demonstration program. The facilities started 
and operated under GNEP might not be licensed by NRC. However, the objective of the demonstration is 
the subsequent commercialization and NRC will be required to license the commercial plants, early NRC 
involvement in the safeguards technology development to guide the development of the requirements is 
very important. 
The needs for the safeguards technology development program can be listed in three general categories: 
• Advanced instrumentation development 
• Safeguards by design methodology development 
• Advanced control logic development. 
Advanced Instrumentation  
Ideally, in order to achieve near-real time monitoring, the measurements method would provide 
• An on-line measuring device that determines precise amount of materials without intrusion; or 
• A device that samples and measures streams with a higher, automated repetition rate. 
As part of the technology development, advanced technologies must be evaluated for precision, sampling 
rate, reliability, durability, and cost. Specific candidates for analysis may include: 
• Online K-edge Densitometry for mixed U/Pu and Pu aqueous solutions 
• Online K-edge Densitometry for separated Np or Mixed Actinide solutions 
• Non-destructive assay (NDA) of spent fuel to be pyro-processed to determine U, Pu, and MA 
(minor-actinide) content in the feed material 
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• Non-destructive or destructive assay of reduced uranium-plutonium-MA metal ingot from 
pyro-processing 
• Improved NDA techniques for assaying salt and other Actinide-contaminated waste arising 
from pyro-processing. 
As new instruments and sampling methods are developed, there is a need for testing these capabilities. 
Earlier tests may be conducted in small facilities with representative materials and representative 
radiation environment. However, the demonstration phase requires an engineering-scale facility where the 
new instruments can be tested in a realistic environment where the results can be scaled directly to 
commercial facility applications.  
Safeguards by Design Methodology 
The implementation relies on both experimental and theoretical development along with a large-scale 
experimental demonstration. Laboratory-scale testing and advanced modeling and simulation will be used 
for the development. The Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF) will be the key in actual verification and 
demonstration of the concept.  
Advanced Control System  
The type of precision required to meet IAEA goals using a single measurement technique are very 
difficult to achieve. In addition to developing advanced instrumentation, the technology development also 
must involve development of an integrated control system that uses all available instruments through an 
intelligent data analyzer. The development of the advanced control system relies heavily on plant 
modeling and simulation and it requires an engineering-scale facility for demonstration and optimization.  
5.3 Transmutation Fuels and Separations Demonstration Program 
As discussed previously, an engineering-scale facility is needed to achieve the demonstration objective 
for the Transmutation Fuels and Separations technologies. The design and construction activities 
associated with the demonstration facility [hereafter referred to as Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility (AFCF)] 
are presented in Section 5.3.1. The technology development activities that will be conducted in parallel to 
AFCF design to prepare the technologies for demonstration in AFCF are summarized in Section 5.3.2. 
Finally, the research activities, which are maintained for mitigating some of the technological risks and 
which may also lead to subsequent fuel cycle optimization and later demonstration in AFCF, are 
summarized in Section 5.3.2.4. The activities discussed in the following section emphasize primarily the 
tasks planned for the next 5 years. 
5.3.1 Advanced Fuel Cycle Facility Design 
The advanced fuel cycle facility (AFCF) is a spent nuclear fuel technology development and 
demonstration facility. AFCF will be the facility where the demonstration of the following recycling 
related technologies will be performed at an adequate-scale for subsequent commercial deployment: (a) 
chemical separations of spent transuranic fuel by both aqueous and pyro-chemical methods, (b) 
fabrication of transmutation fuels, (c) development of safeguards approaches and equipment for recycling 
facilities, and (d) development of optimized waste forms for high-level nuclear waste (HLNW) generated 
in the recycling plants. 
The specific functions of AFCF in achieving the overall GNEP objectives are discussed in the next 
section. 
116 GNEP Technology Development Plan 
  July 25, 2007 
5.3.1.1 AFCF Functions 
The over-arching objective of the AFCF is to perform the technology development and demonstration 
work at a scale sufficient to provide input for subsequent commercialization. It is envisioned that, once a 
given process is developed and demonstrated in AFCF, it will be ready for incorporating into the design 
and construction of the commercial-scale facilities with adequate technologic, engineering, economic, 
safety security and environmental data. Figure 2 summarizes the objectives of the AFCF. The advanced 
fuel cycle facility is being designed to provide the following specific functions to meet the GNEP 
objectives: 
• Develop the capability to conduct synergistic bench-scale and engineering scale integrated 
process development and demonstrations of proliferation-resistant spent fuel treatment using 
actual FR spent nuclear fuel. AFCF will begin its operations with a base-line technology aimed 
at the first generation of FR spent fuel treatment plant and introduce modification for continued 
improvements with time. This objective requires the ability to introduce process improvements, 
either in the form of new flow-sheets or advanced process equipment. 
• Develop the capability to conduct bench-scale and engineering-scale fuel fabrication operations 
to fabricate TRU-bearing transmutation fuels at the rod and subassembly scale. AFCF will be 
the only facility in the world where the TRU can be fabricated into fresh fuel at assembly scale. 
This step is essential for qualifying such fuel for subsequent use in Advanced Burner Reactors. 
Similar to spent fuel treatment technology objectives, AFCF will begin its operations with a 
base-line technology aimed at the first generation of FR transmutation fuel fabrication and 
introduce modification for continued improvements with time. This objective requires the 
ability to introduce process improvements, either in the form of new flow-sheets or advanced 
process equipment. 
• Conduct engineering-scale fuel cycle research operations that can be used as a test-bed for 
development and proof-testing of advanced safeguards instrumentation. As an integrated 
facility, AFCF also has the objective of developing and demonstrating the safeguards envelope 
concepts utilizing correlated control logic with multiple instruments. As part of the “safeguards 
by design” strategy, demonstration of near real-time accountability for special nuclear materials 
and improved transparency of operations will give the U.S. the opportunity to establish a “new 
world standard” for design and operation of future fuel cycle facilities. 
• Develop the capability to assess the waste-forms resulting from the fuel cycle scenario of 
interest. The facility within its mission must support the development and demonstration of 
environmentally friendly waste forms; even though all the necessary technologies at an 
engineering-scale may not be included in the facility functions (e.g. vitrification of the fission 
products if that is chosen as the preferred disposal route).  
• Provide an integrated facility that will permit the movement of fuel materials and analytical 
samples between separations, fuel fabrication and analytical laboratories, to preclude the need 
for outside shipments and the associated security issues. The development and demonstration 
of on-demand fuel fabrication concept with tightly integrated chemical separations and fuel 
fabrication operations has the objective of enhancing the facility safeguards and proliferation 
resistance.  
• Provide facility flexibility to facilitate the development and demonstration of recycling 
methods for advanced fuel types that can support a number of fuel cycle strategies. These 
activities would initially be conducted at laboratory or bench scale and then extended to 
engineering-scale technology demonstration. 
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For the long-term, an engineering-scale LWR spent nuclear fuel separations function also is being 
considered for AFCF to support the design and operations of the Consolidated Fuel Treatment Center 
(CFTC). This function depends on the strategy used for the design, construction and operations of CFTC. 
The LWR spent nuclear fuel separations capability will also enable demonstration of the coupling 
between the UREX+ process module and the fuel fabrication module for on-demand fuel fabrication.  
5.3.1.2 Facility Description 
The pre-conceptual design for AFCF is completed as part of the Critical Decision (CD-0) package. This 
section provides a generic description of the facility based on the pre-conceptual design considerations. In 
order to meet the design objectives of AFCF, the functions listed in Section 5.3.1.1 will be made available 
through provision of: 
• Large hot cells to validate/demonstrate spent fuel treatment (aqueous and pyrochemical 
processes) and remote fuel fabrication processes on an integrated engineering scale 
• Small hot cells and glovebox laboratories to validate bench-scale unit operations and conduct 
other related development activities 
• Adequate space in process cells for practical, realistic evaluation of on-line, near-real time, 
materials accountancy and control techniques for the enhancement of fuel cycle system 
proliferation resistance attributes 
• State of the art monitoring and control systems to implement and test advanced safety, 
safeguards and security systems 
• Centrally-located analytical chemistry laboratories for quick-turnaround analytical support to 
fabrication and separations operations. 
5.3.1.3 Design Related Activities 
The following will be the major activities planned for FY06 through FY12 under the AFCF design 
element of GNEP. 
Project Management 
AFCF project and its interfaces with the technology development activities will be managed under this 
task. Project management includes cost and schedule performance, document control, quality control, 
resource allocations, customer interface, etc. 
Trade Studies for Design Strategy 
The facility description provided above is based on pre-conceptual design considerations. During 
conceptual design, four strategic trade studies will be conducted that will define the AFCF design and 
construction approach.  
The first trade study will establish the basis for a single facility with multiple modules. A multi-module 
facility where separations and fuel fabrication are closely coupled will reduce both the capital and 
operations costs, enhance proliferation-resistance and safety of commercial plants after demonstration in 
AFCF, and reduce the time required to demonstrate the technologies.  
The second trade study will explore the strategy of a modular construction phased in time. The current 
plan calls for modular construction phased in time to level the final design and construction cost over 
multiple years. However, such an approach introduces added difficulty and cost because of the need to 
operate some modules while later modules are still being constructed. 
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A third study will be used to establish the basis for the minimum size required for each module. The size 
of each module will be based on the required amount of materials to complete the fuel qualification 
process (a critical item in demonstrating a closed fuel cycle), and demonstration with adequately sized 
process equipment such that subsequent commercial-scale facility design is enabled. 
In the fourth study, the basis for bench-scale research capability with flexible design in engineering-scale 
modules will be evaluated based on its economics and programmatic drivers. This facility will be 
designed to test improvements in future fuel cycle technologies, and will serve as the technology test bed 
for at least 50 years. However, the bench-scale testing could continue to be done at existing facilities also. 
The trade study must identify the specific functions of the research module to supplement other 
capabilities within the complex.  
Technology Demonstration Mission Support 
AFCF’s primary mission is to demonstrate the recycling technologies at an engineering-scale as a 
precursor to commercial-scale deployment. AFCF’s mission includes the flexibility to test progressive 
improvements in each technology area discussed in earlier sections. The initial operations of the 
engineering-scale modules will incorporate the most mature technologies, to demonstrate the engineering 
feasibility of the first generation plants. Subsequently, improvements will be introduced to support the 
fuel cycle evolution and the next generation plants. Therefore, it is important to  
• Allow enough flexibility in the initial design to accommodate more advanced concepts to be 
tested and demonstrated in the future. Design the capability to use a variety of reprocessing 
technologies, which would include advanced UREX+ processing, pyro-chemical processing 
and pyro-metallurgical processing. Necessarily, the main process area must be a modular and 
flexible, to accommodate the processes noted. 
• Implement a prioritized technology development program to support the design. 
In order to achieve these objectives, the candidate technology elements must be identified and their 
implementation schedule must be prioritized based on technology maturity. To minimize the risk in the 
initial technology demonstration, a technology development program must be implemented where the 
technology development tasks are prioritized for risk minimization, consistent with the AFCF design, 
construction and operations schedule.  
Therefore, in the early part of the conceptual design, there will be a series of expert-opinion based studies 
to identify the critical technology elements and to quantify the risk associated with their large-scale 
testing in AFCF.  
Conceptual Design 
This task includes completing the activities in support of Critical Decision 1 (Approve Preliminary 
Baseline Range) including the requirements definition, conceptual design, acquisition planning, risk 
assessments, alternative analysis, preliminary hazards analysis, preliminary technology needs 
assessments, NEPA documentation preparation, preliminary project execution planning, and updated 
project baselines. 
Preliminary Design 
This tasks includes completing the activities in support of Critical Decision 2 (Approve Performance 
Baseline Range) including design (detailed to support the following) risk analysis, criticality safety 
analysis, site selection, acquisition plan, technology development, material diversion, potential 
assessment, safeguards and security implementation plan, final project execution plan, updated project 
baselines, and independent reviews. 
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Final Design   
This task includes completing the activities to support Critical Decision 3 (Start of Construction) 
including detailed design, specifications for long lead procurements, approved safety safeguards and 
security documentation, independent reviews, technology innovations evaluations, and updated project 
baselines. 
5.3.2 Technology Development Activities 
The technology development activities, as summarized below, place emphasis on the next five years. 
These activities are key to demonstration of transmutation fuels and separations and will be demonstrated 
in the AFCF. In addition to the specific activities detailed below, there is an overall technology 
integration function of the Demonstration Program. This function focuses on interfaces with the other 
elements of the GNEP program (such as the LWR fuel processing, fast reactor transmutation, modeling 
and simulation, systems analyses, etc.). In addition, interfaces among the various technology elements 
(fuels, separations, waste forms and safeguards) are established and brought together in the AFCF. This 
function also provides the interface to the AFCF project management. 
5.3.2.1 Fuels Technology Development Activities 
The primary objectives of this program element are to: 
• Develop and demonstrate a robust fuel system that efficiently destroys transuranics over the 
range of isotopic mixtures of interest, and 
• Supply requirements and design input to support design and construction of the AFCF 
demonstration facility design efforts. 
This plan outlines the first five years of the advanced TRU fuel development program. The program 
requires focused activities in three key areas: (1) fabrication development and characterization, 
(2) understanding of the irradiation behavior, and (3) fuel and process design for demonstration phase. 
Fuel fabrication development will be focused on developing methods and equipment that minimize loss 
of minor actinides and that are amenable to large scale fuel remote fuel production. This activity also 
produces specimens for detailed characterization and irradiation testing.  
Irradiation tests are used to develop a basic understanding of fuel behavior under the range of TRU 
compositions, fission product impurity concentrations, and operating conditions anticipated for burner 
reactors. Both steady-state and transient performance will be established through experimental testing. 
Information from the fabrication, characterization, and scoping irradiation activities (steady state and 
transient) is used to select a fuel(s) and processes that meet GNEP goals. 
For technology development, the focus will be on the oxide and metal fuels until a selection is made for 
the initial demonstration. The tasks necessary to complete the major activities required for development 
of advanced fuels are outlined below. 
Fuel Development Integration 
The objective of this task is to integrate the fuel development activities (including the R&D activities 
discussed in Section 5.3.3.1), International collaborations, and the university research supporting the fuel 
technology element of GNEP. The interface requirements among the fuel development and the other 
elements of the GNEP program also are coordinated under this task.  
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Fuel Design and Selection 
The objective is to provide overall fuel development coordination including determination of viable fuel 
forms and concepts to be developed. The following four task areas are currently identified. 
• Fuel selection and evaluation:  A formal process will be implemented for guiding the process of 
fuel development and selection. A fuel development working group will be organized of 
specific fuel experts. The working group will coordinate work around the complex and will 
also serve as the technical review of fuel performance. Any down-selection of fuel concepts 
will be determined and coordinated by the technical director and the fuel development working 
group. 
• TRU Fuel Characterization. Characterization activities will focus on providing the 
thermodynamic, transport, and physical property data required to support an understanding of 
fuel performance. These data include heat capacity, thermal diffusivity/conductivity, 
interdiffusion coefficients and eutectic temperatures of fuel and cladding couples, phase 
equilibria as a function of temperature, interdiffusion behavior between fuels and cladding, 
density, elastic moduli and creep rates, Existing analytical laboratory and characterization 
facilities in the DOE complex will be used to perform this task. Due to the high specific 
activity of TRU materials, some upgrades to existing equipment to decrease the potential for 
exposure to radiation will be required, as well as some new capabilities. In addition to the 
properties discussed above, the opportunity to explore more fundamental properties of TRU 
elements may present itself. This work should be pursued as allowed by funding. 
• TRU Fuel Handbook. The TRU fuel handbook provides a reviewed and accepted set of 
properties and behavior that supports analysis of fuel behavior and is essential for eventual 
licensing. A new version of the transmutation fuel handbook will be issued with emphasis on 
metal and oxide fuels. The handbook will provide a consistent set of assessed and validated 
data on fuel properties and irradiation behavior. The handbook will include correlations for 
properties and behavior data based on out-of-pile characterization, irradiation experiments, and 
modeling from domestic sources and as the result of international collaborations. This data will 
be used for analysis of fuel behavior, as a design tool for transmutation fuel experiments, and 
for design of ABR test fuel elements. The data will provide the foundation for the ABR TRU 
fuel safety case. 
Fuel Sample Feedstock Characterization and Preparation 
The objective is to provide adequate, consistent, prototypic and well-defined TRU feedstock in support of 
the advanced fuel development effort. Experience has been gained in the AFCI fuel development program 
on the availability of consistent, quality TRU feedstocks. Feedstock condition affect fabrication processes 
to a large degree, particularly for ceramic fuels. Impurity and isotopic content of the TRU feedstock also 
affects irradiation behavior of the fuel. As such, the large quantity handling, identification of sources, 
transport, characterization, and pre-treatment of these starting materials is an important task. The scale of 
the task increases as the program moves towards fuel qualification testing.  
For these activities, definition of the appropriate characterization techniques and development of 
standardized measurement methodologies is required. Obvious among these are a complete analysis of 
impurities and isotopic content. Characterization data will be used to draft detailed feedstock 
requirements. This activity is conducted in coordination with the separations effort and becomes more 
closely linked as larger quantities of feedstock are required for qualification testing.  
Additional characterization for oxide feedstocks includes particle size and morphology, surface area, 
oxygen to metal ratio, and moisture content. The development of calcining processes or washing steps to 
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reduce moisture or reprocessing chemistry impurities must be evaluated and the resultant product 
materials fully characterized.  
Laboratory-scale processes for the production of metal feedstocks through reduction of oxides must be 
developed to ensure a consistent supply of materials for fabrication, characterization, and irradiation 
testing of metallic fuels. Metallic feedstocks require little characterization beyond chemical and isotopic 
analysis due to the nature of metal fuel fabrication progresses. Existing analytical laboratory and 
characterization facilities will be used to the extent possible for this work, although some new equipment 
will be required.  
Fuel Fabrication Development 
The fuel fabrication development will be performed starting with fabrication at small-scale and 
progressively evolving into larger-scale fabrication with increased throughput. 
The objective of the small-scale fabrication development is to provide specimens for irradiation testing of 
TRU fuels and to develop fabrication processes that result in low transuranic loss and are scaleable to 
large scale production in support of ABRs. 
The development of sample/prototype fuel rods must be conducted on two scales; 1) lab scale glove box 
fabrication with manual operations and 2) in a remote fuel fabrication laboratory (hot-cell). Development 
of metal and oxide fuels will initially be completed in glovebox laboratories installed within the DOE 
complex. Due to the requirement to minimize TRU loss while scaling up volume throughput, 
development of new fabrication processes and equipment will be required. Equipment will be developed 
and tested on surrogate materials to quantify loss of volatile components prior to installation in a TRU 
facility. When new equipment is developed, it will be designed to serve as a test bed for remote 
operations. Final testing of new processing concepts and equipment in glovebox facilities with TRU 
materials will ensure robust operation prior to installation in remote fabrication laboratory (RFFL).  
Fabrication development using human handling of materials in gloveboxes provides the foundation for 
the genesis of new fuels, but is limited to handling small quantities of neptunium and americium. 
Transition to a remote fabrication laboratory (hot-cell) allows the fabrication of larger-scale irradiation 
test pins and the inclusion of prototypic mixtures of actinides, including curium, and provides a test bed 
for the development of remote fabrication processes and equipment. The fabrication of irradiation test 
pins in the hotcell laboratory will provide the technical foundation for the development of a full scale full 
fabrication facility (AFCF) and key elements of technical basis for qualification of a fuel fabrication 
process. 
The objective of the remote fuel fabrication laboratory (RFFL) is to provide a remote TRU fuel 
fabrication facility adequate to support GNEP requirements for irradiation testing of prototypic TRU fuels 
and to provide a bridge to development of larger scale processes and equipment in the AFCF. Fabrication 
of fuel containing all of the transuranic elements found in SNF (Am, Pu, Np, and Cm) requires that 
fabrication be conducted remotely, in a shielded cell, due to the high radiation dose. Feedstock 
preparation, product quality assurance, and equipment maintenance must all be performed remotely. The 
RFFL also provides a necessary intermediate step between glovebox-scale fabrication operations and 
larger-scale remote operations. 
Developed capabilities to equip the RFFL will be installed in an existing hot cell to allow for remote 
fabrication of metal and oxide fuels. Existing analytical laboratories and characterization facilities will be 
used to support fuel characterization and property measurement, although some new equipment will be 
required. As part of the general approach to design and equipment selection, the extent to which 
commercially available equipment can be modified for remote operations will be examined.  
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Due to the nature of hot cell operations, the design of equipment and processing operations is critical. 
Equipment will be designed, tested, and optimized at bench-scale in the RFFL before implementing on a 
larger engineering-scale at AFCF. A subset of RFFL activity will continually develop improved processes 
and equipment that are scaleable to AFCF. If advances in equipment result in substantial process 
efficiencies or reduced TRU loss, equipment in use will be replaced with improved equipment. The RFFL 
serves both as an interim fuel fabrication facility, pending commissioning of the AFCF and a guide for 
the AFCF design. The remote fabrication research will produce TRU fuel early in FY 2008 to meet GNEP 
irradiation testing needs. 
TRU Fuel Irradiation Testing and PIE 
The objective of this activity is providing fuel behavior data on advanced fuels containing the full range 
of TRU isotopic and lanthanide chemistry prototypic of the reference GNEP fuel cycle. Due to the 
complex behavior of fissile materials under irradiation, fuel development cannot proceed except through a 
program focused on irradiation of prototypic fuels. Irradiation testing of advanced TRU fuel is required 
for: 
• Determination of fuel performance during normal and anticipated off-normal conditions 
• Verification that fuel fabrication processes and specifications result in a robust fuel 
• Quantification of fuel safety behavior during severe accident conditions including reactivity 
transients 
• Validation and verification of fuel performance codes. 
Detailed post-irradiation examination of irradiated specimens provides the fuel performance data required 
to proceed with engineering scale demonstration. 
Irradiation tests are conducted as a series of experiments beginning with relatively simple drop-in 
screening experiments and progressing to more complex instrumented pins in semi-prototypic irradiation 
environments and ending with full lead test demonstrations. Experiments to determine fuel behavior 
during severe reactor transients are conducted in reactors designed for this purpose such as TREAT and 
ACRR. 
Current tests under the AFCI program are ongoing and include Pu, Am, Np additions to metal and nitride 
fuel. These tests will be completed within the next two years. Testing of metal and oxide compositions 
containing lanthanides (simulating carryover from recycle processes) and curium will also be performed 
in ATR starting in FY08. Additional tests investigating the composition effects, fabrication process 
variables, etc., will continue in ATR at least for another decade. 
Testing in thermal spectrum reactors such as the ATR provides a limited picture of fast reactor fuel 
performance due to the distribution of fissions in the fuel and the lack of appreciable cladding irradiation 
damage. In order to begin to address these areas, irradiation tests to high burnup are needed to assure that 
the fuel forms will perform as specified in the program requirements. The only fast test reactors in the 
world are located outside of the U.S., necessitating joint irradiation test programs. The first of these, the 
FUTURIX-FTA test, will begin in the Phenix reactor in France during FY 2007. U.S. fuels that are part of 
the test were fabricated and shipped to France in FY 2006. A test plan and initial fabrication planning for 
a joint irradiation in the JOYO reactor in Japan beginning in FY 2008 will be completed as soon as 
possible. Remote fuel fabrication will be needed to support these tests. 
Results from post-irradiation examination will show the effect of irradiation on fuel thermal and 
mechanical properties, fission gas behavior and release rates, fuel dimensional changes including 
swelling, anisotropic growth, and inferences as to creep rates as a function of burnup and the resulting 
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fuel-clad mechanical interactions, microstructural stability including restructuring, densification, and 
diffusion of species, fuel-clad chemical interaction and equilibrium and nonequilibrium phase formation. 
The scope of post-irradiation examination tasks includes continuation of efforts already underway for 
irradiation of TRU-bearing metal and nitride fuels irradiated in the AFC-1 series of experiments. PIE 
planning and specific equipment preparation for Phénix-irradiated samples will begin in FY07. The 
resulting data will be evaluated for assessing the fuel behavior and its safe operations in the ABR reactor 
environment. Post-irradiation examination will also include the determination of fission product yield and 
distribution within the fuel matrix through micro-probe analysis. Post-irradiation testing may also include 
the use of in-pile and out-of-pile testing to determine the transient fuel behavior. Within the next 5 years, 
additional capabilities must be added to the PIE facilities. These major capabilities that currently limit the 
analyses are the shielded microprobe and thermal characterization equipment on irradiated fuels. 
5.3.2.2 Transmutation Fuel Recycling Technology Development Activities 
Aqueous Based Processing 
FPEX process development - Laboratory testing of the FPEX process chemistry will be performed, 
including studies to determine the affects of complexants from the UREX process on cesium and 
strontium separation, as well as solvent stability, solvent cleanup, etc. Recent testing with a monocrown 
calixarene cesium extranctant indicates that the extractant can be used at higher concentration than the 
previous extractant, and is more stable to acid hydrolysis. Characterization testing of this new extractant 
will be performed. Finally, laboratory and pilot plant testing of the process in centrifugal contactors will 
be performed to validate the process performance. 
Thermodynamic data for process modeling - Laboratory data (distribution coefficients, extraction 
constants, etc.) will be obtained and incorporated into AMUSE or other process models to improve model 
predictive performance and/or provide new modeling capabilities. This will be done for the various 
solvent extraction steps that might be performed in processing transmutation fuels including the processes 
already outlined for the UREX+ flowsheet and alternatives such as FPEX, if such alternatives prove to be 
viable. 
Phase entrainment and mixing - Studies will be performed to understand and improve the 
decontamination performance of the liquid–liquid extraction processes, particularly with regard to 
mixing, phase entrainment and phase separation. Measurements of mixing (droplet size, etc) will be made 
for different contacting equipment under different operation conditions. Methods to avoid or mitigate the 
effects of haze formation and cross phase carryover will be developed.  
Advanced sampling methods - Enhanced sampling methods and new technologies for online monitoring 
of process parameters and compositions will be developed to improve process operation and MC&A 
measurements. Test solutions containing single components and their mixtures will be analyzed and a 
chemometric model will be developed to quantitatively monitor target analytes. Online monitoring 
techniques will be tested and selected for the targeted analytes. The data acquisition /archiving /storage 
capability and real-time computer display of analyzed data will be customized for the UREX application.  
Head-end pretreatment - Voloxidation methods to remove volatiles from chopped fuel segments, and 
enhance fuel dissolution have been under development. To provide a benefit to the UREX+1a flowsheet, 
near quantitative removal of volatile constituents are needed. Preliminary testing indicates that this has 
not been accomplished to date. Additional testing to determine if changing process parameters enables 
this technology to achieve near quantitative separation of volatiles will be conducted. Depending on the 
success of the testing, the fate of using voloxidation as an enhanced head-end treatment will be 
determined. 
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Reprocessing development integration - The objective of this task is to integrate the reprocessing 
development activities (including the R&D activities discussed in Section 4.3.3.2), International 
collaborations, and the university research supporting the fast reactor reprocessing technology element of 
GNEP. The interface requirements among the reprocessing development and the other elements of the 
GNEP program also are coordinated under this task. 
UREX+1a process modeling - Process modeling coupled with laboratory and continuous pilot-scale 
testing of various UREX+1a flowsheets will be performed to develop optimized flowsheets for the 
processing of fast spectrum transmutation fuels. Laboratory and pilot plant data will be used to validate 
the modeling results. Modified flowsheets will be developed, if necessary, to accommodate the different 
composition of transmutation fuels and these flowsheets will be tested in appropriate contacting 
equipment.  
Pyrochemical Processing 
Process simulation for pyrochemical processing - Material balance process flowsheets will be developed 
and evaluated for prototypic advanced burner reactor fuel compositions. These studies will guide process 
development activities by producing a set of design requirements for each unit operation as well as the 
integrated system. Moreover, these flowsheets and the data generated from experimental studies will form 
the basis for detailed process simulation.  
Oxide reduction and UREX+ product conversion - A systematic evaluation of thermodynamics, 
electrochemical transport, and reaction kinetics of the reduction process including assessment of effects of 
rare earth fission product on the process will be completed to provide a foundation for electrolytic cell 
design. This set of experimental data will guide development of cell designs ultimately leading to an 
optimized design for a commercial system. Complete characterization of fission product partitioning into 
the salt phase needs to be completed, and the effect of these fission products on the anode and cathode 
processes needs to be well understood. Performance assessment of candidate ceramic anodes and 
corrosion resistant structural materials will be completed to identify optimum materials and fabrication 
properties. The methodology for removing residual LiCl-Li2O salt from reduced oxide fuel needs to be 
developed and tested. All of these activities need to feed into the design and development of an 
engineering-scale oxide reduction system.  
TRU recovery - A series of experimental studies will be conducted to elucidate the electrochemical 
behavior of the transuranic elements in molten salts containing uranium and fission product elements. 
These studies will include evaluating inert and consumable anode systems, as well as inert and solvent 
metal cathode systems. Key parameters to be evaluated include product recovery efficiency and fission 
product decontamination, especially under conditions in which the salt has a high fission product 
concentration. Results from the studies will be used to develop an optimized design for a commercially 
viable TRU electrolysis cell.  
Online actinide monitoring - Square wave voltammetry, and perhaps other analytical techniques, will be 
fully developed to provide detailed mass balance data for material control and accountability. 
Experimental studies will provide information concerning the sensitivity of the technique, calibration or 
reference material requirements, and the effect of rare earth fission products on the process.  
Uranium electrorefining - Experimental studies will be completed to fully evaluate the electrochemical 
performance of the PEER. In addition, the design requirements for an on-line product recovery system 
will be developed and a prototype system will be integrated with PEER and its performance evaluated. 
EBR-II spent fuel treatment in the Fuel Conditioning Facility will continue in support of pyroprocessing 
technology development. Specifically, further testing in the Mark-V electrorefiner will be done to 
characterize the electrorefining process with high TRU and fission product concentrations in the salt. The 
results of the experimental studies should allow for equipment and process design optimization.  
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Product processing / consolidation - Two types of product processing systems will be evaluated, one for 
consolidation of uranium product and one for consolidation of TRU product. The design requirements for 
the two systems must be fully determined. Once these requirements are determined, a prototype system 
can be designed, fabricated, and tested if different from current generation systems. One of the major 
experimental needs is the development of novel crucible materials. Novel crucible materials and designs 
will be developed and their performance evaluated in current generation cathode processors under 
prototypic process conditions. Alternative consolidation systems (e.g., continuous casting) will be 
identified, assessed against current product requirements and experimental studies conducted with the 
most promising system to evaluate its performance. A preferred technology will be selected based on the 
results of the experimental studies.  
Process integration - An engineering-scale integrated pyrochemical process demonstration will be 
completed once a baseline flowsheet has been identified and individual unit operations have been 
developed. The integrated demonstration will provide insight into resource and operational requirements 
of the system, which are needed for a commercial-scale demonstration of the technology.  
5.3.2.3 Waste Form Technology Development Activities 
Ceramic Waste Form Development 
The ceramic waste form has been highly developed for encapsulating waste from the EBR II fuel 
conditioning process. However, performance would be improved if waste form loading were increased. 
Experimental studies will be conducted to identify optimum waste form loading and maximum allowable 
decay heat. The results of these experimental studies will be used in simulations to identify optimum 
repository loading schemes. Furthermore, it is necessary to complete laboratory scale experiments aimed 
at selecting operating parameters for the process. Qualification of engineering-scale ceramic waste 
process equipment is also needed.  
Cs/Sr Waste Form for Pyroprocessing 
Experimental studies will be conducted to evaluate potential methods to recover Cs and Sr from spent 
pyrochemical salts and encapsulate those materials in a durable waste form. Criteria will be established 
for product purity and waste form performance as part of the experimental study.  
Alternative Tc Waste Forms 
Alternative waste forms and/or improved waste formulations for technetium will be developed. 
Investigation into destruction of ion exchange resins, reduction of technetium to metal, and alloy 
formulations with Zircalloy will be developed. Waste form performance characterization will be 
performed in conjunction with development or understanding of waste form criteria.  
Alternative Cs/Sr Waste Forms for UREX+ 
Alternative waste forms for the cesium/strontium product stream will be investigated using zeolites and 
tailored waste forms such as Synroc. Laboratory-scale formulation testing will be performed to determine 
the waste loading, stability and heat transfer properties of the immobilized cesium strontium product. 
Stable cesium and strontium isotopes will be used for initial testing. 
Waste Form Development Integration 
The objective of this task is to integrate the waste form development activities (including the R&D 
activities discussed in Section 4.3.3.3), International collaborations, and the university research 
supporting the fast waste form technology element of GNEP. The interface requirements among the waste 
form development and the other elements of the GNEP program also are coordinated under this task.  
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5.3.2.4 Recycling Plant Safeguards Activities 
MC&A in a recycling plant present challenges that must be overcome to demonstrate the viability of fast 
reactor recycling. The primary objectives of the activities conducted in this area are to: 
• provide an improved materials accounting method that can be implemented in a commercial 
facility, and, 
• demonstrate a safeguard by design methodology. 
This plan outlines the first five years of the safeguards development program. The program requires 
focused activities in three key areas: (1) instrumentation research, (2) advanced control system, and 
(3) safeguards by design method. 
Instrumentation Research 
Any recycling and fuel fabrication plant designed for safeguards will include the standard measurements. 
Ideally, in order to achieve near-real time monitoring, the measurements method would provide: 
• An online measuring device that determines precise amount of materials without intrusion; or 
• A device that samples and measures streams with a higher, automated repetition rate. 
Using the sampling approach during continuous processing, for instance, will require higher repetition 
sampling systems. The number of data points needs to be optimized; otherwise computer databases could 
become swamped. Also, there is a need for an automated sampling system to avoid an excessive number 
of plant personnel.  
As part of the research, advanced technologies must be evaluated for: 
• precision 
• sampling rate 
• measurement 
• reliability 
• durability 
• cost. 
For direct materials accounting, the advanced technologies would rely on active or passive measurement 
techniques. Passive measurements are possible when a signature radiation exists and it has sufficient 
penetration and intensity to provide timely data.  
If radiation signatures can be stimulated active measurements have added advantages. Using active 
measurement strategy, near real time in situ measurements are possible. The energy and intensity of 
interrogation radiation (IR) can be varied to provide the required response intensity and to activate 
different responses from different nuclides. Because IR can be adjusted and turned on or off, in theory, 
measurement in environments with large background radiation can be accommodated.  
For active, nondestructive, quantitative fissionable material identification, the following techniques are 
being investigated:a 
• Accelerator stimulated x-ray fluorescence (AXRF) 
 
a Frank Harmon, Idaho State University, Private communications (August 2005) 
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• Neutron integral cross section spectroscopy (NICS) 
• Delayed neutrons 
• Delayed neutron lifetime measurements (DNL) 
• Delayed gamma rays. 
The proposed approach assumes that research scale (grams to kilograms level) facilities are available for 
testing the instruments and developing the uncertainty and error bands of such instruments to be 
developed. The research-scale facilities do not need to mimic the integrated processes for the separations 
and fuel fabrication facilities. Rather, these facilities need to address separate effects testing some of 
which can be done with surrogate materials. However, the nuclear materials accounting instruments need 
to be tested with radioactive materials at sufficient quantities and in relevant environments to properly 
quantify the instrument characteristics. Therefore, hot-cell environments will be developed for these tests. 
Advanced Control System 
In addition to developing advanced instrumentation, the proposed approach also involves development of 
an integrated control system that uses all available instruments through an intelligent data analyzer. In this 
approach all the plant data (safety and operational control data in addition to safeguards data) are 
analyzed via an intelligent analyzer using cross-correlation among various measurements. Because data 
coming from non-safeguards instrumentation are used, this approach requires the development and 
implementation of a tamper-proof data authentication method.  
The advanced control system involves developing multi-variable correlations among many 
measurements, including the standard non-nuclear measurements (pressure, temperature, tank level, etc.) 
and nuclear measurements. Based on a multi-variable and multi-attribute signature analyses a “safeguards 
envelope” will be developed. When the correlated parameters fall outside the safeguards envelope, the 
data analyzer will trigger an alarm, which will prompt further assessment of the plant conditions.  
The development of the advanced control system relies heavily on plant modeling and simulation and it 
requires an engineering-scale facility for demonstration.  
Safeguards by Design Approach 
This approach relies on the integration of the safeguards methodology into the design such that 
engineered barriers are built into design against diversion and theft without jeopardizing the plant 
operations. Because developing such an approach on actual engineering design would be cost prohibitive, 
the approach heavily relies on virtual engineering based on mechanistic modeling and simulation. In the 
area of advanced modeling and simulation, a program called SESAME (Simulation Enabled Safeguards 
Assessment Methodology) has been initiated. SESAME provides a virtual design of a separations and fuel 
fabrication plant using “Safeguards by Design” methodology. Within the virtual test bed provided by 
SESAME, the following are included:  
• Walk-through models and overall system simulation model 
• Detailed mechanistic models for plant components (including all instrumentation) 
• Control and monitoring system logic. 
The virtual test bed will be used to 
• Perform engineering design optimization for the plant (with emphasis on safeguards) 
• Develop proliferation signatures based on multi-variant and multi-attribute data analyses 
method to define the “safeguards envelope” 
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• Directly compare various technology options (with emphasis on their safeguards 
characteristics) 
• Address the plant-scaling issues primarily for instrumentation needs and locations 
• Test the proliferation-resistance assessment methodologies being developed in other programs 
and under the systems analysis element of GNEP 
• Perform “war-games” on the simulated design to identify areas of vulnerability.  
During the 5-years the development of SESAME will continue in coordination with the Simulation 
Laboratory element of the GNEP program. However, it is important to emphasize that simulation and 
modeling by itself is not convincing unless a parallel experimental program supports it. The overall 
approach also relies on the availability of research-scale and engineering-scale test facilities for 
verification. The modeling and simulation along with verification and benchmark tests will form the basis 
of the safeguards by design approach.  
5.3.3 R&D Activities in Support of Technology Development 
In addition to the technology development activities described above that support the initial 
demonstration of fast reactor recycling, long-term R&D also will be conducted to ensure the long-term 
viability of the fast reactor fuel cycle. The following sections describe the R&D activities that will be 
conducted in the next 5 years that could mitigate risk in the base metal and oxide fuel technologies or 
provide economic feasibility to the fuel cycle. The activities below have been identified as areas that will 
either mitigate risk of program elements or provide alternatives that may provide high probability of long-
term success. 
5.3.3.1 Transmutation Fuel R&D Activities 
Nitride Fuels 
The objective of the nitride fuel R&D in the next 5 years is to develop a fabrication process that results in 
structurally stable fuel pellets. The research will focus on fabrication process development at small scale 
and structural characterization of the resulting pellets. Fabrication tests will be conducted over a range of 
fabrication parameters, e.g. powder size, sintering temperature, press pressure, etc…In addition, low 
temperature or low heat fabrication processes will be developed in coordination with the university 
research to minimize the loss of Am during fabrication. Research on innovative processes such as 
microwave processing, combustion synthesis, etc., will continue. Such processes, if proven feasible, may 
also improve fabrication processes for other fuel types, especially ceramics. Nitride fuels may be a good 
alternative for the baseline transmutation fuels in the future. If lead-alloy cooled fast reactors are deployed 
in the long run, nitride fuels may also be used for transmutation in such reactors.  
Dispersion Fuels 
High-temperature dispersion fuels research will focus on design concept and laboratory–scale fabrication 
tests. Some initial irradiation of the fuel samples in ATR also will be conducted to assess the design 
options. In collaboration with the Gen IV program and universities, the assessment of the candidate 
matrix materials for dispersion fuels will continue and the results of the FUTURIX-MI tests in the Phenix 
reactor will be incorporated into the fuel design considerations. Dispersion fuel is a good candidate for 
transmutation in the long-term because of their potential for achieving higher burnup than conventional 
homogeneous fuels. Also, if gas-cooled fast reactors are deployed in the future, high-temperature 
dispersion fuels are the baseline fuel option for such systems and may be used for transmutation.  
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Sphere-Pac Fuels 
Sphere-pac fuels (possibly in oxide form) are very amenable to remote fuel fabrication. As compared to 
powder processing for oxide fuels, which is the baseline fabrication process, sphere-pac fabrication may 
offer considerable simplification in the fabrication. However, performance data on sphere-pac fuels, 
especially for transmutation applications is quite limited. Basic R&D will continue in sphere-pac fuels. 
Small fuel samples will be fabricated and characterized. Samples also will be irradiated in the ATR 
reactor. In addition, as part of the trilateral collaboration on joint irradiations in JOYO, sphere-pac fuel 
samples will be fabricated and characterized for potential irradiation in JOYO reactor in Japan and they 
will be shipped to Japan.  
Transmutation Targets 
The baseline transmutation concept under GNEP relies on homogeneous core with group TRU included 
in the fuel. An alternative option may be to put non-fertile MA targets into the reactor. A longer-term 
option may also be partitioning Am (possibly with Cm) and transmuting Am targets in a moderated pin. 
The research will continue in developing potential matrix materials for such targets and small sample 
fabrication and characterization will be the main focus of the research. ATR irradiation of small samples 
also will be performed later during the 5-year research.  
Fundamental Modeling 
In collaboration with the office of science, fundamental atomistic-scale modeling of the fuels will be 
developed. In the long-run, such models are expected to replace the empirical models currently used in 
fuel performance codes. It is anticipated that at least 10 years of dedicated efforts are needed for such 
models to reach the maturity needed for use in the performance predictions. 
5.3.3.2 Transmutation Fuel Reprocessing R&D Activities 
Alternative Pyrochemical Solvent Studies 
The majority of the separations work completed to date has focused on fluoride and chloride molten salts. 
However, other solvent systems such as iodides, other ionic liquids, or liquid metals may provide process 
improvements in terms of actinide recovery efficiency or waste minimization. Alternative solvent systems 
will be identified and experimental studies initiated to determine their performance in spent fuel 
processing.  
Alternative Actinide Recovery Systems 
Centrifugal contactors are extensively used in solvent extraction systems to effect the separation of 
actinides and fission products. These same devices have been successfully tested in pyrochemical process 
systems. However, additional development work is required to fully evaluate the viability of these 
systems in a commercial pyrochemical processing plant. Other options for actinide recovery will also be 
considered and investigated.  
Thermodynamic and Transport Properties 
Experimentally derived thermodynamic and transport properties of transuranic elements and several 
fission products in molten salt and liquid metal systems are important to process optimization and the 
development of novel processing systems.  
Hybrid Separation Systems 
Aqueous polishing of waste streams from a pyroprocessing plant may lead to improved waste 
consolidation and provide more opportunities to recycle spent salts. Process modeling will be used to 
130 GNEP Technology Development Plan 
  July 25, 2007 
identify waste minimization and recycle strategies. Once identified, experimental studies will be 
conducted to validate process improvements.  
Alternative An/Ln Separation Ligands 
Structural information and high-level quantum calculations can be applied to develop a validated 
molecular model using elements previously shown to provide for an intrinsic lanthanide/actinide 
separation. Combinatorial computational chemistry using public computational codes then can be used to 
design candidate separations agents optimized for complexation and separation of Ln versus TRUs. These 
materials in turn can be prepared and tested with the major radionuclides found in the Ln/TRU part of 
UREX+1a. 
UREX+ Process Improvements 
Because of the long term mission of developing fuel cycles for the future in the AFCF, R&D activities are 
difficult to define. Continued research into new processes that increase product recovery, process 
economics and process flexibility will be performed in laboratory-scale and engineering scale tests.  
5.3.3.3 Waste Form R&D Activities 
Alternative Waste Forms 
Alternative waste form materials for pyroprocessing will be identified and experimentally evaluated for 
storage of select fission products or process wastes.  
Zirconium Refining and Recycle 
Investigation of the technical feasibility of refining spent hulls for recovery/reuse of zirconium will be 
investigated. This task will be coordinated with interested industrial partners to determine if the recycle 
hulls could be used to fabricate transmutation fuels. Small-scale Zircalloy hull refining tests will be 
performed and the purity of the products determined. 
5.3.3.4 Safeguards R&D Activities  
For the next five years, the long-term research on safeguards technology is limited to developing novel 
concepts for advanced instrumentation and control systems. The research will be primarily conducted by 
universities under the guidance of program staff. Limited laboratory testing and assessment of novel 
concepts will be performed. The emphasis will be in assessing the technical feasibility of the novel 
concepts with direct comparison to technologies selected for initial demonstration in AFCF.  
5.4 Enabling Technology Needs 
A successful demonstration of transmutation fuels and separations technologies in the AFCF will require 
modeling and simulation support and security for the operation of the facilities. 
5.4.1 Recycling Plant Simulation 
5.4.1.1 Recycling Plant Simulation Needs 
As indicated earlier, the fuel development process is lengthy and expensive primarily because it relies 
heavily on an empirical approach. Once a fuel form is qualified, there is little incentive in making 
additional improvements since each deviation from the initial qualified process requires a similar series of 
experiments that are lengthy and expensive. Therefore, the initial qualified fuel is typically the one that 
meets the specifications but it is possibly not one with the optimal performance. As part of the technology 
development process, predictive models for both fuel fabrication and fuel performance will be developed, 
taking advantage of the advanced computational capabilities and recent advances in fundamental material 
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science behavior. In the first decade it is anticipated that engineering models based on a semi-empirical 
approaches can be developed to help the fuel and process design. Such models would primarily aim at 
estimating trends to minimize the number of trial and error experiments. Such models can also be used to 
envelope the composition and process parameters of interest while conducting experiments for a limited 
number of discrete parameters. A longer term need would be to gradually replace the semi-empirical 
constitutive models with more fundamental multi-scale models, further reducing the number of tests 
needed to qualify the subsequent generation of transmutation fuels. 
5.4.1.2 Recycling Plant Simulation Activities 
Fuel performance models provide effective tools for understanding fuel behavior as a function of 
temperature and burnup. Underlying fundamental models are used as required to understand complex 
behavior during irradiation. The fuel modeling effort occurs on two major fronts. These are 1) integral 
fuel performance modeling and 2) fundamental modeling of specific fuel behaviors. The modeling effort 
thus spans from fundamental quantum mechanical models for the understanding of the phenomenology 
up to finite-element models used for understanding of fuel irradiation conditions and fuel design. 
Fundamental modeling and simulation work will be performed under the Simulations Laboratory element 
of GNEP and will be closely coordinated with the experimental efforts. An integral fuel performance code 
structure will be developed to support irradiation testing. As detailed fundamental models become 
available for specific irradiation behaviors, these will be assessed and inserted into the integral fuel 
performance code for testing and validation against fuel performance data. 
5.4.2 Security 
Activities performed in support of the Transmutation Fuels and Separations program will require 
adequate security for the operation of facilities and for the protection of nuclear materials. The activities 
in support of future implementations of security features as they related to fuel fabrication, utilization, and 
recycling facilities will be conducted in the Safeguards and Security program element. These activities 
will be coordinated with the Transmutation Fuels and Separations program element through interface 
arrangements and communication.  
5.5 Cost Estimates and Milestones 
The target date for the operation of the initial module(s) of AFCF is ~2020.  
The major 5-year milestones are provided in Table 9. As shown in this table, a number of tracking 
milestones are listed during the conceptual design phase until Critical Decision 1 (CD-1) scheduled for 
June 2009. To support this decision, the CD-1 package will be completed and submitted to DOE by 
February 2009. In addition to Conceptual Design Report, other important elements of the CD-1 package 
include (a) cost, schedule, technology risk and impact associated with AFCF facility, (b) cost, schedule 
and impact of the technology development needs to support the facility design, construction and 
operations, (c) data that will be used in system level studies for assessing the attributes (such as 
economics, proliferation-resistance, safety, etc.) of closing the fuel cycles. 
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Table 9. Transmutations, Fuels, and Separations Technologies Milestones 
Milestones Date 
AFCF Design Milestones  
AFCF 30% Conceptual Design for Review January 2007 
Complete AFCF system trade studies  April 2008 
AFCF 70% Conceptual Design for Review September 2008 
Complete AFCF alternatives analysis strategy December 2008 
Acquisition strategy submittal for approval March 2009 
Complete CD-1 package for AFCF June 2009 
AFCF 70% preliminary design review September 2011 
Complete AFCF preliminary design September 2012 
Transmutation Fuel Development Milestones 
Insert FUTURIX-FTA irradiation test in Phenix reactor (external) May 2007 
Begin ATR irradiation of metal transmutation fuels containing Ln September 2007 
Revision of fuels handbook/with available characterization data September 2007 
Begin ATR irradiation of oxide transmutation fuels April 2008 
Metal Fuel RFFL ready for operation September 2008 
Complete JOYO irradiation test plan September 2008 
Complete FUTURIX-FTA PIE plan September 2008 
Complete FUTURIX-FTA irradiations (external) June 2009 
Demonstrate metal fuel fabrication in RFFL’s September 2009 
Oxide Fuel RFFL ready for operation December 2009 
Begin PIE of FUTURIX-FTA specimens (dependant upon external schedule) September 2010 
Begin ATR irradiation of remotely fabricated fuels October 2010 
TRU metal-fuel specimens for JOYO fabricated in RFFL December 2010 
Begin ATR irradiation for high temperature limits October 2011 
Domestic fast spectrum rodlet irradiation capability available December 2011 
Fuels R&D Milestones 
Develop Sphere-pac fuel design concepts September 2010 
Develop Dispersion fuel design concepts September 2010 
Complete feasibility assessment of innovative fabrication processes (microwave, 
combustion) 
September 2010 
Start ATR irradiation of dispersion, sphere-pac fuels, targets September 2011 
Complete Nitride fuel fabrication process baseline design September 2011 
Ship initial fuel for JOYO irradiations  September 2012 
Complete ATR irradiations of dispersion and sphere-pac fuels, targets September 2012 
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Milestones Date 
Reprocessing and Waste Form Development Milestones 
Develop baseline pyrochemical flowsheets for treating spent metal and oxide 
transmutation fuel 
July 2009 
Demonstrate feasibility of fast reactor MOX fuel to metal conversion by 
electrolytic reduction process 
August 2009 
Demonstrate feasibility of voloxidation of fast reactor MOX fuel September 2009 
Evaluate alternative crucibles for TRU recovery September 2009 
Demonstrate scale-up of ceramic waste process March 2010 
Complete initial testing of Synroc and zeolite waste forms for cesium/strontium April 2010 
Identify safeguards requirements for pyroprocessing facility May 2010 
Identify optimum fission product loading and decay heat for ceramic waste form May 2010 
Select product processing / consolidation technology for uranium product and 
TRU product 
August 2010 
Identify and evaluate alternative product processing technologies selecting 
preferred alternative 
September 2010 
Establish preliminary TRU recovery process parameters September 2010 
Validate performance of novel crucible materials in cathode processor system September 2010 
Conduct feasibility studies for preferred alternative product processing  
technology 
September 2010 
Complete voloxidation demonstration and make go/no go decision of inclusion 
in initial UREX+ testing. 
April 2011 
Develop process simulation model for treating spent advanced burner reactor 
fuel 
August 2011 
Demonstrate electrorefining with salt containing a high TRU concentration September 2011 
Evaluate UREX+1a flowsheet for transmutation fuel August 2012 
Demonstrate on-line product recovery from uranium electrorefiner system August 2012 
Validate TRU recovery efficiency and fission product decontamination April 2013 
Determine feasibility of recycling zirconium from spent hulls May 2013 
Demonstrate on-line actinide monitoring system for MC&A June 2013 
Demonstrate prototype safeguards system for pyroprocessing plant July 2013 
Complete testing to provide data to baseline integrated process demonstration July 2013 
Validate Cs / Sr recovery process from spent process salts August 2013 
Complete equipment selection for initial demonstration in AFCF September 2013 
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Milestones Date 
Safeguards Development Milestones 
SESAME framework  completed September 2008 
Establish a list of advanced instruments to be further developed for 
demonstration 
June 2008 
Define framework for advanced control logic September 2009 
Establish a test bed with relevant environment for instrument testing September 2010 
Initial model for AFCF aqueous processing module September 2011 
Down-select instrumentation for initial demonstration September 2012 
Initial demonstration of advanced control logic September 2012 
Initial model for AFCF pyroprocessing module September 2012 
 
The cost estimates to support the above milestones are provided in Table 10. 
 
Table 10. Cost Estimates for Transmutations, Fuels, and Separations Technologies 
Cost Estimates ($M)       
  Activities FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 
AFCF Design       
Conceptual design 9 30 40    
Preliminary design    80 90 90 
Final design       
Design support    15 20 20 
Subtotal design (Operating) 9 30 40 15 20 20 
Subtotal design (Capital) 0 0 0 80 90 90 
AFCF Subtotal 9 30 40 95 110 110 
Fuel Development       
Fuel Design and Analysis 2.8 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Fuel Feedstock Char. and Prep 0.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
TRU Fuel Fabrication Develop. 9.0 30 33 33 33 33 
TRU Fuel Irradiation and PIE 22.6 32 40 40 40 40 
 Fuel Development Subtotal 35.1 70 81 81 81 81 
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Cost Estimates ($M)       
  Activities FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 
Fuel Development R&D 0.4 8 8 8 8 8 
       
Reprocessing and Waste Form 
Development 
      
Transmutation Fuel Recycle 
Technology Development 
      
Pyroprocessing + EBR II** 8.40 19.2 17 18.5 20 20 
Aqueous 0 5 7 8 10 10 
Waste Form Technology 
Development 
      
Pyroprocessing + EBR II** 1.25 4.5 3 3 2 2 
Aqueous 0 1.7 2 2.3 2.3 2.3 
Transmutation Fuel Recycle R&D       
Pyroprocessing 0 2.5 3.75 4 4.3 4.3 
Aqueous 0 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Waste Form R&D       
Pyroprocessing 0 0.5 0.5 1 1 1 
Aqueous 0 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Subtotal Pyroprocessing 9.65 26.7 24.25 26.5 27.3 27.3 
Subtotal Aqueous 0 8.3 10.9 12.3 14.3 14.3 
Combined Subtotals 9.65 35 35 39 42 42 
       
Safeguards Development 0.6 10 15 17 17 17 
* Fundamental modeling cost estimates is covered under the Simulation Laboratory section of the plan.  
** Includes EBR-II Spent Fuel Treatment
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6.0 GNEP Reactors for International Deployment 
The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership seeks to create an international regime to support large-scale 
growth in the worldwide use of nuclear energy. Fully meeting the GNEP vision may require the 
deployment of thousands of reactors in dozens of countries, many of which are in the developing world 
and do not use nuclear energy currently. Some of these needs will be met by large-scale Generation III 
and III+ reactors (>1000 MWe) and Generation IV reactors when they are available. However, because 
many developing countries have small and immature electricity grids, the currently available Generation 
III (+) reactors are unsuitable since they are too large, too expensive, and too complex. Therefore, GNEP 
envisions new types of reactors that must be developed for international deployment that are “right sized” 
for the developing countries and that are based on technologies, designs, and policies focused on reducing 
proliferation risk. Other countries such as France, Russia, Japan, Korea, and South Africa are moving 
forward with the development of such reactors, so it is vital that the US also embark on the development 
of suitable reactor systems in order to influence the technologies that are deployed internationally and 
position US industry for leadership in this growing international market. In the U.S., the Generation IV 
R&D program is already investigating several small and medium-sized reactor concepts for various 
domestic applications, and some of these concepts may prove relevant to GNEP application. 
The primary objective of this program element of GNEP is the development and demonstration of 
appropriately-sized reactor designs that can provide the world, particularly developing countries, with 
safe, simple and robust sources of energy to meet their expanding needs for electricity, potable water and 
district heating at an affordable price, while minimizing the negative impacts on the local and global 
environment associated with large-scale burning of fossil fuels. The deployment of these reactors, which 
we designate as “proliferation-resistant international modular reactors” (PRIMR), combine with the 
GNEP policy of reliable fuel services to provide an attractive energy solution to many countries without 
the need for them to develop the more proliferation-vulnerable parts of the nuclear fuel cycle. 
Several reactor concepts have been proposed for this purpose, ranging from advanced adaptations of 
conventional light-water reactors to novel battery-like concepts with sealed reactor vessels and fully 
autonomous operations. Multiple US and international studies have been conducted in recent years to 
assess the desired features of reactors that are desirable for global deployment in terms of both meeting 
user needs and reducing proliferation concerns.a, b  The consistent conclusion has been that small and 
medium sized reactors (SMR)c address these needs better than existing commercially available designs, 
which have power levels generally exceeding 1000 MWe. This conclusion is based on a number of 
observations, including capital investment, electricity grid capacity, plant complexity, and country 
demographics. Because of these considerations, and because larger sized Generation III nuclear plants are 
already commercially available, the GNEP program will focus on the development and demonstration of 
SMRs for international deployment. 
6.1 Program Strategy 
Successful deployment of PRIMR systems will require not only the development of specific reactor 
technologies, but also the resolution of challenging infrastructure, legal and regulatory issues.  Also, it 
will be important to understand and address the wide range of physical and temporal interests and needs 
 
a “Innovative Small and Medium Sized Reactors: Design Features, Safety Approaches and R&D Trends,” IAEA-TECDOC-
1451, May 2005. 
b “Report to Congress on Small Modular Nuclear Reactors,” US Department of Energy, May 2001. 
c According to the International Atomic Energy Agency, “small” reactors are defined to have power outputs up to 300 MWe and 
“medium” reactors have outputs between 300 and 700 MWe. 
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of the diverse global market.  The type and size of nuclear plants, as well as the level of need for new 
physical and/or administrative infrastructure, will vary considerably over the spectrum of developing 
countries. 
Figure 5 describes at a high level the principal activities of the PRIMR deployment program, which 
includes three major components: infrastructure development, reactor development and regulatory 
development. Implementation of the plan will require the combined contributions of the federal 
government, industry, the national laboratories and academia.  The technology development and 
demonstration portion of the PRIMR deployment program is described in the following sections and 
focuses on the reactor development component of Figure 5. 
The program will start with an assessment of user country needs and constraints, followed by the rigorous 
development of system requirements. This will be done using input from the international community via 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and bilateral and multi-lateral working groups. Based on 
the identified requirements, an assessment of technology development needs and system deployment 
options will be performed.  Technology options will include such choices as:  reactor fuel and coolant, 
primary system design (pool, loop, integral), and secondary system design (power conversion, process 
heat, cogeneration).  Deployment options include considerations such as: acquisition strategy 
(competitive vs. directed), demonstration strategy (prototype vs. first-of-a-kind unit), siting strategy (in 
US or elsewhere), and licensing/certification strategy (domestic vs. foreign). 
A dual-path approach has been selected for PRIMR development and demonstration.  The first path 
provides a fast-track deployment of a near-term SMR design to facilitate US leadership in the rapidly 
emerging nuclear market and provide U.S. credibility in meeting key GNEP objectives.  The near-term 
PRIMR development also will be used as the vehicle to address and demonstrate infrastructure and 
regulatory development needs, i.e. plant licensing, domestic and international policies, international 
agreements, etc.  As such, the initial SMR system is not expected to exemplify all of the features of a 
PRIMR system, but should manifest many of those qualities while also being derived from sufficiently 
mature technologies to realistically meet the needs of currently emerging countries with some nuclear 
experience.  The second path focuses on specific technology developments that are needed to deploy a 
next-generation SMR to a broader global market with further enhancements in plant safety, robustness, 
safeguards, proliferation resistance and economics.   
The plan anticipates strong industry involvement from the outset to lead the design development and 
international deployment.  This will ensure a rapid transition to a commercial enterprise.  National 
laboratories and universities will be needed to develop the advanced technologies needed to fully meet 
PRIMR system requirements.  International collaborations will be pursued in nearly every aspect of the 
program and maximum use will be made of existing organizations, agreements, and collaborations.  
6.2 Support for 2008 Record of Decision 
The initial focus of the PRIMR program will be to conduct those activities needed to inform the 
scheduled 2008 decision by the Secretary of Energy regarding the path forward for GNEP.  These include 
an assessment of the global need for PRIMR systems, a detailed assessment of technical requirements for 
such systems, the selection of a near-term SMR design for demonstration, and the initial screening of 
next-generation design concepts.  These activities will establish a firm basis for proceeding with the 
development and demonstration of PRIMR systems and provide sufficient information to reliably 
estimate the cost and schedule for full demonstration of these systems.  
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Figure 5.  Principal activities to develop GNEP reactors for international deployment 
. 
6.2.1 Global Needs Assessment 
A global needs assessment will be performed to understand the needs and constraints of the developed 
and developing countries of the world.  Considerable data already exist to support this “market” study, 
hence the study will involve harvesting these data, filling identified gaps, and interpreting the data within 
the GNEP context. An initial characterization of global energy demands and projections was performed 
late in FY 2006.d This study, which concluded that 500-1000 new SMRs may be needed by 2050 world-
wide to meet the anticipated energy demand, will form the basis of a more refined investigation of energy 
supply needs for the full range of country economies.  
The IAEA has been very active in recent years in assessing the design, safety, and economics of SMR 
systems.  Because IAEA membership includes the full spectrum of developed and developing countries, 
they will be a valuable resource for the coordination of many activities related to the PRIMR program.  In 
particular, the IAEA-sponsored International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles 
(INPRO) has positioned itself as the organization representing user nations and has formulated a program 
to assist emerging nuclear nations with infrastructure issues and technology evaluations.  The activities 
and outcomes of INPRO will be extensively leveraged for several aspects of the PRIMR program, 
including the global needs assessment. 
 
d “Potential of Small and Medium Sized Reactors (SMR) to Support the GNEP Vision,” Advanced Systems 
Technology and Management, Inc. (draft November 1, 2006). 
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6.2.2 Requirements Definition 
For successful deployment within the GNEP context, PRIMR systems must: (a) meet all the safety, 
reliability, economics, and proliferation goals established for the DOE Generation IV program, (b) be 
sized for market conditions in developing countries where energy demand per capita, institutional 
maturity and industrial infrastructure vary considerably, and (c) be capable of utilizing fuel cycle/waste 
management support within the GNEP reliable fuel services and fuel recycling paradigm. Realization of 
these top-level requirements gives rise to a number of second-level requirements involving reactor 
technology choices. 
The PRIMR program will generate detailed and substantiated requirements for PRIMR systems. It is 
expected that some of the desirable features will be mutually exclusive, or at least competitive with other 
features, so a prioritization or weighting of requirements will be established also.  The desired outcome 
from this assessment is the eventual formation of a “GNEP Certification” process that will ensure that 
reactor systems deployed worldwide satisfy implementing policies of GNEP.  
Arrangements are already underway to establish SMR Working Groups jointly with Japan and Russia.  
Additional bilateral and multilateral arrangements are expected as GNEP progresses.  These Working 
Groups will be instrumental in establishing an international consensus on PRIMR requirements. 
After the PRIMR requirements have been established, a PRIMR system evaluation methodology will be 
established, including specific evaluation criteria.  This task will draw heavily from recent and ongoing 
efforts in the DOE Generation IV program and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative.  Specifically, 
Working Groups from these two programs have developed a number of relevant tools for the evaluation 
of safety, reliability, economics, and proliferation risk.  Additionally, other technology maturity 
evaluation methods, such as the “technical readiness level (TRL)” scale used by the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration, will be considered for evaluation of PRIMR system maturity. 
6.2.3 Design Selection 
A dual-path approach to PRIMR deployment has been selected that includes an early demonstration of a 
near-term SMR and the longer-term development of reactor technologies for the next-generation SMR.  
The selection of a near-term SMR, which is intended to be responsive to existing foreign power demands, 
will be made early in the program. This will provide GNEP with a commercially viable system that can 
help resolve key infrastructure and regulatory issues for a rapid deployment of a PRIMR system by 2016. 
It will also provide rapid opportunity for GNEP to reach its international objectives of significantly 
increasing the use of nuclear energy worldwide. It is expected that the initial system selected for near-
term deployment will not fully meet all of the ultimate PRIMR requirements, but will be selected based 
on its balance of requirements, technology readiness, and user country needs.  For example, initial 
contacts from several developing countries have indicated a clear preference for water-cooled reactors 
because of the large global experience base with these types of reactors. A trade study will be conducted 
in FY2007 to evaluate near-term designs with a goal to select a system that GNEP will support by 
facilitating resolution of regulatory and infrastructure issues. 
According to two recent IAEA reports,e,f more than 60 SMRs are being studied by various countries with 
a diverse set of features and spanning the full gamut of technology and design maturity. After completing 
the detailed requirements assessment, an initial screening of potential next-generation SMRs will be 
 
e Status of Innovative Small and Medium Sized Reactor Designs 2005: Reactors With Conventional Refueling Schemes, 
International Atomic Energy Agency, IAEA-TECDOC-1485, March 2006. 
f Status of Innovative Small and Medium Sized Reactor Designs 2006: Reactors Without Onsite Refueling, International Atomic 
Energy Agency, (in publication). 
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conducted, and several concepts (4-5) will be selected for further development.  Later, one or two systems 
will be selected for final design development based on their potential for meeting all or most of the 
established requirements with a reasonable level of additional technology development. 
6.3 PRIMR Technology Demonstration 
Satisfying all of the requirements for GNEP Certification will require development, testing and 
demonstration of new reactor technologies, potentially including fuels, materials, instrumentation, 
safeguards, physical security, and advanced manufacturing technologies.  Even for the near-term PRIMR 
demonstration, some advanced technologies may need to be developed, such as sensors and 
instrumentation for reactor control and nuclear material safeguards.  It is important to start this 
development process early so that advanced PRIMR systems can be available as soon as possible for 
deployment to emerging countries.  
Primary activities for the next-generation PRIMR involve the development of detailed design 
requirements, including the establishment of criteria and metrics to permit a thorough evaluation of 
candidate systems. Industry-lab partnerships will be sought to develop pre-conceptual designs of concepts 
that could potentially meet the established criteria through a competitive bid process. The submitted 
designs will then undergo an objective review to be performed by an integrated industry-laboratory-
university team. Down-selection to 2-3 promising concepts will result in contracts to develop conceptual 
designs. Reactor vendors will take lead responsibility for design development with the national 
laboratories and universities providing the supporting R&D.  This process should be performed in 
conjunction with foreign partners but with consideration of domestic policies and business opportunities. 
Once conceptual designs are evaluated, a decision will be made on building prototype reactors to gather 
the experience and data needed to support design approval by the NRC—a key step in making the designs 
commercially attractive for international deployment.  
The technical implications resulting from the requirements discussed earlier give rise to a number of 
technology needs.  For the most part, especially for fuels and materials, technology development needs 
apply to the deployment of the next-generation SMRs, since the near-term plant must be based 
substantially on existing and demonstrated reactor technology.  However, some cross-cutting 
technologies, such as advanced instrumentations and controls, safeguards, physical protection, and 
manufacturing technologies, may be needed or desirable for even the near-term PRIMR system. 
This major task area is best served by considerable involvement of the international R&D community, 
including national laboratories and universities.  Existing or new bilateral and multilateral collaborations 
will be utilized to advance the state-of-the-art in several areas pertinent to PRIMR systems. Many 
countries are already developing SMRs and would mutually benefit from collaborations on basic and 
applied R&D. Because of the significant overlap in the requirements and objectives between GNEP and 
the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) for the next-generation SMR, these two programs will 
cooperate closely in defining research topics and program funding to the maximum extent possible. 
Additionally, the International Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (I-NERI) will be used to build on and 
foster international collaboration. Universities are well suited to contribute to this R&D, which can be 
accomplished through direct programmatic agreements or by leveraging projects within the domestic 
Nuclear Energy Research Initiative (NERI). 
6.4 Commercialization and Deployment 
It is ultimately the responsibility of commercial nuclear plant vendors to provide SMR designs to the 
global market. Hence, it is vital that the PRIMR development program have strong industrial participation 
from the outset. For the industry to engage in a full and committed manner, they must see positive 
business benefit.  At the same time, it is unlikely that industry will develop SMRs for commercial 
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offering without funding support from the government because of perceived risks of deployment to 
developing countries and the numerous infrastructure and regulatory barriers.  Incentives and contractual 
arrangements will be developed for industrial participation consistent with government objectives, and a 
clear path for a transition to full commercial deployment will be defined early in the program. There is 
likely to be a market for several competing designs offering different strengths and providing alternative 
paths for future expansion as the economies of developing countries expand.  Thus, there will be options 
for multiple industrial partners within the program.  It is also plausible for international industrial 
partnerships to form as suppliers, thus requiring international agreements on contributions, property rights 
and liability.  
 
6.5 Cost Estimates and Milestones 
 
Table 11. Cost Estimates Projection for PRIMR System Development and Demonstration 
Cost Estimates ($M) 
Activities FY-07* FY-08 FY-09 FY-10 FY-11 FY-12 
PRIMR System Integration       
Coordination and integration*  0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Support services  0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Infrastructure Development       
Needs/Requirements assessments 
and international collaborations*   0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Country-specific infrastructure 
assistance (evaluations, site 
selection, trade studies, etc.) 
 0.1 1.5 1.5 2 2 
Reactor Development       
Near-term Design  1.3 3.5 4 4 4 
Next-Generation Designs  2.5 2.5 2.5 8 8 
Technology Development (fuels, 
materials, I&C, safeguards, 
manufacturing) 
 0.5 3 5 7 8 
Total 0 5 11.5 14 22 23 
*Funding for this activity in FY07 is from DOE RW funds. 
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Table 12. Top Level Milestones for PRIMR System Development and Demonstration 
Milestones Date 
Select SMR technology for near-term deployment May 2007 
Complete initial needs/requirements assessments September 2007 
Initial screening of next-generation SMR concepts March 2008 
Select next-generation SMR(s) for pre-conceptual design June 2008 
Select near-term PRIMR design for safety evaluation support January 2009 
Submit application for NRC design approval for near-term SMR September 2010 
Down-select to 2 next-generation SMR conceptual designs January 2011 
Award up to two contracts for conceptual designs of next-generation 
SMR 
March 2012 
Complete NRC Final Design Approval for near-term SMR design January 2014 
Complete conceptual design of next-generation SMR(s) September 2015 
Select next-generation design for prototype construction January 2016 
Begin operation of next-generation SMR prototype September 2020 
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7.0 Modeling and Simulation 
Modeling and simulation has always been a key tool in nuclear engineering. From the earliest times, 
primitive computers were used to obtain predicted quantities through interpolation of experimental data. 
More recently, computer based analyses have been used to predict detailed quantities that could not be 
readily measured in situ, for example, the aging of structures, power distributions in cores, transient safety 
behavior, etc. Until the early 80’s nuclear engineering was at the forefront of computer applications, 
making massive use of the largest machines available at the time. Nevertheless, these machines remained 
very limited when compared to the requirements for an explicit modeling of key phenomena in a reactor. 
Thus, the codes developed at the time were rather simplified, using lumped parameter models for 
predictions of neutronics, thermohydraulics, and structural mechanics quantities. These codes were 
validated on a very large experimental database, developed over the years for specific projects. The 
validation process used at the time was coarse, as it could only compare macroscopically measured data 
and macroscopically calculated quantities. Frequently, the validation process consisted of simply 
comparing these experimental and calculated quantities as the tools and techniques available for a more 
formal validation process were missing. 
These same tools are the ones available for the GNEP program today and constitute the starting point for 
design activities. We expect that their use will lead to significant negative consequences for the projects. 
There are three principle reasons for this assessment -- first, the validation process needs to be repeated 
with more formalism, even though this might not be possible due to the disappearance or lack of 
documentation for the experimental data. Furthermore, these tools are embedded with many 
approximations and uncertainties that eventually lead to significant cost increases for the projects. Finally, 
modeling tools available for researchers in critical areas, in particular for the development of advanced 
fuels, are not predictive, and force a research approach that is largely empirical, and therefore expensive, 
lengthy, and extremely risky. There is a broad consensus that a project guided by good science embedded 
in modern simulation tools has a much higher probability of success. 
Preliminary evaluations of the critical areas where modern simulation tools are required for the success of 
GNEP have been undertaken over the past year, in particular during a workshop held December 2005 at 
LLNL, and a workshop held August 2006 in Washington DC. The following list, while it is not 
exhaustive, provides key priorities: 
• Core simulation tools (neutronics, thermohydraulics, structural mechanics) need to be updated 
and validated to give accurate and trustworthy predictions of plant behavior during normal, 
incidental, and accidental conditions. 
• Fuels and materials behavior models need to be built to enable acceleration of the research 
process in these two critical areas, and significantly increase the probability of success. 
An important use of advanced modeling and simulation methods is for process and facility design to 
optimize integration of IAEA safeguards as part of the overall design optimization process for a given 
facility (see Appendix A and Section 5.2.3.4 for details).  
Subsequent discussions have also identified the need for organizing a staged development process, 
whereby critical needs would be met in a timely manner to satisfy project needs in the short, medium, and 
long term. 
The GNEP simulation plan below includes a detailed list of the major simulation goals of the program 
together with a framework for identifying and prioritizing specific simulation targets during the course of 
the GNEP program. This section is organized as follows: 1) a background and overview of the 
opportunities presented by advanced simulation; 2) a methodology and framework for prioritizing 
simulation activities; 3) GNEP simulation goals, and 4) a list of additional domain-specific simulation 
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opportunities within the GNEP framework. This will be done in close collaboration with the DOE’s 
Office of Science. 
An activity that will be extremely important to the success of modeling and simulation is a disciplined 
approach to verification and validation (V&V). V&V plans will be developed very early in the modeling 
and simulation activity. This will require a well-defined, coupled experimental program. 
7.1 Opportunity 
Computer simulation addresses critical needs of the GNEP program in providing the tools necessary for 
safety assessments, design activities, cost, and risk reduction. Existing tools based on a large experimental 
database are likely to be insufficient. For most of the technologies related to the three major GNEP 
demonstration technologies, testing is extremely expensive, protracted, and in some cases unfeasible. 
Furthermore, the existing experimental database is insufficiently documented to support a modern 
validation process. Complementing or replacing testing with high-fidelity computer simulation will make 
it possible to collect simulated data that can, in conjunction with a sound experimental validation 
program, be used to understand fundamental processes that affect facility efficiency, safety, and cost. One 
can, for example, imagine virtual prototyping of reactor cores yielding data that leads to more accurate 
identification of design margins, allows early experimentation with novel design concepts, and ultimately 
significantly reduces plant certification timelines. In other areas, such as advanced fuel fabrication, 
atomistic fuel simulations could ultimately make it possible to target a small subset of promising 
candidate fuel types for further experimentation, greatly reducing the number of experiments to be 
performed.  
Such simulation-based methods are within the reach of modern supercomputers, which currently are 
approaching a peak theoretical performance of one petaFLOP/s, about five orders of magnitude faster 
than a standard desktop computer. In fact, other related industries, such as automotive, airline, chip 
manufacturers, etc. have demonstrated the effective use of high-fidelity modeling (viz. computational 
fluid dynamics) as an integral part of the conceptual design and optimization process. Related industries 
are making remarkable progress in reducing experiments in favor of high-end simulation – e.g. 
pharmaceuticals, engine design, turbines, etc. It is clear that we have only scratched the surface of what is 
possible in the application of advanced simulation to nuclear engineering. 
Of course, over the past twenty five years, simulation tools have been in common use among nuclear 
engineers in a wide range of applications. However, as discussed, most of these can be considered legacy 
tools that were conceived and developed over twenty years ago, when available computer power was 
approximately five orders of magnitude less than current state of the art. Equally importantly, over that 
period significant advances have been made in enabling technologies to more easily leverage this 
performance. With the tremendous computing power currently available in the form of modern 
supercomputers (e.g. IBM BG/P, Cray XT3), radical new approaches can be taken that were previously 
unthinkable. In many cases, leadership class computers can be used to calculate first-principles-based 
physics on very fine meshes, yielding results with accuracies much greater than current techniques, or 
with the ability to predict new scenarios that have not been directly tested. In other cases (e.g. molecular 
dynamics simulations), it is possible to implement completely new techniques now that were 
inconceivable or impractical twenty years ago. A detailed discussion of the simulation opportunities is 
given in Section 7.4. 
7.2 Organization 
While it is possible to identify early candidate simulation projects with high potential payback (see 
Introduction and the next section), the detailed process of downselecting and prioritizing will need to be 
done in the early phases of the program, in close collaboration with the facilities and technology leads, 
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and to some degree dependent on funding levels. For this reason, we have devised a methodology 
whereby simulation effort will be organized as a close collaboration between the engineers and conduting 
technology development for designing the GNEP facilities  and computational scientists, computer 
scientists, and applied mathematicians who are experts in various aspects designing numerical software 
and large application codes for leadership class supercomputers. This will be an iterative decision-making  
process. Facilities designers formulate short and long-term simulation goals to directly address areas that 
would greatly impact their engineering and scientific goals. Computational modellers help identify 
barriers to performing such calculations and assist in priorizing simulation goals, identifying potential 
“low-hanging fruit”, and articulating specific short and long-term scientific and engineering target 
problems. For the  longer-term, more fundamental R&D on the target problems will include significant 
advancements in underpinning technologies, such as helping to define next-generation computing 
architectures in support of GNEP, scalable numerical methods and algorithms, advance visualization, i/o, 
and data management, in addition to more scientific and modelling challenges (see below). For shorter-
term goals the strong emphasis will be on immediate validation and verification of results, definition of 
supporting experiments, and channeling results into particular GNEP technologies. Critical component of 
this model is the formation of a team responsible for ensuring that all development efforts, on whatever 
timescale, feed into particular GNEP facilities needs and timelines, and therein clearly demonstrate 
improvements in the above-menetioned areas. Furthermore, while the tools initially will be used for 
facility designers, as they mature a process will need to be developed for knowledge and technology 
transfer to appropriate certification agencies for ultimate adoption and incoporation into their process.  
In the following section  simulation needs are prioritized based on overlapping short, medium and long-
term goals. 
7.3 Objectives 
Within this framework, emphasis will be placed on the components most directly supporting the design of 
CFTC, ABR and AFCF facilities. Since one of the overarching goals of the simulation program is the 
development of a suite of software tools that will enable quantification of margins of uncertainty to aid 
and accelerate the licensing of new reactor systems, the simulation program will engage and collaborate 
with the research branch of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission at an early stage to position the program 
for appropriate levels of engagement in the future.  
7.3.1 Short-Term Objectives 
The short-term goal of the Modeling and Simulation activity is to advance the development of the three 
major GNEP demonstration facilities, the CFTC, ABR, and AFCF. Improved engineering simulation 
tools, based on existing modeling codes, software infrastructure and knowledge discovery (e.g., 
visualization, feature identification) applications, will be created via the integration of existing 
capabilities and focused on advancing the deployment of the facilities. Tool specifications will be 
developed in close collaboration with the leads for the three major demonstration projects to ensure that 
the resulting suites will benefit the development of the facilities. Existing capabilities will be examined, 
and the most promising will be chosen for integration. Tool development will look to utilize the advances 
in computing technologies as well as leveraging previous work from programs such as ASC, SciDAC, 
and TeraGrid. The need for new numerical algorithms and other enabling technologies will be assessed in 
terms of the facility needs to provide guidance for the intermediate and long-term objectives. It is also 
important to begin initial development of a GNEP system level planning tool. The system level planning 
tool will include a transport model that tracks the flow of nuclear materials (isotopic masses) with respect 
to time and geographic location. The mass change terms are obtained from the next level of modeling in 
the hierarchy referred to as the “system design models.” The output of the systems level model will 
provide the following databases as a function of global location and time: 
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• Raw materials (natural resources) 
• Processed materials 
• Nuclear materials transportation flow 
• Nuclear facilities and their characteristics 
• Material storage 
• Cost/expenditure 
• Proliferation concerns 
• Products and byproducts (electricity, hydrogen, waste, etc.) 
The systems level planning tool and the lower level models supporting it will be structured such that it 
can be run in two modes:  demand mode where energy demand is explicitly defined and the response of 
the overall system is quantified, and optimization mode where the desired optimal characteristics of the 
system are defined based on various constraints and the optimal deployment strategies are predicted. 
Uncertainty propagation will be an important part of the tool.  While this tool will lack maturity in the 
early stages of GNEP development, it nevertheless will provide useful direction to the overall program. 
The technical leads for each of the demonstration facilities will determine the modeling applications upon 
which they will rely for the successful construction of their facilities. The work processes of the 
participants in each activity will be carefully examined to obtain an accurate workflow description of the 
modeling activities. Traditionally, this is a series of independent operations that the analyst must 
individually combine. The examination will cover the specifics of which applications require input from 
others, in what formats, and how the data is currently transmitted. There will also be an analysis of the 
manner in which the suite of applications is used (e.g., multiple flux calculations being performed on a 
given geometry, or different geometries examined with similar fuel loadings). The end-to-end analysis 
process will then be examined, looking for opportunities for efficiency improvement. Many of the data 
transmission steps, sensitivity analyses via parameter variation, model input construction steps, and 
results analyses will lend themselves to modernization capabilities that have been developed and 
implemented by other programs. Once the steps of the process and work flow are understood, efficiency 
and performance optimization will be examined to determine which will provide the greatest benefit to 
the facility construction process.  
For the ABR, the priorities have been determined to be the thermal hydraulics and structural mechanics 
components. The CFTC requires the current modeling code to be fully integrated with minimally a static, 
but preferably a dynamic, plant model in order to accommodate non-equilibrium events within the 
facility. CFTC also desires a substantial improvement in the usability of the CFTC modeling suite. An 
equivalent analysis with the AFCF lead will provide a similar set of facility-oriented priorities. These 
priorities will drive the efforts in the workflow analysis and process improvement. 
A formal validation process also needs to be established within the GNEP program to bring the full 
benefits of modern simulation capabilities to the design and safety of the facilities and the research and 
development process. The purpose of the validation process is to provide for each calculated quantity an 
estimated uncertainty that takes into account all possible sources of uncertainties in the analysis, and 
integrates them for each particular situation.  
Several approaches have been used in the past in the nuclear area; they range from the very rudimentary 
to the somewhat sophisticated: 
• The rudimentary approach has historically consisted of taking a code – developed to whatever 
level of sophistication – and comparing its output to data from a set of representative 
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experiments. The uncertainties are then estimated on the basis of the comparison. This process 
does not distinguish the origins of uncertainties and biases, and gives only a vague definition of 
the domain of validity. 
• More advanced approaches have been developed, for example in neutronics and structural 
mechanics, where reference codes (that provide exact solutions to the basic equations) exist and 
can be used to estimate numerical biases; uncertainty propagation techniques have been 
developed, and have been used to estimate the final uncertainties due to nuclear data or 
mechanical properties. Finally, formal statistical processes have been developed to formally 
compare integral experimental data and predictive results. 
These processes are not satisfactory, as they do not provide maximum confidence in uncertainty 
predictions. Furthermore, it seems likely that the experimental database currently available is 
insufficiently documented to support a formal modern validation process. Finally, it is also likely that this 
database is incomplete and does not contain sufficient experimental data to validate codes capable of very 
detailed modeling of key phenomena. 
Modern methods need to be developed in the short term that incorporate tools such as formal uncertainty 
propagation techniques, statistical analyses of experimental data, and reference codes that minimize the 
effects of modeling approximations. Additionally, GNEP will need to acquire and analyze a complete 
experimental database for validation of the new or updated analysis tools. While these experimental needs 
have not yet been determined, a formal process will be put in place to do this, and this will include as a 
first step the analysis of the existing database. 
7.3.2 Intermediate-Term Objectives 
In addition to the codes adopted within the short-term objectives described previously, an analysis will be 
performed for other existing codes that may provide value but are not currently in general use within the 
nuclear industry. In particular, these codes could serve to bring additional functionality to the short term 
efforts without having to rely on the results of the longer-term research activities. Limitations of the 
existing nuclear code suite will be used to identify possible candidates for inclusion. Once these codes 
have been identified, verification and validation activities will then define the breadth and depth of 
possible inclusion into the Modeling and Simulation activity.  
There are several possible candidates for this activity that have already been identified by the ABR and 
CFTC facility leads. The ABR could utilize higher fidelity thermal hydraulics simulations than those 
currently achievable using commercial CFD applications. These commercial codes do not scale to the 
levels required by nuclear reactor models simply because there is currently little market for such 
applications. Hence, replacing the commercial thermal hydraulics code with one capable of greater spatial 
resolution and execution in a modern HPC environment would bring greater confidence to the simulation 
results. Structural mechanics is another area of the ABR modeling where the capabilities of existing 
commercial codes are too limiting. Replacement of these commercial codes with those from the DOE 
community would again contribute to higher confidence in simulation results. Finally, the CFTC design 
work would benefit from the coupling of the existing model with a dynamic plant model that would 
calculate the effects of transients within the facility. The CFTC would also benefit from greater ease-of-
use, another straightforward application of modern computing experience. 
The integration of the previous model assessment and development work will define the intermediate-
term goal to establish an efficient “end-to-end” modeling architecture. Consistency of cross-model 
assumptions, data, and approaches will be essential for the success of the long-term, large-scale modeling 
efforts. This is especially true when data and models address phenomena across vastly different scales, 
with the results of one calculation becoming the input of another. A set of sub-model requirements based 
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on physical constraints, prediction accuracy, and technical and computational consistency within an 
integrated approach will be defined.  
7.3.3 Long-Term Objectives 
The long-term goal for the simulation program is the development of an architectural model that will 
facilitate modeling the entire fuel cycle from mining through final disposition of waste material, taking 
into account interacting factors that are key to the ultimate success of GNEP (e.g., market forces, socio-
political effects, technology risk). This will facilitate the implementation of a comprehensive suite of 
simulation tools for the design, analysis and engineering of next-generation nuclear energy systems with 
enhanced safety, reduced environmental impact, optimal deployment of facilities, and reduced 
construction cost. To achieve this long-term goal, the GNEP simulation program must address the 
following areas of research and development: 
• Integrated 3D reactor core simulations with rigorous propagation of uncertainty 
• Coupled thermal hydraulic and primary loop simulation 
• Advanced fuel design and performance 
• Fuel behavior engineering 
• Advanced secondary loop and balance of plant engineering and analysis 
• Advanced fuel cycle design 
• Separations facility engineering optimization 
• Repository design including seismic, geological, chemical, and thermal modeling and 
simulation 
• Overall nuclear energy systems model development suitable for alternative economic analysis. 
7.4 Campaigns 
This section provides further details on the specific simulation opportunities and challenges that exist for 
each component of the fuel cycle. As stated earlier, the R&D program will be orginized by campaigns, 
with each campaign including experimental and simulation components, thus insuring a strong validation 
interaction.  Here we motivate and describe the simulation aspect selected campaigns. 
7.4.1 Transmutation Fuels 
The fuels simulation campaign will cover the areas of fuels fabrication, fuel performance and depletion, 
and more fundamental materials science.  This last area will help provide more first principles simulation 
and help to bridge important length and time scales. 
Fuel performance modeling places an emphasis on the detailed understanding of the thermal, mechanical, 
physical, and chemical processes governing fuel rod behavior during normal reactor operation and under 
accident conditions. Fuel rod performance codes are used extensively in research, by fuel vendors, and by 
licensing authorities for the prediction of fuel and cladding performance. 
A fuel performance code should consist of a clearly-defined mechanical-mathematical framework into 
which physical models can be easily incorporated. In addition to its use for fuel rod design, the code will 
be utilized for a wide range of different situations such as the simulation of under-normal, off-normal, and 
reactor accident conditions. The time scale of the problems may range from milliseconds to years.  
All important physical models will be included in the fuel performance code, including models for 
thermal and irradiation-induced densification of fuel, fuel swelling due to solid and gaseous fission 
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products, fuel creep and plasticity, pellet cracking and relocation, fission gas release, oxygen and 
plutonium redistribution within the fuel, volume changes during phase transitions, formation and closure 
of center void and treatment of axial forces (between the fuel and cladding), cladding creep and 
cladding/coolant interactions (such as oxidation), etc. 
Additionally, the code must have access to a comprehensive material database for oxide, mixed oxide, 
carbide, nitride, and inert matrix fuels, and Zircalloy (and advanced zirconium alloys) and steel cladding 
(with the capability to add new fuel forms and advanced cladding). Also, interfaces must be available for 
thermal hydraulic and neutronics feedback to the fuel performance models. 
Code verification of the mechanical-mathematical framework will be accomplished by comparing code 
output to exact solutions and by comparing results from different solution techniques. Code validation 
will be tightly connected to the experimental efforts in this campaign and will include validation of 
single-physics models, and comparison with experiment for multi-physics validation. 
Simulation of basic material properties is the area with the greatest potential for progress and return on 
investment. Simulations that cover the full fuel cycle will require the ability to treat a wide range of 
materials and material behaviors across the full range of scales from atomistic to reactor system. Material 
properties, including nuclear (e.g., reaction cross sections), thermophysical (e.g., thermal conductivity, 
multi-component phase diagrams), mechanical (e.g., tensile properties, fracture toughness), and chemical 
(e.g., corrosion rates), must be determined under static, transient, and accident conditions and after 
irradiation (e.g., radiation-induced hardening, swelling, and embrittlement). 
The fuel selection process is an example that illustrates the possible gain. In the design of a reactor, fuel 
definition along with the choice of coolant is always the first step that then determines the subsequent 
components of the system. The traditional approach requires fabrication of samples or pins of the new 
fuel, measurements of physical and mechanical properties, and finally neutron exposure to high fluence 
under relevant operating conditions with subsequent characterization. This approach requires a great 
investment of money and time (several years). In some cases, the choice of fuel may have become 
obsolete or irrelevant as a result of programmatic considerations before the experimental evaluation is 
complete. A similarly long process is required for the structural materials involved in the fuel pin 
cladding and other critical in-core components. Modern methods and powerful computing tools are 
expected to speed the evaluation and selection of advanced fuels and structural materials. 
Use of several materials simulation methods will be essential. For example, first principles methods such 
as quantum density functional theory (DFT) can now realistically be used to determine fundamental 
material properties, augment experimental information on the phase diagram of multi-component actinide 
alloys and compounds, predict chemical reactivity and material compatibilities, and support the 
development of new interatomic potentials that can be used in Molecular Dynamics (MD) simulations 
involving millions of atoms. The MD simulations can then be used to study defect properties and to 
determine parameters such as the atomistic reaction rates that are required in coarser scale simulations of 
degradation mechanisms that take place over long periods of time. These parameters can be employed in 
reaction rate theory or Kinetic Monte Carlo (KMC) models of microstructural evolution. MD-based 
dislocation dynamics simulations can also provide the fundamental dislocation-defect interaction 
parameters required for continuum 3D Dislocation Dynamics (DD) simulations. The 3D DD simulations 
can then be used to obtain needed information on the constitutive behavior of the materials which is 
required for use in macroscopic methods such as finite element models of defect interaction and long term 
defect stability, as well as simulation of behavior under irradiation. Taken together, this family of multi-
scale simulations can provide predictions from the atomistic and microscopic through to the mesoscopic 
and macroscopic levels.  
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Initial goals will be to determine the set of material properties and behaviors of concern, along with the 
range of conditions under which these need to be known, and to establish the required degree of accuracy 
and practical limitations at each level of simulation. This will provide a basis for predicting the expected 
impact of an advanced simulation program to reduce both the absolute development time and the related 
uncertainties as part of the overall fuel and materials development effort. The initial technical objectives 
should include a strategy for determining the best approach for integrating the various multi-scale 
components (i.e., when to use parameter passing and when models should be more tightly coupled). 
Verification and validation steps will need to be an integral part of this strategy. 
Some possible milestones which help to describe this campaign are listed below. Details will depend on 
available budget. 
Short Term Milestones: 
• Fuel Fabrication: Use Off the Shelf (OTS) codes and methods to perform initial simulation of 
metal and oxide fuel fabrication processes. 
• Fuel Performance: Formulate a macroscopic stress closure relationship based on the 
thermodynamics of a thermo-elastic material. The thermodynamics will incorporate the 
appropriate internal state variables and other independent variables that would describe 
mechanical response of a metal or oxide fuel. 
• Fuel Performance: Perform quasi-steady high-burn up metal and oxide fuel simulation using 
OTS codes and compare to a FRAPCON-like calculational results and appropriate 
experimental data. Include UQ analysis as part of the validation 
• Fuel Performance: Perform a coupled single-phase transient calculation using OTS codes on a 
suite of unstructured meshes focused on fuel performance coupled to the coolant. Effort 
includes porting thermal-physical properties and mechanical submodels from the fuels experts 
and legacy fuels codes, and identifying deficiencies from simulation results and 3D effects 
• Materials Science: Use experiment and calculation to develop materials properties for 
micromechanical simulation for a fuel, Na gap/plenum, stainless cladding and wrap.  Provide 
stress/strain input functions, thermal stress/strain, thermal conductivity 
• Materials Science: Use currently available theory, models, and data to construct EOS for the 
metal and oxide core, Na, and cladding material over P-T-composition ranges relevant to 
reactor operation, including transients.    
• Materials Science: Use available data and EOS for fuel materials to model fuel materials 
models, including thermal expansion, compressibility 
Mid to Long Term Goals 
• Validation of fuels fabrication simulation tools and detailed simulation of fuels fabrication 
• Execute verification & validation effort for OTS fuels performance codes 
• Initiate development of advanced fuels performance simulation tool suite 
• Develop advanced multiscale models, and include relevant multiscale closure modeling into 
continuum-level simulations 
• Transient fuel performance studies with tight coupling to coolant to address design basis and 
severe accidents 
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• Enhance user base ifor OTS fuels performance code and interaction with fuels experts and 
experimentalists 
7.4.2 Fast Reactor Design and Analysis 
The fast reactor simulation campaign will include modern simulation tool development in the areas of 
neutronics, thermal-hydraulics, balance of plant, and structural mechanics.  High performance, first 
principles, 3-D simulation tools will be developed, along with a lower fidelity transient systems safety 
simulation tool. 
The scope of applications for future neutronics modeling will need to address all reactor physics aspects 
related to the design, operation and fuel cycle management for reactor systems developed under GNEP. 
Many computational tools exist for performing stand alone analyses of core reactivity, power production, 
fuel burn-up, shielding design, and ex-core criticality safety. The challenge is to address each of these 
analyses in an integrated, self-consistent framework. 
The analysis of neutronics for complex systems requires a very high degree of sophistication for the 
description of the geometry and for physically realistic representation of the energy dependence of 
neutron cross section data used for modeling. The availability of accurate cross sections and their 
temperature dependence is necessary for modeling the various aspects of neutron transport and interaction 
within highly heterogeneous reactor cores. An assessment of pertinent cross section data available 
through ENDF (Evaluated Nuclear Data Files) and other sources should be performed to determine 
additional needs for experimental and theoretical nuclear physics work to support the establishment of an 
adequate nuclear data base for GNEP applications. A comprehensive assessment would also include 
photonuclear reaction cross sections and cross sections for relevant charged-particle interactions.  
Neutronics modeling has traditionally relied on both stochastic (Monte Carlo) simulations and 
deterministic transport and diffusion theory approaches. Monte Carlo techniques incorporate the basic 
physics at the level of stochastic particle tracking with the general system geometry and material cross 
sections governing the particle track histories. Monte Carlo offers the strong conceptual advantage of 
keeping a close (essentially exact) correspondence between computational and physical geometric and 
cross section energy dependence models. Nevertheless, Monte Carlo can become computationally 
impractical for several different classes of problems. These include calculations of small reactivity 
coefficients, some types of sensitivity/uncertainty propagation studies, time-dependent solutions, and 
some types of burn up calculations. 
For these applications, as well as for several other aspects of neutronics analysis, computational 
advantages can be achieved with deterministic transport and diffusion theory approaches that complement 
the Monte Carlo approach. The two basic computational methods, taken together, can provide a much 
more comprehensive picture of the neutronics aspects of nuclear reactor system behavior than either 
method alone. The deterministic approach may also be favored by the need for coupling the neutronics 
models with other deterministic models (e.g., thermal hydraulics system models) with which data is 
dynamically shared, and in fact neutronics models are ideally organized from the outset to take advantage 
of inherent couplings of neutronic behavior to the thermal hydraulic, structural, and possibly the 
radiochemical behavior of the reactor system. Existing and improved stand alone models should be 
adapted to ultimately serve as sub-models within a multi-physics, multi-scale, and probably multi-
processor approach. The goal is to provide reactor concept design tools that can predict the overall impact 
of the neutronics on the system as a whole (e.g., plant operations, safety analysis, economics and 
efficiency) by computing a coupled multi-physics simulation of the underlying behavior with all relevant 
feedback mechanisms taken into account. 
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Existing reactor core thermohydraulics codes use the traditional single-channel or sub-channel approach 
to model reactor core heat transfer. This is clearly inconsistent with the goal of a first principle type of 
methodology that this project is pursuing. The advantage of a more first-principles based approach is the 
ability to generate data for a much greater range of conditions than is possible with empirically based 
codes. The latter depend greatly on using empirical correlations of global quantities that are valid only for 
the specific designs for which they were tested – that is, they have very little true predictive capability. A 
general thermal hydraulics tool has to be capable of treating both single-phase and multi-phase fluid flows 
in coolants ranging from gas to liquid metal. For the purposes of the fast transmutation reactor, in normal 
operating conditions single phase fluid models are adequate, but these must be augmented with 
multiphase and free convection models for accidental scenarios (coolant exposure, pump shutdown, etc.). 
Additionally, both steady state and transient solutions are required for the full range of phenomena to be 
studied. 
Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) is the general terminology for the numerical solution of the Navier-
Stokes equations. If solved using direct numerical simulation (DNS), the Navier-Stokes equations can 
represent all regimes of flow from laminar to fully turbulent. Since even the largest and fastest computers 
available today are not capable of solving the full range of energy transferring scales in a fully turbulent 
flow, some degree of physics approximation is still required even with this technique, and thus some 
experimental insight for modeling and validation is needed. A CFD approach can, however, be adopted to 
achieve the degree of accuracy and confidence that are essential parts of the scopes of this project, 
provided that the computational burden stays reasonable and that results obtained with this methodology 
can be physically validated. 
For a better understanding of the physics behind the single-phase operational mode of reactors, we can 
couple high performance stochastic and deterministic neutronics tools to coupled flow and thermal 
transport tools. The goal is to model in three dimensions, with fine resolution, the local- to global-scale 
effects for a representative reactor core rod bundle in operational mode. For the simple channel flow of a 
rod bundle, the code structure of choice may be a structured grid with adaptive mesh refinement. For 
more complex geometry and piping, an unstructured grid CFD tool may be preferred. 
The analyses of accident scenarios pose additional challenges. An accident scenario in a liquid-cooled 
reactor usually results in boiling or voiding of the coolant and condensation of liquid on cold structures. 
The excess temperatures and voiding of coolant can cause melting of fuel and cladding. All of these 
processes are transient, have strong, nonlinear feedback effects on fluid displacement, and the whole 
process can occur in seconds. The current approach to the analysis of accident scenarios is through the use 
of semi-empirical tools with adjustable parameters and models determined from experiment. An analysis 
based on first principles would require multiphase, multi-component fluid dynamics with variable core 
geometry and the characteristics of the fluid dynamics would vary through initiation to the final stages of 
the accident. 
There are a number of research challenges that must be addressed to design an efficient and accurate 
modeling tool. The current capabilities for solving incompressible and compressible flow must be 
extended to the regimes that exist in nuclear reactors with large temperature variations. The high-order-
accurate solution of the Navier-Stokes and heat transfer equations in fluid regimes can be coupled to high-
order-accurate solution of heat transfer in solid regimes. These schemes can be extended to use adaptive 
mesh refinement, and the coupled scheme must be scalable on parallel computers. The coupling of the 
flow and heat transfer models to the neutronics tools will require research into ways to couple these 
models which are solved on different grids and evolve at different time scales. Considerable work will be 
required to develop effective techniques to verify and validate the approach. Through the use of structured 
and unstructured grids and high-order accurate methods resulting schemes will be very efficient and will 
allow the rapid evaluation of various design and accident scenarios. 
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Structural mechanics software development has been driven by a breadth of applications over the last 
thirty years which include aerospace, national defense, civil infrastructure, and, in the 70’s and 80’s, 
nuclear reactor technology. These developments have led to a number of finite element based computer 
programs that have mature element technologies and solution algorithms. Existing software that has 
application relevance in the nuclear fuel cycle area can generally be divided into three categories: linear 
finite element programs, implicit time integration nonlinear finite element programs, and explicit time 
integration nonlinear programs. In addition to the general-purpose structural mechanics software just 
mentioned, the nuclear power industry has a unique need to incorporate soil-structure-interaction (SSI), 
whereby the coupling between massive concrete containment systems and the surrounding supporting soil 
is accounted for in earthquake response simulations. Special purpose linear, frequency domain programs 
were developed in the 70’s specifically to simulate SSI effects, and these programs are still the standard 
tools today. The existing SSI programs typically must idealize the nuclear plant superstructure with very 
simplistic structural models in order to arrive at reasonably executable models. 
In terms of future advancements, there is a compelling need for development and implementation of 
advanced material constitutive models that can accurately represent the time dependent behavior of 
materials in extreme environments. These should address the effects of high radiation levels, extreme 
temperatures, and chemical interactions on material behavior. Advanced materials models should account 
for the fully 3D, multi-axial states of stress both at low strain rates (normal operations), and at high strain 
rates (accident scenarios). The development of macroscopic, continuum based phenomenological models 
must progress in parallel to fundamental materials science research aimed at understanding microscopic 
material behavior in extreme environments. It is essential that the materials science community work 
hand-in-hand with the structural mechanics community to ensure that constitutive models represent an 
appropriate balance between characterization of material behavior and numerical efficiency and stability 
in finite element implementations. 
Recent developments in solid/structural mechanics have moved towards a merging of capabilities from 
traditional solids hydro-type codes, which have pushed the computational technologies for representing 
extreme deformations and flow of materials, with traditional structural type elements. Such codes have 
been developed in frameworks that prevent mesh tangling at extreme ranges of response. This has begun 
to open up substantially the types of problems that can be modeled for extremely nonlinear accident 
scenarios. Pushing these developments towards a logical conclusion, it would be very desirable to move 
towards a single program that can solve multiple problems associated with slow (static and quasi-
dynamic) phenomenon associated with operations, slow accidental events like earthquakes, and also 
accurately simulate extreme accidents associated with very rapid transients such as pipe breaks.  
Direct coupling of multi-physics codes can result in more realistic representations of actual behavior and 
eliminate the need for grossly-approximated hand-offs between codes representing different physics. 
There are two areas where coupling of structural mechanics codes can enhance existing capabilities. In 
reactor analysis, vibrations induced by fluid structure interactions can be a problematic design issue. 
Explicit coupling of CFD and structural mechanics codes would be useful in rigorously modeling and 
addressing this issue. Coupling between neutronics and structural mechanics codes would also permit the 
effects of radiation on materials to be explicitly represented for various structural components. The 
neutronics coupling would allow direct, time-dependent integration of the effects of radiation on the 
embedded materials models. 
With the advent of high performance computers, a rigorous, fully coupled simulation of a combined soil-
structure system is within our computational grasp. With appropriate development of an interface model 
between the soil and the structure foundation, it would be feasible to execute a time domain simulation, 
including nonlinearities in the soil and superstructure, with a fully 3D detailed model of the 
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superstructure. Such an analysis would bypass the coarse idealizations of the superstructure system 
currently embedded in typical SSI simulations.  
Balance of plant (BOP) modeling (e.g., piping, valves, heat exchangers, pumps, power conversion units, 
and reactor containment systems) is required during the plant design in order to determine system 
operating parameters and performance, as well as to perform overall reactor system design optimization. 
Reactor control system design and development must also include simulation of the balance of plant 
systems. Finally, reactor safety analysis must include a balance of plant simulation in order to provide 
appropriate boundary conditions to the reactor core during transient events. 
Traditionally, the codes used to perform these simulations have been independent, with minimal overlap 
of component simulation algorithms. An overall objective of this task is to develop high fidelity balance 
of plant simulations that can be used for both design and safety analyses and that can be easily used to 
investigate multiple design options. BOP simulations will require the capability of modeling multi-
dimensional fluid flow, natural circulation, and transients in order to effectively simulate BOP 
performance. The application must be capable of using code and input uncertainties to quantify 
uncertainties in reactor limits, and it must have a complete validation and verification package developed. 
Longer-term requirements include those discussed above, plus the capability of investigating multiple 
BOP and power conversion system types, highly-detailed component simulations, the ability to operate on 
next generation computational platforms, multi-physics interfaces, and the ability to verify and validate 
the algorithm. 
Near-term objectives focus on supporting the ABR deployment effort and include the development of a 
requirement set for BOP simulation, evaluation of existing BOP simulation methodologies, component 
models, etc., and a down-selection of the most appropriate methodology or methodologies. Intermediate-
term objectives include development of appropriate interfaces with the design/optimization, 
instrumentation and control, and safety codes, integrating the BOP methodologies into this code or codes, 
identifying existing data to benchmark BOP simulations, outlining additional data that is required to 
complete benchmarking, and developing a validation package for the BOP simulation to use in ABR 
licensing arguments. Long-term objectives include developing a fully integrated BOP simulation package 
that can be used across all technical areas that is flexible enough to incorporate multiple high fidelity 
process designs (e.g., Rankine cycles, Brayton cycles, multiple heat exchanger designs, and multiple 
control designs), porting to high performance parallel computational platforms, developing interfaces 
with other design physics codes, and developing a validation package appropriate for licensing 
applications. This effort will support reactor system design, instrumentation and control, and safety 
analysis, providing a more consistent and high fidelity analysis package that will be effective across 
multiple disciplines. 
Below are examples of short term milestones and mid to long term goals.  Details here will depend on an 
available budget. 
Short term milestones: 
In the short-term, the focus will be on modifying existing codes or writing codes that use existing physics 
models to run on advanced computers, and identifying gaps in existing data, models, and knowledge that 
can be addressed in the longer-term. 
• Complete deterministic neutronics code 
o Fully parallel version with 2nd order formulation using unstructured mesh 
o Determine design parameter sensitivity analysis. 
o Initial high-fidelity benchmarks on large (1000+) processor configurations Push scalability 
on BG/L  
GNEP Technology Development Plan 155 
July 25, 2007   
 
• Complete core thermal-hydraulics code 
o Fully parallel  CFD with heat transfer  
o Rigorously evaluate models for LES of liquid metals  
o Rigorously evaluate models for density driven flows in  liquid metals  
• Initiate development of modern transient system analysis code 
The validation of codes would be conducted in the following areas: 
• Demonstrate improved transport methods and experiment analysis using modern methods, 
recalculate 
o Superphénix rod worth – original diffusive transport and course mesh methods showed 
large errors in Superphénix rod worth 
o Recalculate EBR II fuel burn-up with modern methods – validate against extensive physics 
data base. 
o Recalculate EBR II blanket isotopic predictions –   diffusion transport through steel is very 
inaccurate and resulting predictions of blanket isotopics were inadequate 
• Demonstrate improved ability to analyze fast reactor irradiation experiments 
o Recalculate Phénix fuels data with modern transport methods 
o Use full 3D neutronics calculations in Phénix to better understand and analyze experimental 
data 
• Demonstrate Improved thermal- hydraulics 
o Apply modern CFD methods to simulation of electrically heated, sodium cooled, rod bundle 
experiments 
o Apply fine mesh CFD calculations to better represent and understand thermal-hydraulics in 
fast reactors and use results as basis for reduced hot-channel factors  
o Perform simplified experiments to validate CFD turbulence models for sodium coolant 
Mid to Longer-term Goals 
• Develop algorithms for, and perform, high-fidelity coupled neutronics, thermal-hydraulics, 
mechanics calculations to further understand passive safety and reduce design margin 
• Develop and demonstrate improved formalism for validation,  uncertainty characterization, and 
propagation 
• Complete soil-structure coupling framework and perform SSI analysis 
• Incorporate existing mechanical response models 
• Experiment with higher-order T-H/neutronics coupling as necessary 
• Simulate range of passive safety scenarios on full core geometries 
• Demonstrate improve models and codes for ex-core components of the primary system and 
balance of plant 
• Develop advanced multiphysics solution algorithms and mesh generation 
• Develop advanced multiphase CFD methods 
• Implement capability for integrated assessment and optimization of the entire fast reactor plant 
7.4.3 Separations Technologies 
Modeling of a separations process involves many complicated steps, each of which requires knowledge of 
several areas of physics, chemistry, or engineering. Fuel disassembly involves mechanical processes 
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(chopping, and filtering) and/or chemical dissolution in strong acid. The fuel solution is then passed 
through many stages of solvent extraction in order to separate several fission product and actinide 
streams. Several separate, solvent extraction processes are required to accomplish this separation, each 
using different additives and components in the organic phase, as well as different acid concentrations in 
the aqueous phase. Safety considerations require monitoring of volatile fission product and organic 
gaseous releases, careful evaluation of component inventories in each stage and even in piping, to avoid 
costly shutdowns or repairs which must be performed remotely, strict attention to nuclear criticality safety 
in actinide solutions with widely varying component inventories, and control systems which are based on 
realistic models of processes, not generalizations or even intelligent assumptions. The hazards of plant 
operation involve radioactive materials, toxic materials, strong acids, highly flammable materials, and 
highly volatile materials. Thus, detailed accounting of all components through all process stages is of 
utmost importance. 
Current reprocessing models provide only qualitative descriptions of process behavior. Empirical models 
of chemical behavior for major components are used to provide overall descriptions of various 
reprocessing strategies. These empirical models are based on benchtop experiments, and usually assume 
chemical equilibrium conditions are met instantly. Even then, current models are unable to answer many 
questions involving phase equilibria, such as precipitation from solution or determining oxidation states, 
where multiple possibilities exist. Very few reaction rate constants are known, and wherever transient 
conditions are simulated, they are usually just assumed or selected heuristically.  
Hence, in order to support both detailed design and safe operation, the improvement of models for 
separations processes requires improved chemistry modeling, including both equilibria and kinetics. New 
fuel materials and requirements arising from nonproliferation concerns demand the use of modern 
sophisticated modeling tools for the design and optimization of a process consisting of several major 
steps, each of which presents its own chemical and physical complexity. None of these steps is adequately 
simulated in a production sense, and some require experimentation to understand or confirm their 
chemical behavior. Advanced simulation can be used to help understand and optimize these processes, as 
well as integrate their behavior into the overall model. Added value can come from the optimization of 
the fuel cycle as a whole, and the possibility of detecting diversions, criticality problems, or possible 
effluent composition deviations outside specifications. 
In addition to improved chemistry, additional elements of separations systems must be modeled which are 
currently not even considered. Fluid dynamics must be considered in piping as well as in process 
equipment. Effects of control systems on component inventories, and vice versa, are necessary to 
adequately understand inventories throughout the plant. Interfaces with nuclear criticality calculations are 
important for both design and safe operation. Balance-of-plant modeling (such as volatile releases to the 
environment) must be included. It is essential that computer codes be flexible, adaptable, and modular. 
They must not only be compatible with other codes which perform related or concurrent calculations, but 
they must be designed to function within larger systems of codes. 
Below are examples of short term milestones and mid to long term goals.  Details here will depend on an 
actual budget.  The work here is further broken down to aqueous separations and pyroprocessing. 
 Aqueous Separations 
Short-term Milestones  
• Develop tools to predict thermodynamic properties and kinetic data for actinides and fission 
products to improve aqueous separations predictions 
• Demonstrate initial CFD code for centrifugal contactors including multi-phase flows and 
turbulence 
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• Develop separations plant mass balance using yield predictor models to support cost and 
proliferation risk reduction goals 
The validation experiments would be conducted in the following four areas: 
• Obtain partitioning data and kinetic data for U, TRU, Cs, Tc, Eu and Nd to validate test model 
• Obtain three phase data for centrifugal contactors to validate the CFD code predictions 
• Obtain data for auxiliary units to determine values needed for yield predictor model to obtain a 
full mass balance for the process 
• Complete coupled end-to-end test from receipt of LWR fuel through remote production of 
actinide-bearing (particularly americium and curium) fuels samples for in-reactor testing 
Mid and Longer-term Goals 
• Develop tools to predict thermodynamic properties and kinetic data for all actinides and fission 
products to improve aqueous separations predictions 
• Develop CFD modules for unit operations were hydraulics and solids handling are critical for 
plant performance and reliability 
• Full-scale simulation of the plant to increase the accuracy and confidence of calculations used 
for cost and proliferation risk reduction goals 
The validation experiments would be conducted in the following areas: 
• Refine and improve calibration of multiphase flow modeling and reaction kinetics 
• Integrate molecular-level simulation into advanced solvent extraction contactor simulation 
• Demonstrate advanced codes for priority processes 
• Continue auxiliary instrumented experimentation in support of modeling and simulation 
• Simulation-driven scale-up design and optimization of contactors for multi-stage, multi-feed, 
solvent extraction 
Pyroprocessing 
Short-term Milestones  
• Electrochemical Cells 
o Initial framework for integrated electrochemical cell simulation capturing salient cell 
phenomena for electrorefining and electroreduction processes 
o Map current distribution in cell 
o Identify concentration of ionic species in electrolyte, at anode and at cathode 
o Elucidate process reaction kinetics 
o Requires parallel computing resources are for efficient solution of coupled nonlinear partial 
differential equations in three dimensional space and time 
• Thermodynamic Properties 
o Initial model development describing thermodynamic activity of relevant species based on 
measured or predicted data 
o Build corresponding thermochemistry database to support model development 
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• Transport Properties 
o Review and evaluate existing correlation models for relevant transport properties 
o Develop initial model from review to predict transport parameters 
• Reaction Mechanisms 
o Evaluate and adapt existing electron transfer reaction mechanisms for electrorefining 
process 
o Develop initial framework for electron transfer reaction mechanisms occurring in 
electroreduction 
The validation experiments for Predictive Model and Cell Simulation Validation would be conducted in 
the following areas: 
• Electrorefining and electroreduction cell fabrication and testing to validate simulation 
• Determine diffusion coefficients of relevant species in molten salt systems 
• Activity coefficient measurements in molten salt systems 
• Electron transfer reaction kinetic studies 
• Evaluate effects of “side” reactions on electrochemical systems to 
Mid and Longer-Goals 
• Electrochemical Cells 
o Detailed  framework for an integrated electrochemical cell simulation capable of accurately 
following all salient cell phenomena 
o Electrorefiner cell model that simulates complex solid formation at electrode 
o Electroreduction cell model that simulates gas evolution at anode and phase conversion at 
cathode 
• Thermodynamics 
o Accurate predictive model for thermodynamic properties of species important to 
pyrochemical systems 
• Transport Properties 
o High fidelity model describing transport properties in molten salt systems including ion – 
ion interactions via molecular dynamics and other simulation systems 
• Reaction Mechanisms 
o Final model describing electron transfer reaction mechanism for electrorefining process 
o Detailed framework for electron transfer reaction mechanisms for occurring in 
electroreduction 
7.4.4 Waste Management and Advanced Waste Forms 
The success of the GNEP initiative would mean that a very different incoming waste stream could be sent 
to a geologic repository than the waste stream (mostly commercial LWR spent fuel) currently planned  
This new waste steam, consisting mainly of fission-product wastes from recycling, will ultimately require 
that a repository be analyzed for the purposes of compliance with NRC regulations, and perhaps have its 
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design tailored to take advantage of the significantly reduced loadings (heat loading, mass loading, and 
much shorter overall half lives) that the new waste stream would represent. 
7.5 Crosscutting Technologies 
Modeling and simulation of advanced nuclear fuel cycles will require a hierarchy of models of vastly 
different physical systems across a wide range of space-time scales, from detailed molecular dynamics of 
new materials to systems level simulation of the entire cycle. The final goal will be optimization in the 
presence of modeling and input uncertainty in order to design safe, reliable, economical, and socially 
acceptable end-to-end solutions for nuclear energy production. While there have been many advances in 
fundamental enabling technologies in mathematics and computer science in the past, additional research 
and development will undoubtedly be required to tackle a problem of this scale. This will be done in close 
collaboration with the DOE’s Office of Science 
At each level, new enabling technologies will be required in order to enhance predictive capability, 
understand and propagate uncertainties, model unresolved physics, and couple multiple physical models 
at a wide range of space-time scales. Likewise, new research and development is required to analyze, 
visualize, and optimize the results of such large simulations and to do so in a way that is useful to 
designers and decision makers who must be fully aware of the limitations of the computational 
predictions and the uncertainties inherent in the simulated results due to the inevitable uncertainties of 
input parameters and modeling assumptions. Associated with this is the stringent need to establish careful 
protocols for simulation code verification (are you solving the model correctly?) and validation (does the 
model represent reality?). These tools must be uniformly accessible within an integrated computational 
environment that reduces time-to-simulation, provides compatible geometry representations, and allows 
for a hierarchy of model fidelity running on workstations to state-of-the-art parallel computer 
architectures. 
Finally, continued research and development of new high performance computer architectures and 
systems software are required to meet the future needs of this initiative where first-principle simulations 
of fuel cycle elements are combined for system-level simulation and optimization under uncertainty.  
7.5.1 Multi-physics Coupling 
Predictive simulation of each process within the GNEP fuel cycle requires accurate solutions to multiple, 
simultaneous nonlinear physical processes. Traditional simulation approaches to this problem involve 
segmented solution techniques whereby the simultaneous physics are assumed to proceed in a sequential, 
loosely-coupled manner. Such a solution approach is not nonlinearly consistent, is prone to numerical 
errors (particularly sensitive to time step size), and in some cases does not even converge (exhibits zeroth 
order errors). Such an approach is in general not predictive. A fully-coupled, nonlinearly-consistent multi-
physics time integration algorithm, such as that offer by Jacobian-free Newton-Krylov algorithms, solves 
this problem. Multi-physics coupling efforts will also provide common computational tools and interface 
structures, through executables and/or modules, to unite the varied temporal and spatial discretizations of 
each physics package to provide a consistent basis for analysis and information propagation. These 
products and interfaces will be used by facility designers to integrate multiple state-of-the-art physics 
simulation packages to provide a generalized coupling. The extensive R&D results conducted in the DOE 
ASC and DOE/NSF SciDAC programs will be examined and may provide a coupling mechanism for 
facility-specific research. This work will not only payoff in more accurate, predictive simulation results, 
but in many cases result in increased efficiency (time to solution) by virtue of being able to take a larger 
integration time step per given level of desire temporal accuracy. 
The algorithmic and software coupling of multiple physics modules and codes will provide analysis 
capabilities for the design, construction, and operation of near-term facilities (short- and intermediate-
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term objectives) and must integrate the current best-in-class, qualified simulation tools. However, 
utilizing high-performance computational systems, high-fidelity simulation packages may be tightly-
coupled to provide a fully-integrated facility simulation that will provide substantial impact on the 
viability of commercial-scale facilities. Associated strategies for Multi-physics Coupling include: 
• Utilizing and developing advanced computational algorithms for fully-coupled, nonlinearly-
consistent multi-physics time integration techniques 
• Providing the improved algorithms via standardized software interfaces for the communication 
of information from each physics package 
• Developing generalized interpolation, integration, extrapolation routines to ensure 
compatibility of solution with different geometric representations and time-scales 
• Integrating tightly-coupled physics packages into a unified module to provide an efficient 
solution on high-performance computing architectures. 
7.5.2 Optimization and Confidence Analysis 
Sensitivity analysis is used to determine the change in a computed result due to a change in some input 
parameter used in the calculation. When this sensitivity information is combined with knowledge of input 
data uncertainties, the standard deviation in the computed result can be determined. Sensitivity and 
uncertainty (S/U) analysis will be an important component in the Modeling and Simulation program, not 
only for performing methods/data V&V studies, but also for certifying that a proposed system design 
satisfies all performance and safety specifications. This is especially significant for GNEP because the 
proposed reactor and fuel processing/reprocessing systems have not been previously characterized by 
measurements. Specifically, S/U methods can provide the following types of information:  
• Improved physical insight into the underlying phenomena governing the system of interest, by 
indicating relationships between variables. This is often useful for guiding design modifications 
and interpreting hypothetical accident scenarios. 
• Realistic, best-estimate design margins that can reduce the tolerances obtained from bounding-
analysis. 
• Quantitative ranking of important modeling/data parameters that impact the calculated results. 
This analysis can identify major sources of uncertainties and can determine the required 
measurement accuracy in the input data necessary to achieve a desired accuracy in the 
computed results. 
• Rapid (but approximate) evaluation of how design perturbations affect computed output 
parameters. This can be coupled to a system optimization algorithm. 
Although developed most extensively for criticality safety and reactor physics analysis, sensitivity 
techniques can also be applied to other types of calculations needed in the overall GNEP program, 
including shielding evaluations for reactors, reprocessing, and transportation systems, fuel depletion 
studies of actinide burning, core lifetime, and proliferation indicators, ex-core fuel cycle parameters such 
as source term activities/decay heat, and safety analysis involving reactor kinetics with thermal hydraulics 
feedback. 
Several techniques have been previously developed for S/U analysis of the above types of calculations. 
Among these are deterministic methods based on perturbation theory or automated differentiation 
methods, and stochastic techniques based on perturbation theory or statistical sampling of the model. The 
different approaches each have advantages and disadvantages, so that in practice a combination of the 
methods may be necessary for a given application. Regardless of the approach, a number of significant 
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challenges must be addressed. The S/U methods should be able to address 3D system designs, possibly 
with multi-physics coupling. Time-dependent problems for core burnup and kinetics, as well as 
radioactive waste transmutation, must be addressed. Nonlinearities can cause problems with first-order 
perturbation theory methods. An efficient technique to address distributed output parameters (in space or 
time) must be developed. A realistic collection of uncertainties in data describing neutron and photon 
interactions, radioactive decay/emission, thermal hydraulic properties, and possibly mechanical properties 
must be assembled. In spite of these serious difficulties, the required S/U methods for the simulation and 
modeling program should be tractable, since considerable expertise has been gained through previous 
work. 
7.6 Cost Estimates and Milestones 
Table 13. Modeling and Simulation Cost Estimates* 
Cost Estimates ($M) 
Activities FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 
Modeling and Simulation 9 53 100 100 100 100 
Long-term R&D Total 9 53 100 100 100 100 
* Funding reflects only DOE-NE contribution.  
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Table 14. Modeling and Simulation Milestones  
Milestones Date 
FY07 
Complete simulations of heat transport and oxygen diffusion coupled with 
thermal expansion in UO2 fuels with metal cladding 
September 2007 
Complete models of thermo-mechanical properties and phase stability of metal 
fuels 
September 2007 
Status report on oxide model development for SE2 September 2007 
Report on uncertainty quantification for selected ATWS sequences September 2007 
Status report on multiphysics coupling algorithms and their application to nuclear 
reactor simulation 
September 2007 
FY08 
Elicit, analyze, validate, and document the GNEP business (why) and functional 
(what) requirements for all Modeling and Simulation activities. The M&S 
requirements should reflect and be constrained by the design and deployment 
schedule for the CFTC, the ABR, and the AFCF.  
December 2007 
GNEP System Level Planning Tool Design Document  September 2008 
Formal software releases in support of ABR design studies September 2008 
FY09 
M&S tools (legacy and developing) directly supporting the ABR will be 
identified, qualified through V&V assessments, and placed under configuration 
control in conformance with a QA plan.  
December 2008 
M&S tools (legacy and developing) directly supporting the UREX+ CFTC will be 
identified, qualified through V&V assessments, and placed under configuration 
control in conformance with a QA plan.  
December 2008 
M&S tools (legacy and developing) directly supporting the AFCF will be 
identified, qualified through V&V assessments, and placed under configuration 
control in conformance with a QA plan.  
December 2008 
Formal V&V assessment of ABR software  March 2009 
Initial GNEP System Level Planning Tool 1.0.  September 2009 
Formal software releases for ABR design studies  September 2009 
FY10 
Demonstration of simulation capabilities for ABR  December 2009 
GNEP System Level Planning Tool 2.0.  June 2010 
FY11 
GNEP System Level Planning Tool 3.0.  March 2011 
FY12 
GNEP System Level Planning Tool 4.0  September 2012 
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8.0 International Safeguards and Proliferation Risk Reduction 
This section of the GNEP Technology Development Plan discusses actions to address technical and 
regulatory aspects of the application of IAEA safeguards at the three planned GNEP facilities 
(Consolidated Fuel Treatment Facility, CFTC; Advanced Burner Reactor, ABR; and Advanced Fuel 
Cycle Facility, AFCF). It also anticipates future requirements related to IAEA safeguards of the 
anticipated future expansion of nuclear energy, including full-scale GNEP system deployment. While the 
initial three GNEP facilities will be built in the U.S., which as a nuclear weapon state does not pose a risk 
of host-state proliferation, the international safeguards actions discussed below are also “forward looking” 
and anticipate the IAEA safeguards challenges that construction of GNEP facilities in non-nuclear 
weapon states (NNWS) would pose.  
The planning horizon of this document focuses on activities to be carried out over the next five years and 
in particular activities to address critical international safeguards needs in support of GNEP facilities and 
the Secretary’s decision in June 2008 on path forward for GNEP. NNSA is developing a GNEP 
Nonproliferation Program Plan that will address a much broader set of near and long-term policy needs 
associated with GNEP, including international outreach and technical collaboration. The NNSA plan will 
thus provide a nonproliferation context for the narrower set of activities described below. 
8.1 Objectives 
8.1.1 Support Secretarial Decision in 2008 
In order for the Secretary to evaluate whether to proceed with proposed GNEP facilities, it will be 
necessary to demonstrate that the enabling technologies for GNEP (materials separation, fast reactors, and 
recycling) can be implemented in a manner that satisfies IAEA safeguards goals and requirements. In 
order to provide such assurances, NNSA would participate fully in the design and development of the 
three GNEP facilities (CFTC, AFCF, and ABR). Such early involvement would enable NNSA to evaluate 
international safeguards approaches to the three facilities and identify areas of safeguards method and 
technology development to proceed past CD-1. Full participation with GNEP facility design teams would 
also enable the GNEP facilities to achieve an optimal balance between design concepts, physical 
protection arrangements, and international safeguards approaches.  
8.1.2 Tailor IAEA safeguards approaches to CFTC, AFCF, and ABR 
In the near-term, GNEP will seek to apply best practices, proven techniques and state-of-the-art 
measurement technologies and instrumentation to meet the requirements for international safeguards at 
the three facilities. Through involvement in the design process for GNEP facilities, modeling and 
simulation, and adaptation of current safeguards instrumentation, safeguards experts will be able to 
identify material balance areas and key measurement points for material accounting and monitoring as 
well as install needed equipment and capabilities.  
8.1.3 Advance the Safeguards “State of the Art” 
GNEP will provide an important opportunity to advance the safeguards “state-of-the-art” through 
demonstrating the use of advanced simulation and modeling techniques, developing improved process 
monitoring measures, and developing the next generation of techniques and instruments for materials 
measurement and analysis as well as containment/surveillance. The three GNEP facilities, and in 
particular the AFCF, will serve as test beds for advanced safeguards methods and instrumentation under 
real-world operating conditions. The successful demonstration of these systems and approaches will, in 
turn, provide the IAEA with proven approaches to ensure the safeguardability of GNEP facilities and 
technologies under consideration for export to a non-nuclear weapon state (NNWS).  
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8.1.4 Fulfill International Agreements 
Under the U.S.-IAEA Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/288), all U.S. nuclear facilities, except those 
involved in national security activities, are eligible for IAEA safeguards. Early determination of whether 
individual GNEP facilities will be added to the list of U.S. nuclear facilities that are eligible for IAEA 
safeguards will enable planning for IAEA safeguards at the individual facility to begin early in the design 
stages of the facilities. It is assumed that the GNEP facilities will be placed on the U.S. eligible facilities 
list (EFL), except where, upon careful analysis, implementation of IAEA safeguards can be expected to 
disclose activities or information of direct national security significance. Any such determination would 
be specific to the particular location of the facility, and the activity/information could be of current direct 
national security significance or a legacy of past national security operations at the selected location. The 
IAEA may, at its discretion, select one or more of the GNEP facilities that are on the EFL for actual 
IAEA safeguards and inspection. More detailed discussion of the procedures associated with placing a 
facility on the EFL can be found in the NNSA GNEP Nonproliferation Program Plan.  
The GNEP fuel processing and fabrication facilities that are envisioned share similarities with fuel 
facilities that the IAEA now safeguards, but present many additional and unique challenges. Therefore, it 
is expected that developing IAEA safeguard approaches will require very thoughtful and iterative 
development. Accordingly, NNSA will begin work on these approaches at the conceptual design stages of 
the GNEP facilities, and begin engagement of the IAEA in discussions about IAEA safeguards for these 
facilities, well in advance of the time when the IAEA would finalize its facility selection decisions.  
8.1.5 Build Support for GNEP 
Early U.S. acceptance and demonstration of IAEA safeguards for U.S. GNEP facilities will promote U.S. 
objectives by demonstrating that GNEP can facilitate the expansion of nuclear energy while reducing the 
overall proliferation risk associated with civil nuclear facilities. Such a demonstration will likely be 
critical in building international support for GNEP. 
Over the long term, demonstration of effective safeguard approaches at U.S. GNEP facilities will also 
help create the pathway for predictable and reliable fuel assurances. Successful implementation of reliable 
fuel assurances is a necessary element for the success of GNEP. Retransfers of U.S.-origin spent fuel to 
third parties that would use GNEP-type processing technologies for processing U.S.-origin spent fuel will 
require U.S. prior consent. Sec 131 of the Atomic Energy Act sets out the factors that the U.S. must take 
into account in deciding whether to grant such prior consent, including the adequacy of international 
safeguards as provided for in the applicable Agreement for Cooperation.  
8.2 Assumptions 
8.2.1 IAEA Safeguards vs. Domestic Safeguards and Security 
In discussing safeguards and security, it is critical to distinguish “domestic” safeguards and security, and 
the risks they address, from IAEA or “international” safeguards and the host-state nuclear proliferation 
risk that they address. Within GNEP, there is a corresponding division of labor within DOE for domestic 
and international safeguards. “Domestic” safeguards include both physical security measures (i.e. guards, 
gates, and guns as well as facility design features) and domestic material control and accountability 
(MC&A) measures designed to detect and deter the loss or theft of nuclear materials or acts of 
radiological sabotage by sub-state actors. “International” safeguards refer to efforts by the IAEA to detect 
state-level diversion of nuclear materials by independently monitoring and verifying declarations 
regarding nuclear facility operations and nuclear materials inventories. IAEA safeguards do not include 
physical protection, which remains a host-state responsibility. NA-24 retains primary responsibility for 
international (IAEA) safeguards, whereas NE is responsible for implementing domestic safeguards.  
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The IAEA has its own set of requirements for its safeguards. Whether DOE safeguards and requirements 
in the 470 series of DOE Orders or NRC safeguards and security requirements in 10 CFR 73 (security) 
and 74 (MC&A) will be the basis for the domestic safeguards and security approaches implemented by 
NE at the GNEP facilities would depend largely on whether those facilities will be licensed by DOE or 
the NRC.  
As a nuclear weapon state (NWS), operation of GNEP facilities within the U.S. does not pose a risk of 
proliferation, properly defined as the diversion of nuclear materials or the misuse of a facility by the host 
state (in this case the U.S.) to acquire the nuclear materials needed to produce nuclear weapons. The 
domestic safeguards and security systems that will be developed and implemented at the U.S. GNEP 
facilities will address the risks of theft or diversion of nuclear materials from these facilities by a non-
state adversary or “insider” (e.g., a member of the plant operating staff), and the risks of acts of 
radiological sabotage by a non-state adversary. IAEA safeguards for these facilities will build upon 
domestic safeguards systems, and provide for independent IAEA verification of nuclear material 
accountancy at the facilities.  
As a result, although domestic safeguards and security are separate and distinct from IAEA safeguards, 
one objective of the NNSA-led IAEA safeguards development effort will be to ensure that IAEA 
safeguards considerations are fully considered in developing domestic safeguards and security approaches 
for the three initial plants. NNSA will have a role for each of the three facility design teams and in the 
domestic safeguards and security development teams to promote the integration of IAEA safeguards 
considerations into the overall design and design optimization efforts for the three GNEP facilities. This, 
in turn, will provide a basis for developing IAEA safeguards approaches that are ready for use as these 
facilities are commercially deployed in various countries. 
8.2.2 Regulatory Requirements   
This plan assumes that U.S. GNEP facilities will be eligible for IAEA safeguards under the U.S.-IAEA 
Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/288), except where it is found that implementation of IAEA safeguards 
would reveal national security activities, and that the IAEA will select one or more of these facilities for 
safeguards. In addition, the ability to use these facilities as test beds and demonstration facilities for 
advanced approaches to safeguards, security, and proliferation risk reduction suggests that potential future 
domestic regulatory or international guidelines should also be anticipated in the design of GNEP 
facilities. 
As noted earlier, if the facilities are built and operated under DOE Orders, then the DOE 470 series of 
Orders would establish the domestic safeguards and security requirements that must be met at the 
facilities. NNSA, as provided in Order 142.2, would be responsible for implementation of IAEA 
safeguards at these facilities, and would have the lead in developing and negotiating safeguards 
approaches that would be implemented if the IAEA selects the facility.  
Adding specific GNEP facilities to the U.S. EFL is the first step in planning for IAEA safeguards at those 
facilities, since the IAEA must first select individual facilities on the EFL for actual implementation of 
safeguards to take place. Planning for safeguards on those GNEP facilities that are placed on the EFL 
would entail a number of activities: 
• Incorporate IAEA safeguards considerations into facility designs in a manner consistent with 
the safeguards by design philosophy and draw upon the results of international safeguards 
systems development presented in Section 3.0 of this plan 
• Engage the IAEA on possible selection of one or more of the U.S. facilities, including resolving 
such matters as whether the U.S. or the IAEA incurs the costs of those safeguards 
• Develop facility design information to submit to the IAEA  
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• Develop an overall IAEA safeguards approach to the facility to guide negotiation of the 
applicable Facility Attachment with the IAEA 
• Support actual safeguards implementation at those facilities that the IAEA has selected for 
inspection.  
In addition, it will be necessary to determine how U.S. legal and regulatory obligations to protect 
Restricted Data and Sensitive Nuclear Technology from disclosure to foreign persons, including IAEA 
inspectors, affect the IAEA safeguards approaches that are developed.  
Finally, it will be necessary to determine whether the IAEA or the U.S. will pay for implementation of 
IAEA safeguards at any GNEP facilities that the IAEA selects. Since the U.S. is a nuclear weapon state, it 
does not pose a proliferation risk. On the other hand, GNEP involves developing a next generation of fuel 
processing facilities and reactors, some of which might be built in NNWS where the IAEA is responsible 
for verification of a state’s obligations under the NPT and the Additional Protocol. In addition, GNEP 
offers an opportunity to demonstrate new safeguards technologies that will be of material interest to the 
IAEA.  
8.3 Proliferation Risk Reduction Assessment 
The GNEP Program will develop standards for proliferation risk reduction that will guide the design and 
operation of both individual systems/facilities and the overall GNEP architecture. The standards will then 
be used to guide the design and operation of GNEP from the perspective of proliferation risk reduction 
and physical protection. Both proliferation risk (PR) (host state diversion) and physical protection (PP) 
(non-state adversary theft of nuclear material or radiological sabotage) have intrinsic and extrinsic 
components that together provide a given level of robustness of a particular system. If goals exist for PR 
and PP, then design and operational features can be developed and introduced to meet these goals. This 
kind of assessment is necessarily a holistic assessment of vulnerabilities of a given system or facility to 
actions by both the host state and non-state actors, and of how to strengthen “system responses” to reduce 
the associated risks. This analysis takes into account many factors including facility design features, 
multiple attributes of nuclear material attractiveness, domestic and international safeguards and security 
measures, adversary pathways, etc. Effectively, the design and operations will be guided by the 
performance goals. Satisfying the goals may occur through various combinations of intrinsic and extrinsic 
features. There will, in fact, be interplay between the intrinsic and the extrinsic, and the overall balance 
would optimize cost effectiveness and efficiency.  
The work of the PR & PP Experts Group under the Generation IV International Forum is directly 
applicable to GNEP. This working group, which includes participants from several prospective GNEP 
partners as well as Euratom and the IAEA, is developing the appropriate measures and metrics for 
evaluating nuclear systems for PR & PP. Furthermore a systematic, rigorous methodology is being 
developed to evaluate the measures. The GIF PR & PP methodology can be adapted to GNEP needs and 
requirements.  
It will be beneficial to begin, at an early stage, assessments of proposed GNEP systems (AFCF, CFTC, 
ABR) with the PR & PP methodology. NNSA will lead this assessment, which will encompass a wide 
range of intrinsic and extrinsic measures for the initial GNEP facilities, including design features, 
domestic safeguards and security, and IAEA safeguards.  
8.4 Challenges in Meeting IAEA Safeguards Goals and Requirements for 
GNEP Facilities 
IAEA safeguards must confront a number of proliferation scenarios associated with peaceful nuclear 
energy production. Such scenarios include attempts by a state to acquire the necessary material for 
nuclear weapons through: 
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• Diversion of declared nuclear materials suitable for manufacturing nuclear weapons or 
improvised nuclear explosive devices; 
• Undeclared production of such materials within declared facilities; 
• Using knowledge obtained from peaceful facilities to establish undeclared parallel facilities to 
support a weapons program; or 
• Establishing latent capabilities for later use after abrogating nonproliferation commitments.  
GNEP seeks to establish a paradigm for nuclear power development and wide scale deployment subject to 
safeguards that minimize these risks. IAEA safeguards address the first two risks. GNEP would address 
the other risks by constraining the spread of sensitive technologies, promoting universal adherence to the 
Additional Protocol that would enhance IAEA access to nuclear sites, and establish the fundamental 
distinction between supplier states and those that decide to abstain from enrichment or reprocessing.  
8.5 Goals and Requirements 
The IAEA detection goal for Pu (not under IAEA seal) is: 
• During the annual Physical Inventory Verification, to have a 90% probability of detecting the 
diversion of 1 significant quantity (SQ) (8 kg); and 
• To have a 50% probability of detecting the diversion of 1 SQ of nuclear material within 1 
month of its diversion  
In addition, IAEA safeguards define the quantitative effectiveness of safeguards by the net uncertainty of 
the material accountancy that is a consequence of the entire MC&A system. Material accounting systems 
focus on the Inventory Difference (ID), which is the starting physical inventory (the input), plus additions 
to inventory (receipts), minus the known/authorized decreases from inventory (shipments), and the final 
physical inventory. The IAEA uses the term material unaccounted for (MUF) to refer to this inventory 
difference. The uncertainty associated with this MUF is the parameter used to measure the net uncertainty 
of material accountancy that is a consequence of the measurement uncertainty of the entire MC&A 
system. Under the IAEA safeguard system, the uncertainty associated with MUF is the essential 
quantitative measure of the safeguards effectiveness. To satisfy IAEA material accountancy requirements, 
the measurement uncertainty associated with estimation of the MUF at the closing of the material balance 
is 2.43 kg of Pu, which is an absolute number irrespective of the throughput of the plant. Under domestic 
safeguards, the measurement uncertainty for the inventory difference (the domestic term for MUF) is a 
very small percentage of the active inventory, so that the actual quantity of Pu this represents varies with 
facility throughput.  
The overall IAEA safeguards approach that NNSA will develop will involve other methods, such as 
process monitoring and advanced containment and surveillance. Process monitoring provides a 
mechanism to detect possible modifications to process chemistry or design that could create or conceal a 
diversion pathway (e.g., causing different chemical reactions than should take place and that would divert 
fissile material into process pathways from which it should be absent.) Advanced and redundant 
surveillance measures can verify the absence of plutonium from those pathways, thus providing additional 
verification that diversion along those pathways is not taking place. Containment and surveillance 
systems can ensure that plant operations are not bypassed.  
However, the existing IAEA safeguards protocols do not take quantitative credit for the contribution of 
these other measures, since they are not taken into account in calculating the uncertainty associated with 
the MUF. 
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At large bulk-handling facilities, meeting these goals requires that the IAEA implement some form of 
process monitoring, typically Near-Real-Time-Accountancy (NRTA), to meet timeliness requirements 
with the requisite degree of accuracy. The IAEA, if it applies safeguards to the CFTC, AFCF and follow-
on advanced reprocessing and pyroprocessing plants, will employ “solution measurement & monitoring 
systems” in part to facilitate NRTA and traditional accountancy, and in part to serve as a C/S system to 
determine if the plant has been modified or if operations do not conform to operator declarations. 
Depending on throughput and measurement capabilities for the various GNEP bulk handling facilities, the 
required measurement accuracy is anticipated to be very difficult to meet using existing equipment, and 
the IAEA may negotiate some additional measures under the facility attachment and safeguards approach. 
With this in mind, the IAEA safeguards approach for these facilities should be both creative 
(transformational) and extend the current state of the art. 
8.6 IAEA Significant Quantities, Conversion Times and Diversion 
Scenarios 
Table 15. Significant Quantities  
 Material 
Significant 
Quantity 
Safeguards 
Apply To: 
Pu (<80% Pu-238) 8 kg Total Element 
U-233 8 kg Total Isotope 
Direct-Use Nuclear Material* 
U [U-235≥ 20%] 25 kg U-235 Contained 
U[U-235<20%] 75 kg U-235 Contained 
Natural Uranium 10 t Total Element 
Depleted Uranium 20 t Total Element 
Indirect-Use Nuclear Material** 
Thorium 20 t Total Element 
* NM that can be converted into nuclear explosive components without transmutation or further enrichment 
** All NM except direct-use material 
 
Table 16. Conversion Times (Weaponization) 
Beginning Material Form Conversion Time 
Pu, HEU, or U-233 Metal Order of Days (7-10) 
PuO2, Pu(NO3)4, or other pure Pu compounds; HEU or U-233 oxide or other 
pure compounds; MOX or other non-irradiated pure mixtures containing Pu, U 
[(U-233+U-235)>/=20%; Pu, HEU and/or U-233 in scrap or other 
miscellaneous impure compounds 
Order of Weeks (1-3) 
Pu, HEU or U-233 in irradiated fuels Order of Months (1-3)
U containing <20% U-235 and U-233; Th Order of One Year 
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8.7 IAEA High Level Diversion Scenarios 
Abrupt Diversion: The immediate diversion of a significant quantity or greater in a short time (typically 
a conversion period: 2 weeks to 1 month). 
Protracted Diversion: The diversion of portions of a significant quantity over extended periods of time 
leading to a significant quantity or greater (typically an inventory period: 6 months – 1 year). 
Safeguards Approaches for GNEP Facilities 
The task of developing IAEA safeguards approaches for the initial three GNEP facilities will bring a 
facility-specific focus to IAEA safeguards work on advanced reprocessing and pyroprocessing that NNSA 
and NE have been funding in several national laboratories for the past several years. In addition, much of 
the instrumentation and C/S effort that NNSA has sponsored in support of developing a detailed IAEA 
safeguards concept for the Japanese reprocessing plant at Rokkasho-Mura will be transferable, with 
facility-specific tailoring, to the CFTC facility. Likewise, collaboration with Japan on an IAEA 
safeguards concept for the JMOX fuel fabrication plant located in Japan will generate technical results 
that can be applicable to the fuel fabrication module in AFCF. IAEA safeguards measures for the 
Japanese fast breeder reactors will be assessed for transferability to the ABR.  
There are areas where further development will be needed. These include, for example: 
• Safeguards technologies for pyroprocessing methods and other advanced reprocessing flow 
sheets 
• Gamma/neutron measurements of TRU materials 
• Gamma spectroscopy analysis codes that are better suited for TRU-type materials produced in 
advanced reprocessing facilities 
• Containment/surveillance capabilities, including thermal, laser, active/passive radio-frequency 
identification devices (RFIDs) 
• Authentication for data/equipment sharing between facility operator and IAEA inspector 
• Secure wireless communications between safeguard systems 
• Use of advanced simulation and modeling methods for process and facility design to optimize 
integration of IAEA safeguards as part of the overall design optimization process for a given 
facility. 
These are just some of the areas that must be addressed. As the design of the GNEP facilities progresses, 
we expect that our understanding of and approach to the IAEA safeguards challenges will be further 
refined. Indeed, this refinement process is one of the principal benefits to be gained from developing 
IAEA safeguard approaches for the three GNEP facilities, so that if such facilities are built in NNWS as 
GNEP evolves and commercial deployment begins, there will exist an effective IAEA safeguards 
approach for these kinds of plants.  
8.8 International Safeguards Approach for GNEP Facilities 
Role of GNEP Facilities 
Each of the three proposed GNEP facilities would contribute in different ways to achieving the overall 
policy goals of developing effective IAEA safeguards for the facilities, ensuring that an effective IAEA 
safeguards approach is developed in a time frame to support possible IAEA selection of the facility for its 
safeguards and inspection, ensuring that the IAEA has effective safeguards approaches for GNEP 
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facilities wherever they might be built, supporting consensus that GNEP reduces proliferation risk, and 
advancing the technical state of the art for IAEA safeguards.  
The CFTC would be an advanced separations facility to separate the components of spent fuel required by 
GNEP.  Its principal mission will be to demonstrate the advanced aqueous separations process on an 
engineering to commercial scale. As a facility that handles commercial spent fuel, the CFTC would be 
eligible for selection under the US-IAEA Voluntary Offer Agreement. If selected, it will be subject to 
international safeguards requirements. “Safeguards by design” will be a key aspect of the overall design 
of the CFTC in order to optimize safeguards effectiveness and to minimize the cost and operational 
impact.  This will include development of advanced safeguards approaches for a commercial-scale 
separations facility that uses the new GNEP separations process. Evaluations of CFTC for proliferation 
risk reduction must commence at the earliest practical time.  
The AFCF would have an even more significant role in the GNEP program for safeguards by design. 
Unlike the CFTC, which would involve one process flow sheet, the AFCF offers the opportunity to 
explore multiple process flow sheets and to consider and define optimized safeguards approaches to each. 
The AFCF’s flexibility is particularly well suited to support experimental and pilot-scale testing and 
validation of new safeguards systems and instrumentation. In addition, the AFCF project would include 
the development of advanced simulation and modeling tools for process and facility design and design 
optimization. This AFCF-related activity would offer NNSA an opportunity to use modeling and 
simulation methods to address IAEA safeguards for alternative flow sheets for advanced reprocessing and 
for pyroprocessing as well as fuel fabrication processes using the products of advanced reprocessing and 
pyroprocessing.  
The AFCF would also be specifically designed to accommodate the Transformational Intelligent 
Accounting and Control (TIMC) methodology, as described in the NNSA GNEP Nonproliferation 
Program Plan. The focus would be on the processing portion of the AFCF since it is the chemical 
separations activities where nuclear material changes form while in a highly radioactive state. The 
combination of change in chemical form, restricted access to the process material and high ambient 
background condition are a few of the challenges that must be overcome to provide accurate estimates of 
the nuclear material inventory that is necessary to meet the safeguards obligation.  
The ABR’s principle mission is to demonstrate actinide destruction using advanced transuranic fuels in 
liquid sodium cooled fast reactors. As the ABR is a burner rather than a breeder reactor, and is essentially 
an “item count” facility, the ABR offers an opportunity to similarly demonstrate safeguards by design 
approaches to such issues as verifying the absence of blanket assemblies, and to demonstrate technologies 
for containment and surveillance that would reduce the IAEA resource burden (measured in inspector-
days) for safeguarding this type of facility. If the ABR is collocated with the AFCF that would include a 
processing and fabrication module for handling the ABR fuel, there would also be an opportunity to 
demonstrate effective and efficient IAEA safeguards approaches for such co-located multi-facility 
complexes.  
8.9 Comprehensive Approach to Safeguards 
In general, both domestic and IAEA safeguards consist of three main elements: (1) traditional nuclear 
materials accountancy, including maintaining inventory records, taking actual physical inventories, and so 
forth; (2) more timely and sensitive safeguards measures (NRTA) that provide a nuclear inventory on a 
very short-term (e.g., daily) basis; and (3) process monitoring systems that provide timely indication of 
off-normal process operations that might indicate that diversion or undeclared production is taking place 
in the period between actual full physical inventories, and C/S measures. Both domestic and international 
systems rely on inspection and verification to ensure that systems are implemented properly and 
functioning correctly. 
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The GNEP facilities would offer test beds for improving these traditional safeguards capabilities through: 
• Integration of process monitoring systems into IAEA safeguards 
• Material monitoring systems to reduce measurement errors 
• Near real-time accountancy techniques for advanced reprocessing  flow sheets 
• Advanced C/S techniques to provide redundant IAEA safeguards system capabilities to verify 
the absence of plutonium from process streams that are consistent with facility declarations, for 
example. 
These improvements are part of a comprehensive approach to international safeguards for GNEP. Under 
this approach, NNSA will work with NE to ensure that IAEA safeguards considerations are fully 
integrated into facility and process design from the earliest facility conceptual design stages onwards, 
including taking full advantage of the use of process modeling and simulation tools, employing advanced 
measurement techniques and instrumentation, and data integration and evaluation. The elements of this 
comprehensive approach to safeguards for GNEP are summarized below.  
8.10 Modeling and Simulation 
Simulation-based design is broadly used in many industries as a proven, cost effective approach to 
complex design problems - such as those involving facilities containing nuclear processes. With respect to 
GNEP, simulations of facilities, material flows, processes, transportation, and other critical elements will 
provide information on potential diversion signatures and the necessary safeguards strategies, designs, 
and technologies to detect diversion. Simulations will also be used to develop instrumentation 
requirements and validate tools and data. In short, simulations of facility processes along with safeguards 
and security systems will allow for optimization of proliferation risk reduction features and detailed cost-
benefit analysis. While all GNEP facilities will benefit from this approach, there will be a priority effort 
to develop and apply this powerful tool to processing and fuel fabrication facilities. The advanced 
simulation and modeling program element in GNEP, and the use of these techniques associated with the 
AFCF facility, will offer a particularly valuable opportunity to work with the developers of the simulation 
and modeling codes to incorporate IAEA safeguards into these codes. This effort is essential to model the 
impact that IAEA safeguards has on process operations and to determine the IAEA safeguards 
effectiveness. 
8.11 Safeguards by Design 
In designing and implementing IAEA safeguards for GNEP facilities, early integration of advanced 
safeguards into the facility design process (“Safeguards by Design”) will minimize impact on operations, 
enhance efficiency of the safeguards system, and improve implementation of safeguards requirements to 
meet international standards and evolving safeguards demands. In short, “safeguards by design” produces 
a superior, more robust result at a reduced cost. 
Safeguards by design will also allow for the integration of safeguards, physical protection, and 
proliferation risk reduction. This is necessary because beneficial actions in any one of these areas can 
results in detrimental impacts in at least one of the other areas. For example, materials selected to enhance 
proliferation resistance by decreasing the level of attractiveness for weapons purposes may complicate 
safeguards measurements. Moreover, such materials could arguably be more attractive to sub-nationals 
who are interested in producing radiological dispersal devices. Safeguards by design will be accomplished 
by having IAEA safeguards experts assigned to GNEP facility design teams, from day one, as full and 
equal partners. NNSA will lead the IAEA safeguards development effort, and will have a role in the 
teams for domestic safeguards and security design to ensure an optimal balance among facility design, 
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safeguards approaches, and physical protection arrangements that is responsive to IAEA considerations. 
This integration will be a long term, iterative process essential to the success of the program.  
8.12 Advanced Measurement Technologies and Instrumentation 
Process monitoring for near real-time accounting (NRTA) includes the use of process data (flow rate, 
temperature, pressure, density, activity, isotopic distribution, etc.) at flow and inventory key measurement 
points (FKMPs and IKMPs) as well as Other Strategic Points (OSPs) to draw frequent conclusions on 
plant configurations, operations, and material flows/inventories at the level of a material balance area 
and/or process unit. These conclusions provide assurances that facility operations are as declared.  
In order to meet the verification objectives of the IAEA, several types of measurement and verification 
technologies are employed. These include non-destructive assay (NDA), analytical/destructive assay 
(DA), and containment/surveillance (C/S). 
• Nondestructive assay (NDA) refers to techniques that actively or passively interrogate 
emanations (neutron or gamma radiation, heat, etc.) from the material within a container and 
then extrapolate the material quantities of the contents of the entire container without opening 
the container or altering its contents. As a general rule, NDA is performed on entire process 
systems or containers, can be utilized on homogeneous or heterogeneous materials, and 
provides quicker measurements, but with higher total measurement uncertainty than destructive 
analysis (DA) for homogenous samples evenly distributed within a uniform matrix. Qualitative 
NDA provides information on the nuclear material type and location within the process system 
or waste container. Quantitative NDA provides an estimate of the mass for a specific isotope. 
As a result, additional information about material characteristics, obtained by destructive or 
other nondestructive measures, are often required. 
• Destructive assay (DA) involves analysis of a sample’s nuclear material content, isotope 
distribution, and/or other important attributes by methods that “destroy” (or more correctly, alter 
the composition of) the sample. The DA sample size can be smaller than the sample size for 
NDA, but it must be taken from homogenous material to be representative. DA measurements 
typically produce results with lower total measurement uncertainty, provided that the material 
sampled is homogenous. However, DA generally requires a longer turn-around time for results 
as well as specialized procedures and personnel protective equipment due to material handling 
requirements for sampling.  
• Containment/surveillance measures encompass a broad range of technologies to ensure that 
previously measured material in containers remains in place and unaltered and that containers or 
items containing material remain in designated and recorded locations or move along declared 
and authorized paths. C/S measures can range from seals, to devices that actively and passively 
certify locations of containers, to sensors that detect the proximity of materials in containers or 
items that move through processes. 
For process facilities, these measurement technologies are traditionally applied to the entry and exit 
points, feed and withdrawal locations, the processing systems, the waste streams, the output streams, and 
any associated material storage areas. For reactor facilities, measurements are applied to fresh fuel, the 
core, spent fuel, transfer processes, and waste disposition. Where necessary, various NDA, DA and C/S 
systems can be combined and networked to integrate an unattended and remote monitoring capability into 
the process system. 
Many GNEP processes, such as advanced reprocessing, pyroprocessing, and TRU fuel fabrication pose 
new challenges for international safeguards. In some cases, existing measurement techniques are directly 
applicable to the materials and conditions envisioned by the GNEP facilities (for example some of the 
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technologies currently employed at reprocessing facilities and spent fuel storage locations). In other 
instances, adaptation of current techniques will be required to specifically address unique material 
compositions and process environment of the GNEP facilities (radiation background, nuclide isotopic, 
etc).  
In addition, GNEP presents an opportunity to adapt, refine, and develop new measurement capabilities 
within the traditional technologies of NDA, DA and surveillance to achieve a significant improvement in 
the state of the art for international safeguards technologies for processing facilities in particular. 
Therefore, GNEP will adopt a three-phased approach to implement IAEA safeguards requirements: 
• In the near-term, GNEP will seek to apply best practices, proven techniques and state-of-the-art 
measurement technologies and instrumentation to meet the requirements for international 
safeguards at GNEP facilities. Safeguards experts will work with various design teams to gather 
information on planned processes and equipment and determine diversion detection sensitivities 
associated with conventional accounting techniques applied in normal facility operating modes. 
This information will be used to recommend material balance area structures for material 
accounting, identify additional key measurement points and process monitoring activities, and 
implement necessary measurement equipment and capabilities. The NNSA will leverage 
ongoing collaboration with international partners to identify IAEA safeguards methods and 
techniques that will provide a near-term direct benefit to the GNEP objective of proliferation 
risk reduction. Some IAEA safeguards methods and systems will be initially tested at advanced 
fuel cycle facilities outside of the U.S. with follow-up validation at the U.S. facilities once they 
are online. This approach will facilitate “safeguards by design” for the U.S. GNEP facilities. 
• In the mid-term, GNEP would seek to advance the safeguards state of the art through a 
development program to improve the precision, speed, sampling methods, and scope of nuclear 
process monitoring and accountancy measurements. Improved methods and instrumentation 
would be tested at the AFCF. These improvements will pay a high dividend in both process 
control and safeguards, as well as result in substantial cost savings. Once again, collaborative 
efforts with international partners would be leveraged to refine the IAEA safeguards systems 
through extension of existing safeguards cooperation agreements and negotiation of new 
agreements as is deemed necessary to advance the GNEP objectives. 
• In the long-term, as specific facility designs and operating modes evolve, evaluation of the 
materials types and characteristics, process equipment and components, fuel types and 
characteristics would be used to adapt existing measurement techniques and drive the need for 
additional development. Ultimately, GNEP would seek to develop intelligent monitoring and 
control systems to meet safeguards requirements. Where appropriate, advanced methods and 
techniques would be provided to international partners and to the IAEA to strengthen the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
8.13 Data Integration and Analysis 
Modern instruments and methods have made it possible to extract huge quantities of data from operating 
processes. For example, at the Rokkasho Reprocessing Plant in Japan, there are approximately one 
thousand sensors that monitor facility operations from the time that spent fuel arrives through its 
subsequent processing, product storage, and disposal through waste streams. This complex mix of sensors 
includes optical, radiation (destructive and non-destructive), mass, ultrasonic, pressure, level, 
temperature, infrared, load cell, magnetic switch, electronic seal, and volume sensors.  
All of these sensors must be integrated and analyzed in near real time to attempt to meet IAEA detection 
goals in a timely fashion. The IAEA methodology involves first validating sensor input to assure that the 
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data is authentic as well as investigating the potential for anomalies and their possible causes with the 
operator. This poses a special challenge because the IAEA must independently verify and authenticate 
operator data related to process monitoring, a standard practice in large throughput facilities. With a one-
month deadline on the determination of abrupt diversion, only rapid sensor data integration and analysis 
can accomplish this task. 
To support GNEP, international safeguards systems must therefore have the capabilities to: 
• Relay appropriate information to various organizational entities while at the same time meeting 
data security requirements 
• Rapidly investigate summary and raw data to unequivocally separate process upsets, 
maintenance problems, and calibration and component failures from actual diversion events 
• Securely archive data to support audit and inspection 
• Report data to IAEA inspectors and allow the IAEA to access or duplicate sufficient 
measurements to verify and authenticate reported results, while at the same time protecting 
proprietary information, sensitive nuclear technology, restricted data, and/or other export 
controlled information.  
In an effort to address the challenges mentioned above, GNEP will seek to develop a Transformational 
Intelligent Monitoring and Control (TIMC) system based on “best in class” intelligent data analysis and 
security systems developed and applied in other applications (such as intelligent supervisory control and 
data acquisition systems (iSCADA) and intelligent process control systems (iPCS)). TIMC will also build 
on developments in information operations and security, advanced secure data acquisition and 
transmission, and advanced modeling and control algorithms to develop innovative methods, systems and 
technologies for plant and material monitoring. A focus will be to feed transformational information 
analyses, control systems, and cyber security and monitoring into the design of the process. This will 
allow optimizing the design of instrumentation systems, plant layout, and cost-benefit, through extracting 
maximum knowledge from the combined, synthesized data.  
The design of these systems will be carried out jointly with the development of advanced measurement 
techniques and instrumentation. This approach will allow for the exploitation of intrinsic features and 
signatures associated with a given nuclear process and/or material to provide data that can be quickly 
synthesized into safeguards knowledge while increasing cost effectiveness, assessment fidelity and 
accuracy. The approach may also provide additional security features to guard against the negative effects 
of possible abrogation of safeguards agreements. 
NNSA will participate in the development of these advanced information management systems to identify 
and pursue their application to IAEA safeguards for the facilities. GNEP will utilize the most modern 
tools to marry the states of the art in information technology, cyber security, and communications with a 
systems level approach to process monitoring and safeguards. GNEP will leverage the work performed 
for intelligent systems to monitor plants for domestic purposes to address specific IAEA safeguards-
related applications and issues regarding independent IAEA authentication and validation of signals and 
data from such domestic process monitoring systems. 
8.14 International Outreach and Engagement 
International cooperation in IAEA safeguards-related areas will be an important element of the activities 
discussed in this section of the roadmap. In particular, NNSA will pursue collaborations with 
international partners, including under the framework of the U.S.-Russia Civil Nuclear Energy Working 
Group, which offers opportunities to engage Russia on many of the safeguards areas outlined above.  In 
addition, NNSA will utilize existing bilateral Safeguards Cooperation Agreements (SCAs) with important 
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international partners to advance the global partnership objective of GNEP. The International Nuclear 
Safeguards and Engagement Program (INSEP) have eleven SCAs in effect. These SCAs are legal 
agreements for collaboration on international safeguards technologies (i.e., material control and 
accountability, physical protection, secure communications, containment and surveillance, environmental 
sampling, etc.) that provide an opportunity to integrate state of the art IAEA safeguards technologies into 
the design of the U.S. GNEP facilities. Collaboration on many of the advanced technologies needed for 
the GNEP facilities currently being conducted under the SCAs or broader government-to-government 
agreements on the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. In addition, INSEP has Sister Laboratory 
arrangements in place with many international partners that may be end-users of the GNEP product. 
These arrangements are non-binding agreements that advance the peaceful nuclear infrastructure of a state 
to support deployment of small reactors. INSEP currently has eight Sister Laboratory arrangements in 
place.  
International cooperation will be carefully coordinated to address export control and classification issues. 
These issues are currently addressed under the auspices of the Safeguards Cooperation Agreements, Sister 
Laboratory Arrangements and other government-to-government agreements such as the Peaceful Uses of 
Nuclear Technology agreement with advanced fuel cycle partners and small reactor end-users. NNSA will 
provide policy and technical support to GNEP to determine how to adequately protect proprietary 
information from disclosure to international inspectors, as well as Sensitive Nuclear Technology and/or 
Restricted Data where and if such are present, and other export controlled information. 
Finally, GNEP will include outreach to other global partners, including universities, for the purposes of 
demonstration and training. Outreach will provide a well-informed community of basic scientists and 
engineers, educators, and political scientists to interface with the general industry, government and the 
general population, to achieve a common perspective of GNEP. Such common perception is critical to 
long-term GNEP success. In addition, outreach will help develop the next generation of scientists and 
engineers trained in nuclear safeguards, security, and the many other disciplines required for expanded 
global use of nuclear energy in an environment of multi-national confidence with regards to the general 
reduction of proliferation risk. These professionals will do the work of GNEP in the future, providing 
safeguards and security advocacy and expertise for evolving nuclear technologies as well as a cadre of 
trained inspectors. These scientists and professionals will provide an avenue for developing a ‘safeguards’ 
culture for GNEP that is similar to the ‘safety’ and ‘security’ cultures that are essential elements of 
effective nuclear energy policy. 
8.15 Cost Estimates and Milestones 
 
Table 17. Cost Estimates for International Safeguards and Proliferation Risk Reduction 
Cost Estimates ($M) 
Activities FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 
Participate in GNEP facility design 
teams [Safeguards by Design] 
0.2 2.0 TBD TBD TBD TBD 
Advanced Safeguards Technology 
and Approaches 
0.3 2.5 TBD TBD TBD TBD 
International Collaboration 0.7 1.2 TBD TBD TBD TBD 
Proliferation Risk Reduction 
Assessment 
0.9 2.5 TBD TBD TBD TBD 
       
Total 2.1 8.2 TBD TBD TBD TBD 
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Table 18. International Safeguards and Proliferation Risk Reduction Milestones 
Milestones Date 
Fully staff GNEP facility design teams with laboratory and headquarters 
safeguards experts 
2007 
Support development of “safeguards by design” approach to GNEP facilities 2007 
Participate in the physical protection design process for GNEP facilities 2007 
Expand GEN-IV and INPRO work on Proliferation Risk Reduction 2007 
Conduct proliferation and security risk reduction analyses for GNEP 
technologies 
2008 
Develop proliferation risk reduction criteria for advanced aqueous separation 
, pyroprocessing, fuel fabrication, and advanced burner reactors 
2008 
Conduct safeguards and proliferation risk reduction assessments of small 
reactor concepts 
2008 
Conduct EIS proliferation risk assessment for U.S. GNEP facilities 2008 
Advanced research, development, and engineering application of new 
safeguards technologies and methodologies 
2008 
Conduct advanced research and development on future 
nonproliferation and safeguards technologies, including: 
Remote monitoring technologies 
Computational toolkits and algorithms 
Advanced concept demonstrations 
 
2009-2013 
Engineering application of advanced safeguards technologies and 
methodologies for new reactor and material processing facilities, 
including: 
Integrated information analysis systems and sensor technologies 
Tools and methods to analyze TRU fuels and waste products 
Advanced remote and unattended monitoring systems 
2009-2013 
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Appendix A 
 
Technology Readiness Levels 
Table A-1 provides a definition of each technology readiness level with specific advanced recycling 
reactor examples. Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) are a systematic metric/measurement system that 
supports assessments of the maturity of a particular technology and the consistent comparison of maturity 
between different types of technology. The TRL approach has been used on-and-off in NASA space 
technology planning and the Department of Defense for many years. Figure A-1 provides a summary view 
of the technology maturation process model for NASA space activities for which the TRL’s were 
originally conceived; other process models may be used. However, to be most useful the general model 
must include: (a) ‘basic’ research in new technologies and concepts (targeting identified goals, but not 
necessary specific systems), (b)  
 
Figure A-1. NASA Technology Readiness Levels 
focused technology development addressing specific technologies for one or more potential identified 
applications, (c) technology development and demonstration for each specific application before the 
beginning of full system development of that application, (d) system development (through first unit 
fabrication), and (e) system deployment and operations. 
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As discussed in a GAO Report r, the experiences of government and commercial technology development 
programs indicate that demonstrating a high level of maturity before new technologies are incorporated 
into product development programs puts those programs in a better position to succeed. For technologies 
that are successfully incorporated into a product, the gap between a technology’s maturity as measured by 
its TRL and the intended product’s requirement was recognized and closed before product development 
began, improving the chances for successful cost and schedule outcomes. The closing of this gap was a 
managed result. It is a rare program that can proceed with a gap between product requirements and the 
maturity of key technologies and still be delivered on time and within costs.  
Two conditions are critical to closing the maturity gap. First, the right environment for maturing the 
technology must exist. Key to this environment is making the science and technology organization, rather 
than the program or product development manager, responsible for maturing the technology to a high 
TRL. When a maturity gap persists, manager are given the flexibility to take the time to mature the 
technology or decrease product requirements so that they can use another, already mature technology. 
Second, both technology and product managers are supposed by disciplined processes, readily available 
information, readiness standards, and authority to ensure technology was ready for products. This support 
enables these managers to safeguard product development form undue technology risks.  
 
r GAO Report, GAO/NSIAD-99-162, “Best Practices, Better Management of Technology Development Can Improve Weapon 
System Outcomes” July 1999 
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A-1. Advanced Recycling Reactor Technology Readiness Levels Definitions 
TRL Category Description Advanced Recycling Reactor 
Definition and Examples 
1 Lowest level of technology 
readiness. Scientific research begins 
to be translated into applied research 
and development 
New discoveries (i.e., in materials 
for cladding and ducts) may lead to 
performance improvement or cost 
reductions. 
At this technology readiness level, 
the basic properties of advanced 
materials might be studied  (e.g., 
tensile strength as a function of 
temperature, irradiation effects, and 
compatibility with fast reactor 
coolants or fuels) and once shown 
that the program understands these 
fundamental properties, the 
advanced material would mature to 
the next TRL level. 
2 Invention begins. Once basic 
principles are observed, practical 
applications can be invented. 
Applications are speculative and 
there may be no proof or detailed 
analysis to support the assumptions. 
Although sodium-cooled fast 
reactor technology is mature, new 
discoveries may result in 
performance improvements or cost 
reductions in future plants. 
For example, following the 
observation of advanced materials 
properties at TRL 1, the potential 
applications of the new material for 
structural materials applications, fast 
reactor fuel cladding, etc. can be 
defined. At this level, the 
application is still speculative; there 
is no experimental proof or detailed 
analysis to support the conjecture. 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Concept 
Development 
Active research and development is 
initiated. This includes analytical 
studies and laboratory studies to 
physically validate analytical 
predictions of separate elements of 
the technology. 
Analysis of the performance of 
SSCs (System, Structure or 
Component) produces favorable 
results, but testing is needed to 
validate the prediction and provide 
data supporting key features.  
Examples would include testing of 
printed circuit heat exchangers to 
confirm performance with sodium 
and testing of new concepts for 
under-sodium in-service inspection 
of components and structures. In 
addition, a compact fast reactor loop 
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TRL Category Description Advanced Recycling Reactor 
Definition and Examples 
concept might depend on the 
irradiation and thermo-physical 
properties of an advanced material: 
TRL 3 might be attained when these 
materials have undergone irradiation 
with subsequent post-irradiation 
examination and their post-
irradiation thermo-physical 
properties are defined and known. 
4 Integration of basic technological 
components for testing in laboratory 
environment. Includes integration of 
“ad hoc” hardware in the laboratory. 
Laboratory testing of individual 
components or portions of systems 
has been completed successfully.  
Examples would include separate 
effects testing of component 
performance, such as heat 
exchanger plugging tests or 
metallurgical compatibility testing 
or successful operation of gas-
turbine components that might be 
used in a supercritical CO2 system. 
5 Integration of basic technological 
components with realistic supporting 
elements for testing in relevant 
environment. 
Individual components or portions 
of systems have been successfully 
tested at less-than-full scale in a 
test reactor, out-of-pile test facility 
or in another application.  
Examples would include successful 
testing of a section of a fuel 
element in a test reactor or 
successful testing of individual 
components of a sodium system in 
a sodium loop. 
For example, a full-size 
electromagnetic pump promising a 
simpler primary plant system 
design will be built and tested with 
a fully-immersed sodium 
environment (in a sodium 
component testing facility) and 
tested with its power supply and 
control system. 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof-of-Principle 
Model or prototype system testing in 
relevant environment 
Systems, subsystems or 
components have been 
demonstrated at less-than-full scale 
in a test reactor, in an out-of-pile 
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TRL Category Description Advanced Recycling Reactor 
Definition and Examples 
test facility or in another 
application.  Examples would 
include successful demonstration of 
individual fuel elements in a test 
reactor, successful operation of a 
section of a steam generator in a 
sodium loop or successful 
operation of a supercritical CO2 
energy conversion system under 
prototypic but non-nuclear 
conditions. 
7 Demonstration of prototype system 
in an operational environment at the 
engineering scale. 
The SSC or system behavior has 
been successfully demonstrated 
under prototypic conditions in a 
test reactor or in an out-of-pile test 
facility if the SSC or system will 
never see a radiation environment 
during anticipated deployment 
operations.  Examples would 
include successful testing of a fuel 
assembly or multiple fuel elements 
in a test reactor or successful 
operation of a sodium-water steam 
generator in a large test loop. 
8 End of system development. 
Technology proven to work in 
operational environment at the 
engineering to full scale. 
The system, structure, or 
component (SSC) has been 
successfully deployed in operations 
of a sodium-cooled test reactor or a 
prototype of the SSC has been 
successfully deployed in power 
reactor operations, or a system 
characteristic has been 
demonstrated in an experiment (i.e, 
the EBR-II passive safety 
demonstration). 
9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof-of-
Performance 
Full scale application of technology 
in its final form at mission 
conditions. 
The system, structure or component 
has been successfully deployed in 
operations of a commercial 
sodium-cooled power reactor (or 
another commercial power reactor 
if the SSC is not sodium-related, 
such as containment structures), or 
a relevant system behavior has 
been demonstrated in such a 
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TRL Category Description Advanced Recycling Reactor 
Definition and Examples 
reactor. 
This TRL does not include 
technologies for planned product 
improvement of ongoing or 
reusable systems. For example, an 
advanced fuel handling system 
concept for the commercial ABR 
plant would not start at TRL 9: 
such ‘technology’ upgrades would 
start over at the appropriate level 
in the TRL system. 
As shown in Table A-2, the technical maturity of the conventional fast reactor component technology is 
high, and the technical risk is limited so long as program managers stay within the current fast reactor 
technology knowledge base. Components with technology readiness levels 7 or above should be ready for 
introduction into the ABR Prototype. A critical item for the transmutation mission is the development of 
transmutation fuels as covered in Section 5.0. Several of the fast reactor technology components show a 
range of technology readiness levels. Some of the reference fast reactor component technologies have 
already been successfully demonstrated in fast reactors to the degree that could be deployed with little 
technical risk. However, a number of the advanced fast reactor technologies, that contribute to the long-
term goal of a commercially viable fast reactor system, are not mature enough today for inclusion in the 
ABR Prototype project and therefore require further development.  The ultimate goal is successful 
commercialization of the advanced recycling reactor technology at a cost that encourages deployment. A 
number of the advanced recycling reactor technologies are not mature enough today for inclusion in the 
final product and require further development. 
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Table A-2. Technology Maturity and Technical Risk for Transmutation Technologies 
Fast Reactor 
Component Technology Maturity  Technology Risk Description 
Transmutation 
Fuel See Tables A-7 and A-8. 
Coolant Control 
Technology 
TRL 8 Conventional technology demonstrated at full scale. 
There is very little technology risk associated with 
sodium coolant control technologies. 
Core Materials TRL 8 Demonstrated at full scale. Proven steel materials, but no vendor. 
Startup Fuel 
MOX – TRL 8-9 
 
Metal U-Pu-Zr – TRL 7-8 
Metal U-Zr – TRL 8-9 
Both MOX and metal startup fuel technologies have 
been matured to the degree that they could be 
handed off to program managers with very little 
technology risk so long as compositions and 
performance requirements are within the range of 
test results. 
Primary System 
Conventional Primary Plant 
Systems – TRL 8 
 
Compact Primary Plant 
Components – TRL 4-6 
 
Advanced Primary Pumps – 
TRL 4-6 
There is very little technology risk associated with 
using conventional demonstrated primary plant 
system and components.  
Compact and advanced primary pumps, which may 
be needed to reduce costs, are not mature 
technologies and therefore require further 
technology development and maturation before 
inclusion in fast reactor designs. 
Reactor Vessel 
and Structures 
TRL 8-9 There is very little technology risk associated with 
reactor vessels and structures using conventional 
demonstrated plant configurations and materials of 
construction. 
Structural 
Materials 
Conventional stainless 
steels – TRL 8-9 
 
 
Advanced stainless steels – 
TRL 3-5 
Related to the reactor vessel and structures above, 
there is very little technology risk associated with 
using known and demonstrated conventional 
stainless steels for structural materials. 
However, there are advanced materials that are 
expected to contribute to reducing the costs of 
primary plant systems and structures. These 
advanced materials are not ready for program or 
product development and need to go through an 
appropriate technology maturation process. 
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Fast Reactor 
Component Technology Maturity  Technology Risk Description 
Balance of Plant 
Steam Generators – TRL 7 
 
Steam Plant – minus steam 
generators – TRL 9 
 
Advanced Energy 
Conversion Systems – TRL 
4-6 
Although there were some problems with early 
sodium steam generators, there is now substantial 
satisfactory experience from EBR-II, France, Japan, 
and Russia.  
Advanced energy conversion system (CO2 Brayton) 
is being considered for cost reduction.  This 
technology must go through a maturation process 
before applications in the ABR program. 
Containment 
LWR Containment 
technology – TRL 9 
Advanced Containment 
technology – TRL 4-6 
Demonstrated at full scale. 
Some features of advanced containment designs will 
require technology maturation. 
Seismic Isolation 
Rubber and steel seismic 
isolators – TRL 7 
 
 
Multiple friction pendulum 
system – TRL 5-6 
There is limited experience (2 plants) in French 
LWR designs and there are many applications in 
large buildings using rubber/steel isolators. 
There is less experience with multiple friction 
pendulum systems and some testing and technology 
maturation would be needed for widespread 
applications. 
Instrumentation 
and Control 
Analog Control – TRL 9 
 
Digital Control Systems – 
TRL 7-8 
Advanced passively-cooled 
nuclear instrumentation – 
TRL 5 
Analog instrumentation and control technology have 
been demonstrated at full scale in both light water 
and fast reactors and are a mature technology. 
Digital control systems and advanced nuclear 
instrumentation systems are examples of advanced 
I&C components and systems that still require 
maturation. 
Maintenance and 
Inspection 
Technology 
Under sodium inspection 
system – TRL 5 
 
Compact robotic inspection 
vehicle TRL 5 
New techniques for in-service inspection, especially 
under sodium inspection technology, needs to be 
demonstrated. 
Fuel Handling 
Systems 
Conventional dual rotatable 
plug with straight pull – 
TRL 8 
 
Advanced compact 
pantograph with single 
rotatable plug – TRL 5 
A conventional dual rotatable plug with straight pull 
fuel handling system could be deployed with very 
little technology risk. 
For cost reduction mission, a simplified fuel 
handling design needs to be developed. 
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One key programmatic challenge for the fast reactor transmutation technology demonstration is re-
establishing the U.S. infrastructure for designing, manufacturing, and testing this technology. Table A-3 
provides an evaluation relevant programmatic risks related to lack of fast reactor infrastructure. Although 
many of the base sodium technology components were originally developed in the U.S., there are only 
limited remaining facilities and human resources, and no current industrial fabrication and testing 
capabilities for sodium-cooled fast reactor components. An urgent need is to re-establish the domestic 
manufacturing and testing infrastructure to support advanced recycling reactor deployment. International 
partners can provide contributions in this technology area; however, reliance on external contributions 
also entails significant program risk. Therefore, without a reinvigorated domestic supporting technology 
base, there is a large programmatic risk of not meeting programmatic and mission objectives. 
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Table A-3. Fast Reactor Infrastructure and Programmatic Risk 
Fast Reactor 
Infrastructure 
Programmatic Risk 
Fast Reactor 
Component Design 
Infrastructure 
Demonstrated at full scale. The U.S. has not built a fast reactor in 
decades and human resources are limited. 
Programmatic risk is high because of the lack of U.S. infrastructure to 
support commercial deployment of fast reactor technology. 
Fast Reactor 
Component Testing 
Infrastructure 
Programmatic risk is high because of the lack of U.S. infrastructure to 
support fast reactor component testing and development. International 
infrastructure is also severely degraded. 
Fast Reactor 
Manufacturing 
Infrastructure 
Programmatic risk is high for the ABR prototype. Infrastructure for 
manufacturing fast reactor components is currently insufficient to 
support technology demonstration. Subsequent advanced recycling 
reactors will benefit from the infrastructure development activities 
during the ABR prototype development 
Fast Reactor Safety 
Analysis Tools 
Programmatic risk is medium because of the personnel infrastructure 
to support safety code development and maintenance. Updating and 
validation of safety analysis and design tools is recommended. In 
addition, test facilities for safety testing and code validation will be 
required. 
Licensing Infrastructure 
Programmatic risk is high. Licensing strategy is unknown. NRC has 
very few staff who understand sodium technology. 
Technical criteria for licensing need to be clarified and the regulatory 
structure re-established. 
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Table A-4. LWR Spent Fuel Processing – Definition of Technology Readiness Levels, and 
TRL for this Technology 
TRL Category Description 
 
1 
Concept for separations process developed; process options (e.g., 
contactor type, solvent extraction steps) identified; separations criteria 
established. 
 
2 
Calculated mass-balance flowsheet developed; scoping experiments 
on process options completed successfully with simulated LWR spent 
fuel; preliminary selection of process equipment. 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Concept Development 
Laboratory-scale batch testing with simulated LWR spent fuel 
completed successfully; process chemistry confirmed; reagents 
selected; preliminary testing of equipment design concepts done to 
identify development needs; complete system flowsheet established. 
 
 
 
4 
Unit operations testing at engineering scale for process validation with 
simulated LWR spent fuel consisting of unirradiated materials; 
materials balance flowsheet confirmed; separations chemistry models 
developed. NOTE: engineering scale is defined as a process 
equipment scale and throughput rate that can with confidence be 
scaled to industrial operations levels. 
 
5 
Unit operations testing completed at engineering scale with actual 
LWR spent fuel for process chemistry confirmation; reproducibility of 
process confirmed by repeated batch tests; simulation models 
validated. 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof of Principle 
Unit operations testing in existing hot cells with full-scale equipment 
completed successfully, using actual LWR spent fuel; process 
monitoring and control system proven; process equipment design 
validated. 
7 
 
Integrated system cold shakedown testing completed successfully with 
full-scale equipment (simulated fuel). 
 
8 
Demonstration of integrated system with full-scale equipment and 
actual LWR spent fuel completed successfully; short (~1 month) 
periods of sustained operation. 
 
9 
 
 
 
Proof of Performance 
Full-scale demonstration with actual LWR spent fuel successfully 
completed at ≥100 metric tons per year rate; sustained operations for a 
minimum of three months. 
* The current TRL for this technology is highlighted in blue. 
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 Table A-5 . Waste Form Development – Definition of Technology Readiness Levels, and 
TRL for this Technology 
TRL Category Description 
 
1 
Identification of waste form options and related processes. 
 
2 
Waste acceptance criteria evaluation, flowsheet development, process 
options scoping experiments, and preliminary systems engineering. 
 
3 
 
 
 
Concept Development 
Laboratory-scale simulated waste streams batch testing, preliminary 
equipment design testing, systems engineering, and waste form 
screening. 
 
 
4 
Waste form production testing of simulated waste streams, actinide 
and non-radioactive fissions products at engineering scale, process 
validation, short-term characterization testing, and initial model 
development. 
 
5 
Waste form production with representative radioactive fission product 
content at engineering scale, long-term characterization testing, and 
waste acceptance criteria confirmation. 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof of Principle 
Waste form production of actual process waste streams using full-
scale equipment, process and equipment final validation, and model 
verification. 
7 
 
Integrated waste form production in industrial facility using full-scale 
equipment; cold shakedown testing of production operations. 
 
8 
Demonstration of integrated waste form production as part of initial 
demonstration of separations systems. 
 
9 
 
 
 
Proof of Performance 
Full-scale demonstration of waste form production with the full fission 
product loading derived from treatment of actual spent nuclear fuel. 
* The current TRL for this technology is highlighted in blue. 
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Table A-6 Advanced Recycle Reactor Spent Fuel Processing – Definition of Technology 
Readiness Levels, and TRL for this Technology 
TRL Category Description 
 
1 
Concept for separations process developed; process options 
(e.g., electrolyte composition, process equipment) identified; 
separations criteria established. 
 
2 
Calculated mass-balance flowsheet developed; scoping 
experiments on process options completed successfully with 
simulated advanced recycling reactor spent fuel; preliminary 
selection of process equipment. 
 
 
3 
 
 
 
 
Concept Development 
Bench-scale batch testing with simulated advanced recycling 
reactor spent fuel completed successfully; process chemistry 
confirmed; reagents selected; preliminary testing of equipment 
design concepts done to identify development needs; complete 
system flowsheet established. 
 
 
 
4* 
Unit operations testing at engineering scale for process 
validation with simulated advanced recycling reactor spent fuel 
consisting of unirradiated materials; materials balance 
flowsheet confirmed; separations chemistry models developed. 
NOTE: engineering scale is defined as a process equipment 
scale and throughput rate that can with confidence be scaled to 
industrial operations levels. 
 
5 
Unit operations testing completed at engineering scale with 
actual fast reactor spent fuel for process chemistry 
confirmation; reproducibility of process confirmed by repeated 
batch tests; simulation models validated. 
 
6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proof of Principle 
Unit operations testing in existing hot cells with full-scale 
equipment completed successfully, using actual fast reactor 
spent fuel; process monitoring and control system proven; 
process equipment design validated. 
7 
 
Integrated system cold shakedown testing completed 
successfully with full-scale equipment (simulated fuel). 
 
8 
Demonstration of integrated system with full-scale equipment 
and actual advanced recycling reactor spent fuel completed 
successfully; short (~1 month) periods of sustained operation. 
 
9 
 
 
 
 
Proof of Performance 
Full-scale demonstration with actual advanced recycling reactor 
spent fuel successfully completed at throughput rate consistent 
with annual discharge from a cluster of advanced recycle 
reactors at a collocated site; sustained operations for a 
minimum of three months. 
* The current TRL for this technology is highlighted in blue. 
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Table A-7 Fuel Fabrication – Definition of Technology Readiness Levels, and TRL for this 
Technology 
TRL TRL Function Generic Definition Fuel Performance-Specific 
Definition 
1 
 Basic principles 
observed and formulated
Technical review leading to identified 
technical options.  Identification of 
criteria for candidate selection. 
2 
 
Concept 
Development 
Technology concepts 
and/or applications 
formulated 
Fuel candidates selected from options 
based on performance data on similar 
systems, based on selection criteria. 
3 
 Analytical and 
experimental 
demonstration of critical 
function and/or proof of 
concept 
 
Analysis and lab-scale experimentation 
and characterization addressing 
feasibility including small fabrication 
tests with surrogate materials. 
4 
 
Component and/or 
bench-scale validation 
in a laboratory 
environment 
Establish proof of concept.  Fabrication 
of irradiation testing samples in 
accordance with requirements.  At this 
scale, legacy materials are blended 
together and a feedstock spec is not 
available.   
5 
 
Proof-of-principle Component and/or 
breadboard validation in 
a relevant environment 
Fabrication of irradiation testing samples 
in accordance with requirements.  At this 
scale, actual separated materials are used 
and feedstock spec are developed. 
6 
 
 
 System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in 
relevant environment 
Fabrication at multiple pin level using 
actual materials and scalable fabrication 
techniques.  A full set of fabrication 
specifications is developed.  Design 
parameters investigated.  Information is 
sufficient to support a Fuel Specification 
and a Fuel Safety Case. 
7 
 
 
 
 
Proof-of-
performance 
System prototype 
demonstration in 
prototypic environment 
Fabrication of reference fuel at assembly 
levels using actual equipment and with 
actual feedstock materials with statistical 
demonstration of performance.   
8  Prototype fabrication facility completed and qualified through test and demonstration. 
9  Actual fabrication facility proven through successful mission operations. 
* The current TRL for this technology is highlighted in blue. 
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Table A-8 Fuel Performance – Definition of Technology Readiness Levels, and TRL for 
this Technology 
TRL TRL Function Generic Definition Fuel Development-Specific 
Definition 
1 
 Basic principles 
observed and formulated
Technical review leading to identified 
technical options.  Identification of 
criteria for candidate selection. 
2 
 
Concept 
Development 
Technology concepts 
and/or applications 
formulated 
Fuel candidates selected from options 
based on performance data on similar 
systems, based on selection criteria. 
3 
 Analytical and 
experimental 
demonstration of critical 
function and/or proof of 
concept 
Analysis and lab-scale experimentation 
and characterization addressing 
feasibility including property 
measurement, and ex-pile tests. 
4 
 Component and/or 
bench-scale validation 
in a laboratory 
environment 
Establish proof of concept. Performance 
phenomena identified with proof-of-
concept irradiation testing of small 
samples completed. 
5 
 
Proof-of-principle Component and/or 
breadboard validation in 
a relevant environment 
Irradiation testing of prototypic 
rods/compacts under nominal 
representative conditions (e.g., fission 
densities, fuel and cladding 
temperatures, cladding damage rates) is 
performed and assessed. 
6 
 
 
 
System/subsystem 
model or prototype 
demonstration in 
relevant environment 
Prototypic rod/compact and 
assembly/element irradiation in 
representative environment, under full 
range of relevant normal and off-normal 
conditions.  
7 
 
 
 
Proof-of-
performance 
System prototype 
demonstration in 
prototypic environment 
Irradiation of Lead Test Assemblies 
8  Irradiation of multiple test assemblies over multiple years of fabrication. 
9  Commercial scale use of the fuel in commercial facilities.   
* The current TRL for this technology is highlighted in blue. 
 
